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SUMMARY
The aim of this research is to examine the role of the state and market in low cost 
housing allocation in Malaysia in the context of a global trend towards neo-liberalism. 
This research explores the transformation in low cost housing provision in Malaysia 
particularly in the allocation process.
The research is premised on a qualitative research paradigm using case study 
research design. The low cost housing allocation system in Malaysia under the Open 
Registration System (ORS) was selected as a case study to determine the role of the 
state and market in housing allocation. Meanwhile the State of Selangor was selected 
to study the implementation of ORS at the state level. The research framework was 
based on the Structure of Housing Provision (SHP) approach in order to determine the 
changes in housing provision system in Malaysia since the 1950s and to identify the 
key players involved in the low cost housing production and allocation process. The 
method of data collection was based on the analysis of documents, qualitative 
interviews and a group interview.
The key findings include, firstly, the fact that housing provision in Malaysia shows no 
sign of convergence with the Western neo-liberal model. The state continues to control 
and regulate the market in low cost housing allocation through ORS. Secondly, 
although low cost housing production shows trends of commodification since the early 
1990s, but the allocation process remains the sole responsibility of the state and is 
highly decommodified. Thirdly, most low cost house buyers prefer the market to 
manage the allocation for private low cost housing. Finally, ORS implementation 
shows the state is dominant in housing provision in Malaysia, which is synonymous 
with the developmental state approach.
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CHAPTER 1:
INTRODUCTION
CHAPTER 1:
INTRODUCTION
1.1 INTRODUCTION
The purpose of this chapter is to set the scene for the whole study and briefly outline 
the structure of the thesis, which is divided into eight sections and includes the 
background to the research, the research problem, research aim and objectives and 
the key research questions. Meanwhile other sections focus on explaining the 
significance of the research, the theoretical and research framework and the 
research process.
1.2 BACKGROUND TO THE RESEARCH
The neo-liberal transformation started in many countries in the 1980s and has been 
propagated by international agencies, particularly the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF) and the World Bank (see Zanetta, 2004; Davis, 2006; Jenkins et al., 2007). In 
developing countries, the transformation was achieved through Structural Adjustment 
Programmes (SAPs) to address debt issues and economic growth (Zanetta, 2004, 
p.3) .The neo-liberalist development policies accomplished through SAPs offered 
market oriented development strategies, minimal roles for the state, the promotion of 
‘free’ trade, financial discipline, the seeking of comparative advantage, and targeted 
prosperity through economic growth (Jenkins et al., 2007, p.45). Clearly the most 
prominent features of neo-liberal thinking are its emphasis on maximising the role of 
the market and minimising the interventionist role of the state (see Moody, 1997; 
Brenner and Theodore, 2003). The neo-liberal ideology requires the replacement of
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interventionism by more non-interventionist states, and encourages the expansion of 
market forces by undertaking various market-friendly policies (Watton and Seddon, 
1994, p.335). Malaysia is one of the East Asian developing countries that accepted 
World Bank structural adjustment packages and began economic liberalisation in 
1986 (see Horton et al., 1994; Jomo, 1999).
However, in the context of East Asian developing countries including Malaysia, 
during the post-independence period there emerged a form of developmental state 
which adopted various state-centred, interventionist development plans and 
programmes to reduce foreign ownership, enhance economic self-reliance, 
redistribute income, develop infrastructure, and promote the overall living standards 
of the people (see Wise, 1990; Haque, 1999). Remarkably, the ideological shift 
towards more market oriented policies advanced by capitalist countries such as the 
United Kingdom and United States of America put pressure on many East Asian 
countries to abandon the developmental state approach and adopt neo-liberal reform 
(Haque, 1999, p. 198).
Therefore, since the early 1980s the statist development programmes have 
increasingly been replaced by market oriented policies through privatisation, 
deregulation and liberalisation under neo-liberal regimes. The neo-liberal advocates 
not only wish to revive market forces, but also at the same time dismantle the basic 
economic and welfare rights of the citizen such as education, economy security and 
health provision (King 1987, p. 3). The role of the market and non-governmental 
organisations has been extended and increasingly governments are relying on the 
market to provide public housing (World Bank 1993). Governments were advised to 
abandon their earlier role as producers of housing and to adopt an enabling role of 
managing the housing sector as a whole. During the Asian Financial Crisis of 1997- 
1998, the IMF renewed its commitment to imposed neo-liberal reform in the East 
Asian countries affected by the crisis, particularly those seeking financial aid to 
rescue their crumbling economies (Robison and Hewison, 2005, p. 184).
This ideological shift from a state-centred to a market-driven perspective has had a 
significant impact on the role of the state and market in housing provision in many 
East Asian countries. However, the outcome of neo-liberal reform in the housing 
sector is still uneven between countries in the region. Studies on the role of the state 
and market with regard to housing provision in a few East Asian countries show 
mixed results (Zhang and Sheng, 2002, p.2). China, Thailand and Taiwan
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demonstrate the increasing role of the market. Meanwhile, Malaysia is an exception 
to the broad-based trend of market-orientated reform, since there is a strong 
reluctance to relax state control and promote market mechanisms. The state still 
maintains its tradition of strong intervention in housing and even restricts the 
distribution of low income housing developed by the private sector.
Thus, a research on the role of the state and the market in housing provision in 
Malaysia can provide a useful contribution to the literature on why some East Asian 
countries are still reluctant to adopt neo-liberal housing policies. This research will 
focus on the role of the state and the market in low cost housing provision in 
Malaysia in the context of political economy changes over the last 30 years under 
global neo-liberal economic regimes. Low cost housing in the context of Malaysia 
refers to houses with a sale price of less than RM42.000 per unit, targeted at 
households with an income not exceeding RM1.500 per month (MHLG 2002). Further 
explanation on definition of low cost housing will be given in Chapter 5 of this thesis. 
Although the provision of low cost housing in Malaysia has been widely studied by 
local and international scholars, but mostly emphasises the role of the state and the 
market at the production stage (see Drakakis-Smith, 1981; World Bank, 1993; Mayo 
and Malpezzi, 1997; Agus, 2002; Agus et al., 2003). There is still a lack of studies 
focussing on the role of the state and the market at the consumption/allocation 
process. Thus, this study will examine the role of the state and market in low cost 
housing provision in Malaysia, with emphasis on the consumption/allocation process.
1.3 RESEARCH PROBLEM
In 2001, 924 million people or 31.6 percent of the world’s urban population lived in 
slums; the majority were in developing regions and 60 percent of the world’s total 
slum dwellers lived in Asia (UNCHS 2003, p.1). The United Nations (UN) also make 
the point that the main single cause of increases in poverty and inequality during the 
1980s and 1990s was mainly due to the retreat of the state, largely caused by 
globalization instituted under neo-liberalism (UNCHS 2003, p.43). Similarly, in the 
context of Malaysia, although the market has been actively involved in low cost 
housing provision since early 1980s, it has still failed to solve the problem of illegal 
squatters.
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A study by Ministry of Housing and Local Government (MHLG) in 1999 identified that 
a total of 571,261 people or 3 percent of the country’s population live in squatter 
settlements (MHLG 1999). Thus, this indicates that the market has failed to address 
the squatter problem in Malaysia with minimum state intervention after economic 
liberalisation in 1986. The underlying problem is actually not caused by an 
inadequate stock of low cost housing built by both the private and public sectors, but 
has largely been brought about by an inefficient and corrupt housing allocation 
system (see Agus 1986; 1992, 2002; National Housing Department 1997). The low 
cost houses for sale were usually allocated to ineligible buyers and people with 
political connections to the ruling party. Therefore, the deserving poor people were 
left with no choice but to live in squatter settlements.
State intervention in low cost housing allocation was politically important to achieve 
the national development agenda, particularly since the introduction of the New 
Economic Policy (NEP) in 1971. Low cost housing provision was one of the 
strategies for poverty alleviation and the restructuring of society. However, corruption 
among the bureaucrats and misuse of power by many politicians during the mid 
1980s and early 1990s again denied the opportunity to allow the actual target group 
access to low cost housing (Agus 1986, p.2). Similarly the issue of low cost housing 
allocation in Malaysia is also highlighted by Zhang and Sheng (2002):
“...housing in Malaysia serves as part of the government’s political strategy.
By applying rules based on racial preference, it gives Malays an incentive 
to migrate from rural to urban areas. Concretely, housing allocation favours 
the Malays over the non-Malay population; Malays enjoy special privileges 
in gaining access to housing. Political attitudes, but also the fact of being 
associated with the ruling party, are also taken into consideration for 
housing allocation. The procedures strongly favour supporters of the ruling 
party. These practices contrast starkly with the modern trends in many 
other countries where state intervention is meant to reduce racial and 
political discrimination..." (Zhang and Sheng 2002, p. 4).
The practice of low cost housing allocation in Malaysia is clearly different compared 
to other countries in the region. With more than 80 percent of low cost housing in 
Malaysia was built by the private sector for home ownership. Thus, it is crucial for the 
government to ensure only eligible people eventually buy and live in low cost 
housing. The Federal government of Malaysia realised the production of low cost 
houses alone could not solve the problem of the squatter; it was necessary to find 
ways to ensure only targeted people could buy low cost houses. Thus, the issue of
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low cost housing provision in Malaysia no longer concerns housing production, but 
rather consumption/allocation. Hence, it is important for the government to improve 
access to low cost housing, not only for slums dwellers but also for people receiving 
a low income in general. In order to address the issue, in 1997 the Federal 
Government under the Ministry of Housing and Local Government Malaysia (MHLG) 
introduced the Open Registration System (ORS) for low cost house buyers in 
Malaysia. Therefore, the ORS implementation was chosen as the case study to 
analyse the role of the state and market in low cost housing provision in Malaysia, 
particularly at the consumption/allocation stage.
1.4 RESEARCH AIM AND OBJECTIVES
The study aim is to examine the role of the state and market in low cost housing
allocation in Malaysia in the context of the global trend towards neo-liberalism.
The specific objectives of the study are as follows:
i) To identify the changing role of the state in housing provision from Western and 
East Asian perspectives.
ii) To establish a housing system for Malaysia using the Structure of Housing 
Provision (SHP) approach.
iii) To analyse the role of the state and market in low income housing allocation in the 
context of the Open Registration System (ORS) for low cost house buyers.
iv) To identify the relationship between the key players involved in low cost housing 
allocation.
v) To determine the current and future direction of Malaysian low cost housing 
provision model.
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1.5 KEY RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
Exploratory and Descriptive Questions
i) Who are key players in low cost housing production and allocation in Malaysia?
ii) What is the nature of the Malaysian low cost housing allocation system in terms 
of policy, institutional set-up and legislation?
iii) What is the view of the state and non-state players involved in low cost housing 
allocation?
iv) What is the current trend and future direction of low cost housing provision in 
Malaysia in the context of the global shift towards neo-liberalism?
Interpretive and Explanatory Questions
i) Why does the state intervene in low cost housing allocation?
ii) How does the government intervene in low cost housing allocation in the 
market?
1.6 SIGNIFICANCE OF THE RESEARCH
There are four significant elements to the research. Firstly, the study is important to 
gaining an understanding of the role of the state and market in housing provision in 
Malaysia and low cost housing in particular. While many East Asian countries 
demonstrate the increasing role of the market in housing provision, most available 
literature points to the opposite conclusion in the case of Malaysia. Furthermore, there 
are a limited number of studies which focus on low cost housing provision in Malaysia 
in order to address the issues related to the role of the state and the market in the 
context of political economy changes.
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Secondly, the study of low cost housing provision in Malaysia also highlights the 
importance of the market’s role in housing production. More than 70 percent of low 
cost houses in Malaysia have been built by the private sector since the 1990s. Despite 
various rules and regulations introduced by the government to control the private 
sector housing production, they still managed to deliver low cost housing. Interestingly, 
no financial subsidy was given to the private sector to build low cost houses, yet the 
government still control the allocation of the houses.
Thirdly, overall more than 80 percent of the low cost houses in Malaysia were built for 
homeownership, with a small number of public rental low cost houses available to the 
low income people. Meanwhile, all the low cost houses built by private housing 
developers are intended for home ownership. Therefore state intervention in low cost 
housing buyer registration and allocation is crucial to ensure only eligible buyers can 
access and eventually buy the houses. It is common in Western welfare state 
countries for the state to control the access of people earning a low income to public 
rented social housing, but this does not often apply to home ownership. Thus, the 
situation in Malaysia is unique in the sense that similar control is aimed towards low 
cost houses for sale, especially those built by private developers.
Finally, the role of the state and market in low cost housing allocation in Malaysia 
provides an interesting case study on how a developing East Asian country can 
address corruption issues and political interference in low cost housing distribution. In 
developing countries, the corruption in low cost housing allocation means that many 
houses are bought by undeserving buyers (UN-Habitat, 2003). Therefore, many of 
these countries cannot solve the problem of squatters and housing problems in 
general. Improvement of the housing consumption process should be emphasised by 
the governments of developing countries in order to ensure the targeted group will gain 
the opportunity to buy houses.
THEORETICAL AND RESEARCH FRAMEWORK
In terms of a theoretical framework, the study uses the role of state theory in 
development, specifically the Neo-liberalism and Developmental State perspective. 
Most literature on the role of the state in East Asia focuses on a shift in the political 
economy towards neo-liberal state, particularly since the 1980s. This research will
analyse the impact of neo-liberal reform and the globalization process on housing 
provision in Malaysia. Malaysia, like most East Asian countries prior to the crisis, 
embraced the developmental state path in most sectors. The study will analyse how 
these two development perspectives influence the outcome of low cost housing 
provision in Malaysia.
Meanwhile, the Structure of Housing Provision (SHP) thesis is used as the research 
framework for this study. SHP has been developed and defended by Ball and Harloe 
since the mid 1980s as a tool for the explanation and comparison of housing systems 
(Lawson, 2006, p. 27). Ball (1986, p. 147) defines housing provision as “a physical 
process of creating and transferring a dwelling to its occupiers, its subsequent use and 
physical reproduction and, at the same time, a social process dominated by the 
economic interest involved”. What determines the nature of a structure of housing 
provision, according to Ball, is how the various social players intervene in the physical 
process of provision. A social relationship is part of a structure of provision if it is a 
component of the physical process of production, allocation, consumption and 
reproduction of housing. Discussion of the role of the state enables a general point to 
be made about political intervention into housing provision.
However, the framework developed by Ball is subject to much criticism, particularly by 
Kemeny (1987), who argues SHP is under-theorised and deliberately attempts to avoid 
issues of tenure and state consumption subsidies. He adds that neglecting such issues 
makes the analysis one-sided and incomplete for the purpose of understanding the 
housing issue. Although the SHP is an extremely valuable pedagogical device to 
redress an imbalance which has undoubtedly existed between production and 
consumption issues, Kemeny considers that it has gone too far in the opposite 
direction.
Ball and Harloe (1992) later responded to criticisms of SHP by Kemeny. They explain 
that SHP is not a theory, but rather a meta-theoretical concept or analytical framework 
that may be used in combination with other theories in the examination of particular 
aspects of housing development. Thus, SHP is theoretical in nature and encompasses 
the principal features observed into a relatively simple organising framework. In order 
to be useful, it must be combined with wider social theories, methodologies and 
empirical investigation and, where necessary, statistical analysis. Most importantly, 
according Ball and Harloe (1992 p.2), SHP can accurately summarise the main forms 
of housing provision in countries at particular points in time. However, Ball tends to
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downplay the role of the state, emphasises the economic relationships of production 
and assumes that the state plays an integral role in regulating such economic 
relationships (Lawson, 2006, p.27).
Despite the criticism of the SHP framework by many scholars, it still provides a useful 
understanding of the housing system in a particular country. Therefore, this research 
will use the SHP framework only to determine changes in the structure of housing 
provision and understand the relationship between the key players in low cost housing 
provision. The key players in the context of this research are the state (Federal and 
State government) and non-state players (private housing developers and low cost 
house buyers).
1.8 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
The research methodology of this study is shown in Figure 1.1. Based on the research 
questions outlined earlier, the literature reviews the changing role of the state in 
housing provision in Western countries, East Asia and Malaysia. This is followed by 
details of empirical data and secondary data collection in Malaysia from March to May 
2008. The analysis of the interviews was conducted using NVivo software version 8. 
Subsequently, the connections between the empirical and secondary data and the 
research questions were identified. Finally, the summary and recommendations for 
future research appear at the end of the thesis. The key period for the analysis in this 
research is from 1997 to 2008. Further explanation of the research methodology will 
be outlined in Chapter 3 of this thesis.
1.9 STRUCTURE OF THE THESIS
This thesis is divided into eight chapters covering specific subjects, as follows:
Chapter 1: Introduction
Briefly introduces the reader to the rest of the thesis. This includes an outline of the 
research aim and objectives, research questions and the significance of the research.
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Figure 1.1: Research Methodology
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Chapter 2: Literature Review
The chapter focuses on the theoretical context of the changing role of the state from a 
political economy perspective, focusing on housing provision in particular. This 
theoretical study is critical to providing a framework to evaluate the performance of the 
role of state and market in low cost housing provision in Malaysia.
Chapter 3: Research Methodology
This chapter deals with methodological issues. Attention is devoted to a discussion of 
qualitative research design, justification of the type of methods used in data collection, 
how these were applied, the problems encountered and how these were resolved. 
Ethical and validity issues are also discussed in this chapter. See Figure 1.1 for an 
overview.
Chapter 4: Housing Provision in Malaysia
This chapter focuses on housing provision in Malaysia which includes an analysis of 
the context of the structure of housing provision. In addition, the chapter also includes 
an analysis of the changes in Malaysia’s political economy and their influence on 
housing provision in general.
Chapter 5: Low Cost Housing Provision in Malaysia
The chapter focuses on the changing role of the state and market in low cost housing 
provision in Malaysia. This includes a definition of low cost housing in the Malaysian 
context and an analysis of the changing role of the state in the implementation of low 
cost housing policy and programmes as the framework for analysis in the next chapter.
Chapter 6: Case Study: ORS at the Federal Level
In this chapter, a case study based on the Open Registration System (ORS) for low 
cost house buyers will be discussed in detail. The analysis will be based on empirical 
evidence and secondary data collected during the fieldwork. The role of the federal 
government in low cost housing allocation and the need for ORS is the main focus of 
this chapter.
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Chapter 7: Case Study: ORS Implementation in the State of Selangor
The analysis in this chapter is based on the operations and implementation of ORS in 
the state of Selangor. A private low cost housing development was also selected for 
detailed study and to gather feedback from the key players involved in low cost 
housing allocation. The empirical and secondary data collected will be used to analyse 
the role and relationship between key players involved in low cost housing allocation in 
the state of Selangor. The perception of the current practice of low cost housing 
allocation from the viewpoint of key players, particularly the state government, private 
housing developers and low cost house buyers, will also be examined in this chapter.
Chapter 8: Conclusion
This chapter comprises the discussion and synthesis. The idea is to work towards an 
interpretation and explanation predicated on delineating matters arising from both the 
literature and empirical components of the thesis. The theoretical implication is also 
discussed in order to locate the research findings in the context of the literature. 
Suggestions for further research are also included in this chapter.
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CHAPTER 2:
LITERATURE REVIEW
CHAPTER 2:
LITERATURE REVIEW
2.1 INTRODUCTION
This chapter reviews existing literature which addresses the changing role of the state 
in terms of political economy and housing provision, from the perspectives of Western 
and East Asian countries in particular. The literature review also focuses on the 
changes in the global political economy under neo-liberalism and globalization over the 
last three decades. Neo-liberal transformation has changed the role of the state in 
many countries and has impacted upon housing provision since the 1980s. However, 
the impact of the neo-liberal policy agenda remains uneven between countries and 
regions. There are continuous debates on the adoption and rejection of neo-liberal 
policies, particularly in East Asian countries.
This chapter is divided into five sections which discuss literature on the role of the 
state, the changing role of the state in East Asia, welfare state regimes and housing 
provision, the changing role of the state in housing provision and housing 
commodification-decommodification debates.
2.2 THE CHANGING ROLE OF STATE DISCOURSE
Over the last two decades, neo-liberalism has dominated policy discourse, policy 
formulation and policy implementation in many countries (Forrest and Hirayama, 2009, 
p.1). In many parts of the world, neo-liberal transformation is also seen as a symbol of 
modernisation (Forrest, 2008, p. 178). This section will focus on a discussion related to
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the rise of neo-liberalism, globalization and the changing role of the state from the 
perspectives of Western and East Asian countries.
2.2.1 The Rise of Neo-liberalism
Historically, the idea of neo-liberalism was introduced by a small and exclusive group 
of people, mainly academic economists, historians and philosophers, together with 
renowned Austrian political philosopher Friedrich von Hayek, who created the Mont 
Pelerin Society in 1947 (Harvey, 2005, p.20). Other notables in the society included 
Ludvig von Mises, Milton Friedman and Karl Popper. The group’s members depicted 
themselves as ‘liberals’ because of their fundamental commitment to ideals of personal 
freedom. They also supported Adam Smith’s view that the hidden hand of the market 
was the best device for achieving human desire for wealth and power for the benefit of 
all (see Brenner and Theodore, 2002; Harvey, 2005).
Various interpretations of neo-liberalism have been put forward, particularly by political 
and economic scholars. Typically, the interpretations were based on two perspectives. 
The first perspective viewed neo-liberalism as related to the rise of wealthy individuals 
and multinational corporations (see Moody, 1997; Harvey, 2005; Craig and Porter, 
2006). Harvey (2004, p. 19) describes neo-liberalism as “...a utopian project to realize 
a theoretical design for the reorganization of international capitalism or as a political 
project to re-establish the conditions for capital accumulation and to restore the power 
of economic elite”. A similar argument is also raised by Craig and Porter (2006, p. 2) 
which states “...neo-liberalism changed how the command over resource accumulation 
and use shifted away from the cabinet of independent nations, and out into the trading 
and boardroom of financial corporations”. In other words, some of the largest 
corporations nowadays have more power and influence than politicians in some 
countries. Generally, the neo-liberal policy agenda will help wealthy individuals and 
large corporations to do business across the world. The increase in the power of 
corporations is also related to the decline of the trade unions which posed a huge 
problem in the past (Moody, 1997, p. 119).
Meanwhile, the second perspective viewed neo-liberalism in the context of the 
declining role of the state or ‘retreat of the state’ (see United Nations, 2003; Brenner 
and Theodore, 2002; Peck and Tickell, 2002; Sorensen, 2006). Retreat of the state 
scholars see the market as much stronger and the state correspondingly weaker and
14
argue that the changes taking place pose a serious threat to the power and autonomy 
of the state (Sorensen, 2006). The adoption of the neo-liberalism policy also meant 
“ ...the reduction of all forms of government spending and regulations, particularly 
those that might inhibit people being active in the market” (United Nations, 2003, p. 
43). Meanwhile, Brenner and Theodore (2002, p. 2) describe the neo-liberalism 
ideology as a “...belief that open, competitive and unregulated markets, liberated from 
all forms of state interference, represent the optimal mechanism for economic 
development”. Most importantly, neo-liberal ideology not only transformed the political 
and economic landscape, but also every aspect of people’s lives in any country 
touched by it. As explained by Moody (1997, p. 119):
“...neo-liberalism aspires to create a ‘utopia’ o f free market liberated from 
all forms of state interference, it has in practice entailed a dramatic 
intensification of coercive, disciplinary forms of state intervention in order to 
impose market rule upon all aspects of social life. ”
The neo-liberal doctrine also deeply opposed state interventionist theories propagated 
by John Maynard Keynes or centralised state planning in the Marxist tradition (Harvey, 
2005, p. 20). The proponents of neo-liberalism also believed state decisions were 
bound to be politically biased, depending upon the strength of the interest groups 
involved such as unions, environmentalist or trade lobbies. Similarly, state decisions 
on matters such as investment and capital accumulation were bound to be wrong 
because the information available to the state could not rival that contained in the 
market (Harvey, 2005, p. 20). Thus, the second perspective is more relevant in the 
context of this thesis and will be discussed further.
Brenner and Theodore (2002 p. 16) explain the basic elements in terms of destructive 
and creative moments of institutional change within actually existing neo-liberalism. 
The basic elements are: wage relations, forms of intercapitalist competition, forms of 
financial and monetary regulation, the state and other forms of governance, 
international configurations and uneven spatial development. However, only two 
elements will be highlighted here, namely forms of financial and monetary regulation 
and the state and other forms of governance (see Table 2.1). In terms of financial and 
monetary regulation, the state began dismantling the regulatory framework and 
allowed the market to dictate the global financial system. International financial 
liberalisation allowed financing for housing development and house buying to be easier 
to access than before. Meanwhile, in terms of governance, the state began to abandon
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its traditional role and rely on the market to provide good and services to the public. 
The strategies include privatisation of public utilities and services to the private sector.
Table 2.1: Destructive and Creative Moments of Actually Existing Neo-liberalism
Site of 
Regulation
Moment of Destruction Moment of Creation
1. Financial and 
Monetary 
Regulation
Dismantling of Bretton Woods global 
monetary system and deregulation of 
money markets
Erosion of national states’ capacity to 
control exchange rates 
Dismantling of regulatory constraints 
impeding monetary and financial 
speculation in global markets 
Separation of financial and credit flows 
from productive sources of investment
Creation of speculation-driven currency 
markets and “stateless monies” outside 
national regulatory control 
Expanded role of global regulatory 
bodies (such as the Bank for 
International Settlements) in the 
monitoring of global financial 
transactions
Creation of offshore financial centres, 
international banking facilities, and tax 
havens
2. The State 
and Other 
Forms of 
Governance
Abandonment of Keynesian forms of 
demand-management 
Dismantling of traditional national 
relays of welfare service provision 
“Hollowing out’ of national state 
capacities to regulate money, trade, 
and investment flows 
De-centring of traditional hierarchical 
bureaucratic forms of government 
control
Dismantling of traditional relays of 
democratic control at national and sub­
national levels
Strategies to “hollow out” the auto- 
centric national economy as a target of 
state intervention 
Erosion of traditional managerial- 
redistributive functions of national and 
sub-national administrative agencies 
Imposition of fiscal austerity measures 
aimed at reducing public expenditure 
Shrinking of public sector employment
“Rolling forward” of supply-side and 
monetarist programmes of state 
intervention
Devolution of social welfare functions to 
lower levels of government, the social 
economy and households 
Mobilisation of strategies to promote 
territorial competitiveness, technological 
innovation, and internationalisation 
Establishment of public-private 
partnerships and “networked” forms of 
governance
Creation of “new authoritarian” state 
apparatuses and “quangos” that are 
insulated from public accountability and 
popular-democratic control 
Rescaling of state economic intervention 
to privilege strategic supra-national and 
sub-national spaces of accumulation 
Underwriting the costs of private 
investment through state subsidies 
Transfer of erstwhile forms of public 
employment to private sector through 
privatisation
Source: Adopted from Brenner and Theodore, 2002, pp.17-19
The neo-liberal policy agenda only began its dominance in the early 1980s, particularly 
during the British Prime Minister, Margaret Thatcher’s, administration in the United 
Kingdom and President Ronald Reagan’s administration in the United States (Harvey 
2004, p. 22). Harvey explained that, as a result of the perceived failure of embedded 
liberalism during the 1970s, most capitalists would choose to move towards neo­
liberalism rather than deepening state control and regulation of the economy through 
corporatist strategies. The neo-liberal policy agenda later spread to many other 
Western countries during the 1990s.
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In developing countries, neo-liberal reform was enforced under Structural Adjustment 
Programs (SAPs) for countries that were gripped by the debt from the World Bank or 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) during the 1970s and 1980s (see Zanetta, 2004; 
Davis, 2006; Jenkins et al., 2007). SAPs were implemented to adjust ‘malfunctioning’ 
economies to become viable components in the global economic system (Jenkins et 
al., 2007, p.45). In order to achieve that, the World Bank and IMF imposed market 
oriented development strategies, minimal roles for the state, the promotion of free 
trade, financial discipline, the seeking of comparative advantage and targeted 
prosperity through economic growth in line with a neo-liberal agenda.
The IMF also played a key role in ensuring the East Asian countries affected by the 
Asian Financial Crisis 1997-1998 followed a neo-liberal path. The neo-liberal reform 
was particularly imposed on those countries seeking financial aid from the IMF during 
the crisis, especially Indonesia, Thailand and South Korea. Meanwhile, other East 
Asian countries such as Malaysia, Singapore and Taiwan which did not seek financial 
aid from the IMF were still subject to constant pressure from international agencies to 
embark on neo-liberal reform.
In the former socialist countries of the Soviet Union, Eastern Europe and China the 
neo-liberal transformation began in the early 1990s (Payne and Grover, 2004). 
Following the collapse of the Berlin Wall in 1989, most socialist countries started 
economic reform towards building a market economy with the retreat of the state in 
many areas of social service provision. Thus, during the 1980s and 1990s the global 
political economy trend was clearly transformed towards a market economy along a 
neo-liberal path.
However, over the last ten years there has been growing criticism of neo-liberalism 
and free market capitalism. Some of the United Nations (UN) agencies began to blame 
neo-liberal policy as the main single reason for increases in poverty and inequality 
during the 1980s and 1990s (UN-Habitat, 2003, p.43). The UN-Habitat also described 
“...the redirection of income through progressive taxation and society safety nets 
severely threatened by the ascendancy of neo-liberal economic doctrines that explicitly 
demanded an increase in equality.”
Meanwhile, in many developing countries, neo-liberal reform through SAPs seemed 
limited in term of scope and imagination (Craig and Porter, 2006, p.2). Craig and 
Porter explain the loan used to finance privatisation had a perverse outcome and
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radical downsizing of the state had failed to produce a more efficient or effective set of 
institutions that could support market growth. Therefore, they argued that an 
unregulated global market caused enormous disruption to both rich and poor societies. 
Imposition of policies suitable for developed countries does not work well in developing 
countries. Experiences in many developed countries show the end of state monopolies 
in many areas has resulted in greater competition, lower prices and a wider choice for 
the consumer, but in developing countries the retreat of the state in social areas such 
as healthcare, housing and education has been detrimental. Neo-liberal policy and 
implementation strategies clearly failed to help the poor in these developing countries. 
Therefore, the governments of developing countries began to question the legitimacy 
of the neo-liberal policy agenda (Beeson and Islam, 2005, p. 198).
There are also continuous debates among scholars about the neo-liberalism policy 
agenda. They highlight several factors and events which have combined to force a 
rethink of the original tenets of neo-liberalism (Beeson & Islam, 2005 p. 198). This 
includes perceived mishandling of the East Asian crisis by Bretton Woods Institutions, 
the termination of the long economic boom of the 1990s in the United States, a series 
of corporate scandals that has tarnished the image of American capitalism, the tragedy 
of ‘fast-tracking’ capitalism in Eastern Europe and the ex-Soviet Union and the failure 
of a neo-liberal experiment in Latin America; finally, inequality and poverty have all 
turned out to be influential in restraining the rise of neo-liberalism. Despite all the 
criticism, neo-liberalism continues to dominate the global political and economic 
landscape.
2.2.2 Role of the State and Market Debates
Max Weber defined the ‘state’ as “...a human community that successfully claims the 
monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force within a given territory” (cited in 
Sorensen, 2004, p.14). Similarly, Sorensen (2004, p.15) described the state as “...a 
sovereign entity with a defined territory, a population and a government. The 
government acts on behalf of the population, no sharp distinction is made between the 
state as a government and the state as a territorial unit with population and resources.” 
Thus, the state is more than just a physical boundary; it is also a legitimate entity to 
control the people.
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Meanwhile, the meaning of ‘market’ is similar to those of the private sector or 
commercial organisations (Alcock, 1996, p. 60). Like most commercial organisations, 
the expectation of profit is the motivating factor for its establishment and the owners or 
shareholders will benefit from the project. A market generally has several distinct 
characteristics (see Barlow and Duncan, 1994, p. 8). Firstly, it transmits information 
through the signals of costs and profit rates about economic conditions, market trends 
and future demand. Producers and consumers can then act appropriately and make 
plans for the future. Secondly, it sets incentives in terms of profit and loss so the 
economic agents can respond to these signals quickly and efficiently. Thirdly, market 
behaviour will mean organising production processes to achieve the best productivity 
rates possible. Fourthly, economic control and coordination will be decentralised and 
concentration of economy i.e. power will be minimal. Finally, goods and services are 
efficiently transferred from the producers to consumers. Markets can do well in the 
right circumstances and the advantage of the market over state planning is maximising 
allocation efficiency while minimising the cost of microeconomic coordination (Barlow 
and Duncan, 1994, p. 8).
The question regarding the respective roles of state and the market in the 
development process has been debated continuously since the end of the 1940s 
(Martinussen, 1996, p.257). There are great variations in how different countries, 
during different periods of time, have arranged interactions between the state and the 
market. During the 1980s, the neo-classical economists recommended that the 
economic role of the state should be minimised or the state should be subject to the 
price mechanism in a competitive market to decide what should be produced and in 
what quantities. The overriding consideration was to set the right prices, because the 
market would then take care of the dynamics, the growth and the structural 
transformation of the backward economies (Martinussen, 1996, p. 263).
In contrast to neo-liberal assumptions that ‘more market mean less state’, market 
economisation produces an enormous demand for legal regulation of money 
exchanges which increases state intervention, particularly with respect to regulations 
(Sorensen, 2004, p. 33). According to Angel (2006 p. 13) “... a real economy cannot 
function without state intervention or without markets”. Therefore there has to be some 
state intervention in the economy. The key argument advanced by the neo-liberalists 
was that the role of the state is to create an enabling environment for the market to 
work by relinquishing control over the economy (Angel 2006, p. 14).
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State intervention in the market should be allowed in certain circumstances. 
Martinussen (1996 p.258) outlines five situations in which the state should intervene in 
the market. The first is the procurement of general judicial and institutional 
preconditions for the production and exchange of commodities and services, including 
a legal framework for enforcing property rights and contracts. The second is in terms of 
macro economy policies such as fiscal, income, and exchange rate policies. The third 
is procurement of material infrastructure, including roads and railways and provision of 
public services in areas like education and health. The fourth is operational control 
over private sector companies and, finally, the last is the state’s direct participation in 
the production of goods and services.
Similarly, Alcock (1996 p. 63) describes that in order for markets to function freely 
there must be laws concerning property ownership and contract rights, and these need 
to be enforced independently through the state. There are many state activities and 
services which operate in effect to support, rather than to undermine, the operation of 
a modern market economy as state provision, for instance education and healthcare, 
meets the long term strategic goals. Whereas state protection, for instance for the 
unemployed or chronically sick, ensures that individuals do not suffer unduly where the 
market fails or is unable to reach those goals. State intervention is needed to prevent 
potential social problems and to protect all citizens from monopolies or cartels 
developing that would subvert the natural self-regulation of the market’s operation. In 
many areas where markets do operate, consumers are clearly unable to make 
informed choices about how best their needs might be met. Finally, free choice in the 
market will be constrained by consumer immobility and consumer poverty. Hence, the 
free and unregulated market to which Hayek and Friedman aspire does not actually 
exist in practice in modern capitalist states (Alcock, 1996, p.65). Therefore, in an 
unequal society, a pure market system will inevitably fail to meet the service demands 
of the poor people.
2.2.3 Impact of Globalization and the Changing Role of the State and Market
Another important aspect which influenced the changes in the role of the state during 
the 1980s and 1990s was globalization. Much of the economic and political 
environment within which globalization has accelerated since the 1980s was instituted 
under neo-liberalism (UN-Habitat, 2003, p.6). Globalization is defined as “...an 
increasing and intensified flow between countries of goods, services, capital, ideas,
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information, and people, which produce national cross border integration of a number 
of economic, social and cultural activities” (UN, 2001, p.8). Similarly Friedman (2000, 
p.9) refers to globalization as an:
“... inexorable integration of markets, nation states and technologies to a 
degree never witnessed before in a way that is enabling individuals, 
corporations and nation-states to reach around the world farther, deeper 
and cheaper than ever before. ”
A more recent interpretation by Sorensen (2006, p. 23) described “globalization, in the 
broadest sense, the expansion and intensification of economic, political, social and 
cultural relations across borders.” However the most important aspect of globalization 
was economic integration in the financial sector (UN, 2001). Cross border financing in 
the property sector enables more people to buy houses since they are no longer 
limited to certain geographic regions. Thus, globalization in the broader sense could 
change people’s way of life and the role of the state in the future.
Recent debates among political economy scholars have largely been devoted to the 
theme of globalization and its impact on the role of state. One of the key issues 
discussed was whether globalization weakened the role of the state and eventually led 
to the end of state sovereignty (UN, 2001, p.29). However, many scholars believed the 
state did not actually lose sovereignty, but remained as a key player in the process of 
globalization (see Kapstein, 1994; UN, 2001; Lister and Marsh, 2006; Sorensen, 2004 
& 2006). According to the UN (2001), the state is still important in the domestic as well 
as in international arenas. In international arenas, close cooperation and concerted 
action among states represent an exercise of state sovereignty and in domestic arenas 
the state assumes a great number of functions which cannot be performed by any 
other actor. States still need to intervene and create a regulatory framework which 
makes the whole process possible (Sorensen, 2004, p. 5).
Similarly, other economic actors also look to the state in order to gain market access 
and to ‘level the playing field’ of international competition’ (Kapstein, 1994, p. 6). In 
order to achieve that, states enforce rules and supervise the players in the 
marketplace and they intervene in order to achieve order and stability. Globalization 
also requires the state to improve its capacity and governance. In order to improve 
state capacity and governance, reform under the New Public Administration was 
introduced by the IMF and World Bank during the 1980s (UN, 2001, p.32). These 
reforms seek to reduce the role of the state in production, as well as in service delivery
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and to encourage deregulation of public enterprises. The need to enhance efficiency in 
the public sector and to cut costs was accompanied by a series of measures including 
privatisation, deregulation, and the introduction of a market-like mechanism in the 
public sector. In reality, the state and markets have actually been transformed under 
conditions of economic globalization (Sorensen, 2006, p.6). The role of the state 
changed since it operated under different circumstances than before and later 
developed new ways of regulating the market. The state was also increasingly 
influenced by events and decisions made beyond their territorial reach. The result was 
an increasing demand for political cooperation across borders through interstate, 
trans-governmental and transnational relations.
2.3 THE CHANGING ROLE OF THE STATE IN EAST ASIA
Debates on the changing role of the state in East Asia focus mainly on Japan and 
other nations belonging to the first generation of New Industrializing Countries (NICs) 
such as Hong Kong, Singapore, Taiwan and South Korea. However, there is still a lack 
of literature on the changing role of the state in the so-called ‘Asian Four’ or the 
second generation of NICs, namely Malaysia, Thailand, Indonesia and the Philippines, 
which are more typical of developing countries (World Bank, 1993, p. 2). East Asian 
countries have generally experienced long term political and economic stability, and 
they have constituted a self-reinforcing regional market (Jenkins et al., 2007, p. 292). 
Prior to the Asian Financial Crisis of 1997-1998, East Asia was one of the most 
successful developing regions in the world (World Bank, 1993; Richter, 2000).
According to Boyd and Ngo (2005 p. 5), East Asian NICs’ successful pursuit of the 
goal of economic development over the post Second World War period owed much to 
the strong role played by the state. This form of development guided by the state was 
characterised as ‘Developmental Capitalism’. Meanwhile, Wade (1990) earlier referred 
to this picture of a centralised state interacting with the private sector from a position of 
pre-eminence so as to secure development objectives as the ‘Developmental State’. 
This section will discuss the changing role of the state in East Asian countries in the 
context of developmental state debates and the pressure for neo-liberal reform over 
the last 20 years.
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2.3.1 East Asian Developmental State
The success of East Asian countries during the early 1990s, particularly Japan, Hong 
Kong, Singapore, South Korea and Taiwan, can be largely attributed to developmental 
states and the governed market according to many scholars (see Johnson, 1982; 
Wade, 1990; Johnson, 1987, Woo-Cumings, 1999, Kwon, 2005). They concluded the 
market has not been free in the context of East Asia, but rather controlled and steered 
in a direction deemed appropriate by the state in order to achieve economic growth. 
The term developmental state was coined by Chalmers Johnson (1982) based on his 
observation of the economic planning bureaucracy model in Japan during the early 
1980s. The developmental state, as described by Boyd and Ngo (2005, p.3), “...hinges 
upon the claim the plan-rational state can engineer economic growth”. In other words, 
a state led by technocrats who enjoy a high degree of political economy, insulation 
from societal demands, and yet who are simultaneously embedded in that society. 
Meanwhile, Kwon (2005, p. 6) described the developmental state as>
“...a state that plays a strategic role in economic development with a 
bureaucracy that is given sufficient scope to take initiatives and operate 
effectively. Economic development is given priority over other spheres of 
public policy, and the national economy as a whole has priority over the 
comparative advantage of particular industries.”
The advocates of the developmental state suggest that the state should play an 
important role in economic development (see Wade, 1990; Low, 2004; Boyd and Ngo, 
2005; Groves et al., 2007). They also believe the developmental state is no longer just 
a theory, but rather part of real world politics in East Asia. Six major components 
define the developmental state model (Leftwich, 1995, p. 85) including a determined 
developmental elite, relative autonomy, a powerful, competent and insulated economic 
bureaucracy, a weak and subordinated civil society, the effective management of non­
state economic interests and finally repression, legitimacy and performance. The 
characteristics of the East Asian developmental state model are summarised in Table
2.2 (Woo-Cumings, 1999). The characteristics are clearly in stark contrast to the neo­
liberal idea of the role of the state in terms of finance, business relations and 
governance.
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Table 2.2: Characteristics of the Developmental State Model
Characteristics of the Developmental State
1. Finance
• Finance is the tie that binds the state to the industrialists.
• Raising and deploying financial resources to create or strengthen state organisation.
• The state can exert influence over the economy and investment patterns & guide sectoral mobility.
2. Business Relations
•  Strong relationship between the state and big business.
• Creates cronyism.
• Intent to hone the competitiveness of national business in the international system.
• Ethnic division of labour in managing politics and the economy.
3. Governance
•  “Political Capitalism”, where profits and investment depend on decisions made by the state.
•  “Developmentism", a dominant developmental discourse on the necessity of industrialisation and
state intervention to promote it.
• “Appointive Bureaucracy”, in which most government officers are affected by regime change.
• The power of the bureaucrat is highly unstable.
Source: Adopted from Woo-Cumings, 1999, pp. 10-20.
In the context of the role of the state and market debates, developmental state theories 
“...did not passively support the operation of the ‘invisible hand’ of market forces, but 
actually guided economic growth, especially through top-down, plan-rational, and 
industry specific policy” (Jessop, 2005, p. 23). Therefore development state theory is 
essentially a theory of economic growth or ‘state-led growth’ rather than full reliance on 
the market (Moon and Prasad, 1994, cited in Boyd and Ngo, 2005, p. 3). The 
developmental state, according to Jessop (2005), appears more realistic than the neo­
liberal approach. At the same time, he added that the developmental state paradigm 
tends to exaggerate the autonomy of East Asian developmental states because more 
‘naive theorist’ and policy advocates believe that this is what distinguishes them from 
the more liberal, pluralistic Western political system. Government in East Asia also 
successfully tapped private sector strengths to their advantage. Therefore, the success 
of state led development in East Asia was actually seen as a challenge to the neo­
liberal approach (Robinson and Hewison, 2005, p. 184). Even the World Bank (1993) 
found it difficult to explain how the success had been achieved in contradiction of basic 
neo-liberal principles.
Many studies related to the developmental state in East Asia focus on countries like 
Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong and Singapore (Johnson, 1982; Woo- 
Cummings, 1999; Kwon, 2005; Boyd and Ngo, 2005). Therefore, some scholars 
avoided the debates over whether other South-East Asian countries including Malaysia
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followed a similar developmental state model to the North-East Asian countries. 
Pempel (1999, p. 160), for example, suggests Singapore, Malaysia, Thailand, 
Indonesia or even China and North Korea should not be included as ‘developmental 
regimes’ due to differences of features compared to the typical developmental states 
of Japan, South Korea and Taiwan. Meanwhile, Low (2004 p. 17) categorises Malaysia, 
Thailand and Indonesia as being included within the second generation of 
developmental states and therefore fall into theories of dependencies.
There are eight features of developmental states in East Asia commonly shared by 
Japan, South Korea and Taiwan, according to Pempel (1999, p. 161), which makes 
them unique from most other regimes. Firstly, all three have “strong states” in which 
technocrats and bureaucrats enjoy a disproportionately high level of power and wield a 
variety of tools to enforce their will. State actors are also relatively free from major 
populist pressures, especially from organised labour and peasants. Secondly, there is 
no sharp dichotomy between state and society. The presence of semi-permanent 
socio-economic coalitions closely linked to state institutions makes such a reified 
bifurcation meaningless. Thirdly, all three underwent land reforms that virtually 
eliminated large landholders as major elements in the socio-political landscape. With 
limited natural resources and small land areas, none of the three is a major exporter of 
agricultural products or natural resources. Fourthly, all have domestic power structures 
that, for males at least, are open to entry largely on the basis of individual merit rather 
than descriptive traits such as social class.
Fifthly, the regimes in all three have taken on what Jessop (1983) might call 
“hegemonic projects” that entail two essential elements: first, the enhancement of their 
national economic competitiveness through the development of internationally 
marketable goods, and second, an ideologically and economically rooted opposition to 
communism, socialism and big states. Sixthly, in conjunction with the project of 
improved economic competitiveness, all three reject the deified Western concept of 
“the market”, opting instead for active market manipulation, but in ways that are market 
enhancing rather than market rejecting. Next is the extent to which they have been 
successful in advancing their overall production, national income per capita, and 
shares of world trade; all three have also done so relatively free from the 
compromising effects of international capital penetration. The three regimes have 
retained highly effective filters over foreign direct investment and foreign capital flows. 
Finally, all three are exceptionally closely linked, both in economic and security 
policies, with the United States.
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However, the developmental state regime in East Asia was also subject to constant 
criticism from Western countries and international institutions. During the Asian 
Financial Crisis of 1997-1998, the World Bank and IMF argued the developmental 
states which were regarded as the recipes for success in the past could be said to be 
the ingredients of failure (see Jomo, 1998; Richter, 2000; Robinson et al., 2005). The 
Asian Financial crisis brought down many so called miracle economies and dealt a 
fatal blow to claims about the functional superiority of the highly centralised, state led 
system of ‘Asian Capitalism’. The impact of the Asian economic crisis was substantial, 
since currency plunged, enterprises failed, financial institutions closed, and rapid 
economic growth turned into recession (Richter, 2000, p.2). This prompted the need 
for neo-liberal reform in the region propagated by the IMF and the World Bank. In the 
next part, the discussion focuses on the impact of neo-liberal reform towards the role 
of the state in East Asia.
2.3.2 Neo-liberalism and the Changing Role of the State in East Asia
The economic success of East Asia through the last three decades of the twentieth 
century was spectacular, with booming growth rates, burgeoning exports and income 
gains. However a study by the World Bank (1993) suggests the policy approach in 
East Asia clearly did not ‘fit’ the neo-liberal development model. The World Bank, in its 
report, the ‘East Asian Miracle’ (1993), concluded the governments in East Asia had 
indeed intervened to foster development. The state role was assessed and justified as 
only ‘market facilitating’.
However, the aftermath of the Asian Financial crisis prompted questioning of the future 
of the developmental state in theoretical and policy terms (Jessop, 2005; Kitthananan, 
2008). Following the crisis convergence theory towards neo-liberalism became an 
important term in the region (Robinson et al., 2005, Lister and Marsh, 2006). Most East 
Asian states were urged to eliminate cronyism and embrace the natural efficiency of 
the market. As Jessop (2005, p. 40) predicted, neo-liberalism would further alter the 
developmental state in East Asia in the future and thus reject the triumph of the 
developmental state. Robison and Hewison (2005 p. 184) describe the crisis as an 
opportunity for neo-liberal policies to be strengthened and many commentators 
confidently expected a convergence of development models, where economies in 
which the state played a significant role and where prevailing predatory or corrupt
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political arrangements were present would be replaced with free markets, private 
sector capitalism, enhanced transparency and good governance.
The initial impact of the neo-liberal agenda has been substantial, especially in South 
Korea, Thailand and Indonesia where the IMF played a central role in defining and 
implementing reform policies. The crisis and the collapse of a number of East Asian 
and South East Asian economies was seen by many within the neo-liberal camp as 
cutting the ground from under their opponents and signifying the superiority of market 
over state (Robison and Hewison, 2005, p. 188). Thus, since the crisis the 
developmental state in Asia has been dismantled and replaced by the neo-liberal 
model with a new democracy, new social movement and civil society (Low, 2004, 
p. 13).
The crisis also represented an important stage in an on-going effort by international 
financial institutions and Western governments, together with businesses, to change 
the systems of state-led industry policy and predatory cronyism. As Robinson et al. 
(2005) describe “for neo-liberal reformers within the World Bank and the IMF, and in 
the Treasuries and Finance Ministries of the Western governments, the crisis 
confirmed that the various models of ‘Asian Capitalism’ were in fact outmoded and 
dysfunctional in an age of global markets”. After the crisis, much more instrumental 
power lay in the hands of the IMF, which demanded the implementation of reform 
measures aimed at deregulating markets, privatising state sectors and imposing fiscal 
austerity (Robinson et al., 2005, p. 173).
However, more than one decade after the crisis, the outcome of neo-liberal reform 
among East Asian countries remains uneven. Different forms and degrees of neo­
liberalism have emerged, according to Robison and Hewison (2005, p. 188). Some 
states in Asia deliberately sought to intervene in the market, in contrast to the neo- 
liberal vision (Kitthananan, 2008, p.77). Domestic forces were often interested only in 
making appropriate neo-liberal policy adjustments to sustain a restructured, 
recalibrated developmental state that could respond to the perceived imperatives of 
the globalizing, knowledge based economy. Despite neo-liberal policy changes in East 
Asian countries towards greater marketization and economic liberalisation, they have 
not led to convergence with the Anglo-American model of a minimally regulated market 
(Cheung, 2009, p.200).
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In some countries affected by the crisis, the states quickly adjusted their policies and 
economic strategies. In Singapore, for example, the government has attempted to 
introduce new strategies for integration into global markets without disturbing the 
essence of the existing structure of the Developmental State (Cheung, 2009). 
Meanwhile, in Thailand, Indonesia and South Korea a range of powerful political and 
economic interests intent on undermining market reform emerged in order to retain 
their power and privilege, thus denying the triumph of neo-liberalism in East Asia. 
There is also a growing rejection of neo-liberal policy in East Asia, given that much of 
the neo-liberal agenda directly threatens existing patterns of political and economic 
power across much of the region.
Many of the East Asian countries embraced neo-liberalism less enthusiastically, 
especially given that there are continuing doubts about its merits and possible impact. 
There is widespread resistance to neo-liberal reform among East Asian leaders, as 
described by Beeson and Islam (2005, p. 210). In reality the neo-liberal motivated 
process has been ’highly contested’, leading to contradictory, ambiguous and 
sometimes surprising outcomes (Cheung, 2009 p.31). Recent studies also show that 
neo-liberal ideas have failed to achieve any meaningful impact on both growth and 
poverty (Beeson & Islam, 2005, p. 208). Opponents of neo-liberalism in East Asia also 
argue that, after more than two decades of deregulation, privatisation and fiscal 
austerity in some countries, neo-liberal policies have still failed to eliminate poverty 
and, to a greater extent, inequality (Robison and Hewison, 2005, p. 188). In the next 
section, the discussion will focus on welfare state regimes and housing provision from 
Western and East Asian perspectives.
2.4 WELFARE STATE REGIMES AND HOUSING PROVISION
Esping-Andersen (1990) has made an important theoretical contribution to the 
comparison of social policy, including housing, via the development of a welfare 
regime typology which identified three welfare regimes from a study of 18 countries. 
Although Esping did not include housing in his analysis, subsequent researchers have 
used his typology in the housing context. Barlow and Duncan (1994), for example, 
have used the Esping-Andersen framework to study the relative effectiveness of the 
market and governments in housing provision in Western Europe.
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Meanwhile, according to La Grange (1999), most studies of housing policy related to 
welfare state regime debates in the ‘old industrial’ countries, new industrial countries, 
transitional socialist countries and developing countries tend to focus on privatisation 
of public housing. Therefore, there is a lack of understanding in terms of the 
applicability of the prevailing concept of welfare regimes, refinement and adaptation in 
areas other than North America, European and the East Asian Tiger Economies’. 
Therefore, in this section, the analysis will focus on identifying welfare state regimes 
from Western and East Asian perspectives and their relationships with housing 
provision, particularly in the production and consumption stages.
2.4.1 Welfare State Regimes from the Western Perspective
Esping-Andersen’s (1990) typology has been commonly adopted by housing 
researchers to examine the relationship between welfare state regimes and housing 
provision. He argues that different regimes derive from different power structures and 
constellations of class-derived power relationships. The three distinctive welfare 
regimes identified by Esping-Andersen are: liberal, corporatist and social democratic.
In Liberal Welfare States, social and labour market policies are characteristically based 
around means-tested assistance. Benefits are mostly aimed at people with a low 
income, the working class and state dependents. In these countries, the social policies 
system is normally used to uphold traditional and liberal work ethic norms. The state 
encourages the market over other forms of state organisation. According to Esping 
(1990, p. 15), the United States of America and the United Kingdom are archetypal 
examples of this cluster. Typically, in liberal welfare regimes, state intervention in 
housing is limited to stigmatised provision for a residual population who cannot meet 
their housing needs in the market, with homeownership usually the dominant tenure 
(La Grange, 1999 p. 18).
Meanwhile, in Corporatist Welfare States, the state focuses on the preservation of 
status differentials. The state is also ready to reinforce rights attached to class and to 
displace the market as a provider of welfare, if necessary. This essential conservatism 
is reinforced by the major political and social role held by the church and is strongly 
committed to the preservation of traditional families. Social insurance typically 
excludes non-working wives and family benefits encourage motherhood. In principle, 
the state only intervenes when the capacity of the family, especially the women, to
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service its members is no longer adequate. Germany, Austria and the Netherlands fall 
into this group. Under this regime, in terms of housing provision, the state does not rely 
c - -he market to same extent as the Liberal approach, nor does it provide universal 
benefits, but rather attempts to reinforce the rights attached to different classes and 
professions (La Grange, 1999, p. 18).
Finally, the Social-Democratic Welfare States as a social democracy are the dominant 
political force behind reforms based on principles of universalism and 
decommodification which are extended to all classes. This type of welfare state 
promotes an equality of minimal needs. In political terms, the social democratic model 
constructs a ‘one-nation’ version of the welfare state, where state allocation replaces 
the market to a much greater extent than in the other two regimes (Barlow and 
Duncan, 1994, p. 29). Esping-Andersen (1990 p.20) also notes the enormous costs of 
maintaining a solidaristic, universalistic and decommodifying welfare system. It means 
high taxation, but most importantly it also minimises social problems. Therefore, this is 
best achieved in countries in which most people are working and few live off social 
benefits. Sweden and other Scandinavian countries belong to this group. In terms of 
housing provision, under a social democratic welfare state it is based on universalism 
and decommodification.
Barlow and Duncan (1994) include another type of welfare state regime known as the 
‘Rudimentary Welfare State’ which they believe is excluded from Esping-Andersen’s 
analysis. In these countries, according to Barlow and Duncan, there is no right to 
welfare and no history of full employment policies. In some respects, this regime is 
similar to the liberal model which stresses residualism and forcing entry into the labour 
market. The state can still rely on older, religious traditions of welfare where women 
cover reproduction costs in extended family systems. It retains a strong agriculture 
bias with surviving elements of a household subsistence economy and large black 
markets. This system is particularly obvious in countries with authoritarian and 
militaristic governments, where fascist dictatorships consciously opposed any welfare 
state of equal citizens. Greece, Portugal and Southern Italy are examples of this type 
of welfare regime. In rudimentary welfare states, there is little tradition of direct state 
involvement in housing provision.
Esping-Andersen (1990 p.8) also argues the importance of class and class alliances in 
determining the nature of welfare provision. Social democratic welfare regimes are 
successfully constructed by working class movements. The corporatist welfare regime
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is effectively a deadlocked power system in which no one interest can dominate and in 
which, as a result, each party wrests its own welfare sub-system for corporatist political 
horse-trading. The liberal regime emerges in a system dominated by conservative 
force and faces a divided working class. The type of welfare system that results from 
these welfare regimes is therefore distinctive. As Kemeny (2001) explains, it reflects 
the different degrees of de-commodification that are the outcome of different balances 
of power between classes. Since Esping-Andersen (1990) does not include housing in 
his analysis, many researchers have tried to use the typology in a comparative 
housing analysis on the role of state and market in the Western European context (see 
Barlow and Duncan, 1994; Domburg-De Rooij and Musterd, 2002; Hoekstra, 2003).
Housing is one of the four major pillars of the welfare state (Kemeny, 2001, p.53), the 
others being social security, health and education. After the Second World War, in 
most Western countries, welfare systems were being established and developed in 
order to provide sufficient housing of an adequate standard. An essential goal of social 
policy in Western Europe has been to raise the general standard of housing and to 
eliminate substandard housing (Nesslein, 1988, p. 95). European welfare states were 
governed by distinctly different mechanisms. Two integral components of this model 
are some form of housing price control, usually within a large rental sector, and an 
emphasis on non-profit housing. Housing sectors in the welfare states are neither co­
ordinated nor controlled by the information and incentive structures of the price 
mechanism. In Western European welfare states, the optimal economic organisation of 
the housing sector remains one of the most ideological and politically divisive issues of 
public policy (Nesslein, 1988 & 2003).
2.4.2 Weifare State Regimes of East Asia
Most East Asian countries, except Japan, emerged from the Second World War with 
different political systems and different imperatives (Groves et al., 2007, p. 177). 
Therefore, Grove et al. argued that all these states did not have the same organised 
demands from the labour movement for welfare reform as the Western countries after 
the war. East Asian countries had also not experienced the same impact of recession 
as industrialised economies and did not have the pattern of representatives for 
democracy or trade union representatives that were so important in the establishment 
of the welfare state in Europe. The development of East Asian welfare states is 
therefore not the product of a particular stage in economics, political systems or in
31
urban development, but rather they reflect the interests, alliances and political 
conditions that were effective at the Key point in time. The development of welfare 
provision after the Second World War was also associated with the threat of 
communism, which was influential in determining the political economies of East Asian 
countries (Groves et al.. 2007, p. 178). Common characteristics of welfare states in 
East Asia include single minded focus on economic performance and concentration on 
the mainstream population, with the view that wider or universal provision of services is 
an ‘unaffordable luxury’. Welfare state systems in East Asia are therefore more forward 
looking and focused on national and economic stability and growth.
Similarly, Agus et al. (2002 p. 13) argue that East Asian countries have established 
social policy systems that are largely subordinate to the needs of economic growth. 
They note that East Asian welfare state systems, particularly social services and social 
security, are based on low government spending. Meanwhile, Jones (1993) describes 
welfare states in East Asia as ‘Confucian Welfare States’ based on extended family 
traditions. A significant role is taken by the family and, to some extent, employers, thus 
reducing the government’s responsibility for social services provision. East Asian 
states generally emphasise education and human capital development as opposed to 
health and housing.
Features of East Asian welfare states, according to Groves et al. (2007 p. 196), include 
a lack of intention to provide a safety net to meet the needs of the whole population. 
Secondly, they are not based on the concept of citizenship rights or on a process of 
democratic negotiation and bargaining. Thirdly, they demonstrate an absence of a well 
established civil society and institutions for representation, participation and 
engagement between citizens and government. Finally, they are less ‘bottom-up’ and 
are less concerned with addressing the problems of previous decades than was the 
case in the traditional welfare state in Europe. However the Asian financial crisis 
actually helped to spur welfare expansion rather than cause retrenchment (Cheung, 
2008, p.33). Cheung explains that, since no other actor than the state would be able to 
fill the gaps in the welfare system, an increasing role for the state looked likely. The 
concern about increasing social instability amidst economy uncertainties gave rise to 
pressure for welfare expansion after the crisis.
The ‘Developmental Welfare State’ (see Kwon, 2005) and ‘Property Owning Welfare 
State’ (see Groves et al., 2007) were the most common terms used to describe East 
Asian welfare state regimes as follows:-
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a. Developmental Welfare State
Welfare states in East Asia have undergone significant changes since the Asian 
financial crisis (Kwon, 2005, p. 2). Many new social programmes were introduced and 
the existing ones were strengthened through reforms. State institutions and the welfare 
state in particular play a greater role amid instability and flexibility in the globalized 
market. The changes, according to Kwon, seem to counter the neo-liberal argument 
that market driven globalization renders the welfare state of marginal importance in 
economic life. Thus, the welfare reforms in East Asia have provided an important 
example that social inclusion can go hand in hand with economic development. In East 
Asian countries, social policy has been used as an instrument for economic 
development strategies. Policy makers, according to Gough (2001), set economic 
growth as the fundamental goal, pursue a coherent strategy to achieve it and use 
social policy as an instrument for attaining that goal.
The characteristics of the East Asian welfare state model could be divided into four key 
elements; the first is a development ideology that subordinates welfare to economic 
efficiency. The second is the fact that dependence on the state is discouraged. The 
third is private sources of welfare being promoted and, finally, financial resources for 
social insurance are diverted into investment in infrastructure (Kwon, 2005, p. 2). To 
avoid a demand for universal entitlement, the state does not provide funding for 
welfare programmes, but enforces the rules, both formal and informal, which regulate 
the payment of contributions for social benefit by companies and their employees. 
Thus, generally only people who contribute and are part of an active workforce are 
entitled to social benefit.
Even though the state played a strategic role in the economic development of all the 
East Asian economies, the role of the state in different countries was not exactly the 
same. Using Taiwan and South Korea as examples, Kwon (2005, p. 15) notes the state 
deliberately intervened in the economic decision making of firms to facilitate 
industrialisation of the whole economy, rather than certain sectors with comparative 
advantages. Although East Asian countries share the characteristic of the 
developmental welfare state, there are differences in the structure of their welfare 
states. South Korea and Taiwan moved towards an inclusive type of developmental 
state, while Malaysia, Singapore and Hong Kong maintained their selective welfare 
state characteristics. Meanwhile, Malaysia, according to Kwon (2005 p. 18), adds an 
important variation to the developmental welfare state due to its historical background 
and the institutional configuration of its welfare state. After the crisis, in contrast with
33
other East Asian countries, the welfare states in Malaysia, Singapore and Hong Kong 
remained largely unchanged.
b. Property Owning Welfare State
Groves et al. (2007 p. 1) describes the welfare state model in East Asia as ‘Property 
Owning Welfare’ which positions property development and ownership, particularly 
housing, in a much more significant position. They also suggest the unique East Asian 
welfare model adds ‘property owning’ as the fourth world of welfare capitalism in 
addition to the three world welfare capitalism identified by Esping-Andersen (1990). 
For many East Asian countries, home ownership has always been a key factor in their 
housing policies. Home ownership, according to Lee (2003, p. 8), is pursued on both 
political and economic grounds. Politically, home ownership is fairly believed to be 
capable of generating social stability and, hence, political legitimacy; economically, the 
performance of the housing market is invariably an important source of growth for the 
economy (King, 1998, p.2). However, housing preferences are constrained by income, 
family ties, employment and market conditions.
The East Asian welfare model also tends not to use cash benefits or social security 
arrangements; instead, it uses a system in which access is available to services in 
kind, including housing. Unlike the welfare state model in advanced industrial 
countries, it is mostly initiated due to local and national pressures which emphasise the 
importance of citizenship rights as a determining factor for access to services as 
(Esping-Andersen 1990). However, in East Asia, as described by Groves et al. (2007 
p.2) “...there was no concept of government as the property of the people or the 
existence of rights but rather founded on the basis of struggle.”
Although Groves et al. (2007) argue East Asian countries do not have significant or 
generous transfer payment and social security systems with underdeveloped welfare 
states, but the government encourages compulsory savings for people to invest in 
property. As described by Groves et al. (2007 p. 11), the property “...direct or indirectly 
provide resources in older age and in periods of low income are significant alternative 
which should not be dismissed simply because it does not follow the western model”. 
Therefore, in East Asian welfare states, housing plays a very important role with the 
expectation that the property will appreciate over time. The property owning welfare 
state involves more minimalist provision through the state. The individual asset 
ownership largely associated with ownership of housing has enabled the state to
34
reorganise and modernise its role in a way that is more in tune with global economic 
pressures and economic orthodoxies about the role of the state.
However, reliance on property as future savings also has weaknesses, since the price 
of property is subject to economic cycles. Those people who invest in property at the 
right time may become wealthy as a result or the reverse situation could happen. It can 
also create inequality among people based on two dimensions, namely place and 
between groups. The inequality among the group is more critical, since it could deprive 
the low income group from owning property, especially due to multiple property 
ownership. The emerging group of property owners or the new landlord class not only 
own the property in which they live, but have purchased other properties as well 
(Groves et al. 2007, p. 207). In many cases these are people who were in 
advantageous generational positions and in the right place in terms of property and the 
economic cycle.
In terms of housing provision, it is important to recognise the success of East Asian 
welfare systems over the last two decades in reducing the most visible shortages, 
achieving a decline in overcrowding and sharing of accommodation and the 
amelioration of the worst housing conditions with reduced government intervention, 
with the exception of Singapore and Hong Kong. Thus, in general, housing provision in 
East Asia is not structured around universal citizenship rights, but is based on the 
ability of the household to pay rather than principles of fairness and equality (Doling, 
1999, p. 203).
2.4.3 Housing Policy Regime of East Asia
Doling (1999) suggests the determination of housing policy regimes should be carried 
out based on an assessment of the balance between the market and the state. He 
used an approach which is similar to that earlier used by Ambrose (1994) for the 
system of producing and maintaining the built environment. The process of housing 
provision involves three main stages, namely development, construction and 
consumption (see Figure 2.1). Both development and construction stages are also 
known as the production stage by Ambrose (1994, p.39). Ambrose meanwhile uses 
the term ‘allocation’ to describe the consumption stage. Therefore, for the purpose of 
this thesis, the terms housing provision mainly refers to production and allocation 
process.
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Figure 2.1: Housing Provision Process
Source: Doling (1999a, p.231)
The development stage involves various agents setting-up the conditions for house 
construction to take place (Doling, 1999a, p.231). This stage, according to Doling, will 
involve acquiring land and ensuring any requisite development permission, acquiring 
finance, drawing-up plans for the development and engaging a builder. The 
construction stage involves assembling the raw materials into a physical shelter. 
Meanwhile, the consumption stage takes place when construction is completed. Other 
factors of production, especially land and finance, are also important in determining the 
housing provision regime of a particular country. At each of the stages, the state may 
intervene to a different degree which causes a different mixture of market and state. 
The level of state involvement will determine the type of housing regime adopted by 
particular countries.
Based on Doling analysis of selected East Asian countries housing regime (1999a and 
2002), he developed the distinct East Asia ‘Little Tigers’ model, of which Singapore is 
archetypal. Doling concluded that, in East Asia generally, there is strong state control 
of the economy and development which is highly directed through five-year plans. 
Meanwhile, the construction stage is undertaken by private companies, often building 
to contract arrangement. Housing allocation and consumption is primarily dictated by 
the willingness and ability of households to pay from their income. Nevertheless, 
Doling also noted some differences within the East Asia model, particularly in the 
cases of Singapore and Hong Kong in which the state plays a greater role, with strong
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control over land and high levels of state provision compared to Taiwan and South 
Korea, which have weaker state controls and rely on market provision. A comparison 
between the East Asian model and Western model is summarised in Table 2.3.
Table 2.3: Comparison of Housing Regimes in East Asia and the West
Stage Market State
a) Liberal Regime
Development X
Construction X
Consumption X
b) European Regime
Development X
Construction X
Consumption X
c) East Asia ‘Little Tigers’
Development X
Construction X
Consumption X
Source: Doling (2002 p.182)
Doling (2002, p. 183) also identified that other East Asian countries, like Malaysia, 
Indonesia and Thailand, each had small scale programmes for state housing provision 
which were often aimed at particular groups such as civil servants and low income 
groups. In these countries, he added that self-help, community development and 
partnership have become key components in slum and squatter upgrading 
programmes. Thus, Doling categorises East Asian countries’ housing policy 
approaches into three types: Hong Kong and Singapore fall under state provision, 
Japan, Korea and Taiwan fall under selective intervention and, finally, Indonesia, 
Malaysia and Thailand qualify as supported self-help.
2.5 THE CHANGING ROLE OF THE STATE AND MARKET IN HOUSING PROVISION
The debate on the changing role of state in housing provision under neo-liberalism has 
been widely discussed in the literature over the last two decades (see Barlow and 
Duncan, 1994; King, 1998; Angel, 2006; Dogson, 2007; Forrest, 2008). Nevertheless, 
meet research has focused upon Western European, North America and other English 
speaking countries such as Australia and New Zealand. Despite a growing number of
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studies examining the changing role of the state and market in East Asia, research is 
generally still concentrated on selected countries, mainly Japan and Asian Tiger 
economies i.e. South Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong and Singapore (see Doling, 1999; 
Agus et al., 2003; Forrest and Lee, 2003; Forrest and Hirayama, 2009) and China 
(Wu, 1998; Zhou and Logan, 2001; Chiu, 2003). There is a distinct lack of research 
which is focused on East Asian developing countries, particularly Malaysia, Thailand, 
Indonesia and the Philippines. This is despite the fact that these countries could offer 
an important lesson on how to deal with growing housing issues in other developing 
countries in sub-Saharan Africa and South America.
Recently, several scholars have conducted comparative studies between Western and 
East Asian countries in terms of housing provision (see Doling, 1999; Forrest and Lee, 
2003; Agus et al., 2002; Forrest and Hirayama, 2009). These scholars identified 
several differences between East Asian and Western housing systems. Firstly, in East 
Asia the state is dominant in housing production through five-year national plans which 
set targets for the production of difference types of housing in different locations. 
Secondly, the allocation of housing in East Asia is not based on bureaucratic 
procedures reflecting principles such as equality or fairness, but on the ability of the 
household to pay. Thirdly, East Asian countries have a greater proportion of home 
owners than Western countries. Fourthly, social housing in the West has been deeply 
embedded in the welfare state, but in East Asia the housing system is still largely 
residual in nature. Finally, housing resources the in West are generally targeted at 
specific income groups, while social housing programmes in East Asia are targeted at 
the poorest section of society. Thus, in this section the discussion will focus on the 
changing role of the state in housing provision from Western and East Asian 
perspectives.
2.5.1 Debates on the Role of the State and the Market in Housing Provision
In developed countries, during different historical periods, different conditions can alter 
the balance between market and state (Kemeny, 2002, p. 191). Usually, when the 
market cannot profit from housing, the state intervenes to fill the gap. Once housing 
becomes profitable, the state partially withdraws. The main issue in terms of housing 
provision is whether society should be organised on the basis of private ownership of 
the means of production (capitalism, market system) or public control of the means of 
production (socialism, communism). A regime combining certain features of state
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intervention with some of a free market may avoid the failures of either a purely 
planned or a free market model. Failure of the socialist systems has been identified as 
over emphasis of the role of the state in the economy (Zhang, 2001, p. 67). At the 
same time, it may be equally impossible to have a successful economy without the 
state, since individual welfare cannot be fully met in the market.
Neo-classical economists believe that individuals behave rationally in maximising 
utilities according to their preference, and relative prices drive the market towards long 
equilibrium. The market is therefore structured according to the players competing by 
price and quality rather than in other ways. However, according to Zhu (1997 & 2005), 
there are usually market failures and imperfections and the housing market is not 
perfectly competitive. The property market, including housing, is one of the least 
perfect markets due to the heterogeneity and immobility of its products, high cost of 
transactions and the fact that it is heavily influenced by fluctuations in economic 
development. Owing to these characteristics, government interventions seem 
indispensable, not only to make market operations efficient, but also to achieve other 
non-economic goals.
During the 1970s and 1980s, it became increasingly clear that the government could 
not maintain its role as a direct producer of housing and that this role must necessarily 
be performed by the formal or informal private sector (World Bank, 1993, pp. 19). The 
government should play the role of an enabler, facilitator in order to encourage 
housing activities by the private sector in line with neo-liberal policy agenda. The role 
of the state and the market has been at the centre of the housing policy debate, while 
low-income housing is of long term concern to every country, particularly those in Asia, 
as described by Zhang and Sheng (2002 p.1). The traditional conceptualisation of 
state and market has been under increasing strain and, over the last two decades, the 
conventional distinction between the state and the market has been challenged. The 
role of the state has gradually shifted from control to influence and from direct 
provision to steering and enabling.
The role of the private sector and non-governmental organisations has been extended 
and, increasingly, governments rely on the private sector to provide public housing 
services, as described by the World Bank (1993). Governments are advised to 
abandon their earlier role as producers of housing and to adopt an enabling role of 
managing the housing sector as a whole. The market for housing can go a 
considerable way towards meeting housing needs, but does not always do so
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effectively (World Bank, 1993, p. 38). Eliminating or mitigating the effect of market 
failure is a key feature of governments’ enabling role in the housing sector, a role that 
deals with the causes of many urban housing problems. Market failures, according to 
Zhu (1997, p. 5), are obvious and inherent, especially in the urban land market. 
Without state involvement, the market would produce an inadequate amount of non­
rival and non-excludable public goods. The public goods, for example, infrastructure, 
open space and greenery, are necessary for the functional well being of city dwellers. 
At the same time, governments have an obligation to avoid intervening in ways that 
disrupt the market.
In terms of housing provision, according to the United Nations (UN-Habitat, 2003 
p.43), the major policy changes towards a market economy and neo-liberal policy 
firstly include the reduction of most public ‘welfare’ expenditure in the developing 
world; this was usually carried out under the terms of SAPs following a fiscal crisis. 
The second change is the privatisation of many forms of government enterprise. The 
new rule is that the government should not be involved in anything that the private 
sector can do. The new role of government is to enable the private sector by improving 
its institutions and its planning and supportive capabilities, rather than engaging 
directly in productive activity. The enterprises most affected are utility companies and 
public housing. The final change is reform of regulation, as a large number of 
regulations and restrictions have been removed in many countries.
As recommended by the World Bank, governments should enable the housing sector 
to function well by focussing on seven operational instruments in order to stimulate 
housing demand, to facilitate the process of housing supply, to create an overall 
institutional framework for managing the housing sector and ensure adequate access 
to housing for the poor (World Bank, 1993, p. 39). The seven operational instruments 
are shown in Table 2.4.
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Table 2.4: The Do’s and Don’ts in Enabling Housing Markets to Work
Instruments Do Don’t
Developing Property Regularise land tenure • Engage in mass evictions
Rights Expand land registration • Institute costly titling systems
Privatise housing stock • Nationalise land
Establish property taxation • Discourage land transactions
Developing Mortgage Allow private sector to lend • Allow interest rate subsidies
Finance Lend at positive/market rates 
Enforce foreclosure laws
• Discriminate against rental 
housing investment
Ensure prudential regulations • Neglect resource mobilisation
Introduce better loan instruments • Allow high default rates
Rationalising Subsidies Make subsidies transparent • Build subsidised public housing
Target subsidies for the poor • Allow for hidden subsidies
Subsidise people, not houses • Let subsidies distort prices
Subject subsidies to review • Use rent control as a subsidy
Providing infrastructure Coordinate land development 
Emphasise cost recovery
• Allow bias against infrastructure 
investments
Base provision on demand 
Improve slum infrastructure
• Use environmental concerns as 
reason for slum clearance
Regulating Land & Reduce regulatory complexity • Impose unaffordable standards
Housing Development Assess costs of regulation • Maintain unenforceable rules
Remove price distortions 
Remove artificial shortages
• Design project without link to 
regulatory/institutional reform
Organising the Building Eliminate monopoly practises • Allow long permit delays
Industry Encourage small-firm entry 
Reduce import controls
• Institute regulations inhibiting 
competition
Support building research • Continue public monopolies
Developing a Policy & Balance public/private sector • Engage in direct public housing
Institutional Framework roles delivery
Create a forum for managing the • Neglect local government role
housing sector as a whole 
Develop enabling strategies 
Monitor sector performance
• Retain financially unsustainable 
institutions
Source: The World Bank, 1993
2.5.2 The Changing Rote of the State and Market in Housing Provision in 
Western Countries
Over the last two decades, neo-liberal supremacy and a market economy has changed 
the political economy landscape in many European and North American countries, 
including the corporatist and social-democratic welfare states. Housing, according to
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Forrest (2008, p. 179), “has been at the forefront of so called ‘modernization’ projects 
by selling of state housing, introducing market actors into the management of state 
housing, marketizing state rental systems and reducing the overall role of direct 
government provision in the housing market.” The current trend in housing provision in 
many European countries has shown movement along a neo-liberal path, as 
concluded by many scholars (see Doling, 1999; Peck and Tickel, 1999; Whitehead, 
2003; Forrest and Lee, 2003; Dogson, 2007; Forrest, 2008).
The neo-liberal transformation in housing provision began in liberal welfare states, 
particularly the United Kingdom (UK) and the United States of America (USA) during 
the early 1980s. In the UK, the state began to sell council public housing stock to the 
sitting tenants under the ’Right to Buy’ scheme introduced during British Prime Minister 
Margaret Thatcher’s administration which included significantly reduced state 
involvement in the provision of new housing stock (Lund, 1996, p.49). The role of 
housing provision was also transferred to the private sector and thus earmarked the 
retreat of state from direct housing provision. Neo-liberals claimed production and 
housing allocation should be ‘marketized’ as far as possible and state intervention 
should be reduced or even removed (Barlow and Duncan, 1994, p.38).
Nevertheless neo-liberal transformation clearly brought new challenges for public 
policy, particularly in housing provision. In order to solve the problem, Western 
countries have commonly re-structured housing subsidy systems by replacing them 
with demand subsidies in line with neo-liberal policy. The states have also begun to 
withdraw from public provision and shift more emphasis towards the private sector and 
market. At the same time, states “... concentrate on improving financing system and 
market framework as well as developing guarantee and insurance systems to support 
the provision of funding” (Whitehead, 2003, p.61). The retreat from direct housing 
provision in the West is also associated with growth in individual home ownership and 
an increase in private renting. Therefore, by the early 21st century, housing provision 
was more thoroughly embedded in market processes and the dominant direction of 
change has been towards a higher level of individual ownership (Forrest, 2008, p. 179).
A recent review of literature on housing provision in several European countries also 
indicates the highly varied and uneven application of the neo-liberal policy regime. 
Countries such as Belgium and France suggest that there is little evidence of the 
withdrawal of the state from housing. Meanwhile, countries such as Sweden and 
Germany have shown clearer examples of apparent state withdrawal from housing and
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a shift in emphasis to the market as a housing provider (Dogson, 2007, p.90). Sweden 
for example, regarded as a typical social-democratic welfare state in Europe during the 
early 1990s, has ceased to maintain a high degree of state intervention in housing 
provision. According to Clark and Johnson (2009), since the early 1990s, the housing 
sector in Sweden has been radically reformed in accordance with neo-liberal ideology. 
Under the new conservative party, housing is regarded as a commodity, with subsidies 
discontinued or radically reduced.
However, the implementation of neo-liberal transformation in housing provision in 
Western society has inevitably resulted in consequences for the social and national 
economy. After more than two decades of neo-liberal policy implementation in many 
countries, problems began to emerge and have been widely debated by housing 
scholars. Among the consequences highlighted in the literature is a weakened state 
capacity to resolve housing problems. Forrest (2008 p. 174) argues “the reduction of 
direct housing provision has arguably diminished state capacity to respond as 
effectively as in the past to shifting housing needs and demand of population”. In many 
situations, state intervention was crucial to resolving housing problems. Adequate 
state intervention, particularly in land and capital markets, proved to be essential.
The second consequence is exposure of housing to the vulnerability of financial 
markets. The housing market tends to be more volatile in financially deregulated 
countries with periodic price booms and bursts (Forrest, 2008, p. 181). Forrest (2008) 
states “lending practices in the deregulated environment have often involved higher 
loan to value ratios and thus higher risk exposure for both households and institutions.” 
Individuals and households nowadays are subject to a credit system shaped by the 
neo-liberal global financial regime. The recent role of housing in the subprime crisis 
and the consequent ‘credit crunch’ proved market inefficiency under the neo-liberal 
regime. It also demonstrated the significant influence of the housing sector in the wider 
economy under economic globalisation nowadays (Glynn, 2009, p.9).
Thirdly, increasing housing affordability problems have occurred, despite a global trend 
in the deregulation of financial markets and low interest rates. Financial globalisation 
has resulted in the acceleration of the homeownership boom over the last two decades 
(Forrest and Hirayama, 2009, p.7). However, at the same time, free market practices 
have created unequal competition among buyers, particularly with regard to the poor 
and younger generation. This problem is concentrated by the multiple ownership of 
houses and speculative buying practices among middle and high income people.
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Thus, the younger generation find it difficult to step onto the property ladder, as shown 
in a comparative study of Japan and the United Kingdom by Forrest and Hirayama 
(2009). The problem is similar in France, as explained by Natiel (2009); in many cities, 
the new houses are beyond the affordability of a lot of people, despite many 
unoccupied homes. These properties, as she explained, are actually owned by wealthy 
French or foreign investors and are left empty for speculative purposes. Another factor 
is rapid house price inflation which contributed to a lack of housing affordability for 
those seeking to enter homeownership (Forrest, 2008, p. 195). Nonetheless, for 
existing house owners, rising property values are very important for their investment, 
but this is not true for new homebuyers.
Finally, the failure of the market to provide adequate houses will contribute to 
inequality among poor and rich people (Glynn, 2009, p.33). Reliance on the market to 
meet the housing needs of economically disadvantaged households and the poor has 
proved difficult. Inefficient markets, according to Glynn, transmit their imbalances and 
volatility into the rest of society, thus affecting savings, investment, expectations and 
eventually the whole of the economy. Thus, the neo-liberal policy agenda has resulted 
in many economic and social consequences in Western societies which could provide 
valuable lessons to other countries.
2.5.3 The Changing Role of the State in Housing Provision in East Asia
Studies examining the role of the state and the market in a few Asian countries show 
mixed results (Zhang and Sheng, 2002). China, India, Thailand and Taiwan 
demonstrate the increasing role of the market. The governments of those countries are 
shifting their role from one of direct intervention, control and order to that of enabling 
and steering. The governments restrict their role to that of providing assistance to low 
income groups. Countries like China are undergoing more radical changes, 
challenging the established housing systems and moving towards a more market- 
orientated approach (see Wang, 1996, 2000 & 2001; Logan, 2002). Despite 
maintaining a developmental approach to housing policy and the implementation of 
housing programmes during the early 1990s, there is a tendency among East Asian 
countries to move towards a relatively less state oriented system of housing provision 
(Doling, 1999 p. 185). Since the early 1990s, the system of housing provision and 
consumption in East Asia has been increasingly deregulated, with greater emphasis 
on market mechanisms (Hirayama and Ronald, 2007, p.4). Thus, many scholars
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during the 1990s suggested a convergence of the East - West policy approach 
seemed possible.
The neo-liberal transformation in East Asia accelerated faster following the Asian 
financial crisis. Countries worst affected by the crisis were expected to adopt neo­
liberal housing policies, particularly South Korea, Thailand, Indonesia and Malaysia 
(Agus et al., 2002). Housing investment by the public sector in East Asian countries 
since the crisis has reduced significantly. The housing sector is also expected to be 
more transparent and better regulated in line with neo-liberal policy. The allocation of 
finance for the housing sector became less the responsibility of the state and more of 
the market (Doling, 1999, p. 186). Most East Asian states instead focussed on 
stabilising the housing market after the crisis and, at the same time, encouraged the 
private sector to get involved in housing provision.
However, in general, housing in East Asia still shows few signs of convergence with 
the Western neo-liberal model (see Hirayama and Ronald, 2007; Cheung, 2009). 
Japan, particularly, and other Tittle tigers’ have all demonstrated elements of a specific 
type of corporatism to a greater extent. As Hirayama and Ronald (2007) explain, 
despite some similarities in the commodified private housing and the residual nature of 
public housing, there is a considerable variety of state-market mix and the stage at 
which the state intervenes in housing provision among East Asian countries. 
Singapore, for example, still pursues active and extensive state subsidised housing 
provision in line with its national development agenda. Meanwhile, Japan, South Korea 
and Taiwan commit to low social welfare spending on housing compared to Singapore 
and Hong Kong. Japan, South Korea and Taiwan have weaker controls and more 
selective state intervention. Subsidies are used to ensure that housing meets the 
needs of low income groups within a market framework. Thus, Japan, along with the 
other ‘Asian Tigers’, according to Hirayama and Ronald (2007), not only shows 
divergence from the Western model of housing provision, but also demonstrates 
differences in the set of social and political relations which link state authority to 
housing policy.
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2.6 HOUSING COMMODIFICATION AND DECOMMODIFICATION DEBATES
The concept of commodification-decommodification has been widely used to explore 
aspects of social, economic and political transformations associated with the rise of 
industrialisation and with the subsequent development and changes in welfare policies in 
industrial countries (Doling, 1999b, p. 156). According to La Grange et al. (2004 p.558), there 
are three main streams of research related to the concept of commodification- 
decommodification. The first focuses on labour under capitalism, particularly work by Nelson 
and Barley (1997) and Siegal (1998). The second stream of research on the 
commodification-decommodification of social policy mainly refers to the framework by 
Esping-Andersen (1990) on welfare state regimes related to healthcare, children, education 
(by Churchill, 1999; Le Grand and Robinson, 1984) and housing (see Barlow and Duncan, 
1994; Hoekstra, 2003; La Grange et al, 2003 & 2004). The final stream addresses the 
commodification of space including cities as tourism destinations (Schollman et al., 2000), 
place promotion and entrepreneurial cities (Wu, 2000) and regional industrial policy 
(Addleson, 1989).
Commodification, according to Radin (1996) and Sternberg (2000), means “a process 
whereby objects became tradable and commensurable in the market.” For a market system 
to function it must commodify those goods, services and attributes that people value. 
Commodification also refers to buying and selling goods or services and, in a broader sense, 
incorporates the practice of thinking about interactions as if they were sale transactions 
(Radin, 1987; Wilkinson, 2000). Chiu (2001 p. 100) highlights that the term commodification 
has often been interchangeably used with marketization. She explains “commodification 
emphasizes the exchange value of the object whereas marketization underscores the 
institutional framework in which exchange value is realized.” Meanwhile, decommodification 
in the context of welfare provision means “the degree to which welfare services are free of 
the market” (Giddens, 2006, p.367). He explains that, in a system with high commodification, 
welfare is provided publicly and is not in any way linked to one’s income or economic 
resources.
Since the 1980s, many scholars have studied the relationship between housing provision 
and the market process in advanced capitalist countries using the commodification and 
decommodification concept (see Forrest and William, 1984; Forrest and Murie, 1995; Doling, 
1999). Forrest and William (1984) discuss the “erosion of decommodification forms and 
reorganisation of commodified relations in the housing sector” and the intensification of the 
commodification process at the level of consumption and at the level of production. Forrest
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and Murie (1995) identify zones of transition in British cities where former state-owned 
dwellings have been privatised under the Right to Buy legislation and the cumulative effects 
of these individual transactions is the progressive commodification of the neighbourhood.
However, studies have only recently begun to focus on East Asia, particularly South Korea, 
Hong Kong and Taiwan (La Grange, 1999; La Grange and Nam Jung, 2004; La Grange and 
Pretorius, 2005; La Grange et al., 2006) and China (Wang and Murie, 1996 &1999; Wang, 
2001; Chiu, 2001; Logan, 2002; Wu, 2001 & 2003). Meanwhile, other South East Asian 
countries including Malaysia are still not extensively discussed in the literature. Studies by 
La Grange and others in selected Asian countries, particularly Hong Kong (1999 & 2005), 
South Korea (2004) and Taiwan (2006), have identified the trend towards housing 
commodification in these countries. Nevertheless, the states remain in control of elements of 
production, particularly land; thus, housing is still not considered to be fully commodified in 
these countries.
Similar studies by Wang and Murie (1999), Chiu (2001), Logan (2002) and Wu (2003) 
explain that the housing system in China has become more commodified since market 
reform in the early 1990s. Commodification has enabled China to become more efficient in 
producing housing and increased homeownership among its citizens (Chiu, 2001, p. 109). 
However, the housing commodification model in China is different from other former socialist 
countries with distinctive characteristics (Wang and Murie, 1999; Chiu, 2001). Thus, a 
different forms and characteristics of housing commodification has emerged in East Asia 
over the last 20 years.
2.6.1 Measuring Levels of Housing Decommodification
Esping-Andersen (1990) used decommodified measures to categorise Western industrial 
countries and Japan into three types of welfare states known as social democratic, 
corporatist and liberal. However, his measures of welfare decommodification levels did not 
include housing. Therefore, many scholars later began to develop decommodification 
measures related to housing (see Dickens et al., 1985; Barlow and Duncan, 1988; Harloe, 
1995; Doling, 1999b; La Grange et al., 1999, 2004, 2005 & 2006; Groves et al., 2007). Most 
scholars focus on the analysis of housing tenure to determine the level of decommodification 
(see Barlow and Duncan, 1988; Harloe, 1995; Groves et al., 2007). Decommodification is 
usually associated with a high level of social rented housing and a country with a high level 
of homeownership is considered to be commodified (Harloe, 1995, p.5). The tenure data
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was used to calculate the level of decommodification. The score was then used to locate the 
level of the housing system of a particular country in terms of commodification or 
c?':cDmmodification. However, the outcomes of analyses based on housing tenure alone 
were sometimes inaccurate and misleading (Doling, 1999b, p. 160).
Doling (1999b p. 157) then suggested the rules of access and rules of exit to determine the 
level of housing decommodification. The rules of access refer to income and other non- 
fin a ncial criteria. When access to housing is based on non-financial criteria or citizenship 
rights are dominant, the level of decommodification is high. If access is based on individual 
income, particularly for homeownership, the country is considered to be highly commodified. 
The rules of exit, meanwhile, refer to security of tenure “...that govern the ability of the 
occupants to continue living in the house when their income changes. Whenever they allow 
continuity without the householder being driven to acquire their former level of income, there 
will be high level of decommodification” (Doling, 1999b, p. 158).
In addition to analysis of housing tenure, some scholars added other elements such as land, 
subsidies and financing in the determination of decommodification levels (see Dickens et al., 
1985; La Grange et al., 1999, 2004, 2005 & 2006). Dickens (1985 p. 120), for example, 
identified government subsidies, rent control, welfare benefits, state control over housing 
finance and land as elements suitable to measure the level of decommodification. 
Meanwhile, La Grange et al. used land, subsidies and financing to determine the housing 
commodification-decommodification continuum in several East Asian countries (Hong Kong, 
Taiwan and South Korea). The continuum method used by La Grange et al. however, was 
derived from Radin’s (1987) earlier work. Radin (1987) suggested using a ‘continuum’ to 
reflect the degree of commodification and draws a distinction between two aspects of 
incomplete commodification, namely participant and social. The former, according to Radin, 
refers to the co-existence of market and non-market aspects of interaction, although money 
changes hands, while the latter refers to societal recognition that things have a ‘non- 
monetisable’ participant significance by regulating the free market.
La Grange et al. (1999, 2004, 2005 & 2006) then further developed the idea and proposed 
that the continuum has end points. At one end land and housing is wholly decommodified, 
produced and consumed according to criteria unrelated to market considerations and at the 
other end, wholly commodified, namely wholly produced and consumed in the market (La 
Grange 2006, p.54). Thus, if the continuum is continuous, then movement along the 
continuum might be treated as the extent to which housing has a use value or an exchange 
vaiue. The movement along the continuum can be in either direction. They also suggested
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the key features of housing in order to determine the level of commodification as, firstly, 
ownership of land, secondly, ownership of housing and thirdly, financing of housing. 
According to them, housing is incompletely commodified when at least one of these 
components is decommodified to a significant degree.
2.7 CONCLUSION
Over the last two decades, neo-liberalism has dominated policy discourse and 
implementation in many countries, including in the sphere of housing provision. The 
discussion in this chapter, however, highlights that the impact of neo-liberalism around the 
globe is still uneven and the pace is changing over a period of time. After almost two 
decades of neo-liberalism dominating policy implementation in developed and developing 
countries, most countries nowadays have begun to question the need to pursue a neo-liberal 
political economy agenda. This includes perceived mishandling of the East Asian crisis by 
Bretton Woods Institutions, the termination of the long economic boom of the 1990s in the 
United States, a series of corporate scandals that has tarnished the image of American 
capitalism, the tragedy of ‘fast-tracking’ capitalism in Eastern Europe and the ex-Soviet 
Union and the failure of the neo-liberal experiment in Latin America.
Similarly, in East Asia the outcome of neo-liberal reform is still uneven. Different forms and 
degrees of neo-liberalism have emerged, according to Robison and Hewison (2005 p. 188). 
Some states in Asia deliberately sought to intervene in the economy in a manner different 
from the neo-liberal vision (Kitthananan, 2008, p.77). Domestic forces were often interested 
only in making appropriate neo-liberal policy adjustments to sustain a restructured, 
recalibrated developmental state that could respond to the perceived imperatives of the 
globalizing knowledge-based economy. However, neo-liberal policy changes in East Asian 
countries towards greater marketization and economic liberalisation have not led to 
convergence with the Anglo-American model of a minimally regulated market (Cheung, 
2009, p.200). In some countries affected by the crisis, the state quickly adjusted its policy 
and economic strategies. In Singapore, for example, the government has attempted to 
introduce new strategies for integrating into global markets without disturbing the essence of 
the existing structure of the Developmental State
There is also a growing rejection of neo-liberal policy in East Asia, given that much of the 
neo-liberal agenda directly threatens existing patterns of political and economic power 
across much of the region. Therefore, many East Asian countries embraced neo-liberalism
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less than enthusiastically, especially given that there are continuing doubt about the merits 
and possible impact; in fact, it could be said that there is widespread resistance to neo­
liberal reform among East Asian states (Beeson and Islam, 2005, p. 210). In reality, the neo­
liberal motivated process has been ’highly contested’, leading to contradictory, ambiguous 
and sometimes surprising outcomes, as explained by Cheung (2009, p.31). Recent studies 
also show that neo-liberal ideas failed to register any meaningful impact on both growth and 
poverty. Therefore many neo-liberal opponents in East Asia also argue that, after more than 
two decades of deregulation, privatisation and fiscal austerity in some countries, neo-liberal 
policies have still failed to eliminate poverty and, to a greater extent, inequality (Robison and 
Hewison, 2005, p. 188). Thus, after more than two decades of neo-liberal reform and a 
market economy, most East Asian countries still maintain a largely developmental state 
approach in their policy implementation.
Meanwhile, in terms of housing provision, a recent review of the literature on housing
provision in several European countries also indicates a highly varied and uneven
application of the neo-liberal policy regime. Countries like Belgium and France suggest that 
there is little evidence of withdrawal of the state from housing. Meanwhile, countries such as 
Sweden and Germany have shown clearer examples of apparent state withdrawal from 
housing and a shift in emphasis with regard to the market as a housing provider (Dogson, 
2007, p.90). Sweden, for example, was regarded as a typical social-democratic welfare state 
in Europe during the early 1990s, but has ceased to maintain its high degree of state 
intervention in housing provision (Clark and Johnson, 2009).
Similarly in East Asia, Japan, along with the other ‘Asian Tigers’, according to Hirayama and 
Ronald (2007), not only show divergence from the Western model of housing provision, but 
also display differences in the set of social and political relations which link state authority to 
housing policy. Singapore, for example, is still pursuing active and extensive state
subsidised housing provision in line with its national development agenda. Meanwhile,
Japan, South Korea and Taiwan commit to low social welfare spending on housing 
compared to Singapore and Hong Kong. Japan, South Korea and Taiwan have weaker 
controls and a more selective state intervention. A discussion on the changes in the global 
political economy in the context of Malaysia and its influence on housing provision will be 
examined in Chapter 4.
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P H A P T F R
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
CHAPTER 3:
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
3.1 INTRODUCTION
This chapter discusses the methodology of the research. Divided into six sections, it 
covers the research strategy, research design, research stages, method of data 
collection, validity and reliability issues, and ethical issues. Justifications for the 
selection of research strategy, research design and methods used in data collection 
will be discussed in each section.
3.2 RESEARCH STRATEGY
The study is premised on a qualitative research paradigm and its inherent 
assumptions. The choice of a qualitative research paradigm is based on the 
ontological, epistemological and methodological assumptions of the study 
phenomenon. Firstly, ontology, which concerns itself with the nature of reality, is seen 
as subjective and multiple in the eyes of the participants in the study. The process and 
issue of the role of the state and the market in low cost housing allocation in Malaysia 
is more likely to be better understood from a qualitative ontological viewpoint because 
of a multiplicity of factors such as socio-cultural, economics, politics and the local 
context. Therefore, a critical realist perspective of the ontological position will be 
adopted in this research.
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Critical realism is a philosophy of science with a particularly ontological perspective 
(Lawson, 2006, p.45). It entails a structured notion of reality with related overlapping 
domains: real (mechanism), actual (events) and empirical (experience). Critical realism 
also promotes active acknowledgement of the structured, open and dynamic nature of 
the object or phenomenon under examination regarding important causal dimensions 
that may or may not be directly observed or recorded. Realism not only acknowledges 
the existence of socially constructed experiences (multiple meanings and actor’s 
interpretations), but also physical and non-physical conditions, actual events and 
influential social relations. Meanwhile, Social Constructionism claims access to the 
material world is mediated through language and discourse (Jacobs et al., 2004 p.3). 
Social constructionists take lay perceptions of housing very seriously. They consider 
that everyday concepts provide the basis for many (housing) related actions. Strong 
social constructionists claim that, in reality, housing only exists at the level of 
experience and that it is not necessary to look beyond this reality as perceived by 
actors (Lawson, 2006, p.47). The research will focus on understanding the low cost 
housing allocation process in Malaysia according to various key players’ 
interpretations from a critical realist perspective.
Secondly, epistemology is understood to be the source and nature of knowledge. The 
key question regards the relationship of the researcher to that of the researched. In the 
qualitative paradigm, the researcher interacts with the research subjects. This is in 
contrast to the quantitative paradigm assumption, where the researcher is viewed as 
being independent of that being researched, which implies non-interaction. The 
qualitative approach is advantageous in the context of this study because it facilitates 
the gaining of deeper insights from the researcher’s immersion in the processes, thus 
illuminating the research issue rather than adopting an aloof stance that brings a 
greater understanding of the research phenomenon.
Finally, there is the issue of methodological assumptions. Qualitative research is an 
inductive rather than a deductive process. As explained by Cresswell (1994, p.5), one 
issue is the cause-effect relationship and the desire to prove causality in the 
quantitative paradigm against “a mutual simultaneous shaping of factors” in the 
qualitative paradigm. Although the research looks at the effect of the relationship 
between various agents in low cost housing allocation, it will be impossible to prove a 
cause and effect relationship between the two aspects. Thus, a triangulation of 
evidence drawn from multiple sources may indicate how the factors affect one another. 
The qualitative paradigm also allows for the possibility of an evolving design in terms
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of categorisation of data during the research process. In quantitative research, data 
categorisation is conducted beforehand, with minimal scope for flexibility with regard to 
the emergence of new data categories during the collection process.
3.3 RESEARCH DESIGN
The study is based on the use of multiple methods in the context of a case study 
design. The selection of a case study design was made based on several reasons. 
Firstly, the case study is a powerful empirical research method that provides the 
opportunity to investigate an actual context (Bryman, 2001, p.49). As a research 
strategy, the case study method allows researchers to retain the holistic and 
meaningful characteristics of real life events such as the individual’s life cycle, 
organisational and managerial processes (Yin, 2003, p.2). Thus, in the context of this 
research, the Open Registration System (ORS) for low cost house buyers is selected 
as a case study to analyse the role of the state and market in low cost housing 
allocation in Malaysia.
Secondly, case study design is suitable for individual researchers as it gives an 
opportunity for in-depth study of one aspect of a problem within a limited time scale 
(Yin, 2003, p.2). Since the study was conducted within a limited time period and 
required the involvement of people from Federal and State government, private 
housing developers and low cost house buyers, only one state in Malaysia was 
selected to investigate the role of the state and market in ORS implementation. Thirdly, 
case studies are preferable when it comes to focussing on contemporary phenomena 
within a real-life situation where the researcher has little control over events (Yin, 
2003). In this study, the researcher obviously has no control over events related to the 
implementation of ORS. Finally, there is the ability of the case study to draw evidence 
from multiple sources (Hakim, 1987). This is facilitated by the use of a variety of data 
collection techniques and methods, thus making the case study potentially overlap with 
other research strategies which offers their combined and complementary strengths 
and allows the investigation to retain a more holistic and meaningful approach to real 
life situations (Hakim, 1987; Yin, 2003). To achieve a more holistic and meaningful 
approach to the role of state and market in ORS implementation, the study combines 
several data collection methods which include documentary analysis, qualitative 
interviews and focus group discussion (see Figure 3.1).
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Figure 3.1: Triangulation of Evidence from Multiple Sources 
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There are four types of case study; these comprise the critical case, unique case, 
revelatory case and exemplifying case, which is important when addressing the issue 
of external validity (see Yin, 2003; Bryman, 2001). In the critical case study, the 
researcher usually has a specific hypothesis and a case is chosen on the grounds that 
it will allow a better understanding of the circumstances (Bryman, 2001, p.51). The 
unique case is commonly used in clinical studies. The revelatory case exists when the 
researcher has an opportunity to observe and analyse a phenomenon previously 
inaccessible to scientific investigation (Yin, 2003, p.44). Meanwhile, the exemplifying 
case is the most common type and is “often chosen not because they are extreme or 
unusual in some way but because they will provide a suitable context for certain 
research questions to be answered. As such they allow the researcher to examine key 
social processes” (Bryman, 2001, p.51). In this research, the ORS provides a suitable 
context to understand the process of the low cost housing allocation system in 
Malaysia and answer the research questions.
One rationale for a single case is the representative or typical case (Yin, 2003, p.41). 
The objective is to capture the circumstances and conditions of an everyday or 
commonplace situation. ORS can be categorised as a typical case of a low cost 
housing registration and allocation system implemented by the Federal government in 
Malaysia. If an independent low cost housing allocation system in a particular state in 
Malaysia was chosen for the case study, the outcome would be more likely to discuss 
the operation of the system rather than a larger contribution towards the theory of the 
role of the state and market in housing provision.
Meanwhile, in terms of the research question or the choice of data collection 
strategies, Yin (2003 p.5) observes that “in general, case studies are the preferred
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strategy when “how” or “why” questions are posed...”, but in general the design is 
appropriate for a whole range of familiar research questions which includes “who”, 
“what”, “where”, “how” and “why”. Four of these types of questions are pertinent to the 
research questions identified earlier in Chapter 1.
However, the case study strategy has also been criticised on various grounds. The 
main concern is that case studies provide an insufficient basis for scientific 
generalisation (Bryman, 2001, p.52). However, the exponents of case study research 
suggest that the purpose of this research design is not to generalise to other cases or 
to populations beyond the case. Yin (1984, p. 10) also provides an explanation on this 
issue; he distinguishes between analytic and statistical generalisability. He points out 
that, in fact, scientific facts are seldom based on single experiments, but rather on 
multiple experiments which replicate the same phenomenon under different conditions. 
Therefore, like experiments, the generalisation of a case study is intended for 
theoretical propositions rather than for populations.
Secondly, the opponents of case study strategy suggest that when using this method 
the researcher often tends to become sloppy and allow anecdotal evidence or biased 
views to influence the direction of the findings and conclusions. However, the critics 
forget that bias can also encroach into the conduct of experiments, as well as into the 
design of the questionnaire in the case of social surveys. Finally, a common objection 
is that case studies take too long to complete and often result in enormous unreadable 
documents. Yin (2003, p. 11) explains that there is no need for case studies to take a 
long time, as this assumption incorrectly confuses the case study method with a 
specific method of data collection such as ethnography.
3.3.1 Case Study Selection
The selection of ORS to analyse the role of state and market in low cost housing 
allocation in Malaysia was made based on several reasons. The first is the importance 
of ORS in the context of the low cost housing allocation system in Malaysia. Since the 
structure of government in Malaysia is based on a Federal system, housing provision 
and allocation is always the responsibility of respective State governments under the 
Federal Constitution. Prior to the establishment of ORS in 1997, all 14 States in 
Malaysia had their own low cost housing registration and allocation system. However, 
centralisation and standardisation of low cost house buyer registration and allocation
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by Ministry of Housing and Local Government under ORS means the Federal 
government has indirectly taken the responsibility from the State government in low 
cost housing allocation. This shows the importance of ORS in the low cost housing 
allocation process in Malaysia since 1997. The study of ORS will also provide an 
understanding of the role of the state and market in low cost housing provision and 
allocation in Malaysia.
The second reason is a lack of academic research on the implementation of ORS at 
the State level. Since the establishment of ORS in 1997, only one study in 2006 has 
been conducted to look at the implementation of the ORS by the National Housing 
Department (NHD). A study by NHD shows many State governments still not fully 
adopted ORS for low cost housing allocation and formulate different policies. A 
variation of low cost housing policies and institutional set-ups are expected because 
housing is under the responsibility of respective State governments. Therefore, the 
study of ORS implementation at the State level is important in order to understand the 
relationship between the key players in low cost housing allocation, particularly the 
State government, private housing developers and house buyers. For that purpose, 
the State of Selangor was selected for the detailed study.
The third reason is that ORS features a unique practice in East Asian developing 
countries in managing and administering housing for people with a low income. Not 
many developing countries have established an effective system to control buyer 
registration and allocation of low cost houses, especially for homeownership. Thus, 
ORS could provide an important lesson to governments in other developing countries 
in dealing with housing for people with a low income, improve housing administration 
and eventually solve housing problems.
Fourthly, in the context of low cost housing provision in Malaysia, the issue is no 
longer related to the stage of housing development and construction. The public and 
private sector, over the last 20 years, has managed to build an adequate number of 
low cost houses in Malaysia. However, the real problem is to ensure the targeted 
group will eventually buy and own the low cost house. ORS implementation, therefore, 
was the key strategy by the government to ensure only the poor can access and 
eventually buy low cost housing. Finally, in Malaysia, the government not only controls 
the allocation of public housing, but also low cost housing built by the private sector. 
Therefore, an analysis of the implementation of ORS at the State level is crucial to 
understanding government intervention in the low cost housing market.
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The State of Selangor was selected for the detailed study of ORS implementation in 
Malaysia. Selection of Selangor was based on several criteria. Firstly, the State of 
Selangor is located in the most developed region in Malaysia known as Klang Valley 
(see Figure 3.2). The national capital of Malaysia, Kuala Lumpur and several of the 
country‘s other largest cities are located within Klang Valley including Petaling Jaya, 
Shah Alam (Capital of Selangor) and Klang. Due to its location, the demand for 
housing was greater in Selangor compared to other states in Malaysia.
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Figure 3.2: Map of Selangor
Source: R & D Unit, State Econom ic Planning Unit fwww .selanqor.qov.m y)
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Secondly, there is a demographic factor. Although Selangor is only the eighth largest 
State in Malaysia (with a land area of 125,000 sq km), it has the largest population in 
Vohysia with 5.1 million people in 2010 (Department of Statistics Malaysia, 2010). 
Over the last 10 years, the Selangor population has increased 21.8 percent or an 
average of 2.18 percent annually, the highest rate of increase in Malaysia. In addition, 
Selangor also has the largest number of households and living quarters in Malaysia 
(see Table 3.1). The situation largely came about due to high natural growth and net 
in-migration from other States in Malaysia (Selangor, 2003). In terms of ethnic 
composition, Selangor has among the lowest Bumiputera population in Malaysia with
53.5 percent, 30.8 percent Chinese, 14.6 percent Indian and 1.1 percent others 
(Department of Statistics Malaysia, 2000). Meanwhile, 88.4 percent of the people lived 
in urban areas in 2010. Higher population growth and net in-migration therefore put 
more pressure on the State government to provide adequate housing for the people, 
particularly the people with a low income.
Table 3.1: Population, No. of Household and Total Living Quarters according 
to State in Malaysia, 2000 & 2010
State Population (‘000) Household (‘000) Living Quarters (‘000)
2000 2010 2000 2010 2000 2010
Johor 2,762.5 3,305.9 652.2 792.6 748.7 961.9
Kedah 1,671.9 1,966.9 364.2 444.3 419.8 501.0
Kelantan 1,361.4 1,670.5 271.3 316.9 311.6 345.2
Melaka 646.6 771.5 145.4 179.9 188.0 247.9
N. Sembilan 866.1 1,011.7 194.9 237.4 252.2 320.7
Pahang 1,295.8 1,534.8 290.6 358.5 318.8 388.8
Perak 2,091.7 2,460.8 485.9 566.9 567.9 656.3
Perlis 207.6 240.1 47.0 54.0 52.4 58.5
Pulau Pinang 1,332.7 1,596.9 309.9 382.4 385.8 525.1
Sabah 2,603.5 3,214.2 507.7 650.8 549.8 713.9
Sarawak 2,071.7 2,506.5 436.3 539.5 483.4 600.3
Selangor 4,188.9 5,102.6 986.5 1,374.1 985.3 1,416.1
Terengganu 902.6 1,050.0 179.6 221.0 205.5 244.5
Federal Territory 1,492.1 1,818.0 354.2 426.1 403.8 508.6
MALAYSIA 23,494.9 28,250.5 5,198.9 6,544.5 5,873.0 7,488.9
Note: * Kuala Lumpur and Labuan
Source: Population and Housing Census 2010, Department of Statistics Malaysia
The third criterion is the economy. In 2008, Selangor contributed 22.1 percent or 
RM28.3 billion to national Growth Domestic Products (GDP), the highest contribution 
in Malaysia. Services and manufacturing are the main contributors to the economy of 
the Selangor, which contributed 51.6 percent of state GDP in 2008 (Department of 
Statistics, 2010). The manufacturing sector particularly attracts younger people to 
migrate into the Selangor and the majority of people in this category are in the low 
income group. The average household income was RM3.702 per month in 2005
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compared to the national average of RM2.472 per month, the second highest in 
Malaysia after Kuala Lumpur. Meanwhile, incidence of poverty in Selangor was only 
14 percent representing 64,100 households in 2002. Therefore, Selangor is 
considered to be a high income State in Malaysia (Selangor, 2003).
Fourthly, Selangor had the largest squatter population in Malaysia in 1999. Despite 
rising income and better access to financing since, Selangor had the largest number of 
people living in squatter settlements with 171,396 in 1999 (MHLG, 2006). However, 
the State government managed to reduce the number of people living in squatter to 
just 3,928 in 2006. Thus, Selangor provides an interesting example of how a State 
government managed to reduce the squatter population through a low cost housing 
allocation system.
Fifthly, in 2008 there were a total of 702 private housing developers operating in 
Selangor, the highest in Malaysia (LPHS, 2008). More than 70 percent of low cost 
housing built during the Seventh Malaysian Plan (1996-2000) and Eight Malaysian 
Plan (2001-2005) was constructed by the private sector, including that built in 
Selangor. This shows the important role played by the private sector in low cost 
housing provision in Selangor over the last 20 years. Finally, Selangor has one of the 
best institutional set-ups for housing administration in Malaysia under the Selangor 
Housing and Property Board (SHPB), established by the State government in 2002, 
which is responsible for implementing ORS in Selangor. From 1997-2005, Selangor 
had the highest number of people registered under the ORS in Malaysia, namely 
148,139, thus justifying the selection of Selangor for the detailed study on ORS 
implementation at the State level.
3.4 RESEARCH STAGES
The research process for this study can be divided into five stages (see Figure 3.3). 
The data collection for each stage was conducted in sequence during the fieldwork. In 
Stage 1, the identification of the case study was accomplished after studying the 
present low cost registration and allocation system in Malaysia. ORS was selected as 
the case study to analyse the role of the state and market in low cost housing 
registration and the allocation system, based on the justification given earlier.
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In Stage 2, the data collection focussed on the role played by the Federal government, 
particularly the Ministry of Housing and Local Government Malaysia in the 
establishment of the ORS. Interviews with the officers involved with the setting up of 
the ORS were conducted. Various ministry official documents related to ORS were 
also collected by the researcher to identify the need and reasons which led to the 
establishment of the ORS. Information related to policy, development and 
improvement to the ORS since its establishment in 1997 were also collected in order to 
analyse the role played by the state and market in low cost housing registration and
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the allocation process. However, due to ORS data confidentiality, only information 
before 2005 could be obtained from MHLG for the analysis purpose.
In Stage 3, the implementation of ORS in the State of Selangor was selected to 
determine the role played by the state and market in the low cost housing allocation 
process. The analysis of the policy and operations of the low cost housing allocation 
system in Selangor was important because the State government deals directly with 
private housing developers and the house buyers. The role of the Federal government, 
however, is only limited to coordination and policy formulation. The information 
obtained from the State government, particularly the Selangor Housing and Property 
Boards, was used to determine the private housing developers involved in low cost 
housing provision in the Selangor from 1998 to 2005 after the establishment of ORS 
(completed low cost housing construction). The purpose is to gather feedback from 
private housing developers which have experience in dealing with State government 
and low cost house buyers under ORS.
In Stage 4, a total of 36 large private housing developers were identified and 
contacted, but only three were willing to participate in the research. The companies 
willing to participate in this study are Sri Damansara Sdn Bhd, Setia Alam Sdn Bhd 
and SPPT Sdn Bhd. All the companies were also a registered member of the Real 
Estate and Housing Developers Association (REHDA) in Selangor and are categorised 
as large companies with working capital of more than RM10 million (REHDA 2008). 
The selection of large companies was necessary because more than 70 percent of low 
cost houses in the Selangor were built by the large companies. The poor response 
from the private housing developers was expected due to unwillingness among the 
developers to openly discuss issues related to the low cost housing allocation system, 
which is politically very sensitive, especially after the general election. An interview 
with a representative from each of the private developers was conducted to gather 
feedback on the issues related to low cost housing allocation and relationships with 
other key players, especially the State government and the low cost house buyers. 
The interviews and discussions with the representatives of the housing developers 
were also used to identify the low cost housing project and the house buyers for the 
next stage.
In Stage 5, a group of house buyers from the Sri Damansara Sdn Bhd project was 
identified to gather feedback on the role played by the state and market in low cost 
house registration and the allocation process. Justification for the selection of the Sri
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Damansara low cost housing project and the buyers for the focus group interview will 
be offered in the next section. A focus group interview was conducted with selected 
low cost house buyers from Sri Meranti Low Cost Apartments in Bandar Sri 
Damansara, Petaling Jaya. Bandar Sri Damansara is situated in Petaling Jaya, 
Selangor near the northeast border of Kuala Lumpur under the jurisdiction of Petaling 
Jaya City Council (PJCC). Sri Damansara is surrounded by Sungai Buloh in the north, 
Kepong in the north east and Damansara in the south (see Figures 3.4 and 3.5). The 
developer for this project is Sri Damansara Sdn Bhd, a subsidiary of Land and General 
Bhd, a company listed on the Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange (KLSE) and the 
Singapore Stock Exchange (SSE). Therefore, Sri Damansara Sdn Bhd is considered 
to be a large developer with strong financial backup. The development of Bandar Sri 
Damansara began in 1988 with the launch of a 150-acre Industrial Park. Bandar Sri 
Damansara covers an area of 1,260 acres of freehold land which was approved for 
14,026 units of mixed development (see Table 3.2).
Table 3.2: Background of Bandar Sri Damansara
Developer Sri Damansara Sdn Bhd
Development Commenced : 1988
Completion Still on-going
Land Area 1,260 acres
Land Use Components Residential -  13,287 units, Commercial -  152 units 
Industrial -  587 units
Population Approx. 61,000 people (average 4.6 per household)
Source: Sri Damansara Sdn Bhd, 2008
In terms of housing development, a total 13,287 units of single-storey and double­
storey houses, condominiums, apartments, semi-detached homes and bungalow lots 
were launched and delivered to the purchasers. Of that figure, a total of 3,530 units are 
low cost houses developed in five phases since 1995 (see Table 3.3). Also of that 
figure, 37.7 percent are high cost housing, 35.7 percent are medium cost housing and
26.6 percent are low cost housing. However, in 2002, the State government reviewed 
the low cost housing quota and reduced the figure to 20 percent in line with declining 
demand for low cost houses (SHPB 2003). Therefore, the total number of low cost 
houses in Sri Damansara is still higher than the minimum requirement set by the State 
government.
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Table 3.3: Distribution of Housing According to Price in Bandar Sri Damansara
Housing Type/Price Total Units Percentage
Low Cost Housing (below RM42,000/un it) 3,530 26.6
Medium Cost Housing (RM42.000-RM100,00/unit) 4,744 35.7
High Cost Housing (more than RM100,000/unit) 5,013 37.7
Total 13,287 100.0
Source: Sri Damansara Sdn Bhd, 2008
During the early stage of development in Bandar Sri Damansara, the focus was on 
medium and high cost housing. Meanwhile, the development of low cost houses only 
intensified after 1998 when the price of low cost house increased to RM42.000 per unit 
from RM25.000. Thus, the development of low cost housing in Bandar Sri Damansara 
proved that most private housing developers waited to launch low cost house 
developments until the new price structure was introduced by the government. In 
Bandar Sri Damansara, 55.6 percent of low cost houses were built after 1998 (refer to 
Table 3.4). The development of low cost houses under Phase 5 is also known as Sri 
Meranti Low-cost House Apartments, which was selected for the focus group 
interview.
Table 3.4: Low Cost Housing Development Phases in Bandar Sri Damansara
Phases Total Units Percentage Year of Completion
Phase 1 120 3.4 1995
Phase 2 314 8.9 1995
Phase 3 360 10.2 1998
Phase 4 772 21.9 1999
Phase 5 (Sri Meranti Low Cost) 1,964 55.6 2004
Total 3,530 100.0
Source: Sri Damansara Sdn Bhd, 2008
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3.5 METHODS OF DATA COLLECTION
Three methods of data collection were used in this research, namely analysis of 
documents, qualitative interviews and a focus group interview.
3.5 .1 Analysis o f Documents
Analysis of documents has been described as part of a wider interpretation of mute 
evidence which includes written texts and artefacts (Hodder 1994, p.393). In this study, 
documentary analysis focuses on written texts. Texts are importance to qualitative 
research for various reasons. To this end, it has been pointed out, for example, that 
access to documents can be easy and low cost and texts endure and thus can shed 
light on historical insights. Texts or documents can also be used alongside other forms 
of evidence (Hodder, 1994, p.394), as is the case in this study where evidence is 
drawn from multiple sources. The application of documentary analysis in the study has 
meant that the researcher has been able to compare and cross check the information 
with data from other sources.
The use of text or documentary analysis allows this study to interpret the meaning of 
written words to illuminate the research issue. Unlike verbal evidence, documentary 
evidence has a high degree of physical endurance and can thus be detached or 
separated, both in space and time, from its originator, author or producer. In most 
cases of documentary evidence, therefore, there is very little scope for interaction 
between the researcher and the producer of the information or evidence. The 
interaction gap between researcher and source or producer of documentary evidence 
raises questions over issues such as context and the process which culminated in the 
production of the document under examination.
For this research several main sources of data for documentary analysis have been 
identified, including official government reports, documents, letters, press statements, 
minutes of meetings and seminar papers related to the establishment and 
implementation of the ORS. The key official documents related to the implementation 
of the ORS include the Guideline for Selection of Low Cost House Buyers under Open 
Registration System prepared by National Housing Department and minutes of 
meetings. Table 3.5 shows the key meetings related to ORS implementation from 
2004-2006. The researcher attended several of these meetings, thus providing a better 
insight into the sentiments of Federal and State governments with regard to the
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operation and implementation of ORS. However, some of the early reports and 
documents related to ORS could not be traced during the data collection stage due to 
poor record management and the difficulty of accessing the archive materials. 
Therefore, the analysis of documents is based on various sources in order to gain an 
overall picture of the establishment of ORS and policy changes.
Table 3.5: Key Meetings Related to ORS 2004-2006
No. Meeting/Date/Venue Chair/Attended by
1. National Housing Council Meeting 
No. 1/2004
13th May 2004 / Istana Hotel, Kuala 
Lumpur
Chaired by Minister of Housing and Local 
Government Malaysia and attended by all State 
government representatives (EXCO Member)
2. Improvement of Computerised 
Open Registration System and Low 
Cost House Allocation Committee 
Meeting No. 1/2004
8th June 2004 / MHLG HQ, Kuala 
Lumpur
Chaired by Chief Secretary of Ministry of Housing and 
Local Government Malaysia and attended by all State 
government representatives (State Secretary)
3. Meeting to Discuss Amendment to 
Standardised ORS Application 
Form
1st December 2004 / MHLG HQ, 
Kuala Lumpur
Chaired by Director, Planning and Coordination 
Section of National Housing Department and attended 
by all State government representatives (Housing 
Secretary/Director)
4. Meeting Related to Adopting 
Standardised Form for Open 
Registration System No.1/2004
22 December 2004 / MHLG HQ, 
Kuala Lumpur
Chaired by Chief Secretary of Ministry of Housing and 
Local Government Malaysia and attended by all State 
government representatives (State Secretary)
5. National Housing Council Meeting 
No. 1/2005
27th Jan 2005 / Pan Pacific Hotel, 
Kuala Lumpur
Chaired by Minister of Housing and Local 
Government Malaysia and attended by all State 
government representatives (EXCO Member)
6. Meeting to Discuss the 
Implementation of Standardised 
ORS No. 1
3rd October 2005 / MHLG HQ, Kuala 
Lumpur
Chaired by Director, Planning and Coordination 
Section of National Housing Department and attended 
by all State government representatives (Housing 
Secretary/Director) and an IT Consultant
7. Meeting to Discuss the 
Implementation of Standardised 
ORS and Launching Ceremony by 
Prime Minister
7th March 2006 / MHLG HQ, Kuala 
Lumpur
Chaired by Director General of National Housing 
Department and attended by all State government 
representatives (Housing Secretary/Director) and an 
IT Consultant
8. National Housing Council Meeting 
No. 1/2006
18th September 2006 / Hotel Seri 
Pacific, Kuala Lumpur
Chaired by Minister of Housing and Local 
Government Malaysia and attended by all State 
government representatives (EXCO Member)
Source: Ministry of Housing and Local Government Malaysia, 2004-2006
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3.5.2 Qualitative Interviews
The interviews were targeted towards knowledgeable informants in various contexts 
such as government departments at State and Federal government, the private 
housing developers and people who have vast knowledge of ORS. Qualitative 
interviews were used because they provide deeper insights into knowledgeable 
informants, most of whom were professional persons involved directly with the low cost 
housing allocation process at the time of the study. King (1994 p. 14) describes the 
qualitative interview as an interview aimed at gathering descriptions of the life-world of 
the respondent in terms of “interpretation of meaning..” of phenomenon being 
researched. The qualitative interview does not seek to generate quantifiable data. It 
seeks to build an understanding of the research issue from the interviewee’s 
perspective, as well as how and why the respondent adopts a particular perspective. In 
general, qualitative interviews have certain distinct characteristics; for example, a 
minimal structure in terms of questions is imposed by the researcher on the 
respondent, which focuses on specific situations, events and action sequences in the 
realm of the respondent’s context rather than general opinions outside this domain.
The interaction between the researcher (interviewer) and the researched (interviewee) 
is an important feature of the qualitative interview. More interaction and rapport is an 
essential component in accessing the insights required by the researcher in qualitative 
research. The development of a relationship between the two parties is a useful part of 
the research rather than a distraction. One of the most important strengths of 
qualitative interviews is flexibility. The interview can be used to focus on decision 
making processes within the groups and organisations. The qualitative interview can 
also be used to examine topics which have different meanings to respondents such as 
attitudes and perceptions. The qualitative interview method also gives informants an 
opportunity to talk freely about their own work and experiences, which is difficult to 
achieve in structured interviews which use closed questions. The opportunity to talk 
freely has been observed as a way of stimulating enthusiasm in the interviewee, as 
they reveal their knowledge and beliefs.
However, the qualitative interview method also has its own weaknesses. It is time 
consuming to conduct qualitative interviews, especially in terms of securing suitable 
and convenient appointments. Moreover, analysis of the collected data is also labour 
intensive and time consuming. Analysis of qualitative data seemed to be the most 
valuable as a progressive and iterative process, but the researcher was also under
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pressure to implement other aspects of research strategy rather than devoting all his 
attention to qualitative interviews. The limited time available for the research thus 
limited the extent of iteration. Also, considerable skills were needed by the researcher 
to distinguish between valuable data and information of no value, since some 
informants, despite the semi-structured nature of interviews, would digress with little 
scope for repeated interruptions by the researcher without antagonising them. Some 
respondents, although with prior permission to be interviewed, were unable to reveal 
certain types of information i.e. information related to ORS data. Despite the problems 
of qualitative interviews, this was an important method for this study in generating in- 
depth insights from individual knowledgeable informants. In the context of the use of 
multiple methods in the case study research strategy, the combined strength of other 
methods used in this study is expected to have minimised the inherent weaknesses of 
qualitative interviews.
The advantage of individual interviews is that they provide an in-depth understanding 
of a person’s opinions. There are three types of interview. According to Fielding and 
Thomas (2001), unstructured interviews require some preparation beforehand. The 
interviewers have a list of topics, and they should be kept constantly in mind. This type 
of interview is characterised by a minimum of control over the informant’s responses. 
The questions are asked in any order that seems sensible in the interviewing process. 
Meanwhile, semi-structured interviewing requires all the skills of unstructured 
interviews, but is based on the use of an interview guide (Bernard, 1995). This is a 
written list of questions and topics that need to be covered in a particular order. 
Although this type of interview will follow the order of questions or topics, the sequence 
can still be changed and more information probed for or an uncertain situation met. 
The interviewer can thus adapt the research instrument to the level of comprehension 
of the respondent. It is common that people often provide answers to questions which 
might be asked later, according to the sequence.
Finally, a structured interview provides the same order and the same questions to the 
informants (Fielding, et al. 2001). One variety of structured interview involves the use 
of an interview schedule -  an explicit set of instructions to interviewers who administer 
questionnaires orally. The structured interview is appropriate when the researcher 
already has some ideas and an understanding of the research questions and the 
research topic. The three typologies of interviews have their own advantages and 
disadvantages. Thus, they are suitable according to different situations, backgrounds 
and the needs of the research.
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The interviews can be divided into two main categories. One is the administered or 
face-to-face interview and the other is the self-administered interview. According to 
Bernard (1995), face-to-face interviews have several advantages and disadvantages. 
The process of the interview can be controlled to probe for more complete data, for 
example, the time allocated for the interview can be extended. During the interview 
process, it is possible for the interviewer to apply different data collection techniques 
e.g. open ended questions or the use of visual aids. With the face-face interview, the 
interviewer knows who is answering the questions. Nonetheless, Bernard also 
mentions several disadvantages, particularly the fact that face-to-face interviews 
require high skill to administer a questionnaire. Sometimes it is still difficult to achieve 
the target that the interviewer may expect. The cost in terms of both time and money is 
higher and the number of interviewees over a certain period of time would be less.
Meanwhile, the advantages of the self-administered questionnaire are that the 
interviewee can use more time to find information for their response. Self-administered 
questionnaires also allow a single researcher to gather data from a large, 
representative sample of respondents at a relatively low cost. At the same time, 
interviewer’s bias can be reduced since all the informants receive the same questions. 
The interviewer can put more questions to more informants compared to face-to-face 
interviews. The disadvantages of the self-administered questionnaire include a lack of 
control of the interpretation of the questions by the people. Another problem is the 
generally low response rate from self-administered questionnaires. Even if a 
questionnaire is returned, it is sometimes not known whether the questions were 
answered by the right person.
This study used face-to-face semi-structured interviews with knowledgeable 
informants (refer to Appendix 1 for a questions guide to the semi structured interview). 
The knowledgeable informants are mostly people attached to organisations within both 
public and private sectors. In most cases, informants held positions of responsibility 
and, by virtue of being in important positions, they had a better understanding of 
overall organisational roles and objectives. They were, in most cases, in a better 
position to shed light into operations of the ORS at the Federal or State level. The 
knowledgeable informants were selected based on both the researcher’s intuition and 
on recommendations from other knowledgeable informants (see Table 3.6).
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Table 3.6: List of Informants for Qualitative Interviews
Reference/ 
Date o f Interview Organisation Position Age
Working
Experience Responsibility
Federal Officer 1
(16/4/2008)
National Housing 
Department
Retired Deputy 
Director 
General of 
NHD
57 More than 
20 years in 
MHLG/ 
NHD
Member of ORS 
establishment team 
and further 
development
Federal Officer 2
(31/3/2008)
Ministry of Housing 
& Local 
Government
Senior
Assistant
Director
53 15 years in 
MHLG
Member of ORS 
establishment team
Federal Officer 3
(2/4/2008)
National Housing 
Department (NHD)
Assistant
Director
31 5 years in 
NHD
Current Officer in­
charge of ORS in 
NHD
State Officer 1
(15/4/2008)
Selangor Housing 
and Property Board 
(SHPB)
Assistant
Director
33 7 years 
with LPHS
Current Officer in­
charge of ORS in the 
State of Selangor
Housing 
Developer 1
(17/4/2008)
Sri Damansara Sdn 
Bhd
Sales &
Marketing
Manager
32 10 years 
with the 
company
Sales manager 
dealing with house 
buyers
Housing 
Developer 2
(19/4/2008)
Setia Alam Sdn Bhd Sales &
Marketing
Manager
33 8 years 
with the 
company
Sales manager 
dealing with house 
buyers
Housing 
Developer 3
(20/4/2008)
SPPT Sdn Bhd Sales &
Marketing
Manager
34 13 years 
with the 
company
Sales manager 
dealing with house 
buyers
Ex-Housing 
Developer 1
(6/5/2008)
Previously worked 
with Sri Damansara 
Sdn Bhd
Town Planning 
Manager
40 10 years 
work with 
the 
company
Officer in-charge 
dealing with State 
government 1997- 
2005 on ORS
Source: Author
However, several problems were encountered during the interviews with 
knowledgeable informants. Since the fieldwork was conducted right after the country’s 
12th General Election in March 2008, some identified informants refused to participate 
in the research. The reason they gave was that they were too busy after the election. 
However, in reality, most officers are not comfortable talking about the low cost 
housing allocation policy, particularly in the State of Selangor which is under a new 
coalition government known as Pakatan Rakyat (People’s Coalition). Even those 
willing to be interviewed were very cautious with their answers and avoided giving too 
much information during the interviews.
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The digital voice recorder data from the qualitative and focus group interviews was 
then transferred onto a computer for analysis. Full interview transcripts were prepared 
and analysed using Nvivo 8 software. The use of Nvivo 8 allowed the researcher easy 
access to data and identified the themes for the analysis. Since the interviews were 
conducted in both Malay (government officers and low cost house buyers) and English 
(private housing developers) language, the original transcripts still maintain the 
language used by the informants. The reason was to ensure the meaning was not lost 
during the translation process. Translation is only done when quotations from specific 
interviews are used in this thesis.
3.5.3 Focus Group Interviews
Many academics suggest that focus group interviews or discussions should be 
arranged between four to 12 people to discuss the topic of concern for a one or two 
hour session with the guidance of a moderator (see Cronin, 2001; Hakim, 2000; 
Morgan, 1997; Kitzenger and Barbour, 1999). They further suggest that a focus group 
of four to five people is better for a more in-depth discussion. Focus groups can 
provide the opportunity to observe a large amount of interaction on a topic in a limited 
period of time. This social science research approach provides direct evidence of the 
similarities and differences in the participants’ opinions and experiences, as opposed 
to the researchers.
The focus group interview was initially applied in market research and political opinion 
research (Yates, 2004). The approach of focus groups has also been regarded as a 
form of “group in-depth interviewing”. As with in-depth interviews, focus groups should 
have a topic, an object, a text or some other “focus” instead of simply a general 
discussion. There should be at least one “moderator” or “facilitator” in the focus group. 
The task of the moderator is to ensure that the discussion addresses the topics in the 
schedule for the focus group. The level of interaction between participants, which 
ultimately will affect the type of data produced, is largely dependent on the role taken 
by the group moderator or facilitator.
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Cronin (2001) divided moderation into two levels. The first level is low-level 
moderation, which means that the moderator’s role in the discussion is kept to a 
minimum. In this scenario, the moderator usually introduces the broad topic and then 
withdraws from the discussion. The data and information from the discussion are 
entirely dependent upon the interaction of the group members. The second level is 
high-level moderation. This means that the moderator operates a high degree of 
control over the direction and nature of the discussion. The moderator asks the 
questions in a specific order and there is little opportunity for participants to deviate 
from the topic or to raise topics of concern to them. This approach may be appropriate 
to achieve a very precise sort of information. However, this type of moderation is not 
suitable for gaining in-depth qualitative material about attitudes, behaviour and 
experience. In practice, the majority of focus group interviews are operated at a level 
of moderation somewhere in between these two levels. The moderator, who would be 
ready to interject, asks questions and probes for further information when necessary, 
and normally guides the focus group interviews.
The fundamental way of generating qualitative data in the study of social phenomena 
through focus groups is listening to and learning from what people say. Therefore, a 
good focus group is thus an interactive and communicative process between the 
researcher and the group participants. The focus group belongs to the qualitative 
research approach and is therefore used with a view to generating a richer 
understanding of participants’ perceptions, aspirations, experiences, beliefs and 
concerns over a given phenomenon. As part of the qualitative methodological 
approach, focus groups share three of the inherent strengths of the research domain, 
as described by Morgan (1998), namely: exploration and discovery, context, and 
interpretation. In the context of this study, exploration and discovery is pertinent to the 
research issue, as it is both under-researched and under-documented in Malaysia. 
Therefore, there is a need to explore and discover from the point of view of a low cost 
house buyer. The context provided by the case study of ORS is unique in terms of the 
role of the state in housing.
One strength of the focus group interview is its reputation for being “quick and easy” 
(Morgan 1997, p. 13), because this approach not only gives access to reports on a 
wide range of topics that may not be observable, but also ensures that the data will 
directly target the interests of the research. However, in addition to being fast and 
easy, it also has disadvantages. It may not provide data that is as in-depth and 
personal as interviews. The advantage of focus groups is that they yield additional
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reactions, as people react to views with which they disagree. The focus group 
discussion involves the exploration of ideas and the interpretation of what people say. 
However, it differs from the individual interview in that the focus group is dependent 
upon interaction between participants. Focus groups do not replace individual 
interviews and surveys, but rather complement them.
Meanwhile, Krueger (1997) has identified several limitations of this method, namely 
time and attention, clarity, culture and language. Firstly, in terms of time and attention, 
focus groups normally last between one and two hours. This is a typical and 
recommended time limit. If the discussions proceed beyond this time limit, there is a 
danger that participants will start losing interest and their attention with regard to the 
research issue will correspondingly decline. This hurdle was overcome through the use 
of an interview guide and therefore none of the interviews lasted for more than an 
hour. Secondly, regarding clarity, there is a need to ensure that the concepts used in 
the focus group interviews are understood by the participants. Failure to ensure 
conceptual clarity by the researcher may generate ambiguous and varying responses 
on the research issue. This has the potential effect of compromising the quality of data.
Thirdly, culture may have a significant impact on the types of questions which are 
suitable for a focus group. Depending on the research issue, some cultures may be 
candid and receptive while others may be less approachable. As the study was 
conducted in the researcher’s own country, he was reasonably familiar with local 
expectations. Finally, language is a critical aspect of the success of data generation 
from focus groups, both from the participants’ and the researcher’s point of view. 
Without a common language, there is bound to be a serious communication 
breakdown in the operation of the focus groups. It was noted at the beginning of this 
section that the hallmark of focus group qualitative data acquisition lies in its interactive 
and communicative process. It is absolutely essential that the language used in focus 
group discussions be normally understood by all the agents in the process. Although it 
is possible to use interpreters, it is warned that “Conducting focus groups through an 
interpreter is not only difficult and tedious, but also of questionable research value” 
(Krueger, 1997, p.51).
In focus group discussions, it is possible for the informants to report inaccurate data. 
They may also withhold their views in public for certain reasons. Bernard (1995) 
proposes several reasons to explain why informants report inaccurate data about 
matters of externally verifiable fact in the focus group interview. One reason is that the
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informants may talk about what they suppose happened, rather that what they actually 
saw. The second reason is that they may be misled by what they see according to 
their own prejudices. It is often the case that memories may not be accurate or correct. 
It is even possible that the informants may not like to tell the truth because they may 
not understand or know it. Besides, they sometimes may try to mislead the interviewer 
for other reasons. There is another important reason; some participants withhold 
things that they might prefer to say in private.
Cronin (2001) suggests four criteria necessary for a successful focus group 
discussion: range, specificity, depth and personal context. Range refers to ensuring 
the maximum number of relevant topics to be covered in the focus group schedule. It 
is necessary to consider both the interviewer’s idea of issues for discussion and 
participants’ likelihood of raising the topics that interest them. Specificity means that 
one of the targets of the facilitator is to encourage participants to go beyond the 
abstract to explore more from their actual live experience. This second criterion helps 
to shed light on the sources of attitudes and beliefs and add clarity and depth to the 
points being made, which is the third criterion. The fourth criterion of personal context 
is to take account of the participants’ lives. In the other words, it is necessary to 
consider the social role the participants perform and the social category to which they 
belong. With attention to such issues, a better insight can be gained into the social 
construction of people’s attitudes and beliefs.
In the case of this research, the response from the low cost house buyers was very 
good. A focus group interview consisting of 13 Sri Meranti low cost house buyers was 
conducted on 26th April 2008 (see Table 3.7) based on a semi-structured questionnaire 
(refer to Appendix 2 for the question guide for the focus group interview). The 
researcher himself acted as the moderator with an assistant to record the conversation 
and note the reactions of the participants. During the session, all the participants were 
actively involved in the discussion and expressed their thoughts freely; the session 
lasted for two hours. Since there is no buyer’s list available from the developer or the 
State government, the selection of participants was made randomly with help from the 
Sri Meranti Resident Association President. Another difficulty was to identify the owner 
of the house according to race. Therefore, no non-Bumiputera participants were 
involved in the interview. Meanwhile, all the participants were male, since none of the 
female buyers were willing to participate in the interview due to the cultural and 
religious belief that the male is the head of the household. Thus, the majority of the 
buyers are male and it was very difficult to find a female house owner for the interview.
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The age of the participants ranged between 30 to 43 years and all were still of active 
vcrklng age. Meanwhile, the main occupations of the participants are: factory 
production operator, clerk, salesman and general labourer located either in Petaling 
Jaya or Kuala Lumpur. It is interesting to note some of the participants revealed they 
are buying a low cost house through channels other than registration through ORS. 
The analysis in the next section will focus on the low cost house buyers’ experiences 
and their perception of the State government intervention in the private sector low cost 
housing allocation.
Table 3.7: List of Participants of the Focus Group Interview from Sri Meranti Low 
Cost Apartments (Stage 5)
Reference Gender Race Age Occupation Workplace Register with ORS
Buyer 1 Male Bumiputera 38 Technician Kuala Lumpur No
Buyer 2 Male Bumiputera 41 General Labourer Petaling Jaya Yes
Buyer 3 Male Bumiputera 43 Salesman Kuala Lumpur Yes
Buyer 4 Male Bumiputera 39 Fishmonger Kuala Lumpur Yes
Buyer 5 Male Bumiputera 40 Production Operator Petaling Jaya Yes
Buyer 6 Male Bumiputera 32 Clerk Petaling Jaya Yes
Buyer 7 Male Bumiputera 41 General Labourer Petaling Jaya Yes
Buyer 8 Male Bumiputera 41 Production Operator Petaling Jaya Yes
Buyer 9 Male Bumiputera 38 Production Operator Kuala Lumpur Yes
Buyer 10 Male Bumiputera 30 Bank Clerk Petaling Jaya No
Buyer 11 Male Bumiputera 34 Production Operator Petaling Jaya Yes
Buyer 12 Male Bumiputera 38 Clerk Petaling Jaya Yes
Buyer 13 Male Bumiputera 38 IT Salesman Kuala Lumpur Yes
Source: Focus Group Interview, 2008
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3.6 VALIDITY AND RELIABILITY ISSUES
The concepts of reliability and validity are often used either closely or interchangeably 
(Neuman, 1997 p. 145). However validity is the most prominent or widely used of the 
two. It has been argued that reliability is necessary for validity and it is also easier to 
achieve than validity (Neuman, 1997, p. 145). Although reliability is necessary to 
achieve the valid measurement of a concept or construct, it does not guarantee 
validity. In other words, reliability is a necessary, but not sufficient, condition of the 
achievement of validity, since a measure can produce the same result many times (i.e. 
be reliable), but without necessarily matching the definition of the construct (i.e. be 
valid). It is apparent that there are problems in defining the concepts of validity and 
reliability. There is also a lack of one agreed definition of validity and it has been 
argued that the concept has been overused and confused with related ideas, 
according to Neuman (1997 p. 145). There are several definitions of validity in 
quantitative research, in which validity relates to description and explanation. It is 
about whether the explanation fits or fails to fit the description (Janesick, 2000). 
Validity is concerned with the credibility of explanation. There is not a single way, no 
one “correct” interpretation of an event or issue.
In fact, construct validity is always a major issue highlighted by people who criticise the 
case study design. They point out “...the fact that a case study researcher fails to 
develop a sufficiently operational set of measures and that ‘subjective’ judgement are 
used to collect the data” (Yin, 2003 p.35). However, Yin suggests, in order to meet the 
test of construct validity, a researcher must cover two steps. Firstly, they must select 
the specific types of changes that are to be studied and, secondly, must demonstrate 
that the selected measures of these changes do indeed reflect the specific types of 
change that have been selected. Thus, in the context of this study, the changes in the 
role of the state and market will be studied and the measurement used will be the 
housing commodification-decommodification level/degree discussed earlier in the 
literature review.
The second issue is related to external validity in order to know whether a study’s 
findings are generalisable beyond the immediate case study. The problem of external 
validity has been a major barrier to conducting case studies (Yin, 2003, p.37). 
However, Yin explains that generalisation is not automatic and a theory must be tested 
by replicating the findings in other areas. Once such direct replications have been 
made, the result might be accepted as providing support for the theory. Thus, a similar
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study on ORS implementation and operations in other States in Malaysia can also be 
carried out based on the result of this research.
In terms of the reliability of case study design, the objective is to ensure later 
researchers can follow the same procedures as described by an earlier researcher and 
conduct the same case study all over again (Yin, 2003, p.37). The goal is to minimise 
the errors and biases in a study. Yin also suggests that the researcher should follow 
case study protocol to maintain reliability. This is because, in the past, case study 
research procedures have been poorly documented, making external reviewers 
suspicious of the reliability of the case study (Yin, 2003, p.38). The general way to 
solve the issue is to make as many steps as possible operational so others can check 
their reliability. Every piece of information and procedure necessary to conduct this 
research has been well documented for the reference of future researchers who may 
seek to study the ORS.
3.7 ETHICAL ISSUES
Ethical practice is an important consideration in the conduct of social research. Ethics 
have been defined as what is or not legitimate or right to do, or what a ‘morally correct’ 
research procedure should entail (Neuman, 1997, p.443). In some instances, a 
researcher may resort to short-cuts which culminate in unethical practice because they 
may be under some form of pressure such as time. According to Swetham (1997 
p. 16), the achievement of ethical research practice is based on several elements; for 
example, no harm should be inflicted on participants in a research project, either 
physically, mentally or socially. Secondly, care should be taken not to exploit 
vulnerable groups. Thirdly, no physical or environmental damage should caused by a 
research project. Fourthly, participants in a research project should, wherever 
possible, be fully informed of the nature of the work and should give their consent 
rather than being forced or hoodwinked into participation. Fifthly, anonymity, 
confidentiality and privacy, where requested, should be guaranteed and honoured. 
Finally, researchers have a duty to ensure that they do not bring their own institutions 
of affiliations into disrepute.
According to Bulmer (2001), ethics is a matter of principled sensitivity to the rights of 
others. From an ethical point of view, respect for human dignity is more important than 
the observation of the truth. Those ethical considerations influence all scientific
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research and, when the research is designed, the ethical implications should be 
treated as a key issue. During social science research, a study needs to be ethically 
sound. The possible ethical issues within this study have been dealt with, as have 
concerns over how the names of respondents are used, how the data will be 
published, how the anonymity of individual respondents will be preserved, and how the 
confidentiality of the final data will be safeguarded.
Yates (2004, p. 160) raises seven issues of concern in ethics, namely gaining access 
to participants: what is your route in? Secondly, getting past the “gatekeepers”: who 
controls access? Those people may control or have power within the research context 
you are proposing to explore. The third issue is informed consent: how much do you 
tell the participants? How much do you tell the participants about the research project? 
In many cases researchers do not wish to overly inform participants in case this 
knowledge will impact on how they respond in an interview. The fourth issue is 
deception: are there grounds for deceiving the participants? In nearly all cases the 
answer to this question is “no” on principled moral and ethical grounds.
The fifth issue is right to privacy: how private are the things being discussed? To what 
extent do the participants wish to be identified as the individuals involved in the 
research? This is followed by the sixth issue, the right to withdraw: how do participants 
get out of research? Finally, self-presentation: how do you present yourself in the 
interview/research context?” Ethical research therefore requires a concerted effort to 
strike a balance between the value of advancing knowledge against the value of 
maintaining non-intrusion or non-interference in the lives of other people affected by 
research (Neuman, 1997 p.445).
Permission from the relevant authority in Malaysia was obtained prior to fieldwork from 
the Ministry of Housing and Local Government Malaysia (refer to Appendix 3 for a 
letter of approval to conduct the study from MHLG). Since most information related to 
ORS was classified as confidential, the ministry could not release specific individual 
records or the latest data from the ORS database. Permission was also granted to 
access selected ministry officials for in-depth interviews. However, in Malaysia there is 
no need to gain permission from the government to study low cost house buyers. All 
informants were also required to sign the informed consent form prior to the interview. 
The approval from the University Research Ethic Committee was also obtained prior to 
conducting the fieldwork in March 2008.
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3.8 CONCLUSION
This chapter has discussed the methodology of the research. The choice of the 
qualitative research paradigm was influenced by the objective of the research to seek 
an explanation and understanding of the relationship between the key players. The 
objective of this qualitative research was to interpret the account of the ideas, 
perceptions, beliefs and behaviours of various agents involved in the low cost housing 
allocation process, based on the ORS case study. Therefore, the study is more 
inclined towards a critical realism perspective rather than social constructionism. In this 
context, the study is both explanatory in that it examines and documents a topic which 
is both under-documented and under-researched in Malaysia.
The general research strategy based on the case study approach was the application 
of multiple methods, within which diverse research methods, especially data and 
information collection, were applied simultaneously and cross checked to minimise the 
weaknesses of each individual method. Two categories of sources of data i.e. 
documentary analysis and interviews spanning three methods and techniques of data 
collection were used in this study to generate and triangulate evidence on the study 
phenomenon. The first was the use of qualitative interviews based on a semi- 
structured questionnaire targeting knowledgeable informants. The results of the 
interview are presented in Chapters 6 and 7. The second method was documentary 
analysis. Much of the documentary evidence was from secondary sources. The review 
of secondary documentary evidence provided general and background information and 
much of this forms the basis for Chapters 4, 5 and 6 of this study. Meanwhile, the 
focus group interview was the third source of evidence used in this study. The focus 
group interview was targeted towards low cost house buyers from a selected project 
identified during the fieldwork. The evidence from the focus group interview is mostly 
incorporated into Chapter 7.
The issues of validity and reliability were also addressed in this research to ensure it 
follows the usual case study protocol as suggested by Yin (2003). Prior approval from 
related bodies on research ethics and in order to access sensitive materials was also 
obtained before the fieldwork was conducted in Malaysia.
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CHAPTER 4:
HOUSING PROVISION IN MALAYSIA
4.1 INTRODUCTION
Malaysia has experienced rapid economic development with rising per capita income and 
urbanisation, particularly since the early 1990s (World Bank, 1993, p.1). Thus, the 
pressure on housing is enormous, particularly among people with a low income. More 
people are demanding a better quality of housing in line with rising income, but at the 
same time thousands still live in poor conditions in squatter settlements throughout the 
country. The social and economic changes experienced by the people necessitate 
improvements in housing conditions. As a multiracial country, housing provision has 
played an important role in nation building and political stability in Malaysia. The changes 
in the global political economy towards neo-liberalism and a market economy over the last 
30 years have clearly directly influenced Malaysia’s housing policy.
The purpose of this chapter is to discuss the impact of the changes to the political 
economy and housing provision in Malaysia from the late British Colonial period until 
2005. The discussion will began with an understanding of Malaysia’s changing political 
economy before exploring an in-depth analysis of the role of the state and market in 
housing provision using the Structure of Housing Provision (SHP) approach. The chapter 
will be divided into three sections to discuss Malaysia in general, the impact of changes to 
the political economy regarding housing provision and, finally, discussion of 
developmental state debates and housing provision in the context of Malaysia.
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4.2 MALAYSIA IN GENERAL
The Federation of Malaysia, formed in 1963, originally consisted of Malaya, Singapore, 
Sarawak and Sabah (Singapore left the Federation in 1965). Malaya is now known as 
Peninsular Malaysia, and the two other territories on the island of Borneo are known as 
East Malaysia. Prior to 1963, these territories were under British rule for varying periods 
from the late eighteenth century. Malaya gained independence in 1957, Sarawak and 
Sabah (the latter known previously as British North Borneo) in 1963. Currently, the 
Federation of Malaysia consists of 14 States including Federal Territory and covers an 
area of 329,750 sq. km (see Figure 4.1).
In 2010, the population of Malaysia was 28.3 million comprising 61.4 percent Bumiputera,
23.7 percent Chinese, 7.1 percent Indian and 7.8 percent others/non-citizens (Department 
of Statistics Malaysia, 2010). Bumiputera literally means ‘son of the soil’ (Roslan, 2001, 
p.2). Malay are the main Bumiputera in Peninsular Malaysia, meanwhile in Sabah there 
are Kadazan, Bajau and Murut. In Sarawak they are Iban, Malay, Bidayuh and Melanau. 
Therefore, Malaysia has one of the most complex ethnic mixes in South East Asia 
(Funston, 2001, p. 160). Bumiputera show the highest growth rate compared to other 
ethnic groups which has risen from 49.8 percent in 1957 to 61.4 percent in 2010 (see 
Table 4.1). The largest population is concentrated along the west coast of peninsular 
Malaysia, especially in the Klang Valley region, with 55 percent of Bumiputera living in 
urban areas. The State of Selangor has the highest population in Malaysia, numbering 5.1 
million in 2010.
Table 4.1: Population of Malaysia According to Ethnic Group 1957-2010
Ethnic 1957 1970 1980 1991 2000 2010
Bumiputera 3,125,474
(49.8%)
5,78,250
(55.6%)
7,782,813
(59.2%)
10,299,903
(58.6%)
14,248,179
(61.2%)
17,306,684
(61.4%)
Chinese 2,333,756
(37.2%)
3,495,977
(33.9%)
4,167,053
(31.7%)
4,623,882
(26.3%)
5,691,908
(24.5%)
6,701,111
(23.7%)
Indian 696,186
(11.1%)
933,250
(9.0%)
1,101,699
(8.4%)
1,316,086
(7.5%)
1,680,132
(7.2%)
2,007,506
(7.1%)
Others/Non-Citizens1 123,342
(1.9%)
151,847
(1.5%)
84,544
(0.7%)
1,323,549 
(7.6%)
1,654,471
(7.1%)
2,205,428
(7.8%)
Total 6,278,758(100.0%)
10,319,324
(100%)
13,136,109
(100%)
17,563,420
(100%)
23,274,729
(100%)
28,274,729
(100%)
Note:1 Others category from 1991 Population and Housing Census include non-citizens 
Sources: Department of Statistics, 2000 and 2010
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Figure 4.1: Map of Malaysia
Source: http://lib.utexas.edu/maps/malavsia.html
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Despite being a multiethnic country, since independence Malaysia has achieved a 
remarkable degree of political stability along with economic and social progress 
(Funston, 2001, p. 160). The United Malays National Organization (UMNO) is a 
dominant political party in Barisan Nasional (National Front). The UMNO, alongside 
the Malaysian Chinese Association (MCA), Malaysian Indian Congress (MIC) and 
other smaller parties formed a coalition government in 1955. The Barisan Nasional 
(known as Perikatan or ‘Coalition’ prior to 1971) has been in power at the Federal level 
from 1957 until the present day. Since independence, Malaysia has had six prime 
ministers namely Tunku Abdul Rahman (1957-1970), Tun Abdul Razak (1970-1976), 
Tun Hussein Onn (1976-1981), Tun Dr. Mahathir Mohamed (1981-2003), Tun 
Abdullah Ahmad Badawi (2003-2009) and Najib Tun Razak (2009 - to date). Dr. 
Mahathir Mohamed is the longest serving prime minister of Malaysia, as he held office 
for 22 years. During his tenure, Malaysia was transformed into the second-tier of 
Newly Industrialised Countries (NICs) in the 1990s.
Political stability has been the key factor behind Malaysia’s continuous economic 
growth since independence. The most important achievement in terms of its economy 
is success in transforming the country from a commodity-based economy into one 
based on manufacturing; this change has occurred since the 1970s. Malaysia’s 
economic growth since independence has been remarkable, with an annual Growth 
Domestic Product (GDP) of more than 5%, except for the periods of 1986-1987 and 
1997-1998 during the recession which show negative growth (see Figure 4.2).
-10
GDP
Figure 4.2: Malaysia’s Annual Growth Domestic Product (GDP) 1970-2008 
Source: The World Bank, 2010 (http://data.worldbank.org/countrv/malavsia)
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In terms of household monthly income distribution, the mean household income 
increased substantially between 1957 and 2007, especially among the Chinese and 
Indian ethnic groups (see Table 4.2). The income disparity between the ethnic groups 
and between rural and urban areas is still present despite various efforts by the 
government to improve the situation. Bumiputera remain the lowest income earners 
and the majority still live in rural areas. This situation justifies the government’s 
continuous efforts to reduce the income gap between ethnic groups and between 
urban and rural areas.
Table 4.2: Mean Monthly Gross Household Income by Ethnicity, Urban and 
Rural, 1957-2007
Ethnic 1957<RM)
1967
mm
1970
mm
1979
mm
1989
mm
1999
(RM)
2007
(RM)
Bumiputera 134 154 172 492 940 1,984 3,156
Chinese 288 329 394 1,002 1,631 3,456 4,853
Indian 228 245 304 756 1,209 2,702 3,799
Rural 307 340 428 1,045 1,606 3,103 4,356
Urban 166 175 200 523 957 1,718 2,283
Source: Economic Planning Unit, 2010
Meanwhile, in terms of structure of government, Malaysia practices a constitutional 
monarchy and parliamentary democracy with a three-tier government structure, 
namely Federal, State and Local/District (see Figure 4.3). Federal executive power is 
vested in the cabinet led by the prime minister. The cabinet is chosen from among 
members of parliament and is collectively responsible to that body. The Malaysian 
Parliament consists of the Yang di-Pertuan Agong or king, the Senate (Dewan Negara) 
and the House of Representatives (Dewan Rakyat). Meanwhile, legislative power is 
divided between Federal and State legislatures. Malaysia’s parliament was based on 
the Westminster model and makes Federal laws applicable to Malaysia as a whole 
(Funston, 2001 p. 179). It also examines the government’s policies, approves the 
government’s expenditure and new taxes and also serves as the forum for criticism 
and the focus of public opinion on national affairs.
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Figure 4.3: Structure of Government in Malaysia
Source: Public Service Department Malaysia (PSD), 2010 at www.ipa.qov.mv
Malaysia’s Federal Constitution clearly outlines the responsibility and division of power 
between the Federal and State government. The Federal government has authority 
over, among other things, external affairs, defence, internal security, civil and criminal 
law and the administration of justice (except for certain civil law cases among Malays
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or other Muslims which are adjudicated under Islamic law), federal citizenship, finance, 
trade, commerce, industry, shipping, communications, transportation, power, 
education, medicine, health, labour and tourism. The State governments have, in their 
respective states, authority over, among others, land, local government and services of 
a local character such as markets, fairs, licensing of places of public amusement. Both 
the Federal and State governments have concurrent jurisdiction over, among others, 
social welfare, town and country planning, public health, sanitation, drainage, irrigation, 
housing and provisions for housing accommodation.
The State governments are presided over by ceremonial state rulers. The ruler acts on 
the advice of the State Executive Council that is chaired by the chief minister. All the 
states have unicameral legislatures and elections are held every five years. In states 
where there is no hereditary ruler, a governor is appointed by the king to be the 
ceremonial head of state. The State governments are led by chief ministers (Menteri 
Besar or Ketua Menteri), selected by the state assemblies. The state legislature has 
the autonomy to pass any law so long as it is consistent with Federal laws. Local 
government comprises two components: district administration and local authorities. 
District administration is the prominent administrative body at the district level for both 
the state and Federal governments. The District Officer usually heads the District 
Council and is responsible for the development of the district as a whole. There are 
two types of local governments: municipalities for large towns, and district councils for 
small urban centres. The State government appoints the mayor, chief administrative 
officer, and local councillors.
However, many political scientists describe federalism in Malaysia as highly 
centralised (Jomo and Hui, 2002; Moten and Islam, 2004). The most common issue 
highlighted in the research was related to the financial power held by the Federal 
government. In Malaysia, the Federal government is responsible for collecting all direct 
taxes such as income tax, import and export duties. Meanwhile, the State 
governments are only assigned to collect residual revenues related to land, real 
property, agricultural and forestry. Therefore, the State governments rely very much on 
Federal grants, including those for infrastructure development and public housing 
programmes. Over the last twenty years, State governments have surrendered various 
functions to the Federal government due to a lack of fiscal resources, including low 
income housing provision (Funston, 2001 p. 190).
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4.3 CHANGES TO THE POLITICAL ECONOMY AND HOUSING PROVISION IN 
MALAYSIA
Many scholars have published studies on the changes to the political economy in 
Malaysia since the British Colonial period (see Boo Teik, 2001; Jomo, 1999; Okposin 
et al., 1999). However, no previous research looks at the impact of the changes to the 
political economy in Malaysia in relation to the changing role of the state and market in 
housing provision. The aim of this section is to briefly discuss the impact of changes to 
the political economy on the role of the state and market in housing provision. 
Therefore, the existing literature on changes to the political economy of Malaysia will 
be used for analysis in this section. Malaysia has undergone different phases of 
political and economic development that have influenced the role of the state and 
market in the economy since independence.
Jomo (1999 p.85) explains Malaysian economic development planning has been 
primarily shaped by the nature of the ruling regimes and their respective visions for 
development. He distinguishes four different regimes of Malaysian development as 
Late Colonial Priorities (1950-1957), Alliance Laissez-Faire (1957-1969), Growing 
State Intervention (1970-1985) and Economic Liberalisation (1986-1997). Since 
Jomo’s analysis was conducted only until the Asian Financial Crisis in 1997, the 
regime after the crisis was identified as Semi-autarchy (1998-present) according to 
Boo Teik (2001 p. 194).
Meanwhile, the analysis of the changing role of the state in housing provision in 
Malaysia will use the Structure of Housing Provision (SHP) framework developed by 
Ball (1986). Various studies have used SHP as a research framework for explanation 
and comparison of different housing systems (see Ball et al., 1988; Wu, 1996; Li, 
1998). The analysis in this chapter focussed on overall housing provision system in 
Malaysia, particularly the role of state and market in housing production and allocation. 
Land matters and housing finance will be discussed briefly in the analysis. A detailed 
analysis of low cost housing provision in Malaysia will be carried out in the next 
chapter.
A summary of housing policy development and the key players in housing is shown in 
Table 4.3. The key local and international policy documents which guide the housing 
policy formulation are also listed in the table. The summary is then followed by an 
analysis of changes to the political economy and their impact on housing provision.
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Table 4.3: Summary of Housing Policy Development in Malaysia, 1950-2005
Theme/Period Key Housing issues Foous of Attention
Key Housing Policy/Implementation 
Strategies Key Documents/ Laws Key Player
Late Colonial
Priorities
(1950-1957)
• Illegal squatters.
• Overcrowding and slums 
in urban areas.
• Housing shortage after 
the war due to lack of 
budget
• Resettlement of people mainly 
from squatter areas during 
Malayan Emergencies into new 
villages.
• Provision of housing for low 
income people in the urban areas
• Building of 480 new villages throughout 
Malaya and resettlement of more than 
500,000 people under military command.
• Setting-up of the Government Housing Trust 
in 1951.
• Malayan Union Housing 
Committee Report, 1947.
• G. Rudduck Report, 1950
• Briggs Plan, 1952
• Housing Trust Ordinance, 
1950
• 1st Malaya Plan (1956-1960)
• Federal Government 
as key player in 
housing provision 
through The Housing 
Trust
Alliance • Housing shortage due to • Encourage government servants • Setting-up of Ministry of Local Government • 2nd Malaya Plan (1961-1965) • Federal and State
Laissez-Faire low production by the and public to own their house and Housing in 1964 • 1st Malaysia Plan (1966 - government as key
(1957-1969) public and private sector. under the Home Owning • State development agencies and large local 1970) players in housing
• Government priority for Democracy Program in 1961. authorities begin housing programmes. • Housing Developer Act, 1966 provision for low cost
infrastructures & rural • Emphasis on housing provision • The Housing Trust concentrates on building enacted housing.
development. for low income people especially low cost houses. • Private sector
• Rural -  urban migration in the urban areas • Introduction of the industrialised system for focuses on medium
increases after • Encourage private sector housing construction. and high cost
independence. involvement in housing provision. housing
Growing
State
Intervention
(1970-1985)
Acute housing shortage in 
urban areas due to a 
huge influx of people from 
rural areas.
Formation of squatter and 
slums.
Eradication of poverty and 
restructuring of society 
Housing provision through land 
development schemes and 
regional development authorities. 
Encourage national unity in 
housing development.
Public sector continues to provide 
housing for low income people 
Setting-up of state development 
agencies to build houses.
Private sector continues to focus 
on medium and high cost housing.
Recognition of informal sector; squatter 
upgrading and sites-and-services; subsidies 
for land and housing.
Establishment of National Housing Dept, in 
1976 to replace The Housing Trust 
State government takes over responsibility 
to provide low cost houses under Public 
Low Cost Housing Programme (PLCHP) 
Imposition of minimum 30% Bumiputera 
quota for housing allocation 
National Consultative Council on Housing 
set-up in 1980 to discuss housing issues 
between private and public sector.
Structure and Local Plan provides better 
framework for housing development and 
land allocation.
Introduction of new ceiling price for low cost 
housing at RM25.000 per unit in 1982 and 
standardisation of 30 % low cost housing 
quota
New Economic Policy, 1971. 
2nd Malaysia Plan (1971-1975) 
3* Malaysia Plan (1976-1980) 
Vancouver Declaration 
(Habitat 1, 1976).
Town and Country Planning 
Act, 1976
4,h Malaysia Plan (1981-1985) 
1990)
Privatisation Policy, 1981 
Shelter, Poverty and Basic 
Needs (World Bank, 1980); 
World Bank evaluations of 
sites-and-services (1981- 
1983)
Private sector takes 
over as the key 
player in housing 
provision except low 
cost housing 
Stategovernment 
takes over 
responsibility for low 
cost housing 
provision from the 
Federal government 
(the Housing Trust)
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Continued
Theme/Period Key Housing Issues Focus of Attention
KeyJHousing Policy/Implementation 
* Strategies - v 4 Key Documents/ Laws Key Player
Economic
Liberalisation
(1986-1997)
Rapid economic 
development, increasing 
influx of foreign 
immigrants.
Worsening illegal 
squatter problem. 
Housing oversupply 
during Asian Financial 
Crisis in 1997-1998.
Human Settlement Concept for 
housing development with an 
emphasis on sustainable 
development.
To ensure all people, regardless 
of their income level, live in a 
decent house.
Securing an enabling framework 
for action by people, the private 
sector and markets.
Privatisation Policy including 
housing provision
To build more affordable housing 
especially low and low medium cost 
housing.
Joint venture housing development 
between public and private sector.
Ministry of Housing and Local Government 
(MHLG) introduced new regulations and 
guidelines related to housing development 
(1991-1995)
New ceiling price for low cost housing set 
between RM 30,000 and RM42.000 per 
unit according to location in June 1998.
National Development Plan, 
1991
5th Malaysia Plan (1986-1990) 
6lh Malaysia Plan (1991-1995) 
7lh Malaysia Plan (1996-2000) 
Global Shelter Strategy until 
the year 2000 (UNCHS, 1988) 
Agenda 21 (UNCHS, 1992) 
Enabling Housing Markets to 
Work (World Bank, 1993)
The Habitat Agenda (UNCHS, 
1996); Global Report on 
Human Settlements (UNCHS, 
1996)
Private Sector takes 
over as the key 
player in housing 
provision including 
low cost housing 
Government began 
to retreat from direct 
housing provision
Semi-Autarchy
(1998-present)
Unresolved squatter 
problems
Oversupply of low cost 
houses
Inefficient housing 
allocation system
• Emphasis on sustainable 
development and adequate 
housing for all income groups.
• Emphasis on information and 
communication technology and 
the use of industrialised building 
systems.
• Public sector to play a major role 
in housing provision for low 
income people.
• Nationwide squatter elimination 
programme
Government announced 35,000 units of 
low cost housing to be built nationwide as 
part of the economic stimulation package 
during the Asian Financial crisis in 1999. 
Emphasis on squatter elimination 
programmes by the year 2005. 
Implementation of People Housing 
Programme (PHP) for rental in 1998 
Introduction of Computerised Open 
Registration System (ORS) for low cost 
house buyers in 1998.
Flexibility on the 30% quota of low cost 
houses in 2002
Implementation of alternative Build then 
Sell Concept for housing development 
since 2006
• Vision Development Plan, 
2001
• 8th Malaysia Plan (2001-2005)
• 9th Malaysia Plan (2006-2010)
• Report of study on 
Computerised Open 
Registration System 
Improvement, 2006
• Amendment to Housing 
Developer Act, 1966 
(rename Housing 
Development Act) in 2002.
• National Squatters Census 
and Relocation Study, 1999
Private Sector 
remains the key 
player in housing 
provision including 
low cost housing 
Federal government 
began to increase 
its role in low cost 
housing provision 
under PHP
Sources: Shuid, 2004 and Various Five Year Malaysia Plans
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4.3.1 Late Colonial Priorities (1950-1957)
a) Political Economy
During the late colonial period, the British Colonial government were more concerned 
with British owned rubber plantation and tin mining interests in Malaya (Jomo, 1999, p. 
88). Therefore, the main priority was to repair facilities damaged during the war and to 
provide new infrastructure such as telecommunications, electricity, roads, highways 
and ports in order to service the primary commodity export economy. However, little 
was done by the Colonial government to improve living conditions and the economy 
before independence. Only fourteen percent was allocated to the economic sector for 
social services compared to sixty nine percent for infrastructure under the First Malaya 
Development Plan (1956-1960) (Jomo, 1999 p.88). The housing sector then only 
received seven percent from the total amount allocated for social services. At the 
same time, the Colonial government was fighting the communist insurgencies in the 
Malayan jungle, which further limited the amount the government could spend on 
social services and housing. Meanwhile, the people of Malaya were generally divided 
geographically according to their social and economic backgrounds. The Malays 
largely lived in rural areas and worked in small agriculture plots. The Chinese were 
concentrated in urban areas and were involved in more lucrative activities such as 
trade and mining and the Indians mainly worked and lived in the large rubber 
plantations owned by the Europeans.
b) Housing Provision
Since the country was predominantly rural in nature, the structure of housing provision
was relatively simple during this period (see Figure 4.4). The Federal government,
particularly through the Malayan Housing Trust (the Housing Trust), was responsible
for housing provision during this period. The establishment of the Housing Trust could
be traced after World War II. According to a report by the Malayan Union Housing
Committee, there was a house shortage of 27,000 units in Malaya, particularly in urban
areas due to a lack of new house construction and house destruction during the war
(Shuid, 2006, p.40). Following recommendation by the Malayan Union Housing
Committee, the British Colonial government established the Housing Trust Federation
of Malaya in 1951 under the Housing Trust Ordinance, 1950. The Housing Trust was
empowered to raise money to be used to pay private builders for housing construction,
to build houses and purchase land where no suitable state land was available
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(Jagatheesan, 1979: 24). Meanwhile, State government involvement was limited to 
identifying suitable land for housing development. The financing for housing 
construction was provided by the Housing Trust. However, due to a limited budget and 
lack of manpower, the trust only began its operation in 1953 and only managed to 
build a total of 1,552 units of housing in Malaya from 1953 to 1957 (Shuid, 2006).
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The only large scale housing programme implemented by the British Colonial 
government occurred during the Malayan Emergency from 1948 to 1960 (Agus, 1998). 
Under the Briggs Plan from 1952 to 1955, the people who lived in the fringe of jungles 
and who were mostly illegal squatters were resettled in new villages across Malaya to 
avoid contact with communist insurgencies. Due to the urgent need for the relocation 
of 500,000 people into 480 new villages, the houses built were mostly not up to the 
required building standards and were poorly constructed by military personnel with the 
help of the villagers. Since the programme was implemented under military control, the 
houses built were therefore never considered to be part of a public housing 
programme (see Figure 4.5).
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Figure 4.5: Typical Houses Built in the New Villages during the Malayan 
Emergency, 1948-1960
Sources: Courtesy of the National Archive, Malaysia
Meanwhile, the involvement of the private sector was fairly limited to high cost housing 
developments in urban areas such as Kuala Lumpur, Klang and Penang. British 
owned companies operated in major cities to cater to the needs of wealthy 
businessmen, for example, the Kenny Hill Development in Kuala Lumpur during the 
1950s (Shuid 2006, p.60). Small scale private house builders also provided house 
construction for individuals. Furthermore, the sources for house financing from private 
companies were limited and difficult to find; for example, that provided by the Malayan 
Building Society (MBS).
4.3.2 Alliance Laissez-Faire (1957-1969)
a) Political Economy
In preparation for Malayan independence, the British ensured that the “ethnic elites 
committed to protecting their interest were cultivated to eventually inherit state power 
in 1957” (Jomo, 1999, p. 90). Thus, the alliance of the political elite from three major 
ethnic groups, namely UMNO, MCA and MIC, formally took state power and political
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jurisdiction over post-colonial Malaya. The compromise protected foreign economic 
interests mainly held by the British, particularly the plantations and tin mines. Jomo 
adds “...the Alliance government’s development strategy reflected the class interest 
and political compromise. Consistent with this compromise, the state pursued a 
basically laissez-faire development strategy with minimum state interference ...” 
Similarly, other scholars describe the state during this period as playing a ‘restrained 
role’, promoting ‘laissez-faire capitalism’ and having an unprotected market (see Boo 
Teik, 1997; Funston, 2001).
However, as a newly independent nation, the development priority was to provide 
infrastructure and rural development, as reflected by government allocation under the 
Second Malaya Plan (1960-1965) and First Malaysia Plan (1966-1970). More than 
sixty percent of development expenditure was allocated to the economic sector 
compared to less than thirty percent for social services during both plan periods. With 
less priority given to social services by the government, the housing sector received an 
allocation of only three percent under the Second Malaya Plan and five percent under 
the First Malaysia Plan. The small amount of money allocated for public housing is 
therefore consistent with a laissez fair economy adopted by the government during this 
period.
b) Housing Provision
The housing provision during this period was still not much different from that available 
in the pre-independence period, except the role of the British Colonial Government 
was replaced by the Federal Government of Malaysia with minor roles played by the 
State governments (see Figure 4.6). The Federal government, through the Housing 
Trust, still played an important role in low cost housing provision. Financing for the 
programme was provided by the Federal government through State governments in 
the form of loans, while the Trust provided the technical expertise for layout 
preparation, house design, tender administration and the monitoring of house 
construction (Ministry of Local Government and Housing, 1966). The house 
construction was undertaken by the private building contractors. The State 
governments’ role was still limited to identification of suitable land for housing provision 
and managing the loan repayment to the Federal government when houses were sold 
by the Housing Trust.
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In terms of market provision, after independence more local companies began to 
become involved in housing development, particularly for medium and high cost 
housing. During this period, the private housing developers enjoyed a relatively free 
market with minimum government controls and regulations in line with the laissez-faire 
economic policy adopted by the government. Their number grew rapidly and by 1972 
there were a total of 626 registered private housing developers in peninsular Malaysia, 
more than in any other South East Asian country at that time, as described by 
Johnstone (1980). The government also did not impose any requirement for the private 
housing developers to build low cost housing in line with the laissez-faire economic 
policy practiced during that period. The private housing developers obtained the sites 
for development from private land. Financing for house construction was available 
from a growing number of private financial institutions and building societies. The 
private contractors were usually appointed to undertake housing construction by the 
private housing developers. However, in 1966, the Housing Developers Act (Control 
and Licensing) was enacted by parliament to regulate and control the operation of 
private housing developers in order to protect the house buyers due to an increasing 
number of fraud cases by the private developers (Malaysia 1966), thus showing the 
early signs of state control in the housing market.
4.3.3 Growing State Intervention (1971-1985)
a) Political Economy
The economic imbalance among ethnic groups and a population divided according to 
geographical locations could not be sustained in Malaysia. The conditions contributed 
to tension and, subsequently, the racial clash known as the ‘13th May 1969 Tragedy’. 
Following the incident, the country was ruled by the National Operations Council 
(NOC) headed by Deputy Prime Minister Tun Abdul Razak under the State of 
Emergency from 1969 to 1971. Razak’s regime, according to Boo Teik (2001, p. 176), 
no longer relied on laissez-faire capitalism and began to devise the New Economic 
Policy (NEP) (see Malaysia, 1991; Jomo & Gomez, 2000; Pillay, 2000 for detail on 
NEP). The NEP had two main objectives; the first was to eradicate poverty by raising 
income levels. The second was to increase employment opportunities for all 
Malaysians, irrespective of race, and accelerate the process of restructuring Malaysian 
society in order to correct the economic imbalance and to reduce and eventually 
eliminate the identification of race with economic function (Malaysia, 1973). Therefore, 
the state visibly encroached into the market including employment in manufacturing, 
property ownership, company equity, etc. in order to meet its NEP targets. The NEP 
envisaged the incidence of poverty declining from 49 percent in 1970 to 16 percent in 
1990 and the Bumiputera share of corporate equity rising from 2.5 percent in 1970 to 
30 percent in 1990.
Many scholars argue that Malaysia’s growth and restructuring policies throughout the 
NEP period were interventionist, with strong roles for both market and government 
(see Jomo, 1999; Rasiah and Shari, 2001). NEP implementation required the state to 
be actively involved in the economy and physical development and to allocate more 
funds to public expenditure (Jomo, 1999, p.93). Thus, the NEP was unique, not only in 
comparison with Singapore which shares a similar history and institutional background, 
but also in the context of East Asia as a whole (Kwon, 2005, p.93). In 1981, Dr. 
Mahathir became Prime Minister which saw a dominant and dramatic change in the 
role of the executive with a shift towards a developmental state approach based on the 
Northeast Asia model through the Look East Policy (Funston, 2001, p. 198). The 
developmental approach adopted in the early stage of the Mahathir administration 
further increased state intervention in all economic and social policies, including 
housing provision.
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b) Housing Provision
Following the cessation of the operation of the Malayan Housing Trust in 1976 (MHLG, 
2006), the State governments began to take responsibility for public housing provision 
from the Federal government (see Figure 4.7). The Stategovemments, through the 
Housing Section, provided low cost housing in the states under the Public Low Cost 
Housing Programme (PLCHP). The State governments also established their own 
State Economic Development Corporation (SEDC) and were involved directly in 
housing development. The establishment of the SEDC by the State government was 
crucial to achieving NEP objectives through housing provision. The SEDC not only 
provided medium and high cost housing, but also low cost houses as directed by the 
State governments. The SEDC received financial support in the form of grants and 
loans from the State governments to provide housing, including low cost. Land for 
housing development for the SEDC was usually provided by the State government 
from state land or through land acquisition. Meanwhile, house construction was 
undertaken by private contractors.
Structure of Housing 
Provision
r
1r
Sta
Goven
ite
iment
Financing: 
Federal Government I
Land:
State land/acquisitioni
Construction: 
Private Contractors
' \*\v *>sr «v.s'
1r
Private
Hout
Sector
sing
Financing: 
Private Financial 
Institutions/Banks
Land: 
Private/State Land
Construction: 
Private Contractors
Housing StockHousing Stock Housing StockHousing Stock
State Secretary 
(Housing Section)
State Development 
Corporation (SEDC)
CooperativeHousing
Developers
Public Low Cost 
House Programme 
(PLCHP) for sale
Low /medium/high 
cost housing for 
sale
Low/med/ high cost 
Housing for sale
Low /medium/high 
cost housing for 
sale
Figure 4.7: The Structure of Housing Provision in Malaysia during the NEP 
Period, 1971-1985 
Source: Author
97
In line with NEP objectives to restructure society, the state encouraged the rural-urban 
migration among the Bumiputera. A sudden increase in migration and rapid 
urbanisation during the early 1970s caused housing shortages in urban areas. The 
failure of the state to provide a sufficient number of low cost houses through the 
Housing Trust prompted the need for private sector involvement. Under Mahathir’s 
administration, the government began to impose various regulations and guidelines for 
housing development undertaken by private developers. This included a requirement 
for 30 percent low cost housing through the planning system and a ceiling price per 
unit of RM25.000 throughout the country after 1981 (Malaysia, 1981).
Meanwhile, the private sector continued with the construction of medium and high cost 
housing with increased control by the government. Private housing developers and 
cooperatives began to play a vital role in housing production after the privatisation 
policy introduced by the government under Mahathir’s administration in 1981. The 
increased role played by private developers in housing production, despite various 
controls and regulations, shows how the government skilfully attracted the market to 
become involved in national development. The land for housing development by the 
private sector was either purchased directly from the market (individual/company) or 
the State governments (state land/land acquisition). The financing for housing 
development was usually provided by private financial institutions or the developers’ 
own sources. Finally the construction of the houses was accomplished by private 
housing contractors.
4.3.4 Economic Liberalisation (1986-1997)
a) Political Economy
The state began to rethink its intervention policy and embarked on economic 
liberalisation after the recession in 1986-1987. The business community generally 
blamed the government’s excessive intervention policy as the main reason for poor 
economic growth (Jomo, 1999; Jomo and Gomez, 2000 p. 292). Thus, they called for a 
less regulated market and reduced state intervention in the economy, including among 
the Malays elites. The state began economic liberalisation and selective interventions 
were implemented in order to overcome market failure and to enhance economic 
performance (Jomo, 1999; Rasiah & Shari, 2001). Meanwhile, Malaysian economic 
recovery and prosperity during the early 1990s was largely as a result of export
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oriented manufacturing investment, with average annual growth rates above 8 percent 
from 1989 to 1997. Malaysia was recognised as one of the newly industrialised 
economies with liberal and export oriented industries governed by the markets by the 
mid 1990s (see the World Bank, 1993; Saleh and Meyanathan, 1993; Jomo, 1999; 
Rasiah and Shari, 2001). A blend of government intervention and the market helped to 
make export-oriented industrialisation a success and specific distributive policies 
helped to reduce poverty and inequality.
The Federal government realised a partnership between the private sector and the 
state was the key ‘ingredient’ to achieve sustained growth (Malaysia, 1991). Thus, the 
government began to rely on the market during the early 1990s and partially retreated 
from social services provision. Despite implementation of NEP strategies during the 
1970s and 1980s, neo-liberal orthodoxy has portrayed Malaysian economic 
fundamentals as having been fulfilled by market-friendly policies (Rasiah and Shari, 
2001 p.58). Therefore, the World Bank considered the second-tier NICs, including 
Malaysia, as better models for the global liberalising process for other developing 
countries (World Bank, 1993, p.2). In 1991, the NEP was replaced by the National 
Development Plan (NDP), which emphasised economic growth, but still maintained the 
NEP’s ethnic considerations.
b) Housing Provision
During the early 1990s, the housing policy in Malaysia was largely influenced by 
international agencies’ recommendations which promoted a neo-liberal agenda in 
developing countries. The World Bank Report “Housing: Enabling Market to Work” in 
particular emphasised the reform of government policies, institutions, and regulations 
to enable the housing market to work more efficiently (World Bank 1993, p.1). 
Governments were advised to abandon their earlier role as producer of housing and to 
adopt an enabling role of managing the housing sector as a whole. As a result, 
governments throughout the world began to retreat from public housing provision and 
were only involved in providing assistance to the self-help housing sector (Pugh 2001, 
p. 400).
In Malaysia, economic liberalisation from 1986 onwards further increased the 
government’s reliance on the private sector to provide housing for the people. The total 
number of houses completed by the private sector for the categories of low, medium
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and high cost housing since the Fifth Malaysia Plan (1986-1990) shows that the 
market made a significant contribution to housing provision (see Figure 4.8). The trend 
continued during the Sixth Malaysia Plan (1991-1995), when 86.9 percent of total 
housing was built by the private sector compared to only 13.1 percent by the public 
sector. Even during the Asian Financial Crisis, the private sector continued to provide
85.8 percent of the total number of houses built during the Seventh Malaysia Plan 
(1996-2000).
4th (81-85) 5th (86-90) 6th (91-95) 7th (96-00) 8th (01-05)
Malaysia Plan
■  Public Sector ■  Private Sector
Figure 4.8: Share of Public-Private Sector Housing Provision from the Fourth to
the Eighth Malaysia Plan, 1981-2005
Sources: Various Malaysia Five Year Developm ent Plans
Surprisingly, during the 1990s, the state continued to control the housing market. A 
study by the World Bank (1993) indicated that private housing developers in Malaysia 
were required to satisfy at least 55 different steps of a regulatory process which might 
take five to seven years before they could deliver their products to the market. This is 
in contrast with Thailand, where the entire process of seeking approval involved only 
15 different steps and took approximately 100 days. However, a major result of these 
regulatory requirements was increased risk associated with participating in the 
residential construction industry. Therefore, in Malaysia, only firms that were relatively 
large and had sufficient capital could afford to deal with this process. Meanwhile, 
another study by Mayo and Malpezzi (1997) explains how various public intervention 
constraints supply elasticity in Malaysia’s housing market. Although the state began to
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retreat from direct housing provision, as recommended by the World Bank, it still 
intervened in the market through various regulations.
Nevertheless, for many private housing developers, housing development remained 
attractive and profitable to the private sector due to relatively free market practice in 
the middle and high income housing markets. In addition, generous asset transfer, 
particularly of land from the government to large private companies, under the 
privatisation programme encouraged the participation of the private sector. Easy 
access to finance for housing development under financial globalization also 
contributed to an increasing number of houses being built in Malaysia during the early 
1990s. The structure of housing provision did not change very much from the NEP 
period except for an increased number of public-private partnerships in housing 
provision through joint-venture companies or the privatisation of government land (see 
Figure 4.9). The State governments usually provided land for development whilst the 
housing developers provided the capital and technical expertise. The financing for 
housing development was mainly provided by private financial institutions or banks. 
Meanwhile, house construction was usually undertaken by private contractors.
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4.3.5 Semi-Autarchy (1998 -  2005)
a) Political Economy
Before the Asian financial crisis of 1997, Malaysia was one of the most rapidly growing 
economies in East Asia. Unfortunately, Malaysia’s progress towards industrial nation 
status almost came to an abrupt halt due to the financial crisis (see Jomo, 1998, Flynn, 
1999, Mera and Renaud, 2000; Rodan et al., 2001 for details of the Asian financial 
crisis). The Asian financial crisis began to threaten the survival of the conglomerates 
and upset the state’s relationship with the market. Apart from the currency crisis, many 
scholars believe the Asian financial crisis was also triggered by excessive bank 
lending to the real estate sector, particularly housing (Koh et al., 2005; Quigley, 2001; 
Mera and Renaud, 2000). They argue that speculation in the real estate market was 
rampant in many Southeast Asian economies in the early 1990s. Corruption had also 
become deeply entrenched among both political leaders and the bureaucrats, with a 
lack of transparency (Funston, 2001, p. 197).
Despite all the problems, Malaysia was still among the countries which weathered the 
crisis due to its ‘mixed economy’ and strong economic fundamentals (see Besson, 
2000; Case, 2005 p. 28). The Malaysian mixed economy produced rapid growth and 
stability and enabled the government to initially resist the crisis induced pressures for 
reform that engulfed other East Asian countries. During the Asian Financial crisis in 
1997, there was also greater pressure from the international agencies, particularly the 
IMF, for neo-liberal reform. The IMF required countries affected by the crisis including 
Malaysia to pursue the principles of ‘good governance’, ‘economic reform’ and ‘market 
discipline’ in order to achieve economic recovery (Boo Teik, 2001, p.213). However, 
the Malaysian government refused to seek financial aid from the IMF in order to avoid 
interference from international agencies in the country’s economic affairs and through 
fear of the possible dismantling of the NEP (Jomo and Gomez, 2000, p. 275). Although 
Mahathir transformed the country into a modern capitalist state and had shown 
sensitivity to the forces of globalization since 1986 (Verma, 2004, p.9), during the 
financial crisis he began to blame globalization for the loss of control over national 
economic programmes.
After the crisis, the state began to emphasise statist interventions in managing the 
economy (Case, 2005, p. 285). However, this move was clearly against the neo-liberal
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reform propagated by the IMF. Due to continuous pressure from international 
agencies, the state turned to neo-liberal reforms and good governance agendas in 
both public and corporate sectors by the early 2000s. However, this new market thrust 
failed to re-energise foreign investment. Eventually the Mahathir administration 
returned to statist intervention until the end of his period of office in 2003. After 22 
years in office, Mahathir finally stepped down from his post and was replaced by 
Abdullah Badawi in October 2003. After taking over, Abdullah Badawi renewed 
reformist commitments to reduce corruption and pursue neo-liberal reform (Case 
2005). From late 2003, the government began to refurbish its regulatory apparatus, 
giving new attention to neo-liberal reform and good governance agendas.
Under the Abdullah Badawi administration, the government introduced more 
regularised procedures in both public and corporate sectors. This was later followed by 
the introduction of master plans and codes of conduct geared towards neo-liberal 
reforms and good governance (Case, 2005, p. 294). Some observers consider that the 
approach undertaken by the government since the appointment of the new Prime 
Minister Abdullah Badawi could be the best-regulated and most transparent in Asia. 
Thus, under the new administration, the Malaysian political economy has regained 
some of its earlier equilibrium prior to the crisis. His administration strongly identified 
with neo-liberal reforms and evoked another policy turn from statist intervention to 
market forces (Case, 2005, p. 305). In conclusion, the state embarked on statist 
intervention during the crisis in order to protect the political elites and Malaysian 
conglomerates before neo-liberal reform began after 2003.
b) Housing Provision
During the crisis, unsold property, including housing, soared in price and many buyers 
were caught unawares when the interest rate rose, especially those buying for 
speculative purposes (Boo Teik, 2001, p. 198). Subsequently Federal government 
established National Economic Action Council (NEAC) to make recommendations in 
order to revive the country’s economy (NEAC 1998). NEAC recommended several 
strategies related to housing. These included the construction of houses which cost 
less than RM200.000 per unit, particularly low cost housing, and the introduction of 
flexible prices for low cost houses (NEAC, 1998, p. 195). Low cost housing seemed to 
provide a viable solution to stimulate economic growth and to create job opportunities. 
The Federal government also believed there was still demand for low cost housing,
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despite the economic crisis, in view of the large number of squatters in the country. As 
an alternative for people with a low income who faced difficulty in obtaining finance 
during the crisis, the NEAC recommended that the Federal government, State 
governments and local authority should build low cost housing for rental instead of for 
sale (NEAC, 1998, p. 196). Another important NEAC recommendation was the revision 
of low cost house selling price by MHLG. The new low cost housing price structure 
was finally approved by the Cabinet in June 1998 (MHLG, 1998). The ceiling price for 
low cost housing was increased to between RM25.000 and RM42,000 per unit, 
according to location, land cost and type of house. Thus, an element of market forces 
was reflected in determining low cost house prices. Based on the recommendations by 
the NEAC, the Federal government began to build public low cost houses for rental, 
which were also known as the ‘People Housing Program (PHP) NEAC in 1998.
Despite government efforts towards market reform in housing provision, it still 
remained inadequate. As described by Zhang and Sheng (2002), “Malaysia is an 
exception to broad-based trend of market-orientated reform, since there is a strong 
reluctance to relax state control and promote market mechanisms.” The state, 
according to them, “maintains its tradition of strong intervention in housing and 
providing housing not only for low income groups but also for medium and high-income 
groups”. Among the most important issues highlighted by Zhang and Sheng was the 
fact that the state even restricts the distribution of low income housing developed by 
the private sector, which is an unusual practice in the region. Meanwhile, according to 
Agus (2002, p.49), excessive state control over housing hindered the development of 
the market, while the potential of the private sector’s capacity was under-utilised. 
Clearly the state still maintained strong control and intervention during the crisis, 
despite IMF and World Bank pressures for market reform.
The structure of housing provision during this period clearly became more centralised 
and heavily controlled by the Federal government (see Figure 4.10). Everything from 
financing, design and building construction monitoring was handled by the Federal 
government through the National Housing Department (NHD). Meanwhile, the 
Stategovernments’ involvement in direct housing provision was limited to the State 
Economic Development Corporations (SEDC). From 1998, most SEDC were 
transformed from state agencies into corporate entities with the majority of shares still 
owned by the State governments. The corporations began to operate like private 
companies with profit oriented objectives, thus reducing political interference and 
avoiding selling houses at subsidised prices.
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The Asian financial crisis and state intervention in low cost housing provision under 
PHP has had a direct impact on housing tenure in Malaysia after 1998. With more 
people facing difficulty in accessing finance during the crisis and an oversupply of 
housing, people tended to be more cautious in buying property (Usilappan, 2006, pp. 
74-75). Furthermore, the implementation of PHP gave an opportunity for people with 
a low income to rent their house rather than buying. The homeownership rate among 
Malaysians decreased from 85.1 percent in 1991 to 77.2 percent in 2000 
(Department of Statistics, Malaysia, 2000). Furthermore, the National Housing Policy 
Study (MHLG, 2005) projected homeownership in Malaysia to continue to decline to 
only 60 percent in 2005 (see Figure 4.11). Interestingly, the trend for public and 
private rental kept increasing over the years from 14.9 percent to 22.8 percent in 
2000 and further increased to 40 percent in 2005. Thus, unlike other countries in the 
region, homeownership in Malaysia shows a declining trend.
%
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Figure 4.11: Changes in Housing Tenure in Malaysia, 1991-2005
Sources: Departm ent of Statistics, Malaysia, 2000 & National Housing Policy Study
2005
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HOUSING PROVISION IN MALAYSIA IN THE CONTEXT OF DEVELOPMENTAL 
STATE DEBATES
Any analysis of the development of the political economy of East Asian countries 
commonly discusses developmental state regimes. In the context of Malaysia, before 
1997 many scholars agreed that Malaysia was a developmental state (see World 
Bank, 1993; Leftwich, 1995; Jomo, 1999). Leftwich (1995), in his analysis of six major 
components to define the developmental state, describes Malaysia as fitting within the 
developmental state model. Leftwich also identifies three previous Malaysian prime 
ministers as being developmental: Tunku Abdul Rahman, Tun Abdul Razak and Dr. 
Mahathir Mohammad. These leaders, together with a small group of politicians and 
bureaucrats, were instrumental in establishing a developmental regime and its culture. 
Malaysia was described as an ‘authoritarian state’, ‘semi-democratic state’ or ‘illiberal 
state’ (Beng Huat, 2005, p. 99). Malaysia, like many other developmental states, is 
very much controlled by the prime minister particularly during the Mahathir’s 
administration (Richter, 2000, p. 7).
In terms of relative autonomy, Malaysia was classified as a democratic developmental 
state which means that the state has been able to achieve relative independence from 
the demanding clamour of special interest groups (Boo Teik 2001, p. 178). Some 
groups can benefit from the state autonomy, as is the case of the Bumiputera in 
Malaysia under the NEP during the 1970s. The state has governed the market through 
extensive economic intervention conducted by social circumstances and political 
pressures under the NEP. The state functions through a high degree of control and the 
integration of institutions and civil society. In addition to the NEP, the turning point 
towards being a developmental state was the government’s ‘Look East’ policy 
introduced by Prime Minister Mahathir’s administration once he took over in 1981 
(Pillay, 2000, p. 209). The policy intended Malaysia to adopt the Japanese and Korean 
models of economic development, where the state plays a crucial role in the drive for 
industrialisation.
The bureaucrats were also very strong and dominant in Malaysia. The agencies under
the prime minister’s department appear to have real power, authority, technical
competence and insulation in shaping developmental policy. Malaysia was led by a
strong executive and thus the government relied upon subtle ideological control and
nationalist sentiment to maintain an authoritarian structure (Verma, 2004, p.208).
However, there is a history of strong bureaucrats and technocrats in Malaysia which
extends way back to the British Colonial period. The British provided a strong
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authoritarian bureaucratic foundation for Malaya independence and helped to educate 
an elite group of people to later take over the administration of the country (Funston, 
2001, p. 161). In contrast, the civil society in Malaysia was considerably weaker with 
state practices controlling the media and labour organisations (Leftwich, 1995, p.417).
However, it is important to recognise the Malaysian variant of the developmental state 
model compared to the typical Northeast Asia Model (see Trezzini, 2001; Low, 2004). 
The difference can be seen in many aspects such as land reform, state control of 
finance, macroeconomic management, industry policy, income policy and social 
organisation.
The Trezzini study identified many dissimilar features between Malaysia and the ideal 
type of developmental state in East Asia (see Table 4.4). In addition to the eight 
features of developmental states identified by Pempel (1999), Trezzeni added four 
more features for comparison which include: ethnicity, cultural heritage, saving rates 
and investment in human capital. The main similarities found in the key features of 
developmental states are ‘strong state’ and ‘authoritarian regime’. Nevertheless, many 
scholars still regard Malaysia as a developmental state, despite its differences from 
Asia’s North East countries model (see Woo & Cummings, 1999; Jomo, 2000; 
Trezzini, 2001; Low, 2004; Ju Kwon, 2005). Even during the Asian financial crisis there 
was strong reluctance by the government to adopt neo-liberal reform (Jomo, 2000; 
Low, 2004). Jomo explains that the strong statist intervention adopted since the 1970s 
in Malaysia was the reason behind the refusal of IMF financial aid and subsequent 
neo-liberal reform.
The analysis of housing provision regimes since the British Colonial period until 2005 
clearly shows strong state intervention. State intervention is particularly obvious since 
the implementation of the NEP in 1971. Even after economic liberalisation in 1986, the 
state continued to control the housing market through various regulations and laws 
such as those required the private developers to provide low cost housing with the 
buying and selling price determined by the state. Furthermore, the implementation of 
PHP for rental in 1998 by the Federal government was a clear indication of a 
government response to market failure and enhanced it role in housing provision.
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Table 4.4: A Comparison Between the Ideal Type of East Asian Success Model 
and Malaysia
Ideal Type of ‘East Asian Success 
Model’ Malaysian Peculiarities
1. Ethnic-religious homogeneity
2. Neo-Confucian cultural heritage
3. Geo-strategic exposure, financial aid from 
the USA, propitious world markets
4. Socio-structural reforms such as a 
sweeping land reform which toppled or 
weakened old oligarchic and landed elites
5. Comparative low income and wealth 
inequality at the outset of the catching-up 
with industrialisation process
6. Relative scarcity of natural resources
7. Authoritarian political system, legitimacy 
of rule strongly based on economic 
performance and nationalist appeal
8. ‘Strong state’ with regard to state capacity 
and autonomy
8. Comparatively low reliance on foreign 
direct investments, promotion of local 
entrepreneurial expertise and enterprises
9. Alternation between places of import- 
substitution and export oriented 
industrialisation
10.Sound macro-economic fundamentals 
and high saving rates
11. High investment in human capital 
development
1. Ethnic-religious heterogeneity
2. Predominantly Malay-Muslim cultural 
heritage, Islamic resurgence and a sizeable 
ethnic Chinese cultural element
3. Predominantly Malay-Muslim cultural 
heritage, Islamic resurgence and a sizeable 
ethnic Chinese cultural element
4. No real land reform
5. More marked income inequality, but 
successful poverty reduction, rising intra- 
Malay inequalities through NEP trusteeship 
and cronyism
6. Relatively abundance of natural resources
7. Formal democracy with strong authoritarian 
tendencies
9. ‘Strong state’ with regard to state capacity, 
limited state autonomy and complex 
embedded autonomy
10. Heavy reliance on foreign direct investment, 
promotion of a ‘Bumiputera Commercial and 
Industrial Community’
11. Less successful attempts at deliberate 
policy change and industrial upgrading and 
enduring structural imbalances
12. Generally achieved and forced saving 
schemes such as ‘ Employees’ Provident 
Fund’
13. Education policy marred by ethnopolitics
Source: Trezzini, 2001, p. 328
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4.5 CONCLUSION
The analysis of changes to the political economy from the late Colonial period until 
2005 shows Malaysian housing provision has experienced different regimes/phases. 
The development of the political economy of the country and the pressure of 
international agencies has also had a huge influence, specifically on housing policy 
and provision. Prior to 1969, the free market mechanism clearly dominated the 
housing sector. The government was only concerned with the provision of low cost 
housing through The Malayan Housing Trust with limited success. Meanwhile, the 
private sector focused on medium and high cost housing, generally without state 
intervention.
However, the racial riot of May 13, 1969 suddenly changed the landscape of the 
political economy of the country. The government introduced the New Economy 
Policy (1971-1990) in 1971 with objectives to restructure society and eradicate 
poverty. The government began to align all national and state policies towards 
achieving NEP objectives, including those for housing. Thus, the government began 
to control the housing market through the introduction of racial quotas in housing 
allocation and house price control. When Prime Minister Mahathir took office in 1981, 
he moved further towards a developmental state based on the Japanese economy by 
encouraging large corporations to become involved in housing development through 
generous asset transfer and joint venture projects with government 
agencies/departments. Although the Mahathir administration began economic 
liberalisation in 1986 (Jomo, 1997), he still maintained NEP objectives even after 
1990. The political scenario at the end of the 1980s also made it difficult for the 
government to fully dismantle NEP policy. NEP objectives and policy continue under 
the country’s subsequent National economy development plan.
Housing provision in Malaysia since 1970 has clearly moved along the 
developmental path, with most activities initiated or controlled by the government. 
Privatisation of housing provision is mostly undertaken by selected large corporations 
who receive support and privilege from the government. Some of the biggest housing 
developers in the country have received large tracts of land from the government at 
very low prices. The practices were even more rigorous during the boom period of 
1990-1996. Nevertheless, the Asian financial crisis changed the political economy 
scenario of the region, particularly for countries which accepted financial help from 
the International Monetary Fund (IMF). Those countries had to embark on neo-liberal
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reform in all areas of policy. Although Malaysia was not subject to the IMF policy, it 
still faced growing international pressure to adopt neo-liberal reform. Mahathir’s 
administration continued to resist reform until his resignation in October 2003. Under 
Prime Minister Badawi’s administration, the government began to show signs of neo­
liberal reform in managing the country’s economy. However, the neo-liberal reform 
did not permeate into the housing sector until the later stages of his administration. 
The government continue to control the housing market and were still directly 
involved in public low cost housing for sale and rental in 2005. The state’s 
intervention in low cost housing provision is a clear example of how the state 
intervened in the housing market. Therefore, in the next chapter the analysis will 
focus on the role of the state and market in low cost housing provision in Malaysia.
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MALAYSIA
CHAPTER 5:
LOW COST HOUSING PROVISION IN 
MALAYSIA
5.1 INTRODUCTION
The objective of this chapter is to set the development of low cost housing policy and 
provision in Malaysia into historical context. The Structure of Housing Provision (SHP) 
framework will be used to identify the changing role of the State and market, 
particularly in low cost housing production and the allocation process. This chapter will 
also provide understanding and context for analysis in subsequent chapters. It is 
divided into eight sections; the first section will outline the definition of low cost housing 
and is followed by the development of the low cost housing policy in Malaysia since 
1956. The next four sections will discuss low cost housing policy, programmes and the 
allocation system according to the themes identified in this chapter. The final two 
sections will explain the role of the private sector in low cost housing production in 
Malaysia and the distinctive features of Malaysian low cost housing provision model.
5.2 LOW COST HOUSING: THE DEFINITION
The term ‘low cost housing’ has been widely used in housing literature and policy 
throughout the world. Low cost housing generally means housing for people with a low 
income (Ural, 1980, p.1). However, it is difficult to standardise the meaning of low cost 
housing, since the definition of a low income differs from one country to another. 
Nevertheless, many scholars agree that the term low cost housing relates to the 
construction cost of the house (Drakakis-Smith, 1981; Lai, 1995; Kilham, 2008). 
According to Lai (1995. p.38), “...low cost housing may be defined as the provision of 
housing which caters to the minimum requirements of masses within their income
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capabilities, without scarifying the quality of construction...” Meanwhile, Kilham (2008, 
p. 175) explains the meaning of low cost housing from the designer’s point of view “...it 
is important to strike the balance between comfort and the minimum construction cost 
for low cost housing provision." To ensure the large group of people with a low income 
can afford to buy low cost houses, the state should intervene to reduce the 
construction costs in terms of land, building materials, labour and planning/building 
standards (Drakakis-Smith, 1981, pp. 172-181).
Therefore, it can be established that the meaning of ‘low cost housing’ is different from 
‘affordable housing’ which has also been widely used to describe housing for people 
with a low income. As Stone (2006, p. 154) explains “affordable housing is not 
necessary low cost housing...typically encompasses not only social housing and low 
income housing but also financially assisted housing for middle income households 
that find it difficult to purchase houses in the private speculative market”. Hence, there 
is no specific price threshold or construction cost limit for affordable housing as long 
people can afford to pay for the house.
Meanwhile the United Kingdom government, based on Circular 9/98, uses the 
following definition: “... affordable-housing or affordable homes used in this circular to 
encompass both low cost market and subsidised housing (irrespective of tenure, 
ownership whether exclusive or share or final arrangements that will be available to 
people who cannot afford to rent or buy homes generally available on the open 
market” (cited in Cullingworth and Nadin, 2006, p. 168). In conclusion, the 
implementation of low cost housing requires state intervention in order to reduce the 
construction costs and the selling price (supply side subsidies). Meanwhile, affordable 
housing requires state intervention to ensure people with a low income can afford to 
buy the houses, regardless of the price, either by providing financial assistance or 
housing allowance (demand side subsidies).
In Malaysia, the term ‘low cost housing’ has been used to describe housing for sale or 
rental targeted for low income people since 1956 (Housing Trust, 1956, p.1). 
Moreover, the term was politically acceptable to reflect government efforts to help 
people with a low income. Low cost housing in the context of Malaysia always refers to 
conventional housing provided by both public and private sectors for people with a low 
income rather than squatter upgrading or aided self-help housing programmes. The 
conventional housing provision represents housing that is produced through the official 
channels of recognised institutions such as planning authorities, banks and building
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societies and land development companies and observes formal legal practices, 
building standards and land use subdivision regulations (Drakakis-Smith, 1981, p.40).
The selling price, the target group and building specifications have been used by the 
government to define low cost housing in Malaysia (Malaysia, 2006, p.55). The selling 
price of low cost housing is subject to review from time to time by the government to 
ensure people with a low income can afford to buy houses. The government also 
constantly reviews the building specification and design standards of low cost houses 
in order to minimise the construction costs (CIDB, 1998). Therefore, low cost housing 
in Malaysia can be defined as housing provided for people with a low income either for 
sale or rent by both the public and the private sector, according to appropriate building 
standards. However, for the purposes of this research, only low cost housing for sale 
will be discussed further.
People with a low income in the context of selling low cost houses means people 
above the poverty line (see Table 5.1). The Poverty Line Income (PLI) method has 
been used to determine the poverty line in Malaysia since 1977 (Mat Zin, 2007 p.31). 
The PLI was estimated based on the minimum requirements of a household for three 
major components, namely food, clothing and footwear, and other non-food items such 
as rent, fuel and power, furniture and household equipment, medical care and health 
expenses, transport and communications and recreation, education and cultural 
services (Malaysia, 2001, p.58). The PLI is also updated annually to reflect changes in 
the levels of prices by taking into account changes in the Consumer Price Indices 
(CPI). It is important to note, low cost housing is not targeted for people below the PLI 
since they are categorised as hard core poor in Malaysia and most likely would not be 
able to afford to buy a house. Instead, they have received assistance directly from the 
Federal and State governments through a special programme known as Program 
Pembangunan Rakyat Termiskin (Hard Core Poor Development Programme) since 
1993 (Malaysia, 2001, p.59). Assistance given to this group in terms of housing 
includes free building materials for house construction in rural areas or subsidised 
monthly rental for public low cost houses in urban areas. However, analysis of the 
housing programme for hard core poor people is beyond the scope of this research.
Meanwhile, the determination of the income ceiling for low cost house buyers was 
derived from the affordability of monthly instalments; effectively a buyer should not 
spend more than 30 percent of their income to pay for the instalments. Based on that 
formula, the ceiling income for low cost house buyers was set between RM500-750 for
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a house price of RM25.000 per unit (1981-1998). When the sale price for low cost 
houses was increased to RM42.000 per unit in 1998, the ceiling income for buyers was 
raised to RM1,500 per month. Based on PLI and the income ceiling, the target group 
or ‘people with low income’ in the context of selling low cost houses is determined by 
the government from time to time.
Table 5.1: Poverty Line Income, Income Class and Target Group for Low Cost 
Housing in Malaysia, 1970-2007
1970 1979 1989 1999 2007
Poverty Line Income (RM)1
Peninsular n.a. 272 370 510 661
Sabah n.a. 352 544 685 888
Sarawak n.a. 304 425 584 765
Income Class (% household)^ 
RM499 and below : 89.3 57.0 25.7 6.0 1.7
RM500 -  999 7.5 25.7 35.3 19.0 6.8 ;
R M 1.000- 1,499 1.8 8.5 17.0 18.8 15.8 ;
RM 1 ,5 0 0 - 1,999 0.6 3.6 8.5 13.9 13.5
RM2.000 -  2,499 0.3 1.9 4.8 10.1 11.2
R M2,500 -  2,999 0.2 1.0 2.9 7.3 8.6
RM3.000 -  3,499 0.1 0.6 1.7 5.7 7.1
RM3.500 -  3,999 01 0.5 1.0 3.9 5.8
RM4.000 -  4,999 0.0 0.5 1.3 5.5 8.6
RM5.000 and above 0.1 0.7 1.8 9.8 20.8
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Low Cost Houses" 
Target Group (Income) > RM300 RM300-750 RM500-750 RM750-1500 RM750-1500
House Price (‘000) RM15-18 RM15-18 RM25 RM25-42 RM25-42
Note: ; 1 Target Group for low cost house
Sources: 1 & 2 Economic Planning Unit Malaysia, 2010 
3 Asek, 2007, p. 144
Similarly, the percentage of households within the target group according to income 
class was also used by the government to justify the 30 percent low cost house unit 
requirement for private sector residential development from 1981. However, by 2007 
only 22.6 percent of the population was eligible to buy low cost housing based on their 
income level. Although the government established the number of households within 
the target group, it was difficult to determine demand according to location and status 
of homeownership. Therefore it was important for the government to establish a low 
cost house buyer registration system to address the issue.
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5.3 LOW COST HOUSING POLICY DEVELOPMENT IN MALAYSIA
The changes in the low cost housing policy, programmes and allocation system in 
Malaysia will be examined according to the themes identified in this section. The major 
themes are explored within four chronological periods known as Selective State 
Intervention (1956-1970), Emergence of State Control (1971-1990), Market Reform 
(1991-1997) and Squatter’s Clearance (1998-2005). These periods were selected 
because they generally represent four distinct phases in the development of the low 
cost housing policy and also correspond with changes to the political economy in 
Malaysia, as discussed earlier in Chapter 4.
‘Selective State Intervention’ represents a period when the state had to be selective in 
low cost housing provision due to a limited budget and manpower capacity. Although 
the country faced an acute housing shortage during the 1960s, the state still could not 
provide adequate housing for its people, especially in small towns and rural areas. 
Instead, most low cost housing projects were implemented in major towns. The low 
cost housing programme also targeted selected groups of people including 
government employees and political supporters, especially prior to the general 
election. In general, low cost housing provision during this period was not meant to 
address the housing shortage, but rather to gain political support.
Meanwhile the ‘Emergence of State Control’ period earmarked the beginning of strong 
state intervention in low cost housing production and allocation following the 
introduction of the NEP in 1971. Low cost housing ownership was identified as one of 
the key strategies to achieve NEP objectives to eradicate poverty, particularly among 
the Bumiputera. Therefore, state intervention in low cost housing production and 
allocation was crucial during this period. At the same time, the government imposed 
low cost housing requirements for the private sector with regard to housing 
development. Various rules and regulations were also introduced by the state to 
regulate and control the market during this period.
The ‘Market Reform’ period shows a policy shift from state to market for low cost 
housing provision. During this period, the state began to retreat from direct housing 
provision in line with the recommendations of the World Bank and international 
agencies. The reform was implemented by the state through a privatisation 
programme and financial liberalisation for low cost housing construction. The success 
of market reform was reflected by a total of 214,889 units or 82.2 percent of low cost
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housing completed by private housing developers during the 1991-1995 period 
compared to only 17.8 percent by the public sector.
Finally, the ‘Squatter Clearance’ period shows state commitment to eliminating 
squatters through the provision of mass housing for sale and rental under the People 
Housing Programme (PHP). Despite a large number of low cost houses built by the 
public and private sector, the number of squatter settlements kept increasing during 
the 1990s. The Federal government launched a nationwide large scale squatter 
clearance programme in 1998 and implemented PHP as a strategy to relocate the 
squatters.
Figure 5.1 shows a summary of main public and private sector low cost housing 
programmes and the key players from 1956 to 2005. Meanwhile, Table 5.2 displays a 
summary of the low cost housing policy, programmes and allocation system during a 
similar period. A detailed analysis of the low cost housing issues, policy, programmes 
and allocation system according to themes identified earlier will be carried out in 
subsequent sections. However, a detailed analysis of low cost housing allocation 
under the Open Registration System (ORS) will be conducted in the next chapter.
Period/ 
Key Player 1956-1960 1961-1970 1971-1980 1981-1990 1991-2000 2001-2010
Federal Government PHP (by NHD) 
1994-2004
Low Cost Housing (by Housing Trust) 
1956-1976
State Government PLCHP (by State Governments) 
1976-2002
Government Owned 
Company (National 
Housing Company)
'  PHP >
.after 04,
MARKET
Private Housing 
Developers Low Cost Housing (based on 30% low Cost Quota) 1980-today
5LCHP
87-89 j
Special Government- 
Private Developers 
Programme________
Note:
NHD - National Housing Department PHP - People Housing Programme
PLCHP - Public Low Cost Housing Programme SLCHP - Special Low Cost Housing Programme
Figure 5.1: Summary of Key Public and Private Sector Low Cost Housing 
Programmes, 1956-2005 
Source: Author
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Table 5.2: Summary of the Low Cost Housing Policy, Programmes and Allocation System in Malaysia, 1956 - 2005
Theme Year Housing Issues Key Policy/Programme(s) Allocation Policy/System Target Group/ Eligibility Criteria
UJH
s s
UJ -  </>
1956 Squatter and shop house overcrowding in
urban areas due to rural-urban migration 
after World War II.
1960 Acute housing shortage nationwide
particularly low cost due to population 
increase and old stock replacement.
1967 -1969 Inadequate low cost house units built by
the Housing Trust prior to 1967. Housing 
shortage continues.
British Colonial Government through the Housing Trust 
introduced low cost housing for sale and rental for the first 
time in 1956.
Federal government promote ‘Home-Owning Democracy’ 
policy to encourage people to buy a house in 1960.
Federal government via the 'Crash Programme’ launched 
to impress voters prior to the 1969 General Election 
completed 14,175 units between 1967-1969.
‘First Come First Served System’ for 
low cost houses built by the Housing 
Trust.
'Point-based Waiting List System’ 
introduced in 1964 by Ministry of 
Local Government and Housing.
People live in squatter and 
low rank government 
servants
People with monthly income 
less than RM300 
Dependents (max. 16)
UJ
S(O
LL -J  
UJ £O 5
UJ §
8
UJs
UJ .
1971 Poverty and lack of homeownership among
the Bumiputera.
1976 Failure of the Housing Trust Federation of
Malaya to provide adequate low cost 
houses.
1961 Rapid rural-urban migration under NEP
contributed to housing shortage and squat 
formation.
1986-1989 Economic recession has an impact on
housing market.
Government imposed requirement of minimum 30% low 
cost houses allocated to Bumiputera.
State governments take over responsibility for low cost 
housing provision under Public Low Cost Housing 
Programme (PLCHP) from the Housing Trust.
Government imposed 30% low cost house requirement 
and RM25.000 ceiling price for housing development by 
the private sector.
Government introduced Special Low Cost Housing 
Programme (SLCHP) for private housing developers.
‘Point-based Waiting List System’ 
with ethnic quota introduced.
State governments take over 
responsibility for low cost housing 
allocation from the Housing Trust.
State government began to control 
low cost housing allocation by the 
private sector.
Bumiputera
People with monthly income 
RM300 -  RM750 
Dependents (max. 16) 
People live in the state
M
A
R
K
E
T
R
E
FO
R
M
1991 -1997 Housing affordability issues and growing 
number of squatters.
Private sector takes a leading role in low cost housing 
provision. State began to retreat and encourage 
privatisation of housing.
Federal government build 14,751 units of low cost housing 
for rental under the People Housing Programme (PHP) 
and spend RM600 million to relocate the squatters in 1994.
State governments still responsible 
for low cost housing allocation for 
both public and private sector 
housing
• Bumiputera
• People with monthly income 
RM500 -  RM750
• Dependents (max. 7)
• People live in the state
• Applicants’ age
• House condition
S
Q
U
A
TT
ER
C
LE
A
R
A
N
C
E
1998 
2002 - 2005
Economic crisis and growing number of 
squatter
Failure of State governments to provide 
adequate low cost under PLCHP
Federal government launched PHP NEAC for rental to 
relocate the squatters and to revive the economy. Low cost 
house price to RM42.000 per unit according to location.
PHP New Policy for sale and rental implemented by 
Federal government to replaced (PLCHP) by the State 
government since 1976.
‘Point-based Waiting List System’ 
with ethnic quota under Open 
Registration System (ORS) for low 
cost housing established by Federal 
government in 1997.
• Squatter residents
• People with monthly income 
RM500 -  RM750
• Dependents (max. 7)
• People live in the state
• Applicants' age
• Disability
• Consumer Price Index
Source: Author
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5.4 SELECTIVE STATE INTERVENTION (1956-1970)
The Housing Trust Federation of Malaya (Housing Trust, 1957) identified two main 
housing problems during the 1950s: the squatter settlements and shop house 
overcrowding where people lived in accommodation of sub-human standards (see 
Figure 5.2). It was reported that in Kuala Lumpur alone approximately 30 percent of 
the population or 100,000 people (20,000 families) lived in squatter during this period 
(Housing Trust 1957, p.2). The problem was mainly caused by a disproportionate 
increase in the population and rapid rural-urban migration after World War II. The 
population of the Federation of Malaya increased at the rate of 2.5 percent per annum 
from 1947 to 1957 and therefore required approximately 10,000 new houses annually 
(Housing Trust, 1956, p. 4). However, due to a lack of funding, the British Colonial 
government failed to provide adequate low cost housing. Thus, the quality of life for 
many people with a low income failed to improve after the war.
Figure 5.2: Squatters and Shop House Overcrowding Were Common Housing 
Problems in Malaysia During the 1950s and 1960s 
Source: Courtesy of the National Archive, Malaysia
Meanwhile, the Atkinson Report on Low Cost Housing in Malaya (Atkinson, 1961) 
revealed that a large proportion of low cost housing was in poor condition throughout 
the Federation. He estimated the government needed to construct between 35,000 
and 40,000 new low cost houses a year to replace the dilapidated houses and to fulfil
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increasing housing need due to rural-urban migration. Subsequently, the study by the 
Ministry of Local Government and Housing (MLGH) in 1964 estimated the country 
needed more than 18,720 units of low cost houses annually based on the population 
increase. The figure, however, does not take into account the backlog in urban 
housing need resulting from squatters, overcrowding of shops, cubicles and slum 
clearance (MLGH, 1966, p.4). From 1956 to 1970, only 33,073 units of low cost 
housing were built by the government throughout the country. This represents only two 
percent of the total of 1.6 million units completed during the same period by both public 
and private sectors (Soo Hai, 1979, p. 67). This achievement in low cost housing 
construction was way below the total annual low cost housing units recommended in 
the Atkinson Report (1961) and MLGH (1964). The low cost housing shortage not only 
occurred in Malaysia, but was also a common problem in other developing countries 
during the 1960s (Abrams, 1964).
5.4.1 Low Cost Housing Policy and Programmes
Prior to independence, the British Colonial Government introduced the low cost 
housing programme in response to continued housing problems. The Housing Trust 
Federation of Malaya was entrusted with providing low cost housing by the 
government from 1956. Prior to 1956, the Housing Trust confined itself to the provision 
of houses for sale for the middle income group (Housing Trust, 1956, p.2). Following 
the general election in 1955, the Housing Trust came under the Ministry of Natural 
Resources and Local Government and the minister was appointed as the Trust’s 
chairman. The minister then decided that the Housing Trust should concentrate only 
on providing low cost houses for rental and sale. The housing was targeted at people 
with a household income of less than RM300 per month. The Housing Trust’s role as a 
government agent also earmarked the beginning of state intervention in low cost 
housing provision in Malaysia (Housing Trust, 1956 p.5). Meanwhile, the private sector 
continued its role of providing housing for people with a middle and high income.
After independence, the low cost housing policy was largely influenced by 
recommendations from the United Nations and British government experts. The report 
by Mr. Atkinson, the Head of the British Tropical Building Section (Atkinson, 1961), on 
low cost housing revealed a large number of houses in poor condition throughout the 
Federation of Malaya particularly the low cost houses. Under the Second Malaya Plan 
(1961-1965), the government emphasised the provision of cheap housing as a basic
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social need based on the ‘home-owning democracy’ (Agus, 1997, p.34). However, the 
programme never achieved its objective to increase homeownership among people 
with a low income due to a limited number of low cost houses built by the government 
during this period (Johnstone, 1979, p.220).
Following the establishment of the Ministry of Local Government and Housing (MLGH) 
in 1964, the formulation of low cost housing policy was based on two guiding 
principles. Firstly, the Federal government should provide the necessary funds at a low 
interest rate and utilise the technical services of the Housing Trust. Secondly, the State 
governments would provide land at a nominal price with the necessary roads, road­
side drains and water mains free of charge (MLGH, 1966, p.3). The housing, however, 
was still targeted at people with a monthly income of less than RM300, usually working 
class people such as general labourers and lower rank government staff. From 1964 
onwards, a lot of ground work and research was conducted to prepare for a more 
intensive low cost housing programme under MLGH. This includes the formation of “a 
Committee on Standards” which was appointed to draw up minimum standards for low 
cost housing with a view to achieving uniformity throughout the country and also to 
reduce the cost of construction (MLGH, 1966, p.5).
The structure of low cost housing provision shows the significant role played by the 
state during this period. From 19560 to 1970, most low cost houses were built by the 
Housing Trust (see Figure 5.3). The reason was because private housing developers 
did not find it economically viable to undertake low cost housing, especially on land 
which they bought at a competitive market price (Soo Hai, 1979, p. 175). In addition, 
there was no requirement from the government for the private sector to provide low 
cost housing. That was in line with government policy for minimum intervention in the 
housing market.
The low cost houses built by the Housing Trust were for both hire purchase and rental. 
The hire purchase housing was defined as “housing where the monthly rent paid by 
the tenant is recorded as a hire purchase instalment” (Housing Trust 1956, p.6). The 
tenants were also not required to pay an initial purchase deposit and they became the 
owner of the house when the cost of the building and ancillary services was fully 
repaid. Loans were provided to purchasers by the Housing Trust at a heavily 
subsidised rate of 2 percent with a 10 year repayment period. The monthly repayment 
was fixed at RM35 which meant that the total cost of the house including land and 
services must not have exceeded a total of RM3,500. The provision of timber for low
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cost houses under this category targeted people living in rural areas or the fringes of 
urban areas (see Figure 5.4). Therefore, it shows the Housing Trust were willing to use 
local materials for housing construction to reduce the construction costs.
STRUCTURE OF LOW 
COST HOUSING 
PROVISION
STATE
Financing:
Federal
Government
Land: 
State Land
Construction:
Private
Contractors
Federal Government 1
N/
The Houssing Trust | >1 Allocation Committee
Housing StockI
I
Housing StockI
State Government
\ /
Local Aijthorities |
Infrastructure provision and housing 
administration
Hire Purchase Rental
Figure 5.3: The Structure of Low Cost Housing Provision in Malaysia, 1956-1970 
Source: Author
Meanwhile, rental housing was defined as “housing where the tenant pays a monthly 
inclusive rent sufficient to cover repayment of loan, interest, fire insurance, rates, 
maintenance and administration” (Housing Trust 1956, p.6). The inclusive monthly rent 
was fixed at not more than RM50 per month. Loans were provided for a period of up to 
30 years at the subsidised rate of 3 to 5 percent per annum to local authorities for 
housing construction by the Housing Trust. The rental housing then became the 
property of the local authority when the repayment of the loan to the Housing Trust 
was completed. It was decided to implement this policy through the construction of 
houses and flats of brick or concrete construction in inner urban areas (see Figure 
5.5). Local authorities were still involved directly in house allocation and the collection 
of monthly rents from the tenants.
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Figure 5.4: Typical Wooden Low Cost House Available Under the Hire Purchase
Scheme in Rural Areas by the Housing Trust
Source: Annual Report Housing Trust Federation of Malaya, 1957
Figure 5.5: Typical Low Cost House Available for Rental in Urban Areas by the 
Housing Trust
Source: Annual Report Housing Trust Federation of Malaya, 1957
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In order to implement the programme, the Housing Trust required cooperation from 
State governments and local authorities. The State governments were responsible for 
identifying suitable land for low cost housing and contributed financially towards the 
provision of infrastructure. A subsidy in the form of land, either free or with a nominal 
premium, was required from the State governments. Meanwhile, local authorities 
allowed for faster planning approval for low cost houses built by the Trust. The 
arrangement between the Housing Trust, State governments and local authorities 
continued until 1970 for low cost housing production.
In 1967, the Housing Trust implemented the ‘Crash Programme' to overcome the 
housing shortage (MLGH, 1968a). The main objective of the programme was to build 
small schemes of 50 or 32 dwellings per scheme in the smaller towns which had not 
previously had a low cost housing project. The essence of this programme was speed, 
and the ministry, through the Housing Trust, paid for land acquisition and was 
responsible for infrastructure. The whole programme emphasised standardisation to 
the highest possible level. It began with standardised layouts of 2.3 acre plots to 
accommodate 50 dwellings or 1.66 acre plots to accommodate 32 dwellings and 
continued with a standardised house design and standardised tender and contract 
procedures. A total of 14,175 low cost housing units were completed under this 
programme from 1967 to 1969.
However, the real intention of the programme was to impress voters prior to the 1969 
general election (Drakakis-Smith, 1979; Alithambi, 1979). As described by Alitambhi 
v i 979, p.51), the Crash Programme also “demonstrate[d] the ability of Federal 
government to harness its resources to implement the housing programmes if it really 
wants to do.” Clearly, the low cost housing programme’s implementation during this 
period was based on a ‘Tokenism’ approach. The goal of a tokenism housing 
programme was mainly to gain political mileage rather than solve a housing problem 
(Pacione, 2009, p.538). Pacione added, “...the programme [was] implemented to be [a] 
visible symbol of government concern for the poor rather than meeting the housing 
need and usually taking [the] form of high rise block irrespective of their fiscal or 
cultural suitability.” The “Crash programme” also demonstrated the importance of 
political intervention in low cost housing production and allocation during the 1960s.
In terms of financing, before 1960 the Federal government channelled all the funds 
directly to the Housing Trust as part of revolving fund for housing construction 
(Housing Trust, 1956, p.3). When the purchasers or tenants repaid the loans to the
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Housing Trust, the money was used for future low cost housing projects. However 
from 1964, Federal funds were loaned directly to the State governments and 
municipalities, as described by MLGH:
“The Ministry controlled the allocation of loan and funds and invited bids 
annually from the various State governments to undertake low cost 
housing schemes. On approval of a project a loan agreement was drawn 
up between the Federal Treasury and the State government for the 
amount allocated and the State government was granted the architectural 
and supervisory services of the Housing Trust free of charge. The Trust in 
conjunction with the State P.W.D. (Public Work Department) and the State 
Town Planner, designed the project, supervised the construction and on 
completion handed over the houses to the State governments” (MLGH 
1966, p.3).
The construction of low cost houses for the Housing Trust was always undertaken by 
private building contractors from 1956. The Housing Trust was only involved in project 
design and supervision, but relied on private contractors to build the houses which 
were later handed over to State government for sale or rental.
5.4.2 Low Cost Housing Allocation
From 1956 to 1964, low cost housing allocation was on a first come first served basis. 
Priority to buy low cost houses was given to people who lived in squatter, overcrowded 
shop houses or who were lower rank government employees (see Housing Trust, 
1956; Agus, 1998). Since the total number of public low cost houses constructed by 
the Housing Trust was relatively small, the allocation process was very simple. The 
Allocation Committee members comprised representatives from the Housing Trust and 
local councils where the project was located and they were responsible for the 
selection of low cost house buyers and tenants (Housing Trust 1957, p.20).
The low cost housing allocation system began to improve after the establishment of 
the Ministry of Local Government and Housing (MLGH) in 1964. Although the MLGH 
generally accepted income as a reasonable yardstick to measure an applicant’s 
financial status, it was also believed that the government should consider other criteria 
to determine eligibility (MLGH, 1968a, p.7). Therefore, in 1964, the MLGH began to 
allow people with a monthly income of up to RM750 per month to buy low cost houses, 
subject to a number of dependents, up to 16 people. The priority for low cost house 
allocation, however, remained for people with a monthly household income below
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RM300. At the same time, the government also introduced a more systematic 
allocation system for low cost houses based on a ‘points based waiting list system’ to 
identify the house buyers.
5.4.3 Conclusion
From 1956 to 1970, low cost housing provision in terms of production and allocation 
was the responsibility of the Federal government through the Housing Trust Federation 
of Malaya. However, the achievements of the Housing Trust were hampered by a lack 
of funds and professional staff to implement low cost housing projects. Therefore, the 
Housing Trust had to prioritise and focused on low cost housing provision in major 
cities and towns. Low cost housing production by the Housing Trust only increased 
significantly during the “Crash Programme” launched by the Federal government 
before the 1969 general election. However, the programme was implemented in order 
to impress the voters rather than to fulfil the housing needs of people with a low 
income. In general, the Housing Trust failed to address the housing problem by 
providing adequate houses for people with a low income.
5.5 THE EMERGENCE OF STATE CONTROL (1971-1990)
The implementation of the NEP in 1971 earmarked a major shift toward greater state 
control in low cost housing provision. Low cost housing provision suddenly became a 
central focus in order to eradicate poverty and restructure society. However, one of the 
consequences of NEP implementation was a sudden increase in housing demand, 
particularly among people with a low income due to rapid rural-urban migration during 
the early 1970s. Rapid migration and the government’s failure to provide adequate 
housing in urban areas contributed to an increased number of people living in squatter 
(Agus, 1992; Wagelin, 1979). The squatter settlements were mainly concentrated in 
the Klang Valley, particularly Kuala Lumpur and parts of Selangor. In 1973, 
approximately 30.5 percent of Kuala Lumpur’s population or 169,500 people lived in 
squatter settlements compared to 4 to 6 percent in other major towns (Wagelin, 1979, 
p.97). The problem was further compounded, as most public low cost housing units 
were not offered to existing squatters and were instead allocated to police and army 
personnel (Wagelin, 1979, p.98).
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During the 1970s, international agencies, particularly the World Bank, encouraged 
most developing countries to adopt aided self-help housing and slum upgrading 
programmes to solve the squatter problem (Pugh, 2001, p.400). However, the 
Malaysian Government continued to pursue a conventional public housing programme 
and refused to adopt aided self-help housing or slum upgrading programmes. The 
reasons for the government’s rejection of the World Bank’s recommendations were 
because the people of Malaysia had a relatively high per capita income and the 
magnitude of the squatter problems was more manageable than other South and 
South-East Asian countries (Wagelin, 1980, p. 102). At the same time, the political 
leaders also favoured technocratic modernisation in housing and buildings rather than 
slum upgrading programmes.
However, the main problem during this period was the capacity of the Housing Trust to 
build adequate conventional low cost houses for people with a low income (see 
Drakakis-Smith, 1980; Johnstone, 1979; Alithambhi, 1979; Soo Hai, 1979). Several 
factors contributed to the relative failure of the Housing Trust to provide adequate low 
cost housing from the 1950s to early 1970s. The first was a lack of funding available 
for low cost housing construction. Due to other development priorities, low cost 
housing only received a small amount of money from the Federal government. Low 
cost housing provision was not considered to be as important as infrastructure and 
rural development, which received a large amount of investment.
The second was the high standard of building and infrastructure specifications 
imposed by the government for low cost housing construction. As described by Pugh 
(2001 p. 401) “...the inappropriateness of public housing provision in many developing 
countries during the 1960s is because they usually used the idea and building 
standard transplanted from the developed countries...” Similarly, in Malaysia, the 
Housing Trust adopted the highest possible standard of construction for its public 
housing based on the Western model (Housing Trust, 1957, p.8). The obvious 
example was the construction of low cost housing units for Pekeliling Flats, Kuala 
Lumpur and Rifle Range, Penang in 1969 using the industrialised housing technique 
(see Figure 5.6). The problem was that the construction techniques could not be 
replicated in other projects due to high capital involvement and thus contributed to a 
higher monthly rental rate beyond the affordability of people with a low income.
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Therefore, the implementation of the project was regarded as a failure by the 
government (Wagelin, 1978; Drakakis-Smith, 1979).
Figure 5.6: Pekeliling Flats was the First Public Low Cost Housing Project Using 
Industrialised Housing Construction Techniques in Malaysia 
Source: Author (Photos taken by Author in 2001)
The third was a lack of private building contractors who were capable of constructing 
low cost houses, since the guiding principle adopted by the Housing Trust was to 
provide structurally sound houses at a minimum cost (Housing Trust, 1957, p.8). The 
Housing Trust also faced difficulties in identifying suitable contractors, especially in 
small towns and rural areas, at a reasonable tender price. As described in the Housing 
Trust Annual Report, 1957, there were “...not many contractors outside Kuala Lumpur 
capable of handling contracts for more than about fifty houses” (Housing Trust 1957, 
p.8). Meanwhile, some projects faced serious delays due to the contractors 
experiencing difficulty in completing the construction. This happened mainly because 
some of the smaller building contractors took on contracts beyond their financial and 
organisational abilities (Housing Trust, 1957, p. 13).
Finally, there was a drawback to the relationship between Federal and State 
government, which particularly related to land issues and programme financing
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towards the end of the 1960s (MLGH, 1968a, p. 7). MLGH realised that low cost 
housing provision during this period was problematic due to the limited role played by 
the Housing Trust, which could only provide financial assistance, supervisory, 
technical and professional services to the state governments.
As a result, only 26,779 units of low cost housing were built by the Housing Trust 
during the period of 1956-1974 (see Figure 5.7). From 1956 to 1965, the Housing 
Trust managed to build a total of 7,431 units of low cost housing or on average 826 
units per year, well below the annual figure recommended by the Atkinson Report 
(Atkinson, 1961). Housing production via the Housing Trust still failed to improve after 
1965, except under the “Crash Programme” (1967-1969) with 14,175 low cost housing 
units completed or 52.9 percent of total units completed from 1956 to 1974. The 
Housing Trust also failed to cope with increasing demand for low cost housing after 
1970 under the NEP. The total number of houses completed declined from 1970 to 
1974, with only 3,398 units finished. The Housing Trust finally ceased to operate in 
1976 (MHLG, 2006).
Unit
12000
1 0 7 4 8
10000
8000
6000
4000
2 28 5
2000 1 4 8 9 1 4 6 4
1 0 8 6  1 1 4 21 1 7 6  1197, 1081933
® °Z. 6 6 0  5 9 2 43 1
14623 9
0
(3> (S i frN cCl' Gy> G-^  G& ^  A*^  A^ *P ><P Sp Sp Sp Sp sp sP xp xp XP XP Xp ^  ^  ^
■ Total Low Cost Houses
Figure 5.7: Low Cost Housing Production by the Housing Trust 1956-1974 
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The role of low housing provision was later taken over by the State governments. The 
Federal government then confined its role to providing advisory services and loans to 
governments to implement new programme known as Public Low Cost Housing 
Programme (PLCHP). The National Housing Department (NHD) was then established 
in 1976 by the Federal government, but only to provide a technical advisory service to 
the State governments. The Ministry of Local Government and Housing also changed 
its name to the Ministry of Housing and Local Government (MHLG) in 1976 to reflect 
the importance of housing in the national development agenda.
5.5.1 Low Cost Housing Policy and Programmes
The State government began to play a significant role in low cost housing provision 
and allocation after 1976. The implementation of a low cost housing programme was 
supposed to be easier, since the State governments had more power in terms of land 
matters and housing according to Federal Constitution (Malaysia 1960). Furthermore, 
the implementation of public low cost housing programmes was important as part of a 
government strategy to eradicate poverty and to improve homeownership among the 
Bumiputera under the NEP. The emphasis on the housing policy during this period 
was to provide adequate housing for people, particularly the people with a low income, 
as indicated in the Third Malaysia Plan Report (1976-1980):
“The fulfilment of housing needs is a major social objective of national 
development The aim is to ensure that all Malaysians, in particular the 
lower income groups, have access to adequate housing. The Third 
Malaysia Plan (TMP) emphasizes the provision of housing as an 
important component of the programmes to eradicate poverty’’
(Malaysia, 1976 p.330).
One of the most important policy changes under the NEP was the introduction of an 
ethnic quota for low cost housing allocation. Although the NEP set the minimum quota 
for Bumiputera at 30 percent, some State governments set a higher quota. In the State 
of Johor, for example, a 70 percent quota was set for Bumiputera (Agus, 1986, p.71). 
Subsequently in order to increase low cost housing production and to solve the 
squatter problem, the Federal and State governments began to impose a minimum of 
30 percent low cost housing units in every housing project undertaken by private 
developers from 1981 (Malaysia, 1981, p.210). Most private housing developers were 
initially very much opposed to the idea of a 30 percent low cost housing requirement. 
Later, the concept of ‘cross-subsidisation’ for low cost housing provision was 
introduced in the late 1970s to ease the financial burdens faced by private developers
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(Salleh and Lee, 1997, p. 60). Under this concept, the private developers expected to 
make a huge profit on medium and high cost developments to cover their loss, while 
providing low cost houses in the same project. The government agreed not to control 
the selling price for medium and high cost houses. However, the approach contributed 
to a huge price increase for medium and high cost housing (Johnstone, 1980, p.356). 
Subsequently the selling price was increased from RM18,000 to RM25,000 per unit to 
encourage private developers to build low cost houses (Malaysia 1981, p.210).
According to Johnstone (1980 p.338), there are three ideological justifications which 
explain the need for private sector involvement in low cost housing provision by the 
government. The first is government recognition that the private sector housing 
industry had attained maturity and that it had the efficiency, capability and capacity to 
be dominant producers of adequate and affordable homes for the community. 
Although the private sector had already been involved in housing provision since the 
1950s, that was only for medium and high cost housing (Johnston, 1980, p.356). After 
more than 20 years in the industry, the government believed private developers should 
be involved in low cost housing provision as part of their social obligations. The second 
justification was that, in order to achieve economy of scale, the private sector should 
be able to come up with more innovative designs and technologies. Finally, private 
sector participation would allay any accusation of the government posing unfair 
competition through its own involvement in housing.
The structure of low cost housing provision remained the same from 1971 to 1997 (see 
igure 5.8). The only significant change during this period was the leading role played 
by the state governments and market in low cost housing provision. The state 
governments were key players in low cost housing provision from 1971 until 1990; 
however, the market took over the leading role after 1990. The Public Low Cost 
Housing Programme (PLCHP) was the main low cost housing programme formulated 
by the Federal government in 1976. The objective of the programme was to provide 
affordable housing for low income people through State and Federal government 
cooperation. Under the PLCHP, the State government was the key player in low cost 
housing production. As explained by Dali (1998, p. 124):
“PLCHP is a housing programme implemented through an intergovernmental 
cooperation and division of responsibility between the Federal and States 
government. Under this programme federal government acts as a 
coordinator and financier, provide funds in the form of loan to State 
governments. Whereas State governments act as developers, whose borrow 
money from Federal and implement the projects. ”
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Under the PLCHP, the respective State governments were responsible for identifying 
suitable land to build low cost houses, planning, implementing and administering the 
programme with assistance from NHD on the technical matters. The main features of 
the PLCHP included a selling price not exceeded RM25.000 per unit with 3 bedrooms, 
a minimum size of 60 sq metres and targeted at people with a household income of 
less than RM750 per month from 1981 (Malaysia 1981, p. 211). Low cost house units 
built under this programme were either for sale or rent for a number of years with the 
option to buy under the hire purchase scheme (Dali, 1998, p. 125). The financing for 
PLCHP projects were provided by the Federal government to State governments 
through the Ministry of Housing and Local Government.
The amount of loans given were based on the number of low cost housing units 
proposed by the State government at RM25,000 per unit. The Federal government 
then charged an annual interest rate of 4 percent and imposed a repayment period of 
20 to 25 years for the loan (Asek, 2007, p. 211). The State governments then sold the 
houses to people with a low income at the same price and charged the buyers an 
interest rate of 5.5 percent, which was paid directly to the State government every 
month for a period of up to 30 years. Thus, under the hire purchase scheme, the 
buyers were not required to obtain any financing from private financial institutions. The 
financial arrangement to purchase the houses under the PLCHP was more convenient 
because buyers only had to pay RM143.35 per month for 30 years and the upfront 
money was equivalent to two or three months of instalments (Dali, 1998, p. 127). Dali 
adds, if the loan was obtained from private financial institutions, the buyer would have 
had to pay up to RM275.00 per month. Thus, shows the loan was highly subsidised by 
the State government for the low income people.
The State government was responsible for the selection of buyers and the collection of 
monthly instalments from those buyers. The money collected was then used to pay 
back the loan from the Federal government (Asek, 2007, p.211). The house 
construction was usually carried out by private building contractors and their selection 
was made according to state government standard procedures (Dali, 1998, p. 131). 
Implementation of the PLCHP clearly reflects the significant role played by the State 
governments in low cost housing provision. The State governments were not only 
directly involved in the production of low cost housing, but also the financing and 
allocation process.
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During the 1970s, the State governments also provided low cost housing through the 
State Economic Development Corporation (SEDC), especially in new growth centres 
and rural areas. Although the main purpose of the SEDC was to become involved in 
property development in order to improve the State’s economy, low cost housing 
provision was still the State governments’ main priority in order to achieve NEP 
objectives. The financing for low cost housing provision partly come from the State 
governments and private financial institutions in the form of loans.
However by early 1980, the Federal and state governments realised they could not 
solve the problem of low cost housing without the involvement of the private sector. As 
a total of 626 private housing developers and 1,147 construction firms had registered 
with the government since 1972, the private sector could play a crucial role in 
alleviating low cost housing shortages in Malaysia (Johnstone, 1980, p. 56). Large 
conglomerates began to venture into housing development and became directly 
involved in low cost housing provision. These companies not only have large banks of 
land for housing development, but also have strong financial back-up from internal 
sources or private financial institutions (Johnstone 1980, p.57). Implementation of the 
Privatisation Policy in 1981 further accelerated the private sector’s involvement in low 
cost housing provision (Malaysia 1981, p.211).
Therefore, in the 1980 and 1990s, more than 70 percent of low cost housing units 
were built by large companies (Yusof, 2007, p. 152). Furthermore many joint venture 
companies were set up between the State governments/local authorities and private 
developers to undertake housing development. The arrangement was usually that the 
State government would provide the land and the private developer would provide 
technical knowledge and capital for the project. The joint venture companies were still 
required to provide 30 percent low cost housing units imposed by the State 
governments. Cooperatives were also involved in low cost housing provision, although 
the number was relatively small and they were built for members only.
During the economic recession from 1986-1989, the Federal government sought 
cooperation from the private sector to provide low cost houses. The programme was 
known as the Special Low Cost Housing Programme (SLCHP) and was implemented 
in 1987 with a construction target of 240,000 units of low cost housing (Soernarno, 
1986, p. 34). The main objectives of the programme were to mitigate the adverse 
effects of the economic recession, to generate economic growth and to create 
employment opportunities. The programme was implemented wholly by the private
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sector, but was coordinated by MHLG (Subramaniam, 1986 p.3). Under this 
programme, the Federal government, through the Central Bank of Malaysia, provided 
a financial package of RM2 billion for housing construction. However, by 1989, private 
housing developers had failed to achieve their target, despite various incentives 
offered by the government and only 84,940 units were completed. The reason for the 
poor rate of achievement was mainly because most private housing developers were 
not confident of the actual demand for and saleability of the 240,000 units targeted by 
the Federal government (Sen, 1986). This shows that financial assistance alone 
without accurate market information failed to convince private housing developers to 
build low cost housing.
5.5.2 Low Cost Housing Allocation
In 1976, the State governments began to take over responsibility for public low cost 
housing allocation from the Housing Trust. This was in line with the role played by the 
State governments as the key players in the PLCHP implementation. Every State 
government then began to establish a low cost housing allocation system based on 
their own selection criteria. Although State governments maintained the main selection 
criteria based on monthly income and number of dependents, most gave priority to the 
people who were born in the state. At the same time an ethnic quota for housing 
allocation was also introduced in line with NEP strategy. After 1971, those eligible to 
purchase houses were divided according to an ethnic quota determined by the state 
government (Alithambi, 1979, p.66).
In terms of the registration and allocation process during the 1980s, the study by Agus 
(1982) on the States of Melaka, Johor and Perak shows different allocation policies 
were adopted (see Figure 5.9). The State of Perak adopted a simple way to select 
eligible buyers through an interview. Meanwhile, Melaka used a points based system 
according to criteria set by the State government, which was followed up by an 
interview to determine the eligible buyers. The State of Johor, however, had a clear 
policy on low cost housing allocation which included a quota according to ethnic group 
and political supporters. For both the States of Perak and Melaka, the ethnic quota 
was not clearly spelt out in the housing policy and thus those state governments had 
the flexibility to change the percentage of houses allocated for specific groups. The 
politicians influence over the selection process was rather rampant during the 1980s. 
Johor was one of the States in Malaysia which had formally adopted a policy to
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allocate at least 10 percent of low cost housing units to political party supporters. In 
other States, the actual percentage allocated to political party supporters was not 
officially announced in the allocation policy..
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Applicants for low cost housing must also complete an application form provided by 
the respective State government. An incomplete application form would mean the 
application would be rejected. This included a failure to attach all the necessary 
documents i.e. identity card, birth certificate, marriage certificate and supporting letter 
from employer. Some applicants also attached a recommendation letter from their 
local politician or member of parliament to support their application. The State 
Selection Committee was usually headed by the chief minister or menteri besar and 
the members included State Executive Council Members (EXCO) for housing,
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members of parliament or state assemblymen and senior government officers. Since 
the committee members also included politicians, most decisions were therefore likely 
influenced by political agenda and in favour of ruling party supporters.
When the power for low cost housing allocation was transferred to the State 
governments after 1976, one of the unintended consequences was that politicians 
began to intervene in the process. Most politicians believed their involvement in the 
low cost housing allocation process was important since it could influence election 
results in particular areas if houses were allocated to their supporters. Therefore, many 
people who purchased low cost houses during the 1980s were strong supporters of 
the ruling political party (Agus, 1982, p. 60). The low cost housing unit or ‘Politic 
House’ as described by Agus (1986, p.61) was used to honour party members who 
were close with local politicians or contributed to the party. In the State of Johor, for 
example, more than 10 percent of low cost housing was allocated to ruling party 
members without them having to go through the normal selection process. As 
described by the Director General of the National Housing Department of Malaysia in 
1981 (cited in Agus, 1986, p. 74):
“...Government has distributed guidelines to all State government on the 
selection of applicants. There must be followed closely by all officials 
connected with distribution of houses. If it considered necessary to 
accommodate a political bias in the distribution of houses it is important 
that the proportion to be set aside for this purpose be the absolute 
minimum, say 10%... ”
7 r;-3 Federal and State governments generally acknowledged the need to allocate a 
certain percentage of low cost house units to political supporters. Therefore, the 
government suggested a maximum of only 10 percent should be allocated to political 
supporters. However, in reality, the number of political supporters buying low cost 
houses could have been higher (Agus, 1986, p. 74). Meanwhile, a study by Hassan 
(1984) describes how local politicians from the ruling party could influence the 
selection process. In some cases, the political supporters didn’t have to go through the 
selection process set by the State governments. The allocation system was also 
subject to manipulation by politicians and housing administrators. The low cost 
housing allocation practiced during the 1980s could explain why many people with a 
low income faced difficulty in accessing the low cost housing, despite a large number 
of units being built by the public and private sectors during this period.
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5.5.3 Conclusion
Implementation of the NEP in 1971 earmarked a shift in low cost housing provision to 
the State government. Low cost housing ownership was identified as one of the key 
strategies to eradicate poverty under the NEP. Thus, state intervention in low cost 
housing provision was important to ensure that targeted groups, particularly 
Bumiputera, had access to buy the houses. Following the closure of the Housing Trust 
operation in 1976, the State government began to take main responsibility for provision 
of low cost housing under the PLCHP. In 1981, the government began to impose 
compulsory low cost housing provision on the private sector through the introduction of 
a 30% low cost housing quota policy. State governments were not only responsible for 
public low cost housing allocation, but also for houses built by the private sector in 
order to achieve the NEP target to increase homeownership among the Bumiputera. 
However, State governments’ involvement in low cost housing allocation increased 
political interference and exposed the allocation to corruption at the State level.
5.6 MARKET REFORM (1991 -1997)
Although the country’s economic liberalisation started as early as 1986, it was not until 
1991 that the market’s transformation began to emerge in low cost housing provision. 
Furthermore, the implementation of the Privatisation policy and Malaysia’s 
Incorporation was almost completed by the end of the 1980s (Jomo, 1999, p. 76). 
Thus, this provided a good platform for market involvement in low cost housing 
provision. During the Sixth Malaysia Plan (1991-1995) the emphasis was on the 
private sector to take a leading role in national development, including housing 
provision. The World Bank’s recommendations (World Bank, 1993) further enhanced 
the market’s role in housing provision in Malaysia. However, at the same time, rapid 
economic growth encouraged rural-urban migration and a widening income gap 
between the rich and poor people. Poor access to low cost housing among people with 
a low income left many new migrants with no other alternative but to live in squatter 
settlements. Many middle income people found it difficult to buy a house in the market 
due to high selling prices as a result of the cross-subsidy approach used in low cost 
housing construction. This group, in a desperate attempt to own a house, would use 
any chance to a buy low cost house. The situation led to corruption and cheating in the 
low cost housing application process, thus putting more pressure on the government to 
control the selling and buying process of low cost housing.
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5.6.1 Low Cost Housing Policy and Programmes
Generally the government still maintained a low cost housing policy similar to that 
formulated in the 1980s. During the Sixth Malaysia Plan (1991-1995) the private sector 
began to take a leading role in low cost housing provision, with 129,598 units or 82.2 
percent compared to only 60,999 units or 17.8 percent built by the public sector (see 
Figure 5.10).This impressive achievement by the private sector was largely caused by 
the imposition of a 30 percent low cost housing quota in every private residential 
development (Salleh and Lee, 1997; Sirat et al., 1999). However the figure declined 
slightly to 68 percent during the Seventh Malaysia Plan (1996-2000) following the 
economic crisis. Although the trend shows a decline in private sector low cost housing 
provision after 1995, overall its contribution is still significant. It is interesting to note, 
even without direct financial subsidies and with various regulations imposed by the 
government on the market, they still managed to provide low cost housing (see 
Appendix 4 for details of low cost housing production by the public and private sectors 
1971-2005).
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Meanwhile, in terms of public low cost housing expenditure in Malaysia, from 1971, 
expenditure on public housing steadily increased in every five year Malaysia plan. With 
the exception of the Sixth Malaysia Plan (1991-1995), actual expenditure was usually 
higher than that originally allocated by the government (see Figure 5.11). Based on the 
revised figures, expenditure increased steeply from the Second Malaysia Plan (1971- 
1975) at RM0.2 billion to RM4 billion in the Fourth Malaysia Plan (1981-1985) in line 
with state commitment towards housing provision under the NEP. However, the 
government’s public low cost housing expenditure began to decline during the Fifth 
Malaysia Plan (1985-1990) at RM3.9 billion to only RM1.8 billion in the Sixth Malaysia 
Plan (1991-1995). This is in line with economic liberalisation and the increasing role 
played by the private sector in housing provision during the boom period. The 
expenditure kept increasing after the financial crisis due to active government 
involvement in low cost housing provision.
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Figure 5.11: Public Low Cost Housing Expenditure, 1971-2005 
Source: Various Malaysia Five Year Plans
As recommended by the World Bank, the government began to reduce its role as a 
low cost housing provider, as shown during the Sixth Malaysia Plan (1990-1996). 
Instead, the government emphasised its role as an enabler and facilitator which 
provided institutional support for the delivery of houses by private developers (Yahya, 
1997, p. 244). State governments and local authorities also slowly retreated from being 
major players in the provision of low cost houses by the mid 1990s. Although most
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private housing developers had to provide low cost housing as part of planning 
permission approval requirements, The government also gave other incentives such 
as faster planning and building approval processes, lower standards of planning 
requirements (i.e. car park spaces, open spaces) and lower building specifications to 
reduce the cost of construction (Sirat et al., 1999, pp. 81-83).
Increasingly, government role was confined to being regulator of land sales, land 
conversion and development, land use and construction standards (Sirat et al., 1999 p. 
37). The country’s complex political economy made it necessary for the government to 
rely heavily on market forces for many aspects of low cost housing provision, while 
simultaneously trying to get a grip on legal, regulatory and economic frameworks (Sirat 
et al., 1999, p.40). Therefore Sirat et al. (1999),argued ‘housing enablement’ in the 
Malaysian context does not imply a non-interventionist stance by the government. It 
was more of a situation or framework whereby the government decides where and 
when to intervene. Regardless of the changes to the market, ethical and philosophical 
arguments insisting on state intervention, particularly on behalf of the poor, are still 
valid. Increasing privatisation and the limited role of the state may seriously 
disadvantage the urban poor.
The structure of low cost housing provision during this period remained the same as in 
the 1980s. The State governments still continued with PLCHP implementation and 
were directly responsible for low cost housing allocation. However, by the mid 1990s, 
the Federal government was disappointed with the State governments’ failure to 
provide adequate housing for people with a low income and to resolve the problem of 
squatters (Asek, 2007 p. 257). Therefore, in 1994, a new public housing programme 
was launched known as the People Housing Programme RM600 million (PHP RM600 
million) and was only for rental. PHP RM600 Million was the first large scale low cost 
housing for rental programme ever implemented in Malaysia by the Federal and state 
governments. Under this programme, the Federal government tried to emulate the 
success of Singapore’s government in the implementation of low cost housing and 
sought to eventually eliminate squatters from the country (Asek, 2007, p. 238).
Unlike the PLCHP, the PHP was not initially planned to be a permanent feature of 
Malaysian housing policy, but rather a one-off housing programme to solve the issue 
of squatters. The idea was initiated by the MHLG in view of the many existing 
squatters in major urban areas occupying State land reserved for public purposes 
(Asek, 2007, p.267). It was therefore easier for the government to develop the land
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with public housing. A study by the MHLG in 1993 also revealed that most people in 
squat areas could not afford to buy a low cost house at the price of RM25.000 per unit 
and would struggle to pay the 10 percent deposit for house purchase and monthly 
instalments. Therefore, the MHLG realised the need to provide low cost houses for 
rent targeted at squatter and people with a low income of less than RM500 per month 
(hardcore poor). Under the programme, the squatters were required to move out 
temporarily from the land they occupied which would then be used for low cost housing 
construction (Asek, 2007, p. 234). The people then moved into the rental low cost 
housing built by the Federal government in the same area when it was completed.
Under this programme, the Federal government was responsible for overall housing 
provision through the National Housing Department (NHD) including project design, 
finance, tendering and construction monitoring. Meanwhile, the state governments 
were only responsible for tenant selection. When construction was completed, the 
house ownership was handed over to state governments, who were also responsible 
for monthly rental collection and overall maintenance. In terms of financing, the 
Federal government provided RM150 million and another RM150 million was provided 
by the Central Bank of Malaysia; the remaining RM300 million was obtained from 
private financial institutions in the form of a long term loan. With strong economic 
growth during the mid 1990s, in an effort to improve people’s quality of life, the Federal 
government was willing to spend RM600 million, with low financial returns to the 
government. A total of 14,751 units were completed under this programme nationwide, 
mainly in Kuala Lumpur (see Table 5.3). Meanwhile, monthly rental was set at RM124 
per month, based on affordability among people with a low income (MHLG, 1996).
Despite the government’s efforts to reduce its involvement in direct low cost housing 
production in a move towards the market in the early 1990s, the continuous squatter 
problem required urgent government attention. Thus, the implementation of the PHP 
RM600 Million programme reflected a market failure to eliminate squatters and solve 
the housing problem among people with a low income. However direct state 
intervention in low cost housing production with a highly subsidised rental rate was 
clearly not in line with neo-liberal policy. The average cost of each low cost housing 
unit built under PHP was RM41.329 per unit or 65 percent higher than the selling price 
of low cost housing in the market at RM25,000 (Asek, 2007, p.287). With rent of 
RM124 per month set by the Federal government it was well below market rate and 
not even sufficient to cover maintenance costs.
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Table 5.3: PHP RM600 Million Projects According to State, 1994-1998
State
PHP RM600 Million
No. o f Projects No. of units Allocation (RM Million)
Johor 1 1,502 48.45
Kedah 3 758 25.30
Kelantan 0 0 0
Melaka 2 720 26.39
Negeri Sembilan 1 190 5.75
Pahang 0 0 0
Perak 2 868 32.24
Perlis 1 150 6.42
Pulau Pinang 2 1,441 61.73
Selangor 1 1,152 49.43
Trengganu 4 955 43.67
Kuala Lumpur 7 5,297 231.04
Sabah 2 1,462 55.18
Sarawak 1 256 11.87
MALAYSIA 28 14,751 597.47
Source: National Housing Department, 2005
5.6.2 Low Cost Housing Allocation
During the early 1990s, the practice of low cost housing allocation remained similar to 
that of the 1980s.To enhance the efficiency of the allocation process, some developed 
State governments began to improve allocation with the introduction of a computerised 
system to replace the manual approach. The State of Selangor was the first to 
establish the computerised low cost housing allocation system in 1995 to cope with an 
increasing number of applicants and a huge amount of low cost housing constructed 
by the private sector (MHLG, 2003). By mid 1990s, there was growing criticism from 
housing developers regarding the low cost housing allocation system in Malaysia. At 
the same time, a huge number of people living in squatter required attention from the 
government to improve access to low cost housing for people with a low income. 
Studies by Salleh and Lee (1998) and Sirat et al. (1999) identified several problems 
related to low cost housing allocation practice during the 1990s.
The first problem was the ineffectiveness of the State government low cost housing 
allocation system. The Housing Developers Association of Malaysia (HDA), in their 
memorandum send to the relevant authorities in 1995, urged them to take a closer 
look at the system of allocating the sale and distribution of low cost housing to the
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public (Sirat et al., 1999, p.79). The action was necessary to check the unhealthy 
activities of speculators in low cost housing. The problem of housing allocation practice 
was also highlighted by the former President of the HDA (Chan, 1997, p. 211):
“One of the most problematic areas in the whole issue of low cost housing 
is distribution... given the present system of distribution and sale of low 
cost houses where there are hardly any controls binding low cost housing 
purchasers, the system is open to abuse. For example a purchaser of a 
low cost house does not have to abide by any regulation requiring them to 
occupy the unit. There are also no restrictions on the resale price that the 
purchaser may demand from the next buyers, making the system 
vulnerable to speculative activities by undeserving purchasers...”
The second problem was delays in the allocation process. As described by Sirat et al., 
(1999, p. 99) the delays in the allocation process by the relevant government agencies 
caused holding costs for the housing developers. The delays also affected the 
applicants and there were cases where applicants had to wait for between three and 
five years before being offered the opportunity to purchase a low cost house. The third 
issue was political intervention in low income housing allocation in Malaysia (Agus, 
2005, p. 74). Although political intervention was not new in Malaysia, rapid economic 
growth and urbanisation during the 1990s made the problem even worse. The fourth 
problem was the fact that the names in the States’ low cost housing registers were 
usually not up-to-date. There was no mechanism in place to regularly update the 
applicants’ details and status in the system. The updating of the State register was 
important to weed out those potential buyers who already owned a house or were no 
longer eligible to purchase a low cost house due to an increase in household income. 
Finally, the system for allocating low cost houses to eligible buyers from the State 
government register was not transparent. The lists were prepared internally by the 
State governments without private developer involvement. Therefore, they were 
criticised as lacking transparency in the allocation process (Salleh and Chai, 1997, p. 
226).
The government also believed that improvement of the low cost housing allocation 
system was important to solve the squatter problem in Malaysia. An efficient and 
transparent housing allocation system was required to ensure better access for people 
with a low income to own a low cost house and to stop people from living in squatter 
as an alternative. Clearly, by the mid 1990s, there were an increasing numbers of 
issues related to low cost housing allocation practices in Malaysia. Thus, this situation 
required attention from the Federal government to improve people’s access to low cost 
housing and solve the squatter problem.
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5.6.3 Conclusion
Rapid economic growth and financial liberalisation during the early 1990s encouraged 
private sector involvement in low cost housing provision. The private sector began to 
take over the leading role in low cost housing provision in 1991 until the financial crisis 
hit the region in 1997. At the same time, the state began to retreat from direct low cost 
housing provision and became a facilitator for the private sector in line with 
recommendations from international agencies particularly the World Bank. The 
practice of low cost housing provision during this period clearly reflects changes 
towards the market and a neo-liberal policy approach. Thus, the convergence towards 
market provision was likely to happen in Malaysia.
The rapid economic growth also contributed to an increase in rural-urban migration 
and income inequality among the people. This issue, combined with poor access to 
low cost housing, meant many people with a low income ended up living in squatter 
settlements during the 1990s. Despite the success of the private and public sectors in 
providing a large number of low cost houses, the squatter issues continued to get 
worse. By the mid 1990s, the state realised the market alone could not solve the 
squatter problem and housing needs among people with a low income. Therefore, in 
1994 they began to implement public low cost housing for rental known as PHP 
RM600, which specifically targeted squatters for a relocation programme. The public 
low cost housing programme to eliminate the squatters continued after 1997.
5.7 SQUATTER’S CLEARANCE (1998-2005)
The number of people lives in squatters was still growing, despite the country’s rapid 
economic growth and active private sector involvement in low cost housing provision 
during the 1990s. The Asian financial crisis in 1997-1998 provided an opportunity for 
the government to review low cost housing policy and the reasons behind their failure 
to solve the squatter problem in the past. A nationwide squatter census conducted by 
the MHLG in 1999 and the Selangor Government earlier in 1997 revealed there was a 
total of 571,261 people living in 129,117 squatter buildings (see Table 5.4). Selangor 
had the highest number of residents living in squatter, with 171,396 people or 30 
percent of total squatters in Malaysia.
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Table 5.4: No. of Squatter Settlements, Buildings and Residents According to the
State, 1999
State Squatter (1999)Settlements Buildings Residents
Selangor (1997) 314 40,064 171,396
Sabah 143 32,235 148,099
Federal Territory Kuala Lumpur 197 26,941 134,345
Johor 74 7,708 30,832
Sarawak 75 8,268 29,173
Perak 118 3,945 14,991
Kedah 58 3,074 12,822
Pulau Pinang 26 2,009 6,985
Perlis 22 1,380 6,558
Pahang 23 1,074 4,511
Federal Territory Labuan 1 1,315 5,978
Terengganu 12 792 3,915
Negeri Sembilan 9 256 1,460
Melaka 5 56 196
MALAYSIA 1,077 129,117 571,261
Source: Ministry of Housing and Local Government, 2006
Meanwhile, in Sabah, the squatter residents were mostly illegal immigrants from the 
Southern Philippines and the squatter settlements became a haven for criminals and 
smugglers (MHLG, 1999). Thus, the squatter issues in Malaysia not only contributed to 
physical, environment and social problems (see Figure 5.12), but also to national 
security. Despite both private and public sectors having completed 261,386 units of 
low cost housing during the Sixth Malaysia Plan period (1991-1995), squatters were 
still a major housing issue in Malaysia, thus raising a question over the effectiveness of 
the low cost housing allocation process by the state governments.
Various studies conducted during the 1990s on low cost housing provision identified 
three main reasons which could explain why the government could not resolve the 
squatter problem (see Salleh and Chai, 1997; Salleh and Meng, 1998; Dali, 1998; Sirat 
et al., 1999). Firstly, there was a mismatch between low cost housing supply and 
demand. In many areas, the supply did not reflect the actual housing need in the 
particular area. Scholars argue that the private sector failed to deliver the houses 
where demand was most pressing, particularly in urban areas. With most squatter 
settlements located within existing towns and cities, it was identified that most new low 
cost housing development was located in the urban fringes and new growth centres. 
The problem was also partly caused by the blanket 30 percent low cost house 
requirement imposed by the government on the private housing developers through
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the planning system (Sirat et al., 1999 p. 80). Although the policy increased total 
housing production, but it failed to encourage private developers to build low cost 
houses in areas with high demand, especially the urban areas.
Figure 5.12: Images of Squatter in Malaysia During the 1990s
Source: Author (Photos taken by Author in 1996 at Kg Medan, Petaling Jaya Selangor)
The second reason was affordability for squatter residents to buy low cost housing. 
They also faced difficulty in obtaining financing from private financial institutions, which 
denied them access to low cost housing (MHLG, 2003; Asek, 2007). The final reason 
is related to the poor system of low cost housing allocation. Poor allocation practice 
and corruption led to difficulties being faced by genuine applicants, including the 
squatters, with regard to gaining access to low cost housing.
Furthermore the implementation of PLCHP by the State government also faced 
several problems which contributed to the squatter problem and access to housing by 
people with a low income (Asek, 2007). The first was poor loan repayments by the 
State governments. To provide low cost housing, the State governments were 
expected to have an effective and efficient system of loan repayment to the Federal 
government and collection of monthly instalments from the house buyers. However, 
since most State governments were facing these constraints, they preferred not to
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undertake low cost housing development directly and instead imposed it on the private 
sector. Initially, the State government would provide loans for the purchasers, but due 
to many loan defaulters in the mid 1980s, buyers were urged to take out a loan from 
the financial institutions. Overall the performance of State government in low cost 
housing provision under the PLCHP was poor, despite the assistance given by the 
Federal government in terms of technical help and financing. Between 1976 and 1990, 
most State governments only managed to deliver between 30 to 60 percent of the total 
units planned by the Federal government (see Table 5.5). Therefore, the Federal 
government began to question the State governments’ capability and commitment to 
implement the PLCHP (Asek, 2007).
Table 5.5: Performance of Public Low Cost Housing Programme According to 
State, 1976-1990
States
3ra Malaysia Plan 4m Malaysia Plan 5m Malaysia Plan
Target Completed Target Completed Target Completed
Johor 10,693 2,833 22,896 11,977 7,114 4,560
Kedah 4,3743 1,757 7,681 5,835 1,233 1,021
Kelantan 1,497 141 6,172 2,699 3,072 1,180
Melaka 3,514 763 5,657 3,936 1,087 757
Negeri Sembilan 4,369 1,987 8,824 4,932 3,979 2,185
Pahang 5,894 1,392 12,572 3,320 8,813 5,772
Perak 3,310 1,520 16,897 3,074 5,775 3,839
Perlis 1,875 210 2,390 2,120 441 365
Pulau Pinang 3,870 982 6,983 4,397 1,065 615
Selangor 10,635 4,264 20,234 6,260 3,998 2,162
Trengganu 2,391 1,015 6,103 3,804 1,333 290
Kuala Lumpur 14,194 3,718 46,227 16,735 1,207 1,000
Sabah 2,160 1,284 6,983 910 2,895 1,734
Sarawak 4,730 559 6,793 3,257 3,788 692
MALAYSIA 73,506 22,425 176,502 73,258 45,800 26,172
% Completed 30.5% 41.5% 57.1%
Source: Dali, 1998 p. 12
The second problem was the delays in many PLCHP projects that meant the State 
governments were faced with financial constraints and an inadequate development 
fund. The third was the practice among the State governments of privatising 
government land in strategic locations to private companies. This left most of the 
PLCHP projects located in undesirable areas. In some cases it led to unsold low cost 
housing units which were eventually abandoned. Finally, the last problem was
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intervention by the politicians in low cost housing allocation and delays in processing 
the applications by the State governments. As a result, there were cases of completed 
public housing projects that were not occupied for months or even over a year 
because the list of buyers was not available (Endan, 1984, p. 71).
5.7.1 Low Cost Housing Policy and Programmes
In 1996, the Federal government began to step up its efforts to eliminate the squatters 
following a discussion between Prime Minister Mahathir and the Mayor of Kuala 
Lumpur (NHD, 2006). Several approaches were outlined to solve the problem 
including conducting a nationwide squatter census, registration, control and 
implementation of the Open Registration System (ORS) to select low cost house 
buyers. In April 2001, all the State governments agreed to pursue comprehensive 
action to achieve zero squatters by the year 2005. In order to achieve the target, the 
Federal government began to implement various efforts which included reviewing the 
low cost housing price structure in order to encourage the private sector to build low 
cost houses. For seventeen years the price of low cost houses remained the same 
throughout the country, regardless of project location, house type and inflation (Salim, 
1998). This clearly does not reflect the market mechanism in price determination and 
showed strong government control over the low cost housing market.
The selling price also did not reflect the actual construction cost of the low cost 
houses. The average development cost per unit for low cost houses built by private 
housing developers in Peninsular Malaysia from 1987 to 1996 shows a sharp increase 
after 1993 which was largely caused by higher land costs and building materials during 
the boom period (Saleh and Lee, 1997, pp.56-57). The development cost for a 
terraced house increased from RM31.699 per unit in 1993 to RM48.463 per unit in 
1996 (see Figure 5.13). The private developers generally had to subsidise almost 
100% of the cost based on a selling price of RM25.000 set by the government. 
Meanwhile, for flats the cost was slightly lower at RM34.464 per unit, but still the 
developers had to subsidise another RM9,464 per unit. The ‘cross-subsidy’ with 
medium and high cost housing no longer worked in this situation and the private 
developers incurred huge losses for low cost housing provision.
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Figure 5.13: Average Construction Cost and Selling Price for Low Cost House by
Private Housing Developers in Peninsular Malaysia 1987-1996 
Source: Saleh and Lee, 1997 p.56
Following continuous complaints from private housing developers (Morshidi et al., 
1997; Saleh and Lee, 1997), the Ministry of Housing and Local Government began to 
review the price of low cost housing. Finally, the government agreed to introduce a 
new pricing structure in June 1998. The changes also affected the overall housing 
price structure used by the MHLG for planning purpose. Low cost house ceiling price 
was increased to RM42,000 per unit, low medium cost house from RM42.001 to 
RM60.000 per unit, medium cost house between RM60,001 to RM100,000 per unit 
and high cost house more than RM100,000 per unit (MHLG 2002).
Unlike in the past, the determination of the new low cost housing price structure was 
based on the land cost where the project was located (see Table 5.6). Therefore, it 
began to reflect market consideration in the pricing of units. However, for the public 
housing projects, the price structure was slightly different with a lower selling price 
according to location. At the same time, the Federal government also issued various 
guidelines on low cost housing planning and design, particularly through the 
Construction Industry Development Board (CIDB) and the Town and Country Planning 
Department (TCPD) (see Appendix 5 for details of the design guideline for low cost 
housing).
150
Table 5.6: Four-tier Pricing for Low Cost Housing for the Private and Public
Sector from 1998
Price per unit (RM) 
Private Housing
Price per unit 
(RM) Public 
Housing
Location 
(Land cost per sq. m.)
Target 
Income 
Group (RM)
Types of 
House
42,000 35,000 Cities and major towns 
(RM45 and above)
1,200 to 1,500 More than 5- 
storey flat
35,000 30,000 Major towns and fringes 
(RM15 to RM44)
1,000 to 1,350 5-storey flat
30,000 28,000 Small towns 
(RM10 to RM14)
800 to 1,200 Terrace and 
cluster
25,000 25,000 Rural Areas 
(Less than RM10)
750 to 1,000 Terrace and 
cluster
Source: National Housing Department, 1998 & 2002
The floor area of a low cost house was fixed at a minimum of 650 sq ft with three 
bedrooms from 1998 (CIDB, 1998). However, the size of household did not determine 
the size of the house allocated by the state government under the present guidelines. 
Buyers with large households were still allocated a low cost house unit similar to 
people without dependents. Clearly, the government’s objective was to relocate 
families from squatter and to provide decent houses for first time home buyers rather 
than fulfilling the space requirement according to household size. This is unlike 
Western societies, where the size of the household will determine the size of the 
house allocated to them, regardless of their income (Yuen, 2003, p.45).
The structure of low cost housing provision significantly changed after 1998 (see 
Figure 5.14). Based on the successful implementation of the PHP RM600 million in 
1994, the Federal government was confident about implementing a large scale low 
cost housing programme after the crisis. In 1998, the Federal and State government 
began to intensify public low cost housing programmes to eliminate the squatters 
under PHP.
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Figure 5.14: The Structure of Low Cost Housing Provision after the Crisis, 1998-2005
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Following the recommendations by the National Economic Action Council (NEAC), the 
Federal government began to build public low cost housing for rental, also known as 
‘PHP NEAC’. The objective of the programme was to spur economic growth following 
the crisis and to eliminate the squatters (Asek, 2007, p. 131). For implementation of the 
PHP NEAC, a total of RM 2.32 billion was allocated for construction of 52,496 units of 
public rental houses within five years (1998-2002) nationwide by the Federal 
government and private sector financing (see Table 5.7). PHP NEAC was the largest 
public low cost housing programme dedicated to rental since independence by the 
Federal government (Asek 2007, p. 131). The Federal government believed that the 
construction of rental houses was not only vital for the squatter resettlement 
programme, but was also crucial to kick-start the economy through the construction 
industry during the crisis. The bulk of houses were built in Kuala Lumpur, with 23 
projects consisting of 33,952 units.
Table 5.7: PHP NEAC Projects According to State in Malaysia, 1998-2002
State No. of Projects No. of units Allocation (RM Million)
Johor 0 0 0
Kedah 2 1,894 84.79
Kelantan 0 0 0
Melaka 0 0 0
Negeri Sembilan 1 420 20.75
Pahang 0 0 0
Perak 6 682 25.92
Perlis 2 1,228 55.10
Pulau Pinang 3 782 37.24
Selangor 3 4,884 92.64
Trengganu 0 0 0
Kuala Lumpur 23 33,952 1,509.39
Sabah 9 6,658 464.21
Sarawak 4 1,996 33.77
MALAYSIA 53 52,496 2,323.81
Source: National Housing Department, 2005
Under this programme, houses were still rented out at a very low rate of RM124 per 
month to make them affordable to the squatters, similar to the previous PHP RM600 
million (Asek, 2007 p. 221). The implementation of the PHP NEAC adopted a similar 
approach with PHP RM600 million. PHP for rental was initially planned as temporary 
housing to relocate the squatters and would later be offered to other people with a low 
income when the Zero Squatter Programme had achieved its target (see Figure 5.15).
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Although the State government was still responsible for low cost housing allocation, 
the Federal government realised the need for them to monitor the allocation process at 
the state level. Therefore, the Federal government required every State government to 
use the Open Registration System (ORS) for low cost housing to replace the existing 
allocation system they used (NHD, 2003, p. 3).
Figure 5.15: Squatter Area Redevelopment for Low Cost Housing Construction 
under PHP NEAC, 1998-2002
Source: Author (Photo taken by Author in 2001 at Kg Medan, Petaling Jaya Selangor)
The success of the PFIP NEAC (1998-2002) implementation prompted a review of the 
government’s public low cost housing policy. Following the Cabinet decision dated 27th 
February 2002, the Federal government through National Flousing Department (NHD) 
was given the responsibility to implement a new low income housing programme 
named ‘People Housing Programme New Policy’ (PHP New Policy). The programme 
was formulated to replace the PLCHP implemented by the State governments since 
1976 (NHD, 2003). It involved two separate categories of low cost housing, one was 
PHP for sale and the other was PHP for rental. PHP for rental was a continuation from 
the PHP RM600 million and PHP NEAC. Meanwhile, PHP for sale was a new 
programme to replace the houses for sale under PLCHP.
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There were four reasons for the implementation of the PHP New Policy (Asek, 2007, 
p.257); the first was not to repeat the State governments’ failure to provide adequate 
low cost housing under the PLCHP. Poor achievement during the PLCHP also 
portrayed a lack of commitment from State governments and a lack of capacity to 
provide low cost housing. In order to tackle the problem, the Federal government had 
to come up with a new strategy (Asek 2007, p.259):
“This opportunity was taken by federal government as an opportunity to 
explore new approaches and strategies that could tackle the housing 
problems as well as having upper hand in the implementation of public 
low cost housing which before this was not federal domain...This 
indirectly could influence the public low cost housing distribution to the 
interested parties which it chooses in spite all the claim that housing 
distribution is still the domain of the State government.”
Secondly, the programme also gave the Federal government opportunity to get 
involved directly in construction tender distribution to selected private contractors, 
especially the Bumiputera. Thirdly, it was felt that the success of PHP RM600 million 
and PHP NEAC implemented by the Federal government should set the benchmark 
for the implementation of future public housing programmes. Finally, under the new 
PHP policy, the Federal government also wanted to portray a better image of public 
low cost housing programmes. Public low cost housing in the past had been called 
many negative names by the people such as ‘Cheap House’ (rumah murah), ‘Lightning 
House’ (rumah kilat) and Kai Boh House (Kai Boh is the former Minister of Housing in 
the 1960s). The Federal government intended to wipe out the attached stigma of 
public low cost housing programmes with a new name known as the ‘People’s Housing 
Programme’ which was politically acceptable (Asek, 2007, p. 260).
There were seven implementation strategies outlined by the NHD for the PHP 
implementation. The first was to implement two type of PHP for rental and sale. A total 
of 50,000 units were planned for rental and 40,000 units for ownership throughout the 
country by 2006. Secondly, the Federal government would cover in full the land cost 
for PHP for sale. Thirdly, the Federal government would not cover the cost for state 
land for PHP for rental, as the houses would eventually be handed over to the State 
governments when completed. Fourthly, Federal government would cover 50% of 
infrastructure cost in the form of a subsidy towards PHP for ownership. Fifthly, the 
Federal government created a PHP Trust Fund to cover the building construction and 
infrastructure cost. Sixthly, the end finance for buying houses was provided by private
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financial institutions. Finally, the house prices would be determined according to 
MHLG Guidelines.
Another important feature of PHP New Policy is the need for State government to use 
Open Registration System (ORS) for low cost house buyer registration and allocation 
process (MHLG 2006, p.3) The summary of the role of the Federal and State 
governments in PHP New Policy implementation is shown in Figure 5.16.
Role of Federal 
Government
Project
Implementation .>( Selling Price & V Quota
Site
Selection
Infrastructure
Cost
Tender
Management
Role of State 
Governments .>( Manage the V  Houses
Identify Suitable 
v Site A
Land
Matters
Buyer Selection
Figure 5.16: Role of Federal and State Government in PHP New Policy 
Implementation (2002-2004)
Source: Modified from Asek 2007, pp. 280-284
In general, Asek (2007 p.280) describes the PHP New Policy implementation by 
saying “...for the first time in history after the independence in which Federal 
government directly involved in developing low cost housing at the large scale”. PHP 
also managed to reduce the ‘red tape’ and bureaucracy involved in dealing with state 
governments and therefore the implementation could be achieved by a ‘fast track’ 
approach. With the MHLG acting as the developer, it was easier to obtain finance from 
financial institutions for the programme and also end finance for house buyers (refer to 
Figure 5.17). Thus, a large amount of money could be raised for the programme’s
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revolving fund. The success of the PHP New Policy implementation, according to the 
MHLG (2006), was largely caused by strong support from the top leadership of the 
government and no stringent cost limits imposed by the Federal government.
Target Group
Financial
InstitutionsRevolvingFund
Low Cost 
Housing
MHLG
(Developer)
Figure 5.17: Implementation of Low Cost Housing Under the PHP New Policy, 
2002-2004
Source: Asek, 2007 p. 282
However, the implementation of the PHP New Policy was not as smooth as expected 
due to several problems faced by the NHD, especially a lack of manpower to 
implement the programme. Firstly, there was a limited number of professional staff at 
the NHD to handle the large number of houses built under the programme (MHLG, 
2006), Secondly, there were delays in project implementation. The new projects only 
took off after the completion of previous projects under the PHP NEAC. Therefore, the 
NHD failed to achieve the construction of 50,000 units for rental and 40,000 units for 
sale, as targeted by the Federal government. As of December 2004, only 10,070 units 
were completed in the States of Johor and Sabah (MHLG, 2006c, p. 15). The 
implementation of the remaining PHP units was transferred to the National Housing 
Company (NHC) or Syarikat Perumahart Negara Berhad in 2004.
The NHC was incorporated under the Minister of Finance Incorporated in August 1997 
as a fully government owned company with capital of RM2 billion to increase the 
supply of housing costing RM150,000 and below. From 2004, the NHC was 
responsible for the development of PHP for sale (Asek, 2007, p. 224). The involvement 
of the NHC was also to ensure efficiency in the implementation of the housing 
programme based on market operation. The structure of PHP implementation after 
2004 is shown in Figure 5.18.
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Figure 5.18: Implementation of PHP For Sale After 2004 
Source: Asek, 2007 p. 283
Meanwhile, private sector housing developers continued to build low cost houses, 
although the number declined after 1995. Private sector low cost housing provision fell 
to 129,598 units during the Seventh Malaysia Plan (1996-2000) from 214,889 units 
throughout the Sixth Malaysia Plan (1991-1995). The figure further declined to 94,029 
units during the Eighth Malaysia Plan (2001-2005). The increased role played by the 
state in low cost housing production under PHP and the impact of the economic crisis 
clearly affected the number of low cost houses built by private developers. 
Furthermore, in 2002, the government began to review the 30 percent low cost 
housing quota based on information obtained from the National Property Information 
System (NAPIC) and ORS database (MHLG, 2005, p.3). The low cost housing quota 
was later reduced to 20 percent and the other 10 percent was allocated to medium 
cost housing at a price between RM42.000 and RM60,000 per unit.
The outcome of the PHP implementation, together with private sector low cost 
housing, managed to reduce the number of squatters from 571,261 in 1999 to 102,045 
residents as of June 2006, a reduction of 82.1 percent (see Table 5.8). This shows a 
successful public-private sector partnership in low cost housing provision. However, 
the reduction could not have been achieved without an efficient low cost housing 
allocation system under ORS. The low cost housing allocation system under ORS will 
be discussed further in the next chapter.
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Table 5.8: Total Squatters Resident in 1999 and 2006 According to State
State Squatter Resident i 
(1999)
Squatter — 
Resident 
(2006)
Changes (+/-)
Squatter % 
Resident
Selangor 171,396 3,928 -167,468 -97.7
Sabah 148,099 38,868 -109,231 -73.8
Kuala Lumpur 134,345 11,969 -122,376 -91.1
Johor 30,832 11,411 -19,421 -63.0
Sarawak 29,173 9,515 -19,658 -67.4
Perak 14,991 7,766 -7,145 -48.2
Terengganu 3,915 846 -3,069 -78.4
Kedah 12,822 3,520 -9,302 -72.5
Pulau Pinang 6,985 5,835 -1,150 -16.5
Perlis 6,558 2,266 -4,292 -65.4
Pahang 4,511 2,928 -1,583 -35.1
Labuan 5,978 1,068 -4,910 -82.1
Negeri Sembilan 1,460 247 -1,213 -83.1
Melaka 196 85 -111 -56.6
MALAYSIA 571,261 102,045 -469,216 -82.1
Source: Ministry of Housing and Local Government, 2006
However, state intervention in public low cost housing provision under PHP clearly 
went against neo-liberal policy. The rent that the public housing tenants were charged 
was way below the market value. A study by Asek (2007, p.290) reveals the RM124 
rent was too low based on the cost of houses per unit and current market rental (see 
Table 5.9). In some states like Kuala Lumpur and Pulau Pinang, the amount of rent 
subsidised by the Federal government was up to RM450 per month, more than three 
times the rent actually paid by the tenants. Meanwhile, the average cost of PHP for 
sale was RM45.345 per unit. With a selling price of RM35.000 per unit, the Federal 
government subsidised RM10,345 for every unit sold to the public. As Asek (2007 
p.294) describes “...the Federal government was subsidizing the housing unit not the 
target group and as the result those who had access to PHP units were like those who 
struck the lottery”.
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Table 5.9: Average Cost Per Unit and the Appropriate Monthly Rental for PHP 
(Rental), 1998-2005
State
Average
Cost/Unit
(RM)
Appropriate 
Monthly 
Rental (RM)
Monthly
Rental
(RM)
Subsidy
(RM)
Kuala Lumpur 50,946 574 124 450
Perak 35,000 376 124 252
Kedah 48,248 519 124 395
Perlis 44,878 482 124 358
Pulau Pinang 51,090 576 124 452
Selangor 43,999 496 124 372
Negeri Sembilan 49,407 557 124 433
Peninsular Malaysia 46,224 511 124 387
Source: National Housing Department 2005 (adopted from Asek, 2007 p.290)
5.7.2 Conclusion
The economic crisis and the large number of squatters who still occupied government 
and private land required government intervention to resolve the issue. At the same 
time, it was thought that construction of low cost housing could revive the crumbling 
economy after the crisis. The PHP NEAC was implemented by the Federal 
government in 1998 to relocate the squatters through the provision of low cost housing 
for rent. Subsequently, the PHP New Policy was launched to replace the PLCHP 
implemented by the state government in 1976. The implementation of the PHP New 
Policy also shows the rolling back of the state in low cost housing provision in 
Malaysia. With the private sector beginning to reduce low cost housing production after 
the crisis, the government had to be directly involved to fill the gap. To improve access 
to low cost housing, the Federal government introduced the Open Registration System 
(ORS) for allocation of low cost housing built by both public and private sectors in 
1997. However, state intervention in low cost housing production under PHP and 
highly subsidised public housing for sale or rental clearly did not fit with neo-liberal 
policy.
5.8 THE IMPORTANCE OF PRIVATE SECTOR INVOLVEMENT IN LOW COST 
HOUSING PROVISION IN MALAYSIA
The analysis in earlier sections has highlighted the important role played by the private 
sector in low cost housing provision in Malaysia, particularly since 1990. Without 
private sector involvement, especially private housing developers, it was impossible for
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the government to provide adequate low cost housing and eventually reduce the 
number of squatters in Malaysia. A housing developer, according to the Housing 
Development (Control and Licensing) Act 1966 (Malaysia, 1966), “means any person, 
body of persons, company, firm or society, who or which engages in or carries on or 
undertakes or causes to be undertaken a housing development.” Meanwhile, housing 
development “means to develop or construct or cause to be constructed in any manner 
more than four units of housing accommodation and includes the collection of moneys 
or the carrying on of any building operations for the purpose of erecting housing 
accommodation in, on, over or under any land; or the sale of more than four units of 
housing lots by the landowner or his nominee with the view of constructing more than 
four units of housing accommodation by the said landowner or his nominee.”
A study by Malaysia’s Real Estate and Housing Developers Association (REHDA) on 
the private sector’s social obligations with regard to low cost housing development 
revealed Malaysia was the only country in East Asia which required private housing 
developers to build low cost housing without any direct financial subsidy from the 
government (REHDA, 2006). In Singapore and Thailand, for example, the private 
sector was not required to build low cost housing which was instead undertaken fully 
by the government agency dedicated to public housing provision (see Table 5.10). 
Meanwhile, in Indonesia, the housing development was totally market driven. 
Therefore, both public and private sectors were not obliged to provide low cost 
housing. In Hong Kong there was no indication that the state imposed any low cost 
housing requirement on private developers. This explains why the contribution of the 
private sector in low cost housing provision was significant in Malaysia compared to 
other East Asian developing countries.
In terms of the housing delivery system, the practice in Malaysia was generally similar 
to other South East Asian countries. The Sell-then-Build (STB) system was commonly 
practiced in the region as compared to the Build-then-Sell (BTS) system. Under the 
Sell-then-Build system, the house construction would begin once all the units had been 
sold (REHDA, 2006, p. 6). The buyers usually had to pay a minimum 10 percent 
deposit and the remaining payments were paid progressively according to construction 
progress, as stipulated in Schedule G (for landed property up to 24 months) and 
Schedule H (high rise property up to 36 months) under the Housing Developers 
(Control and Licensing) Act 1966 (refer to Appendix 6 for detail of Schedule G, H and 
housing development process in Malaysia under STB system).
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Table 5.10: Comparison Between Malaysia and Selected East Asian Countries 
in Terms of Private Sector Socio-economic Obligation, Housing 
Delivery System and Low Cost Housing Allocation
Country Private Sector Socio- Economic Obligation
Housing Delivery 
System
Low Cost 
Housing 
Allocation
1. Malaysia • Both public and private sector •  BTS -  Practiced by the • State managed
provide low cost housing private developers but not low cost
• Private developers to built for low cost housing housing
between 20-30% low cost • STB -com m only allocation for
housing units in every practiced by private both the public
residential development developers and private
• Minimum 30% allocated for sector
Bumiputera
• Private developers to provide
the infrastructure for new
development
2. Singapore • Singapore Housing • BTS -  Applicable for •  State only
Development Board (HDB) secondary markets. Not manages
manages all social housing applicable for private new allocation for
requirements development or HDB public low cost
• Private developers not obligated projects. housing
to include low cost/sodal •  S TB -C om m only
housing as part of their practiced by private
developments developers and HDB
3. Thailand • National Housing Authority of • BTS and STB both used • State only
Thailand (NHA) manages all by the private sector. manages
social housing needs Varies from project to allocation for
• Private developers not obligated project public low cost
to include low cost/social housing
housing as part of their
developments
• Infrastructure for new
developments will be discussed
between developers and
agencies concerned
4. Indonesia • Private sector housing is not • The systems used depend • Market driven
regulated and all developments on the developers. Both
are market driven BTS and STB used by the
• No socio economic obligation developers
imposed on private developers
-
5. Hong Kong • No socio-economic obligations • BTS -  common but not •  State only
imposed on private developers mandatory manages
• STB -  subject to consent allocations for
from the Lands public low cost
Department and after housing
providing sufficient
information to purchasers
Note:
BTS -  Build-then-Sell system 
STB -  Sell-then-Build system
Sources: Adopted from REHDA Bulletin November 2006 & Author
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In Malaysia, the success of the government’s efforts to ensure market participation in 
low cost housing production from the 1980s was mainly due to the planning system. 
The Town and Country Planning Act 1976 (Malaysia, 1976) clearly gave the power to 
local authorities (which were also local planning authorities) to impose a low cost 
housing requirement on every residential development undertaken by private 
developers. Section 22 (3) of the act states “after taking into consideration the matters 
specified in subsection (2), the local planning authority may, subject to subsection (4), 
grant planning permission either absolutely or subject to such conditions as it thinks fit 
to impose, or refuse to grant planning permission...” One of the conditions usually 
imposed by the local authority before granting planning permission was to ensure the 
developer fulfilled the 30 percent low cost housing requirement.
The practice was generally similar to other countries, particularly the United Kingdom 
and former British colonies such as Hong Kong and Australia which share a similar 
planning system (see Whitehead, 2007; Beers et al., 2006; Chiu, 2006). The trend in 
these countries over the last two decades was to encourage low cost/affordable 
housing provision through the planning system. In the UK, the power to implement the 
policy by the local authorities was clearly stipulated under Section 106 of the Town and 
Country Planning Act 1971. The policy was adopted by 90 percent of local authorities 
in the UK. There are three main economic reasons for the provision of affordable 
housing through the planning system (Whitehead, 2007, p. 26). The first is to provide 
adequate land for affordable housing. The second is to ensure the provision of 
affordable housing and the final reason is because it is an effective way of 
redistributing wealth. The majority of the contributions required are expected to be in 
the form of on-site provision of affordable housing or a financial contribution.
In the context of Malaysia, local authorities, with strong back up from the state 
governments, successfully implemented the policy of 30 percent low. cost housing in 
every residential development built by private developers. The State governments and 
local authorities across the country continuously adhered to the policy, despite 
complaints by private developers which began in the 1980s. This proved the planning 
system was an effective way to ensure private developers provide low cost housing, 
even in the context of developing countries. However, further studies are required to 
support the argument, which is beyond the scope of this thesis.
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Another unique feature of Malaysian low cost housing provision was the low cost 
housing registration and allocation system. In other East Asian countries, the state was 
only involved in public low cost housing allocation. However, in Malaysia, the state was 
responsible for low cost housing allocation for both public and private sectors. This 
unique practice in Malaysia therefore warrants further investigation as to how and why 
the state controlled low cost housing allocation.
5.9 DISTINCTIVE FEATURES OF MALAYSIAN LOW COST HOUSING PROVISION 
MODEL
In order to identify distinctive features of the low cost housing provision model for 
Malaysia, a simple comparison with other East Asian countries was performed (see 
Table 5.11). Singapore was selected for comparison since it represents a typical East 
Asian developmental state model with strong state control in both the production and 
allocation processes (Li, 1998; Lee at al., 2003; La Grange, 2006). Meanwhile, Taiwan 
was selected to represent an example of an East Asian neo-liberal state housing 
model. As La Grange et al. (2006, p. 71) note “...land and housing are almost totally 
commodified in Taiwan and the country’s has one of the most speculative land and 
housing market in Asia. Similarly Li (1998 p.57) explained the state intervention in 
housing sector was also low in Taiwan compared to other East Asian countries.
The unique features of the Malaysian model can be divided into four include, firstly, the 
role of the market in low cost housing production. The majority of low cost houses for 
sale in Malaysia have been built by private housing developers since 1990. 
Meanwhile, in Singapore and Taiwan, the low cost houses were built by the state. 
Secondly, there is the role of state in low cost housing allocation. Unlike Singapore 
and Taiwan, the state in Malaysia not only controls public housing allocation, but also 
low cost houses built by private housing developers. Thirdly, both Singapore and 
Taiwan used demand-side subsidies to encourage people with a low income to buy a 
house. In Singapore, a housing grant of up to $50,000 was offered to buyers to buy 
public housing. Meanwhile, in Taiwan, loans at a subsidised interest rate were offered 
to eligible public housing buyers. However, in Malaysia, the state still controls the low 
cost house prices at below market rate and has done since the 1950s. The practice of 
state control of the selling price for houses clearly does not fit with the neo-liberal 
model, which prefers the state to offer demand side subsidies.
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Table 5.11: Comparison of the Malaysian Low Cost Housing Provision Model
with Typical East Asian Developmental and Neo-liberal State Models
C h aracteris tic M alaysian  M odel D eve lo p m en ta l S ta te  M odel (S in g ap o re )
N eo-libera l S ta te  
M odel (T a iw an)
% of Home 
ownership
• 77.7% (2000) • 81.0% (2000) • 85% (2000)
% of Public housing • 5.5% (2000) • 82% (1999) • 5% (1999)
Housing delivery 
system
• Sell and then build (pre­
sale)
• Build and then sell • Pre-sale
Main low cost 
housing provider
• Market (private housing 
developers)
• State (Housing 
Development Board)
• State (Local 
Authorities)
Form of state 
assistance for low 
income people to 
buy new low cost 
house
• Government control 
selling price for public 
and private low cost 
houses (below market). 
No cash subsidy to 
house buyers from the 
government.
• Cash grants up to 
$50,000 from 
government to low 
income people to buy 
house. House price set 
according to market 
value.
• Subsidised loan from 
government
Agency/body 
responsible for low 
cost housing 
allocation?
• State (Federal and 
state governments) for 
both public and private 
low cost housing
• State (HDB for all types 
of public housing only)
• State (Local authority 
for public housing 
only)
Current housing
allocation
mechanism
• Waiting list under ORS • Registration System for 
flat for all public housing 
(Build to order houses) 
since 1998
• Not available
Target group • Low income people. 
Applicants must register 
with the state
• Low income people. 
Applicants must register 
with HDB
• Low income people in 
need of housing. 
Applicants must 
register with the state.
Legal back-up for 
low cost housing 
allocation
• Not available • Housing and 
Development Act 
(Singapore), 1990
« Not available
Sources:
1. Malaysia - Agus et al. (2003); MHLG (2006)
2. Singapore - Yee (1998); Lee et al. (2003); Huat (2005)
3. Taiwan - Li (1998); Lee et al. (2003); Chen (2002); La Grange et al. (2006)
Finally, there is the low cost housing allocation mechanism. In Singapore, after the 
Asian financial crisis in 1997-1998, the state moved away from a waiting list system 
towards a more market based allocation system. The houses were only built by the 
HDB if there was demand. Therefore, the supply of houses was decided by the market
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rather than dictated by the state. Meanwhile, in the case of Taiwan, due to a small 
number of public houses for sale or rent, housing allocation was controlled by local 
authorities. However, in Malaysia, the state still managed and controlled low cost 
housing registration and allocation at a national level with the cooperation of the state 
governments. The state still used a waiting list system to allocate the houses and 
made final decisions without consulting the low cost house buyers.
The comparison with both Singapore and Taiwan shows the difficulty in drawing a 
conclusion regarding how to locate Malaysia’s low cost housing model in the context of 
East Asia. Thus, Malaysia did fit well with both the developmental and neo-liberal state 
model in terms of low cost housing production and allocation.
5.10 CONCLUSION
The analysis of housing provision and policy changes since the 1950s highlighted 
several features of the Malaysian low cost housing system. The first is the 
government’s reliance on the private sector to build low cost houses. Malaysia 
provides a unique example of how the state could mobilise the private sector to 
provide low cost housing. The private sector began to take a leading role in low cost 
housing provision in the early 1990s. Without private sector involvement, the 
government definitely faced difficulties in providing an adequate number of low cost 
S ouses, as shown during the 1960s and early 1970s. The state governments not only 
forced the private sector to build low cost houses through the planning system, but 
also controlled the housing allocation to the buyers.
Secondly, the majority of low cost houses were built for home ownership rather than 
for rental. Only a small number of rental units were retained by the state governments 
or local authorities before the implementation of the first PHP programme in 1994. 
Meanwhile, all low cost houses built by private housing developers were for 
homeownership. Low cost houses have been used by the government as part of their 
strategy to eradicate poverty since the 1970s. Therefore, Malaysia fits within the 
‘Property-based welfare state model’, similar to many other East Asian countries in the 
region. Low cost houses were used as a stepping stone for many first time buyers to 
get onto the property ladder. Thirdly, continuous improvement was made to the low 
cost housing registration and allocation system by the government. Since the 1950s,
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the government has provided various mechanisms for the registration and allocation of 
low cost housing. By 2001, all state governments had begun to use a computerised 
allocation system to replace the manual system. The improvement to registration 
systems was crucial to ensure better access among low income people to buy low cost 
housing.
Fourthly, the state was still continuously involved in low cost housing provision in order 
to achieve the country’s social and economic development objectives. Low cost 
housing provision was not only used by the government to house people with a low 
income, but was also a most important strategy during the economic crisis. During 
both economic crises of 1986-1987 and 1997-1998 in Malaysia, the Federal 
government implemented large scale public and private low cost housing programmes 
to kick start economic recovery. The fifth feature is the fact that state intervention in 
low cost housing provision and allocation are crucial in a multi-racial country like 
Malaysia. A fair distribution or allocation system will ensure political stability and 
promote national unity. Finally, the last feature is the preference of the Malaysian 
government towards clearing squatter and conventional public housing programmes. 
Unlike many other developing countries, since the 1970s Malaysia has preferred to 
implement programmes to clear squats and relocate the people into conventional low 
cost houses built by the public and private sectors. Under PHP implementation during 
1994 to 2004, most public low cost houses were built on existing squatter settlements 
throughout the country.
However, state intervention in low cost housing provision and allocation also created 
several unintended consequences. The first was the fact that the state policy of a 30 
percent low cost housing quota contributed to oversupply and mismatch between 
supply and demand in certain locations. Many low cost housing projects built by the 
public and private sectors were located in urban fringes or in new growth centres, 
whereas the demand for low cost houses was greater in existing city centres, 
particularly from squatters. Thus, many private housing developers found it difficult to 
sell low cost houses in these areas. The competition between the state and private 
sector to sell low cost houses in the same location also made the situation even worse. 
This could explain why the squat settlements kept increasing during the 1990s, despite 
a large number of low cost houses being built by the public and private sectors.
The second unintended consequence relates to the low cost housing allocation 
system. Without documented policy and legal back-up for the low cost housing
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allocation system, it was still subject to manipulation and interference from politicians 
at the state government level. The improvement done to the low cost allocation system 
after the 1960s still could not stop corruption and abuse of powers among the state 
government housing officers. Thus making it difficult for people with a low income to 
register and eventually buy low cost housing. The analysis in the next chapter will 
discuss the practice of low cost housing allocation in Malaysia under the Open 
Registration System (ORS).
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CHAPTER 6:
CASE STUDY: THE ORS AT THE
FEDERAL LEVEL
CHAPTER 6:
CASE STUDY: THE OPEN REGISTRATION 
SYSTEM (ORS) AT THE FEDERAL LEVEL
6.1 INTRODUCTION
This chapter will discuss the low cost housing allocation system in Malaysia under the 
Open Registration System (ORS) introduced by the Federal government in 1997. The 
objective is to answer the question: why did the state intervene in low cost housing 
allocation in Malaysia? Therefore the chapter will be divided into five sections to 
discuss the following aspects. The first is to find out the importance of state 
intervention in low cost housing allocation in Malaysia from the 1950s until the present 
day. The second section will explain the reasons which led to the establishment of 
ORS in 1997. The third section, meanwhile, will focus on the operations and 
improvement to the ORS since 1997. Section four will discuss the role of the Federal 
government in the low cost housing allocation process under ORS and, finally, section 
five will explain the changes made to the low cost housing provision process since the 
introduction of ORS.
The data used for the analysis in this chapter were mainly obtained from interviews 
with Federal government officers and Ministry of Housing official documents related to 
ORS. Due to the confidential status of some of the documents and the sensitivity of the 
data, some information could not be used in this chapter for further analysis.
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6.2 THE IMPORTANCE OF STATE INTERVENTION IN LOW COST HOUSING
ALLOCATION IN MALAYSIA
As explained earlier in Chapter 5, state intervention in low cost housing allocation was 
not only limited to public housing, but also to that built by the private sector. The 
government has been involved in low cost housing allocation since the 1950s and 
shows no sign of giving up the responsibility to the market. Therefore, this section will 
discuss the importance of government intervention in low cost housing allocation. 
Based on an analysis of secondary and empirical data, it can be said that there are 
four main reasons for state intervention in low cost housing allocation in Malaysia.
The first is to maintain the country’s economy and social and political stability. Unlike 
other countries in the region, Malaysia has an ethnic-religious heterogeneous 
population comprising 61.4 percent Bumiputera, 23.7 percent Chinese, 7.1 percent 
Indian and 0.7 percent others in 2010. Government intervention in low cost housing 
allocation was crucial to ensure balanced home ownership among various races in 
Malaysia following the racial clash in May 1969 (Trezzini, 2001, p.328). The 
introduction of the New Economic Policy (NEP) in 1971 was the turning point in state 
intervention in low cost housing allocation in Malaysia. Under NEP, a minimum 30 
percent of low cost housing was allocated for the Bumiputera as part of the strategy to 
increase home ownership and to eradicate poverty (Salleh, 1997). Low cost home 
ownership was part of the government’s wealth distribution strategy which contributed 
to the rise of Bumiputera equity ownership of share capital and property from 2.4 
percent in 1970 to 19.3 percent in 1990 (Jomo, 2004, p.9). At the same time, the 
incidence of poverty was significantly reduced from 42.4 percent in 1971 to 17.1 in 
1990 (Rasiah and Shari, 2001, p. 10) which was partly caused by increased home 
ownership among people with a low income. The policy still continues today, despite 
the NEP formally ending in 1990.
This reason was supported by the Federal Officer 2 when asked about the need for the 
government to intervene in low cost housing allocation:-
“...the control was done in relation to our development philosophy.
First is because we are multiracial society. Our development thrust at 
that time under NEP since 1971 was to restructure the society and 
asset. We don’t want to repeat the 13th May 1969 tragedy because 
imbalance asset ownership according to ethnic and income 
category...” (Federal Officer 2, age mid 50s, has worked for more 
than 20 years with the Ministry of Housing and Local Government).
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Clearly imbalanced asset ownership among the different races has far greater 
consequences than failing to provide adequate housing for the people in the case of 
Malaysia. Thus, state intervention in low cost housing allocation in Malaysia is 
necessary not only to ensure people with a low income can buy low cost houses, but 
also for economic, social and political stability in the country. With more than 30 
percent of the population considered to be earning a low income in 2000 (Malaysia, 
2001), state intervention in low cost housing allocation was still required even after 
1990.
The second reason is to provide better access to low cost housing for people with a 
low income. State intervention was important due to the government’s policy of 
encouraging homeownership among this group. Malaysia, like many other East Asian 
countries, sees the development of home ownership is mainly achieved "’through the 
activities of private developers and private households rather than product of pervasive 
and direct state intervention and orchestration” (Lee et al., 2003, p.4). The private 
sector has contributed significantly to low cost housing provision, as explained in 
Chapter Five. Thus, state intervention is crucial to ensuring people with a low income 
have access to private low cost housing in Malaysia.
Access to low cost housing was a common problem for people with a low income in 
many developing countries, which led to the formation of squatters and slums (UN,
2003). Therefore, since the 1950s, the government in Malaysia has continuously tried 
to improve access to low cost housing for this group. Through a more systematic and 
transparent low cost house buyer’s registration system, it was easier for the Federal 
and State governments to identify and allocate houses to buyers with a low income. 
Most importantly, competition from people with a middle and high income could be 
eliminated and thus provide a better opportunity for people with a low income to buy 
low cost houses. The actions taken by the Malaysian government to improve people’s 
access to low cost housing was consistent with the recommendation from the United 
Nations under the Habitat Agenda to ensure adequate shelter for all (UNCHS, 1996).
Meanwhile, in the context of private low cost housing allocation in Malaysia, the 
government usually acted as a mediator between the market and house buyers. Since 
most people with a low income have poor knowledge of the property buying process, 
they faced difficulty buying low cost houses from private housing developers. 
Therefore, they relied on the government to provide market information and assistance
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in the low cost house buying process. The situation prompted the need for the 
government to create a mechanism not only to manage the low cost house buyers’ 
registration and allocation, but also to obtain private sector low cost housing 
information. The State government Officer interviewed also highlighted the importance 
of state intervention in low cost housing allocation in order to give the opportunity to 
people with a low income to buy a low cost house:
“In my opinion at the moment we have to take care of low income people 
welfare so they can buy a house...there are people still need low cost 
house. If we open to developers to allocate, they will restrict chances of 
low income to buy the house. It still required government intervention.
That the only way we can give the opportunity to low income to buy the 
house...” (State Officer 1, aged mid 30s and has worked for more than 
five years for the Selangor Housing Board).
The third reason is to optimise public and private sector financial investment in low 
cost housing provision. The public and private sector have spent a large amount of 
money on low cost housing provision, particularly since the 1980s. However, the 
government were continuously criticised by private housing developers and the public 
for failing to ensure people with a low income had the opportunity to buy low cost 
houses (Sirat et al., 1998). Therefore, it is important for the government to take the 
necessary actions to prevent people with middle and high incomes from buying low 
cost houses. The Federal government, who spend a lot of money on public low cost 
housing programmes, really wanted to ensure the houses were bought by the low 
income group in order to prevent them from living in squatter and slum areas. By the 
mid 1990s it was clear the government needed to ensure that public and private sector 
investment in low cost housing was directed to the most needy people at the right time 
and in the right location in order to minimise the waste of money.
The final reason is to facilitate private housing developers in low cost housing 
provision. This is in line with recommendations by the World Bank for the government 
to become a facilitator and enabler for the market to work (World Bank, 1993). Since 
the role of low cost housing provision shifted from the public to the private sector 
during the early 1990s, the government had to do whatever it could to facilitate the 
market to work. Their experience during the implementation of the Special Low Cost 
Housing Programme (SPLCH) from 1986-89 taught an important lesson to the 
government on how to encourage the private sector to build low cost houses. Without 
reliable data on housing demand according to location, most private housing 
developers were generally reluctant to build low cost houses and this lack eventually
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contributed to the failure of the programme. Therefore, the Federal government 
realised the establishment of a centralised low cost house registration system could 
provide valuable information to the private sector with regard to their housing provision 
planning. A list of eligible buyers obtained from the system meant housing developers 
generally didn’t have to worry about the demand and saleability of low cost houses.
Based on the factors explained earlier, it was considered important for the state to 
intervene in low cost housing allocation in Malaysia. The Federal and State 
governments continued to intervene in low cost housing allocation during the 1990s 
with the introduction of the Open Registration System (ORS) for low cost house 
buyers. In the next section, the discussion will focus on the reasons which led to the 
establishment of the ORS by the Federal government in 1997.
6.3 WHY DID THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT ESTABLISH ORS?
The analysis of official documents related to ORS obtained from the Ministry of 
Housing and Local Government Malaysia (MHLG, 1997; MHLG, 1998; MHLG, 2006) 
did not give a detailed and clear explanation of the events which led to its 
establishment. Moreover, some of the original documents related to the establishment 
of ORS could not be traced for further analysis due to poor record management by the 
ministry. Thus, the analysis in this section will be based on the interviews conducted 
with Federal government officers involved in the establishment of the ORS and limited 
information obtained from the ministry’s official documents. The analysis revealed 
several reasons which led to the decision by the Federal government to establish the 
ORS in 1997.
The first was the need to reduce and eventually eliminate corruption in the low cost 
housing selling and buying process. In many South East Asian countries, including 
Malaysia, “Bureaucracies are subject to various forms of corruption with varying 
degrees from one country to another and from one department of the public service to 
another. Nepotism, bribery, speed money, extortion red tape, and inefficiency could be 
found in the different departments of public administration...” (Ahmed, 2005, p. 158). 
Meanwhile, according to Transparency International’s Corruption Perception Index 
(CPI), in 1997 Malaysia ranked 32nd in the list of countries studied compared to 23rd in 
1995. It shows there was an increasing trend of corruption in Malaysia during the mid 
1990s. Therefore, the low cost housing administration and allocation process in
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Malaysia was also not immune from corruption. Federal Officer 2, when interviewed, 
admitted there were corrupt practices in the low cost housing administration and 
allocation process during the 1990s:
“...what happen, I believe some people involved in the system 
operation are not ethical. So he can delete or amend the applicant’s 
information, this made them (house buyers) more desperate...” 
(Federal Officer 2).
Federal Officer 2 also pointed out that some of the State governments’ officers who 
were responsible for low cost housing allocation could manipulate the system for their 
own benefit. Changes made to the applicants’ information such as income or the 
number of dependents could increase the applicants’ chances, but at the same time 
deprive other eligible applicants of the opportunity to buy low cost houses. Another 
common practice in the public sector in Malaysia was ‘speed money’ or money paid to 
expedite any process in government departments (Ahmed, 2005, p. 50). Although 
Ahmed did not specifically mention the practice within the low cost housing buying 
process, it could still have happened.
There is a possibility that money could have been paid by the applicants to state 
housing officers in order to expedite the allocation process or to jump the waiting list. 
However, it was difficult for the Federal and State governments to take action against 
those involved in corruption due to a lack of evidence and witnesses and partly a lack 
of manpower in Malaysia’s Anti Corruption Agency (ACA). From 1991-1997 a total of 
58,290 cases were reported, but only 1,349 cases (or 2.3 percent) were brought to 
justice by the ACA (Siddique, 2010, p. 50). In view of the difficulty of bringing the 
culprits to justice, the ACA recommended prevention as a major strategy to combat 
corruption in Malaysia (Siddique, 2010, p. 158).
Thus, the implementation of the ORS was part of the prevention approach taken by the 
MHLG to reduce corruption in the housing allocation process. With the system linked 
directly to the ministry, officers at the state level were unlikely to be able to delete or 
change the applicant’s information without informing and updating the applicant’s 
database held by the ministry. At the same time, it also promoted greater transparency 
and fairness in the low cost house buyer selection process. Moreover, the introduction 
of the ORS was very important to restore the confidence of the people and private 
sector with regard to the low cost housing allocation system in Malaysia. The effort was 
also in line with government strategy to improve public sector management and
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governance, as promoted by the World Bank during the early 1990s (World Bank, 
1993).
The second reason was to eliminate fraud in the low cost house buying process. Poor 
coordination and information ‘cross-checking’ among the 14 States in Malaysia 
allowed some unscrupulous buyers to buy more than one low cost house unit in 
different states. Since 1976, low cost housing allocation has been under the 
responsibility of the respective State government; therefore, it was difficult to cross­
check the applicants’ backgrounds and their status regarding low cost house 
ownership. As explained by Federal Officer 1, with regard to the problem of multiple 
ownership of low cost houses:
"...previously, there are some people own 2 or 3 units of low cost house.
In one cheating case, he registered in Kedah and he knows our system 
weaknesses so he went to Johor and register again. Eventually he got 2 
low cost houses. That the weaknesses of the system especially on the 
monitoring aspect in addition to lack of manpower...” (Federal Officer 1, 
aged early 60s).
Federal policy clearly stated that people with a low income were only allowed to own 
one unit of low cost housing (MHLG, 1997). A combination of corruption and the 
weaknesses of the low cost housing allocation system allowed buyers to buy more 
than one low cost house in other states in Malaysia undetected. The statement 
confirms an earlier study by Salleh and Lee (1997, p. 23) as they describe “... the 
mechanism for the allocation of low houses is defective because of favouritism, 
patronage, indifference, fraud and inadequate database resulting the units being 
allocated to the undeserving (i.e. well-to-do).” However, no available statistics on the 
number of fraud cases in low cost house buying have been revealed by the ministry or 
State governments for further analysis.
Meanwhile, in some cases, the applicant did not declare they already owned a low 
cost house and submitted false information to support the application. Most people 
were still willing to take the risk of buying a low cost house, despite the consequences. 
All the applicants were required to make a statutory declaration in the presence of a 
Commissioner for Oaths, Judges of Session Court or Magistrate under the Statutory 
Declaration Act, 1960 in the application form. However, many still submitted false 
information in order to increase their chances of buying a house. The most common 
false information given by the applicant was related to household income and the 
number of dependents which was used to determine the buyer’s eligibility and
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awarded the highest points (MHLG, 2006, p.55). Under the Statutory Declaration Act, 
those caught giving a false declaration were punishable under Section 199 and 200 of 
the Penal Code (Act 574, 2006) which carries the penalty of up to seven years 
imprisonment and fines. Furthermore, the house purchased using false information 
could also be confiscated. However, due to political and social sensitivity, it was 
difficult for State governments to take action against the culprits and bring them to 
justice. There was no reported case of any State government taking action against 
fraudsters under the law. In order to solve the problem, the Federal government, 
through the MHLG, needed to intervene and eliminate the corrupt practices in low cost 
housing allocation.
The third reason was to provide the information required for the planning of low cost 
housing by the public and the private sector. In the public sector, the MHLG required 
comprehensive data to plan for low cost housing planning in the Five Year Malaysia 
Economic Plan. Together with other demand for demographic and housing data, the 
ministry was able to plan low cost housing requirements more accurately according to 
state in Malaysia. The State governments then could determine the number of low cost 
houses to be built according to location based on actual demand. The low cost 
housing programme by the government could thus target the areas with high demand. 
As explained by Federal Officer 1:
“...the data is very important when formulating the National Housing 
Policy especially to identify the housing need. Because when we 
(ministry) planned for the housing for each state, let say 100,000 units 
for the State of Selangor but we don’t know where to build? State of 
Selangor is very big. So if we have the housing need data we can use 
it. Let say we built 10,000 in the (district of) Gombak, Shah Alam, Hulu 
Selangor, that exactly match the need. If there is no housing need, so 
no point we built the house. May be we don’t have to build at all, why 
wasting money...’’(Federal Officer 1).
Data obtained from the system could also be used to guide future policies related to 
low cost housing provision. The decision to reduce or abandon the low cost housing 
quota imposed by the State governments on private housing developers could be 
decided based on actual housing demand data rather than assumption. Meanwhile, 
similar to the public sector, the data obtained from the ORS database could be used for 
low cost housing planning by the private sector. Federal Officer 3, when interviewed, 
described the importance of ORS data for private housing developers:
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“...first we want to know who get the house. Secondly is in term of 
planning according to location requested by the applicants. During the 
application stage we already know the district and mukim (sub-district) 
requested. If properly planned, developers should know where to build 
the house? Where the demand is? They will know where to built low cost 
house?” (Federal Officer 3).
The data are important to avoid a mismatch between supply and demand of low cost 
housing, particularly with the introduction of a 30 percent low cost house unit quota for 
private sector residential development after 1981. The ORS database has been used 
to justify changes to low cost housing policy in Malaysia since 1998. This includes a 
reduction made by the MHLG to the low cost housing quota for private housing 
developers from 30 percent to 20 percent in 2002. A further revision was made in 2006 
when the MHLG recommended that private housing developers should provide low 
cost housing units according to demand in a particular area rather than meet a blanket 
20-30 percent quota as in the past (MHLG, 2006). This shows the significant 
contribution of the ORS to low cost housing policy formulation in Malaysia. At the same 
time, it helped the market to operate efficiently with accurate low cost housing demand 
data. Most importantly, both public and private sectors have been building low cost 
houses since independence, but nobody knows how many more low cost houses 
should be built and where without an appropriate mechanism to monitor production and 
consumption.
The fourth reason was to determine the migration pattern and housing needs of people 
with a low income. The country experienced rapid economic growth and rural-urban 
migration during the early 1990s and the trend of migration was mostly from less 
developed states to more developed states with a higher average income (see Table 
6.1) such as Selangor, Pulau Pinang and Johor. In 1995 and 2000, Selangor had the 
highest number of migrants, 37,635 people and 24,304 people respectively mainly 
from the States of Perak, Johor Terengganu and Kuala Lumpur (Selangor State 
Structure Plan Report, 2003). The migration trend also contributed to rapid urban 
population growth from 33.5 percent in 1970 to 49.8 percent in 1990 and 61.8 percent 
in 2000 in Malaysia (Statistical Department, 2000) putting more pressure on housing 
provision.
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Table 6.1: Migration According to State in Malaysia in 1995 and 2000
State
1995 2000
In
Migration
Out
Migration
Net
Migration
In
Migration
Out
Migration
Net
Migration
Perlis 2,897 2,484 413 1,832 3,567 -1,735
Kedah 18,798 17,943 855 22,530 23,143 -613
P. Pinang 24,436 11,925 12,511 29,735 15,077 14,658
Perak 15,975 36,346 -20,371 20,711 27,656 -6,945
Selangor 78,005 40,370 37,635 60,941 36,637 24,304
Kuala Lumpur 14,137 45,183 -31,046 4,459 34,200 -29,741
N. Sembilan 23,535 15,438 8,097 16,293 17,110 -817
Melaka 13,224 10,961 2,263 9,688 9,507 181
Johor 22,387 24,471 -2,084 31,522 18,146 13,376
Pahang 17,218 25,488 -8,270 17,908 19,720 -1,812
Terengganu 11,689 15,913 -4,224 19,953 11,519 8,434
Kelantan 22,406 17,679 4,727 12,846 21,422 -8,576
Sabah 12,685 11,615 1,070 13,147 21,079 -7,932
Sarawak 8,133 9,709 -1,576 9,284 12,066 -2,782
Sources: Migration Investigation Report 1995 and 2000, Department of Statistics, 
Malaysia
In Malaysia, rural-urban migration was an always important contributing factor towards 
the formation of squatters in urban areas (Johnstone, 1983, p 293). Since most people 
who migrated were people with a low income, the need for the state to intervene and 
monitor the situation was very great in order to avoid these people from ending up 
living in squatters. The low cost housing registration system could be used to 
determine the migration pattern of this group within the state and eventually across the 
country. Information on the applicant’s current address and preferable location for low 
cost housing could be used by the government to determine migration patterns 
particularly amongst people with a low income looking for job opportunities. Federal 
Officer 2 explained how the need to identify the migration pattern of people with a low 
income contributed to the establishment of the ORS:
“...during the 1990s, the country’s has transformed from agriculture to 
industrial oriented development... many people migrated to Klang 
Valley but there was no houses... therefore in early 1990s we began to 
think, why not we have the central registration system. So we could 
know people movement and plan accordingly. With that information 
local authorities and town planning department could prepare local and 
structure plan for particular town and it land uses...’’(Federal Officer 2).
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Meanwhile the data from ORS can also be used by local authorities and town planning 
departments to determine the number of low cost houses required and land use in the 
Local and Structural Plan for the particular area. Most importantly, the oversupply of 
low cost houses can be avoided if data from the ORS is used by the local authority 
when making the decision to grant planning permission.
Finally, there was a need for a better mechanism for the allocation process and the 
monitoring of the implementation of the People Housing Programme (PHP). As 
explained earlier in Chapter 5, the Federal government implemented the PHP in 1998 
with the intention to eliminate the existing squatter and to prevent future formation of 
squatter settlements. Therefore, it was crucial for the Federal government to ensure 
that people with a low income and existing people live in squatters could have better 
access to low cost housing. Since the low cost housing provision was no longer under 
the sole responsibility of the State governments, the Federal government could make 
sure the PHP units were eventually owned by eligible buyers. The implementation of 
ORS by the State governments eventually covered low cost housing provided by the 
private sector.
Despite the success in the provision of low cost housing during the early 1990s, the 
ministry was still criticised by various parties regarding the selling and buying process 
of low cost houses (MHLG, 1997, p.1). Private housing developers have complained 
since the early 1990s that many low cost houses were not being sold to the target 
group. Meanwhile, the people with a low income described the buyer selection process 
as highly questionable and subject to corruption (Salleh, 1997; Sirat et al., 1999). At 
the same time, the Federal government also needed to address several issues related 
to low cost housing allocation, as highlighted in Chapter Five. The issues included the 
ineffectiveness of the allocation system used by the State government, political 
intervention in the allocation process and difficulties faced by people with a low income 
when buying low cost housing.
6.4 THE OPERATIONS AND IMPROVEMENTS TO ORS
This section is divided into three parts. The first part primarily focuses on the ORS’ 
background and operations. The second part will discuss the improvements made to 
the system since 1997 and the third part analyses the background of low cost house 
applicants from 1997-2005. The data for analysis in this section was mainly derived
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from secondary data from the MHLG such as ORS guidelines and reports, the ORS 
computerised database, minutes of meetings related to ORS and supported by 
: ‘ nation from interviews with Federal government officers.
6.4.1 ORS Background and Operations
In order to modernise and solve problems related to low cost housing allocation in 
Malaysia, the Open Registration System (ORS) was proposed by the Federal 
government in 1997 (MHLG, 1998). The National Housing Department (NHD) under 
; e Ministry of Housing and Local Government (MHLG) was given responsibility for 
preparing the proposal to establish ORS. After consultation with the State 
governments, ORS was finally approved for introduction and implementation 
throughout the country in a cabinet meeting dated 28th May 1997 (MHLG, 2004 p.1). 
Thus, all State governments were required to adopt ORS and abandon their existing 
allocation system (MHLG, 2006, p. 54). However, Sarawak was the only state in 
Malaysia to refuse to adopt the ORS framework for low cost housing allocation until 
the present day.
There were five main purposes for the establishment of the ORS (MHLG 1998); the 
first was to provide a countrywide “waiting list” of eligible low cost house buyers. The 
second was to standardise the criteria for the selection of eligible buyers who are 
considered qualified and therefore can be “short listed”. The third reason was to avoid 
misconduct in the selection of eligible low cost house buyers. The fourth was to ensure 
that only eligible buyers were entitled to buy and subsequently own low cost houses 
and that no buyers would be allowed to purchase more than one unit of low cost 
housing; and the final reason was to ensure the selection process became more 
transparent.
The MHLG (MHLG, 2006) expected full implementation of the ORS throughout the 
country to derive several outcomes; firstly, data on potential and eligible applicants and 
supplies of low cost housing stocks could be compiled by relevant authorities in a more 
systematic and comprehensive manner. Secondly, the allocation processes could be 
monitored with relative ease. Thirdly, an evaluation of the backgrounds of the 
applicants and the selection of eligible buyers could be done within a shorter time 
frame; and finally, the ORS could allow a more transparent and fair distribution of low 
cost houses.
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The idea of establishing a standardised and centralised low cost housing registration 
system was suggested by the MHLG as early as 1990 (interview with Federal Officer 
1). However, the proposal to introduce ORS only materialised in 1997 following a 
Federal government announcement of the implementation of PHP. Since the Federal 
government was responsible for the implementation of PHP, standardised selection 
criteria for low cost house buyers were required for the whole country. Although State 
governments were still responsible for the day to day operation of low cost housing 
allocation, the implementation of ORS would allow Federal government to coordinate 
and monitor the low cost house buying process.
During the implementation of PHP NEAC in 1998, the ORS was intended to be used 
for the allocation of low cost housing for both rental and for sale. However, allocation 
for rental public housing under PHP NEAC was never used by the State governments 
(MHLG, 2004). Instead, the State governments continued to use their own low cost 
housing administration systems. Management of rental housing not only involved the 
allocation process, but also other aspects such as the monitoring of monthly rental 
payments and maintenance. Therefore, ORS was primarily used for PHP units for sale 
by State governments. Later, the usage of ORS was extended for low cost housing 
allocation built by the private sector, as described by Federal Officer 1:
“...at that time the low cost houses built by the government and that is 
why government need to monitor, that is our purpose. Later in the 
second stage, government also wanted to monitor low cost houses built 
by private sector to avoid it being sold to people who already own the 
house”(Federal Officer 1).
Linder ORS, the applicants who aspired to purchase a low cost house had to register 
with the MHLG through the respective State government (MHLG, 1998). Registration 
was open throughout the year, which explains why the system was called an ‘Open 
Registration System’. Registration could be done manually at all state housing 
sections or district offices by filling in the form provided (see Figure 6.1). The MHLG, 
through its agents at the state level, then input the data into the computerised ORS. 
District Offices played a very important role in ORS implementation, particularly with 
regard to the distribution and receipt of application forms. They were also responsible 
for informing the ORS secretariat of any low cost housing projects within the district. 
The information was used to identify the eligible buyers who had already chosen two 
preferred locations on their application form. Upon receiving the form with all relevant 
documents, the State governments started processing the application. Data on the 
applicants were sorted by computers and, on the basis of their incomes, dependents,
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age and their housing needs, numerical scores were assigned to each applicant. The 
list of successful applicants was then forwarded to the National Housing Department 
for record.
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Figure 6.1: Low Cost Housing Registration and Allocation Process Under ORS, 
1997-2006
Source: National Housing Departm ent, Malaysia, 1997
Successful applicants were then short listed and called for the interview by the State 
Housing Section in order to check the authenticity of the documents submitted and the 
information given in the application form (MHLG, 1997, p. 6). However, the interview 
process received criticism from the public due to difficulties faced by the applicants 
with regard to attending the session and the complicated application process (MHLG, 
2006 p.53). The interview sessions conducted by State government housing officers
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also increased the human interaction and negotiation in the low cost housing allocation 
process. Although the intention behind the interview session was good in order to 
: :n":rr' the buyer’s eligibility, at the same time it also increased chances for corruption 
to occur. Therefore, in a subsequent improvement of the ORS in 2006, the interview 
session was scrapped in order to minimise the negotiation in the low cost housing 
allocation process (MHLG, 2006, p.93).
The list of successful applicants after the interviews was then sorted by the computer 
to determine the applicant’s priority level. The applicants were placed in the waiting list 
until there any low cost housing units were available for sale in the district requested in 
ihs application form (see Figure 6.2). Upon request by the state housing agencies or 
private housing developers, the State Housing Section then forwarded the list of 
applicants from the waiting list to the State Selection Committee headed by the Chief 
Minister or State Executive Councillor for final screening and endorsement. The final 
list was then distributed to state housing agencies or private housing developers as 
requested. A copy of the list was forwarded to the National Housing Department and 
District Office where the project was located for record.
Selection of 
Successful 
Applicants 
Using 
Computer
SORTING
(O
WAITING LIST
District A
An Ai
Highest Priority
District B
An As A2 ♦
Highest Priority
District C 
, An An An
Screening & 
Approval by 
State 
Selection 
Committee
Figure 6.2: Applicant’s Sorting and Waiting List Process Under ORS
Source: Modified from MHLG 1998 by Author
The low cost housing allocation process under ORS was not governed by any law, but 
rather based on administrative procedure. Therefore, the procedures and process of 
low cost housing allocation were different from one state to another. The State
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governments had the right to change the procedures and buyers’ selection criteria 
according to their needs. Similarly, the eligible buyer list from ORS’s housing register 
\ -3 not controlled under the law. This left the low cost house buyers’ selection 
process to respective State government interpretation and priority.
6.4.2 Improvements to ORS
Implementation of ORS during the early stage was not as smooth as expected by the 
Federal government. Two key areas constantly required attention from MHLG for 
continuous improvement; the first was the low cost house buyer’s selection criteria and 
the second was the ORS computerised database. Improvements to the ORS buyer 
selection criteria and database ensured it remained relevant and efficient as a low cost 
housing allocation tool. Table 6.2 shows the timeline for the implementation of ORS 
and improvements between 1996 and 2006.
Table 6.2: Timeline for ORS Implementation and Improvements, 1996-2006
Date Events
January 1996 Ministry of Housing and Local Government (MHLG) issued the 1st 
edition of the guideline for the Selection of Low Cost House Buyers 
under the Open Registration System (ORS)
28th May 1997 Cabinet Meeting approved the implementation of ORS nationwide
September 1997 MHLG issued the 2nd edition of the guideline for the Selection of Low 
Cost House Buyers under ORS (1997 Guideline)
April 1998 MHLG issued the 3rd edition of the guideline for the Selection of Low 
Cost House Buyers under ORS (1998 Guideline)
December 2001 Computerised ORS was implemented by MHLG. Only 4 states linked 
directly to the ministry and other states updated applicant data 
manually.
April 2004 The issue of unsold low cost housing emerged in the media. ORS 
inefficiency blamed for unsold low cost housing nationwide.
May 2004 NHD conducted a study with HUM to improve Computerised ORS
13m April 2005 Cabinet approved implementation of Improved Computerised ORS
16th April 2006 Prime Minister launched the implementation of the new improved ORS 
nationwide and new guideline for the Selection of Low Cost House 
Buyers under ORS (2006 Guideline)
Sources: MHLG, 1997,1998 and 2006
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a. Low Cost House Buyers’ Selection Criteria
Since the establishment of ORS, the low cost house buyers’ selection criteria have 
been changed several times. The guidelines were issued by the Ministry of Housing 
and Local Government to standardise the buyers’ selection criteria. Four editions of 
guidelines for the Selection of Low Cost House Buyers under ORS were published by 
the MHLG from 1996 to 2006. The first edition of the guideline was issued in January
1996 prior to ORS’s approval by the Cabinet on May 1997 (NHD, 1997). The 1996 
guideline, however, was not available in MHLG records for further analysis. The 
second edition was issued in September 1997 and the third in April 1998 (NHD, 1998). 
Changes to both were made following further discussions with the State governments 
and the need for PHP NEAC implementation in 1998. The latest change to the 
guideline was made in April 2006 following various problems encountered during the 
implementation of ORS (National Housing Department, 2006). Despite the changes, 
basic criteria such as applicant’s income, dependents, occupation, age and disability 
have always been used to determined eligibility.
The total points awarded to each buyer’s selection criteria reflect the Federal 
government’s priorities in low cost housing allocation (see Figure 6.3 and Table 6.3 for 
details of main criteria). However, there was no justification indicated in the guidelines 
with regard to how each set of eligibility criteria was derived by the ministry. In the
1997 Guideline, priority was given to applicants paying for rental accommodation (refer 
to Appendix 7). Therefore, the highest points were awarded to applicants who pay a 
high monthly rent. Similar points were also awarded to the burden of the mortgage 
instalment which the applicant was expected to pay when they purchased the low cost 
housing. Households with an income of between RM500-RM600 per month were given 
the highest points, although those with an income up to RM750 per month were 
eligible to purchase a low cost house for their household. The determination of income 
eligibility to purchase a low cost house was based on the buyer’s ability to pay. 
Therefore, applicants with an income of less than RM500 per month were not given 
any points due to the assumption that they might face difficulty in obtaining and 
repaying the loan.
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1997 G uideline
L e w  income people 
living in a rental 
house
1998 G uideline
Squatter received 
relocation order
2006 G uideline
Low income people 
in formal sector and 
in greater need
Figure 6.3: Government Priority Groups for Low Cost House Allocation Under 
ORS
Sources: MHLG, 1997,1998 and 2006
Table 6.3: ORS Main Eligibility Criteria 1997,1998 and 2006
1997 Guideline 1998 Guideiine 2006 Guideline
Rank MainCriteria
Max.
Points Rank
Main
Criteria
Max.
Points Rank
Main
Criteria
Max.
Points
1 i) Existing house rental 100 1 Loss of home 100 1 i) Monthly household 30
burden income
2 ii) Monthly household 50
1 ii) L/C house mortgage 100 income 1 ii) Dependents 30
instalment
2 iii) Status of existing 50 2 iii) Applicant age 10
2 >■>) Status of existing 50 house
house 3 iv) Marital status 6
3 iv) Marital status 25
3 iv) Marital status 25 4 v) Applicant disability 5
3 v) Occupation 25 status
3 v) Occupation 25
3 vi) Dependents (child) 25 5 vi) Health status 4
3 vi) Disability 25
4 vii) Disability 10 5 vii) Status of existing 4
3 vii) Other dependents 25 house
4 viii) Other dependents 10
3 viii) Monthly household 25 6 viii) Ex-police/Army 3
income 4 ix) Applicant age 10
7 ix) Occupation 2
4 ix) Loss of home 10 4 x) Place of work 10
7 x) Registration 2
4 x) Dependents (child) 10 4 xi) Length of stay in 10 duration
current house
4 xi) Applicant age 10 7 xi) Disabled children 2
4 xii) Place of birth 10
4 xii) Place of work 10 (state) 7 xii) Disabled spouse 2
4 xiii) Length of stay in 10
current house
4 xiv) Place of birth (state) 10
Total Max. Points Awarded = 435 Total Max. Points Awarded = 335 Total Max. Points Awarded = 100
Sources: National Housing Department, 1997,1998 and 2006
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The 1998 Guideline attempted to simplify the selection process of low cost house 
buyers by reducing the number of criteria and making point calculation easier (refer to 
Appendix 8). The highest points were given to those people who had received a 
relocation order in squatter settlements. This is in line with the ‘Zero Squatter Target 
by 2005’ policy formulated by the Federal government during the mid 1990s. The 
income eligibility threshold to purchase a low cost house was also increased from 
RM750 to RM1.500 per month in line with changes in the ceiling price of low cost 
housing to RM42.000 per unit (MHLG, 2002). Clearly, the 1998 Guideline placed 
greater emphasis on applicants’ social and economic background in awarding points. 
Criteria such as the number of dependents, marital status, occupation and disability 
were given higher points rather than the physical condition of the applicants’ existing 
houses. The 1998 Guideline also included pre-conditions to apply for low cost housing 
which particularly related to the applicant’s citizenship, age and income. Only 
Malaysians of an age greater than 21 years and with an income of not less than 
RM500 were allowed to apply for low cost housing. The applicants also could not own 
any house or land to build a house in order to qualify.
More than five years after the implementation of the ORS, the system began to receive 
widespread criticism from the people, Non-Governmental Organisations (NGO) 
particularly the Real Estate and Housing Developers Association (REHDA), private 
housing developers and State governments, as reported in the local media in April 
2004. However, the issues of unsold low cost houses in the State of Selangor in 2004 
provided the real test of ORS effectiveness. The issue started with controversy as it 
was claimed that the State Government of Selangor had allowed the sale of low cost 
houses to people with a middle and high income (The New Straits Times, 12th April
2004), thus triggering negative responses from the public and various NGOs. The Real 
Estate and Housing Developers Association (REHDA) claimed there were more than 
300,000 units of unsold low cost houses nationwide and the highest number was in the 
State of Selangor with 250,000 units. The ORS was deliberately blamed for the failure 
to sell low cost houses in the State of Selangor (MHLG, 2004c). The prime minister 
was finally involved and resolved the issue by directing the State Government of 
Selangor not to offer low cost housing to middle and high income groups (The Star, 
15th April 2004). Instead, the prime minister instructed the MHLG to review and 
improve the low cost housing allocation system.
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Subsequently, a study was conducted by the National Housing Department (NHD) with 
the International Islamic University Malaysia (HUM) in 2003 to identify the problems 
and to make recommendations to improve the low cost housing allocation system 
under ORS (NHD, 2006, p. 1). The study highlighted the fact that not all State 
governments appeared to follow the guideline on low cost house buyers’ selection 
criteria prepared by the NHD in 1998 (see Table 6.4). Instead, the State governments 
had a tendency to include additional criteria based on their needs.
Table 6.4: Number of Criteria and Maximum Points Adopted by the State
governments, 2003
State No. of criteria/sub-criteria Maximum points
1. MHLG Guideline, 1998 66 335
2. Selangor 94 86
3. Negeri Sembilan 80 100
4. Terengganu 69 -
5. Kedah 114 147
6. Melaka 76 198
7. Perak 97 217
8. Perlis 98 227
9. Pulau Pinang 101 317
10. Kuala Lumpur 74 316
11. Johor 76 304
12. Kelantan 84 -
13. Pahang 77 120
14. Sabah 99 200
15. Sarawak 68 75
Source: National Housing Departm ent, 2006
Additional criteria meant more information required from the applicants and a more 
complicated application form used by the State governments. The State Government 
of Selangor, for example, used the ‘Optical Mark Reader’ format which was very 
difficult for people with a low income to complete (see Figure 6.4). A complicated 
application form and additional documents required during submission discouraged 
people with a low income from registering under ORS (NHD 2006, p. 65), thus 
defeating the purpose of establishing the ORS to improve people with a low income’s 
access to the low cost housing market.
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Figure 6.4: Example of a Complicated Low Cost Housing Application Form 
Used by the State government of Selangor in 2004 
Source: Selangor Housing and Property Board, 2004
The study then recommended that the MHLG should reduce the number of criteria, 
simplify the application process, request less information and make application forms 
easier to complete (MHLG, 2006). The idea was to persuade more people to register 
with the State governments under the ORS and thus gain more accurate information 
on low cost house demand in particular areas. The revised eligibility criteria based on 
the 2006 Guideline reflected simplicity and avoided unnecessary points being 
awarded to unimportant criteria (refer to Appendix 9). Any information relating to 
applicants’ background was not awarded any points and was used only for statistical 
purposes. Instead the highest priority was given to people with a household income 
of less than RM1.500 per month and more dependents. In addition to income, 
applicants’ current house location was also considered when awarding the points 
since it reflected the burden they faced. Income was also will adjusted based on the 
Consumer Price Index (CPI) and only real income was used to determine the 
applicants’ eligibility. For the first time, economic factors such as the cost of living and 
CPI were taken into account when making the decision to allocate the low cost 
housing.
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Under the 2006 Guideline, priority was no longer given to squatter to apply for low 
cost houses. The Federal government changed the priority in order to ensure other 
people with a low income in the formal sector (i.e. low rank government servants and 
factory workers) and people with a real need for a house (i.e. single mothers and 
disabled people) were given the opportunity to buy a low cost house. By doing so, the 
government sent a strong message to people who illegally occupied government or 
private land, as they were no longer given priority to buy low cost housing in the 
future. Also for the first time priority was given to people with a disability and health 
problems. Single parents or widows were given higher points than married couples in 
revised criteria to reflect the difficulties faced by this group. However, the government 
stili required other information such as age, occupation, the disability of spouses and 
children and the length of registration to determine the buyers’ eligibility. Most 
importantly, a reduction in the information required meant a less complicated 
application form to be completed by the applicants.
The idea was to encourage more people with a low income to register with the State 
governments under the ORS to buy a low cost house. No additional documents were 
needed during the application stage except for a copy of the national identity card to 
ensure only Malaysian citizens could apply for a low cost house in view of the millions 
of illegal immigrants still living in the country. The overall registration and allocation 
process was improved again in 2006 (see Figure 6.5). This included the appeal 
process for unsuccessful applicants going directly to the MHLG and simpler 
procedures to submit and check application status. In the past, no appeal was 
allowed for applicants who failed during the selection process. Thus, the revised 
process gave applicants the opportunity to explain and submit additional information 
to ministry officials to support the application if required. Previously the application 
could only be made at the State Housing Department or District Offices, but under 
the improved system more options were given to applicants to submit their 
application form. After several meetings between the MHLG and State governments, 
the final version the of application form and eligibility criteria was agreed. The 
proposal was then tabled in National Housing Council Meeting No. 1/2005 and 
approved by cabinet for implementation nationwide on 13th April 2005. Malaysia’s 
Prime Minister then officially launched the new improved ORS on 16th April 2006 
(MHLG, 2006, p.1).
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Stage Responsibility Remarks
Purchase and Complete 
ORS Application Form
District Office 
Local Authorities
State Housing Division/ Housing Corporation 
Post Office / Housing Developers 
Ministry of Housing and Local Government
To ensure easy access for 
target group to obtain an 
application form.
Submit Form and 
Points Calculation
District Office 
Local Authorities 
State Housing Division 
(check the application form and to issue 
acceptance letter).
Points calculation to be done 
immediately upon submission 
using the computer and to 
notify the applicant of the 
preliminary result.
Eligible Buyers List to be 
Fowarded to National 
Housing Department
National Housing Department 
State Housing Division
List of eligible buyers will be 
checked and records to be 
kept by National Housing 
Department
Inform the Successful/ 
unsuccessful Applicants
- State Housing Division State Housing Division will 
issue letter to successful and 
unsuccessful applicants. For 
successful applicants the 
process ends here.
Shortlist of Applicants to 
be Interviewed
- State Housing Division State Housing Division will 
issue a letter to applicants for 
interview by State Selection 
Committee (case to case 
only, if necessary).
Conduct the Interviews 
with the Selected 
Annlicants
State Housing Division 
State Selection Committee
Interview required if there are 
problems on applicant’s 
income or other additional 
information required as 
determined by the state.
Evaluation by State 
Selection Committee
State Housing Division 
State Selection Committee
Evaluation based on the 
outcome of the interview.
List of Successful 
Applicants Sent to 
National Housing
National Housing Department 
State Housing Division
List of successful applicants 
will be checked and the 
records to be kept by 
National Housing 
Department.
Inform the Successful/ 
unsuccessful Applicants
State Housing Division State Housing Division will 
issue letter to successful and 
unsuccessful applicants.
Unsuccessful Applicants 
Submit an Appeal
National Housing Department 
State Housing Division
(state government to set-up the Appeal Commitee)
Appeal can be submitted only 
at National Housing 
Department as secretariat 
and to inform applicants the 
result by Appeal Committee.
Final List of Successful 
Applicants
- State Housing Division State Housing Division to 
provide final list of successful 
applicants according to 
ranking based on the points 
awarded.
Forward List to Housing 
Developers
State Housing Division
State agencies and private housing developers
State Housing Division to 
forward list to housing 
developers according to prefe 
rred location and priority.
Figure 6.5: Low Cost House Registration and Allocation Process Under ORS Since 2006 
Source: National Housing Department, Malaysia 2006
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b. ORS Computerised Database
Initially the ORS was only intended to standardise the selection criteria among the 
states in Malaysia, but later the MHLG realised the important of the computerised 
registration and allocation system. The Computerised ORS was introduced by the 
MHLG in December 2001 because some of the State governments were still using a 
manual system for low cost housing allocation (MHLG, 2004b p.1). The 
computerisation of the low cost housing allocation system was introduced as part of 
Federal government administration modernisation under the E-Government initiative 
during Prime Minister Mahathir’s administration (Karim, 2004, p.211). The 
Computerised ORS was not only used for low cost housing registration and 
allocation, it was also useful to the MHLG for monitoring purposes. The centralised 
database system was maintained by the MHLG with direct online links to four State 
governments without their own computerised system, namely Kelantan, Perlis, 
Trengganu and Perak (see Figure 6.6). Meanwhile, other State governments 
forwarded the low cost applicants’ data manually to MHLG and the data was then 
updated in the ORS database.
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Figure 6.6: Computerised ORS Operations, 2001-2006 
Source: MHLG, 2004
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However, a study conducted by the MHLG (MHLG 2003) revealed that most 
applicants’ data held by the Ministry was outdated due to failure by most State 
governments to update the data regularly in the ORS database. Two years after the 
implementation of the Computerised ORS, the MHLG was still facing difficulty in 
receiving updated data on low cost housing applicants from the State governments, 
which mostly used an independent computerised system. The study not only 
recommended improvement of the low cost house buyers’ selection criteria, but also 
suggested a single computerised system should be established nationwide in order 
to solve the problem. This meant that all State governments must abandon their 
existing computerised systems and use the computerised system developed by the 
MHLG.
The new computerised low cost housing allocation system under ORS was 
introduced in April 2006 by the MHLG to replace the old system. Under the new 
computerised system, all states were provided with computers which linked directly to 
the Ministry of Housing and Local Government ORS computerised database. The 
registration of applicants’ data could be updated immediately by the State 
governments. The data from the ORS database would allow for inter-state cross­
checking of low cost housing applicants’ information, eliminate multiple applications, 
and was useful for statistical purposes for low cost housing planning and research by 
the ministry or State governments (MHLG, 2004b, p.2). Federal governments were 
also able to keep track on the registration and allocation practices by the State 
governments.
The ministry also expected that interference by politicians and the misuse of power 
by State government officers during the selection process could be minimised by 
using the centralised computerised allocation system. Thus, greater fairness and 
transparency in the allocation process could be promoted. A centralised 
computerised system also meant applicants from different states could apply for low 
cost housing in another state, especially government employees and people with a 
low income who were thinking of migrating into another state in Malaysia. Before 
2006, the applicants could only submit an application for a house located within the 
state in which they live (see Figure 6.7). The changes gave more flexibility to low 
income people to apply for low cost housing anywhere in Malaysia and request low 
cost houses for sale in any state through the new improved Computerised ORS. The 
data from the system could not only be used to identify local demand, but at the 
same time assess inter-state low cost house demand. This is also important to
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prevent people from less developed states or rural areas ended up living in a squatter 
if their housing needs could not be fulfilled by the government after they migrated to 
the urban areas.
Before 2006 (2001-2006): Single state application and allocation
1
ORS: STATE OWN SYSTEM -  “1 1 1
Applicant from State 1 --------------->: State Housing Unit in State , ;--------------- > Low Cost House Located Only in State 1
i 1
After 2006: Interstate application and allocation
Applicant from State
Applicant from State 3
Applicant from S tate ,
Applicant from State A
Applicant from State 2
Low Cost House Located in Any State
State Housing Unit in State
State Housing Unit in State 3
State Housing Unit in State 4
State Housing Unit in State i
State Housing Unit in State 2
ORS: MHLG SYSTEM
Figure 6.7: Low Cost Housing Registration and Allocation Mechanism under 
Computerised ORS Before and After 2006 
Source: Author
During the Ninth Malaysia Plan (2006-2010), there was further improvement of the 
registration and allocation system for low cost houses to ensure proper distribution 
and prevent genuine target groups from being denied the opportunity to buy low cost 
houses (Malaysia, 2006). The Federal government aimed to update the information in 
the ORS database regularly and the criteria for the selection of eligible buyers was 
revised and standardised for all states. The existing centralised database system at 
MHLG was upgraded and integrated with the database administrated by State 
governments to facilitate the selection and distribution of low cost houses in a more 
systematic and transparent manner (Malaysia, 2006, p.447). The new improved 
system also allowed applicants to check their application status online via the Internet 
at the Ministry of Housing and Local Government’s website. The changes clearly 
made it easier for low cost housing applicants to check their status and at the same 
time promoted greater transparency in the system.
The status of applicants in the ORS database were organised into eight categories 
according to three stages, namely: application, waiting list and decision by the
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applicant (see Figure 6.8). Upon receiving the form under stage 2, the State 
government began to process the application and the applicant was placed under: 
Status 1: Processing the application. Those applicants who qualified to buy a low 
cost house were then put under Status 2: Shortlisted or in waiting list. Meanwhile, 
disqualified applicants were placed under Status 3: Application Rejected. Under the 
ORS Guideline in 2006, the applicants had the right to appeal directly to the MHLG. 
In stage 3, the qualified applicants were offered State government the chance to buy 
a low cost house by the State government, according to the location requested in the 
application form. Those applicants already offered a house would be either be put 
under Status 4: House Offered or Status 5: House Not Offered (house to be offered 
when available).
Level 1: 
Application
Level 2: 
Waiting List
Qualified Disqualified
Level 3:
Applicant to decide
Status 2:
Short Listed
Status 6:
Awaiting Answer
Status 4: 
House Offered
Status 7: 
Accept the Offer
Status 5: 
Not Offered
Status 8:
Decline the Offer
Status 1:
Processing the 
Application
Applicant 
Submits the 
Application
Status 3:
Application
Rejected
Figure 6.8: Status of Applicant Under Computerised ORS 
Source: Modified from MHLG, 2004
The State government, however, still awaited the decision by the applicants to buy a 
low cost house so they were placed under Status 6: Awaiting Answer. When the 
applicants accepted the offer from the State government, they were put under Status 
7: Accept the Offer. However, if they declined it then they were placed under Status 
8: Decline the Offer. Under the ORS, applicants were given the power to decide
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whether they wanted to accept or reject the house offered by the State government 
with an appropriate reason. This is particularly important, because the low cost house 
allocated by the State government was for sale. Therefore, various factors must be 
taken into consideration by the house buyers including location and type of house 
before a decision could be made. In general, the status of applications was useful for 
Federal and State governments to determine the number of applicants in the waiting 
list for low cost housing provision planning.
6.4.3 Background o f Low Cost House Applicants Under ORS 1997-2005
Since the information from the ORS database is considered to be highly sensitive 
and confidential under Malaysian Law, only limited data could be obtained for 
analysis purposes. Between the establishment of the ORS in 1997 and 2005, a total 
of 492,150 people had registered with the ORS (MHLG, 2005) or an average of 
54,683 people per year. In terms of ethnic composition, the majority of the people 
who registered under the ORS are Bumiputera, with 59.5 percent, Chinese 26.7 
percent and Indian 13.6 percent (see Figure 6.9). Overall, the percentage of ORS 
applicants was still balanced according to ethnic composition. Thus, this shows that 
no particular races were denied access to low cost housing in Malaysia.
13.6%
26.8%
HD Bumiputera 0  Chinese □  Indian
Figure 6.9: Number of Applicants According to Ethnicity Under the ORS, 1997- 
2005
Source: ORS Database, MHLG, 2005
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Meanwhile, in terms of spatial distribution, the State of Selangor had the highest 
number of people registered, with 148,139 (30.1 percent) followed by Johor and 
Pahang (see Figure 6.10). The developed states such as Selangor and Johor 
received more applications to buy low cost houses due to their larger population and 
higher degree of net migration. However, the states with a larger population did not 
necessarily have more people registered under the ORS, for example, Kelantan, 
Perak and Kuala Lumpur. Surprisingly, poorer states like Kelantan and Perlis had the 
lowest number of people registered to buy low cost houses under the ORS. This 
shows there was no relationship between the number of people registered to buy low 
houses in a state and the total population, net migration, economic status or number 
of squatter.
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Figure 6.10: Number of Applicants Under ORS According to States, 1997-2005 
Source: ORS Database, MHLG, 2005
Of the total people registered, 66,278 or 13.5 percent of applications were rejected, 
mostly due to the applicants’ income being greater than the maximum household 
income set by the government. Meanwhile, only 119,964 applicants or 24.4 percent 
were offered the chance to purchase a low cost house during the same period. The 
majority of applicants were actually still stuck in the ‘waiting list’, with 305,908
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applicants or 62.1 percent of the overall number of people registered under the ORS 
(see Figure 6.11). This significant number still on the waiting list should not have 
happened based on the total number of low cost houses completed since 1997, as 
explained earlier in Chapter 5. This shows that the ORS still cannot expedite and 
improve access to low cost housing. Another explanation for the large number of 
people still on the waiting list was the State governments’ policy to relocate squatter 
in low cost houses without registration under the ORS as part of the ‘Zero Squatter’ 
by 2005 target. This meant many people registered under the ORS had to wait longer 
before being offered the chance to purchase a low cost house.
13 Rejected E2 Waiting List □  Offered the House
24.4%
Figure 6.11: Status of Low Cost House Applicants Under ORS, 1997-2005 
Source: ORS Database, MHLG 2005
As explained earlier, the data available from the ORS are also useful for low cost 
housing policy formulation either at Federal or state level. A study by the National 
Housing Department (MHLG, 2006) revealed that 36.3 percent of people registered 
under the ORS have a monthly income of more than RM1.500 per month (see Figure 
6.12). Therefore, in 2006, the MHLG decided to review the policy to allow 
applications only from people with a monthly household income of less than RM1.500 
per month. After extensive discussion with the State governments (NHD, 2004), the 
MHLG finally agreed to allow people with an income greater than RM1,500 to register 
with ORS and eventually purchase a low cost house subject to the consideration of 
other criteria such as number of dependents, age, marital status and disability.
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However, people with a household income between RM751 and RM1,500 were still 
the largest group who applied for low cost housing, accounting for 45.4 percent of 
total applicants. This shows that the majority of people applying for a low cost house 
had a sustainable income and were capable of paying monthly instalments for the 
house purchase compare to only 5 percent of people with an income of less than 
RM500 per month. It also indicated that low cost houses in Malaysia were not 
targeted at the hard core poor or people without a sustainable income.
36.3%
f c j . J 7 D  :
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□  RM 1001-1500 ■  > RM 1500
Figure 6.12: Monthly Household Income for Applicants Registered Under the 
ORS, 1997-2005
Source: ORS Database, MHLG, 2005
Meanwhile, in terms of applicants’ age, the largest group registered under the ORS 
are people aged between 30-40 years with 44.5 percent, followed by people in the 
21-29 age group at 31.6 percent and then the 41-50 age group at 18.6 percent (see 
Figure 6.13). People with an active working age between 21 to 40 years are the 
largest group seeking to buy low cost housing in Malaysia. This indicates that most 
people of working age are eager to buy a low cost house, especially married couples 
with children at 74.5 percent, compared to only 12.8 percent for single people and
12.1 percent for widower/single mothers.
44.5%
31.6%
0.9% 4.0%
□  Below 20 yrs □  21-29 yrs □  30-40 yrs
□  41-50 yrs ■  51-60 yrs ■  Above 60 yrs
Figure 6.13: Age of Applicants registered under ORS, 1997-2005 
Source: ORS Database, MHLG, 2005
Surprisingly, the majority of people who registered with the ORS were private sector 
employees with 62.4 percent compared to only 17.4 percent government employees 
(refer to Figure 6.14). This shows that the majority of private sector employees are in 
greater need of a low cost house, especially those who work in the manufacturing 
and service sector compared to government employees. There is also a considerable 
small number of applicants who work in the informal sector (12.8 percent) such as 
street hawkers and general labourers. Therefore, the majority of people registered 
under the ORS work in the formal sector, the public and private sector which 
represents 79.8 percent of total applicants.
1 7 .4%
Q.2%
6 2 .5 %
12.8% 0 .1%
□  Government □  Private Sector □  Housewife
□  Own ■  Jobless S  Other
Figure 6.14: Occupation of Applicants Registered With the ORS, 1997-2005 
Source: ORS Database, MHLG, 2005
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In many developing countries, low income housing is mostly occupied by public 
sector employees (see Payne, 1977; Amos, 1984; Siddiqui and Khan, 1990; Purewal, 
2000). Public sector employees usually have better access to low income housing 
through connections with the housing developers. Meanwhile, in the context of 
Malaysia, a large number of private sector employees registered under the ORS 
could be explained based on the argument that the ORS provides better access to 
low cost housing. Private sector employees have no choice but to register under the 
ORS in order to buy a low cost house. Meanwhile, the low income public sector 
employees could use their connections and special government privilege to gain 
c'cess to low cost housing. A further analysis of this issue will be conducted in the 
next chapter.
6.5 ROLE OF FEDERAL AND STATE GOVERNMENTS IN LOW COST HOUSING 
ALLOCATION UNDER ORS
The implementation of ORS required close cooperation between the Federal and 
State governments in Malaysia. In terms of institutional set-up, the Federal 
government, through the Ministry of Housing and Local Government (MHLG), was 
responsible for coordinating the implementation of ORS nationwide. The task was 
undertaken by the National Housing Department (NHD) which was responsible for 
the formulation of policies, legislation, regulations and the conducting of research 
related to the housing sector in Malaysia. In the context of the ORS, the NHD were 
responsible for maintaining the computerised system, liaising with the State 
governments and monitoring the implementation.
The NHD was also responsible for hearing the appeals submitted by rejected low 
cost applicants. If the applicants believed they had enough evidence and reasons for 
the government to consider his/her application, the appeal could be made directly to 
the ministry. Meanwhile, the State governments were responsible for implementing 
ORS at the state level. The responsibility was usually placed under the Housing 
Section of the State Secretary’s Office, except for the State of Selangor and Melaka 
which created an independent state agency named the Housing Board. In Sabah, 
ORS implementation was under the responsibility of the Ministry of Housing (refer to 
Appendix 10). Sarawak was the only state in Malaysia not using the ORS for low 
cost housing allocation.
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Implementation of the ORS had changed the role played by the Federal and State 
governments in low cost housing allocation. This is unlike the practice in many 
Western welfare state countries, which relied on local authorities to manage public 
housing allocation. However, in the case of Malaysia, the Federal government was 
involved directly in low cost housing allocation, together with the State governments 
who were responsible for day to day operations. The local authorities had no role to 
play in low cost housing allocation process under the ORS in Malaysia. The role of 
Federal government through the MHLG under ORS includes, firstly, coordinating and 
monitoring ORS implementation in all the states in Malaysia (see Figure 6.15). 
Through ORS, coordination in terms of selection criteria and allocation procedures 
could be standardised throughout the country. The implementation of a single 
application form and applications between states could also be achieved. Secondly, a 
centralised database for low cost housing applicants could be created at the national 
level, not only for low cost housing allocation purposes, but also for planning by the 
Federal and State governments.
Thirdly, Federal government, through the Ministry of Housing and Local Government, 
was also responsible for hearing the appeals submitted by rejected low cost 
applicants. If the applicants believed they had enough evidence and reasons for the 
MHLG to reconsider the application, the appeal could be made directly to the 
ministry. Fourthly, they were responsible for improving the ORS according to the 
current and future needs of low cost housing allocation. The ministry also reviewed 
the computerised system from time to time to ensure better coordination with the 
State governments. Finally, they formulated policy related to low cost housing 
allocation at the Federal level. Thus, the policy on low cost housing allocation could 
be standardised throughout the country. Discussion with all the State governments 
was organised by the ministry before any final decisions for implementation could be 
made.
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Figure 6.15: Role of Federal and State government in ORS Implementation 
Source: Author
However, the implementation of centralisation and standardisation of the low cost 
housing allocation system in Malaysia was difficult without cooperation from the State 
governments. Under the Federal system, the State governments had the right to 
adopt or refuse any policy introduced by the Federal government. Centralisation of 
low cost house buyer registration also meant the State governments had less control 
and responsibility over housing provision in the states. Thus, the Federal government 
were not only directly involved in public low cost housing provision through PHP, but 
also indirectly controlled housing allocation in the state through ORS. Politically it was 
important for the Federal government to have access to the low cost housing 
allocation systems in the states, particularly those controlled by the opposition 
parties. Nevertheless, whether the political motive led to the implementation of the 
ORS is beyond the scope of this thesis to investigate.
The role of State governments encompassed more than just day to day management 
of the operation of low cost housing registration and allocation; they also promoted 
home ownership by people with a low income. Thus, the State governments were 
expected to encourage as many as possible of this group to register under ORS and 
to allocate houses in a transparent manner, as envisaged by the Federal
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government. Although the State governments were still responsible for day to day low 
cost housing allocation, the decisions and processes were still subject to policy 
formulated by the Federal government from time to time. Generally, the State 
governments played five roles; the first was making sure that people with a low 
income registered with the state before they could buy low cost houses. Secondly, 
they processed applications and subsequently approved or rejected the applications 
according to criteria set by the Federal and respective State government. Thirdly, 
they maintained a list of applicants under the ORS register. The people on the 
waiting list were offered the chance to purchase the low cost house from private 
housing developers when it became available. Their fourth role was to deal with the 
Federal government on ORS implementation which included applying the allocation 
policy to the computerised system. Finally, they dealt with private housing developers 
on ORS implementation in the state. This includes identifying the low cost housing 
projects and the number of low cost house units in particular projects.
Several issues undermined the relationship between the Federal and State 
governments. Firstly, from a State government perspective, the purpose of the ORS 
was more than coordination and monitoring of low cost housing allocation; they felt it 
was also used to impose Federal control over state housing affairs. Therefore, in 
2006, the Federal government placed increasing pressure on all State governments 
to use the system developed by the MHLG and abandon their existing independent 
computerised allocation system. Meanwhile, according to the Federal government 
officers interviewed, there was still a need for a monitoring mechanism to ensure 
State governments adopted the low cost housing allocation policy formulated by the 
MHLG (interview with Federal Officers 1 and 2). This is important, especially when 
the State governments are controlled by opposing political parties and are therefore 
in the position to adopt or reject the Federal policy of low cost housing allocation. 
After the 12th General Election in 2008, five states, namely Selangor, Perak, Pulau 
Pinang, Kedah and Kelantan, were controlled by opposition parties.
The second issue was poor coordination between Federal and State governments in 
terms of ORS policy formulation and implementation. Despite all State governments 
agreeing to adopt the computerised allocation system developed by the ministry in 
2006 (MHLG 2006), implementation remained uneven among State governments. 
There was growing refusal by State governments to allow intervention by the Federal 
government in low cost housing allocation at the state level. According to Federal 
Officer 3, when interviewed, the governments of six states, namely Selangor, Johor,
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Pulau Pinang, Pahang, Sabah and Sarawak, still have not fully adopted the improved 
Computerised ORS. These states have tried to delay the implementation of ORS for 
various reasons, as described by Federal Officer 3:
“When it came to implementation stage, we received a lot of 
complaints from the state... that is why we get the state involved from 
the beginning. When we want to implement they found a lot of 
problems. In reality those use the system is the low rank officers at the 
state. They see what can be implemented and what is not. Those 
attended the meetings (at the ministry) mainly the top state officials, 
according to them everything is fine. That the problem. There is no 
understanding between the top State government officials and the 
lower rank officers...” (Federal Officer 3).
The statement shows that Federal and State governments have different views on 
the ORS and its purpose. Furthermore, the misunderstanding continues to exist 
between the Federal and State governments with regard to ORS implementation, 
particularly the low rank housing officers. The lower rank officers are usually the 
people dealing directly with applicants at the state level. Therefore, they believe the 
State government should impose strict controls during the application stage in order 
to eliminate cheating applicants. Without the necessary power and political will, it is 
therefore difficult for the Federal government to monitor the allocation activities in the 
state (Interview with Federal Officer 3). As the officer-in-charge of monitoring and 
coordination of ORS implementation at the state, Federal Officer C’s statement 
clearly indicates the frustration among the Federal officers when dealing with State 
governments. The implementation of the ORS without legal back-up also confirmed it 
is not meant to be mandatory for the State governments to adopt it, but is rather 
intended for housing administrative purposes, as described by Federal Officer 2:
“...When we design the system, what we found is some states already 
have their own system. We tried to match with their system. But the 
state has the right not to use the system because it will involve cost, 
time, thinking, redesign and so on. For the state without any system 
like Trengganu so we pump the money, give them PC, give them 
computer system. We don’t care whether they are using manual or on­
line system but the most important thing to us (ministry) is all the states 
are covered” (Federal Officer 2).
Although the MHLG had already agreed to further improve the system in order to 
satisfy the remaining six states, there was no assurance that they would adopt the 
system. Federal Officer 3’s interview indicated most State governments were still not 
in favour of the proposal for inter-state applications for low cost housing, fearing the 
state would lose the power to control the allocation process which would be politically
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unpopular. Prior to 2006, applications for low cost housing were limited to the state in 
which the applicants dwelt, but the ministry later proposed inter-state applications, 
which thus gave the opportunity for applicants to apply for low cost housing in any 
state in Malaysia.
Finally, there was a misunderstanding regarding the purpose of ORS implementation 
between Federal and State governments. The Federal government’s intention was to 
make it easier for people with a low income to register under ORS, but the State 
governments thought otherwise. The State governments imposed stringent 
application procedures and eligibility criteria to ensure that applicants were not only 
eligible to purchase a low cost house, but were also later able to acquire a loan from 
financial institutions. However, the changes affected a number of people with a low 
income registered under the system in the states. As a consequence, the data in the 
ORS did not actually reflect the actual demand for low cost housing in the states and 
therefore could not be used for planning purpose, as explained by State Officer 1:
"... we (the state) cannot use the data because many people don’t 
know they have to register to purchase low cost house... people 
register to buy house, not register for census purpose. So we cannot 
use the data to determine housing demand...” (State Officer 1).
In the wider context of debates on the role of state and market, this certainly proved 
that the state showed no sign of retreating from low cost housing allocation. The 
continuous power struggle between the Federal and State governments to control 
low cost housing allocation also meant the government still dominated the low cost 
housing market. Meanwhile, centralisation of power to the Federal government under 
ORS shows a deepening of the state’s power in housing allocation and was hence 
consistent with the developmental state approach.
6.6 ORS IMPLEMENTATION AND THE CHANGES TO THE LOW COST HOUSING 
PROVISION PROCESS IN MALAYSIA
The analysis in this section specifically discusses the role of ORS in the low cost 
housing provision process, particularly at the consumption stage. The discussion 
begins with an analysis of the housing provision process in Malaysia in the context of 
East Asian and European countries. Subsequently, attention will be focused on low 
cost housing provision with an emphasis on the consumption stage. In many East
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Asian countries, the housing provision process usually involves three main stages, 
namely Development-Construction-Consumption (Doling, 1999, p.231). Meanwhile, 
finance and land play an integral part in the overall process.
However, in Malaysia the sequence is rather different and can be summarised as 
Development-Consumption-Construction. This difference in sequence of the housing 
provision process is caused by the ‘sell and build system’ adopted by both the public 
and private sectors in housing provision. The housing provision process still starts at 
the development stage, but is followed by consumption instead of construction like 
other East Asian countries. A comparison of Malaysian housing with other regimes 
reveals differences which are particularly related to the stages of the housing 
provision process and the role between the state and market (see Table 6.5). 
Malaysia clearly does not follow a similar pattern to other East Asian countries, but is 
more like a European regime in terms of the role of state and market. However, 
despite the similarities with the European regime, the situation is rather different in 
terms of the purpose of state intervention, especially at the consumption stage. In 
Malaysia, the state intervenes in the housing consumption stage only to ensure home 
ownership among the people with a low income. But in the case of the European 
regime, state intervention is to ensure universal housing provision under the welfare 
state system. Thus, these differences highlight the peculiarity of the Malaysian 
housing regime compared to other countries.
Doling (2003) categorises Malaysia as being similar to Indonesia and Thailand which 
have small scale housing programmes aimed at particular groups such as civil 
servants and people with a low income. Self-help, community development and 
partnership have become key components for slum and squatter upgrading 
programmes in these countries. However, the housing provision regime in Malaysia is 
clearly different from that described by Doling (2003). Instead, Malaysia has 
increasingly relies on large scale market provision, especially for low cost housing, 
since the 1990s.
Table 6.5: Comparison of Housing Processes in Malaysia and Other 
Regimes
Stage Market State
Liberal Regime
Development X
Construction X
Consumption X
European Regime
Development X
Construction X
Consumption X
East Asia ‘Little Tigers’
Development X
Construction X
Consumption X
Malaysia
Development X
Construction X
Consumption X
Source: Adopted from Doling, 1999 (except for Malaysia)
Meanwhile, in the context of low cost housing provision in Malaysia, implementation 
of ORS significantly changed the process, particularly at the development and 
consumption stage (see Figure 6.16). At the development stage, data obtained from 
the ORS database has been used to determine housing demand according to 
location by the government. Together with other demographic and housing census 
data, the MHLG can produce a more accurate plan for low cost housing provision. 
The number of registered buyers under ORS will be used to determine the number of 
low cost housing units to be built according to location by the public and private 
sector. The information is also important for the public and private sector to obtain 
necessary financing and land for low cost housing provision. Without reliable data on 
low cost housing demand, it is difficult, particularly for the private sector, to provide 
low cost housing. Like other East Asian countries, the state still plays a significant 
role at the development stage of low cost housing provision in Malaysia through 
ORS.
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Figure 6.16: Comparison Between the Typical Process of Low Cost Housing 
Provision in East Asia Countries and Malaysia 
Source: Doling (1999, p.231)
Meanwhile, at the consumption stage, in other East Asian countries the market is 
responsible for housing allocation without state intervention. Even in Singapore, with 
its high level of state intervention in the housing provision, the trend is clearly moving 
towards the market in the low income housing consumption process (Lee et al., 2003, 
p.41). However, in Malaysia, the state still plays a significant role in the low cost 
housing consumption process through ORS. State control is restricted to low cost 
housing, but overall it still accounts for at least 30 percent of overall housing provision 
in Malaysia. Uniquely, the state only intervened at the consumption stage of low cost 
housing provision through the implementation of the ORS. Meanwhile, other factors 
of production such as finance and land are still left to the market to decide, including 
interest rates and land prices.
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6.7 CONCLUSION
The analysis in this chapter revealed the importance of state intervention in low cost 
housing allocation in Malaysia. The social political situation and imbalanced economy 
among the races in Malaysia required continuous state intervention in low cost 
housing allocation. At the same time, it was important for the government to enable 
people with a low income to have better access to the low cost housing market, 
regardless whether units were built by the public or private sectors. The government 
also needed to determine the actual demand for low cost housing in order to 
formulate future low cost housing policy in Malaysia. Since the government had 
limited money available for the low cost housing programme, it was important to 
ensure that people with a low income had access to buy the low cost housing. Thus, 
the establishment of the ORS was a reaction by the MHLG to various problems faced 
by the low housing allocation system in Malaysia during the 1980s and early 1990s.
Although ORS was introduced for low cost housing allocation for both rental and sale, 
the State governments never used the system for rental house allocation. Moreover, 
the size of the rental house stock managed by State governments is relatively small 
compared to houses built for sale. The ORS is not only used for low cost housing 
allocation built by the public sector, but also for that constructed by the private sector. 
Due to large scale private sector low cost housing provision in Malaysia, the ORS 
became an important tool for Federal and State governments to intervene in the 
market. Analysis shows the introduction of the ORS has not significantly changed 
housing tenure, either in public or private sector low cost housing in Malaysia. 
Nevertheless, the ORS became the single most important tool to improve the access 
of people with a low income to housing, since it introduced greater transparency and 
minimised corruption in low cost housing allocation.
Thus, the ORS is more than just a low cost housing allocation mechanism; it also 
helps the government to eliminate corruption in the system. Corruption among the 
State governments’ officers and intervention by local politicians in the low cost 
housing allocation process has been reduced by the implementation of a centralised 
buyer’s registration system. At the same time, the data obtained from the system has 
been used for low cost housing planning by the public and private sectors. The 
implementation of PHP NEAC in 1998 prompted a greater need for a centralised low 
cost housing allocation system since the programme was fully funded by the Federal 
government.
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Since 1997, the ORS has been improved by the MHLG in line with changes in 
circumstances at the state level in order to meet the needs of low cost house buyers. 
The improvements are largely related to low cost house buyers’ selection criteria and 
the introduction of a computerised system. However, some State governments still 
refused to adopt the system, despite all the changes made by the MHLG. Sarawak is 
the only state in Malaysia which refuses to use ORS in low cost housing allocation. 
The establishment of ORS also undermined the relationship between the Federal and 
State governments. Implementation of ORS meant the State governments no longer 
had full authority over low cost housing allocation. Instead, all the housing allocation 
activity at the state level was monitored and controlled by the Federal government. 
The changes and improvements made to the ORS since 1998 reflect the fact that the 
low cost housing allocation system in Malaysia is not static. The allocation policy and 
criteria will be reviewed from time to time in accordance with social, economic and 
political changes.
The analysis also revealed the differences between the housing provision regime in 
Malaysia and other East Asian countries. The differences are mainly caused by the 
sell and build concept adopted by the housing provision system in Malaysia. This 
means that the house must be sold to buyers before construction can begin. The sell 
and build concept is used by both public and private sectors. However, the 
introduction of ORS proved to be important to the process of low cost housing 
provision in Malaysia. In conclusion, Malaysian housing in general and low cost 
housing provision in particular is highly controlled by the state, similar to Singapore 
and Hong Kong (Doling, 1999 & 2003). Low cost housing allocation practices in 
Malaysia under ORS prove the state had still retained control over the low cost 
housing provision process over the last 10 years, despite the global trend towards 
market economy and neo-liberalism.
In the next chapter, the discussion will focus on the implementation of ORS in the 
State of Selangor. The purpose is to analyse the outcome of ORS implementation at 
the state level and gather feedback from various players involved in low cost housing 
allocation.
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CHAPTER 7:
CASE STUDY: THE ORS IMPLEMENTATION
IN THE STATE OF SELANGOR
CHAPTER 7:
CASE STUDY: ORS IMPLEMENTATION IN 
THE STATE OF SELANGOR
7.1 INTRODUCTION
The purpose of this chapter is to analyse low cost housing allocation in the State of 
Selangor. Most importantly, it objectives to analyse the role of the state and market in 
low cost housing allocation. A private low cost housing project located in Selangor 
known as Sri Meranti Low Cost Housing Apartments in Sri Damansara, Selangor, was 
selected for the detailed study. Various state and non-state players involved in the 
production and allocation of low cost housing in Selangor were interviewed to gather 
feedback on the role of the state and market in the process.
This chapter is divided into nine sections; the first outlines the structure of low cost 
housing provision in Selangor. The second section seeks to identify the low cost 
housing allocation policy in the state and the third section discusses the low cost 
housing registration and allocation process under ORS in Selangor. Meanwhile, 
section four will focus on the background of the selected project in order to provide a 
detailed study. Section five discusses the consequences of state intervention in the 
low cost housing registration and allocation process. This is followed by an 
examination of low cost house buyer preference between state and market in low cost 
housing allocation in section six. Section seven will discuss market view on low cost 
housig allocation. Section eight then discusses the relationship between the state and 
market in low cost housing allocation. Finally, section nine represents a summary of 
access to low cost housing by people with a low income in the State of Selangor.
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7.2 LOW COST HOUSING PROVISION IN THE STATE OF SELANGOR
The objectives of State of Selangor’s housing policy are to provide adequate, quality, 
and affordable housing to be owned or rented, to expedite the development of ‘People 
Housing’ and finally to ensure access for people with a low income to enable them to 
own or rent a house (Selangor, 2005, p. 5). Therefore, the State government has, 
since 1998, placed an emphasis on the provision of low cost housing in order to 
eliminate the squatters in line with the Federal government’s ‘Zero Squatters by 2005’ 
target (Selangor, 2003). In 1998, the total number of families living in squatter 
settlements across the state was 46,941, the highest in Malaysia. However, by the end 
of 2006, 44,165 squatter families, or 94.1 percent, had been relocated to public and 
private sector low cost housing (Selangor, 2006, p. 76).
The significant reduction in squatters from 1998 to 2006 in Selangor could not have 
been achieved without a private developer contribution. During the Seventh Malaysia 
Plan (1996-2000), a total of 28,000 units of low cost housing were planned for 
construction in the state of Selangor by both the public and private sector. At the end 
of the plan, the public and private sector had managed to complete the construction of 
85,642 units rather than the targeted number of low cost housing units in Selangor 
(MHLG, 2005). Similarly, during the Eighth Malaysia Plan (2001-2005), a total of 
85,929 low cost housing units were completed by the public and private sector, a 
considerably greater number than the 30,000 units planned by the State government. 
During both plans, more than 85 percent of the low cost housing units were provided 
by the private sector for homeownership. The market clearly played an important role 
compared to the public sector in low cost housing provision in Selangor. This therefore 
explains why the issue of low cost housing provision in Malaysia, and the State of 
Selangor in particular, is no longer related to housing production, but focuses on the 
housing consumption process.
The number of low cost houses built by the private and public sectors was more than 
enough to relocate all the squatters and meet the housing needs of people with a low 
income in general and squatters in particular (see Figure 7.1).
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Figure 7.1: Total Low Cost Housing Units Planned, Completed and Squatter 
Households During the Seventh and Eighth Malaysia Plans in Selangor 
Source: Seventh Malaysia Plan and Eighth Malaysia Plan, Selangor
Surprisingly, as of January 2006, not all squatters had been relocated into low cost 
housing, despite the huge supply available in the market. There are two possible 
reasons for this: firstly, they could not afford to buy low cost houses and, secondly, 
there was a mismatch between supply and demand. A mismatch between supply and 
demand was identified as the main reason for unsold low cost houses and the failure 
to relocate the remaining squatters, based on the study conducted by the State 
government (Selangor, 2003; Yunus, 2008). Despite state intervention through the 
implementation of ORS since 1997, the problem of mismatching and unsold low cost 
houses in Selangor still could not be solved. This therefore raises the question about 
the effectiveness of state intervention in the low cost housing registration and 
allocation system in Selangor.
In terms of housing tenure, Selangor experienced the highest decrease in private 
home ownership in Malaysia from 89.2 percent in 1991 to 68.3 percent in 2000 
(Department of Statistics Malaysia, 2001). This therefore indicated that more people 
rented houses in the state over those 10 years. Meanwhile, the National Housing 
Policy Study conducted by the MHLG in 2005 showed only 54 percent of the people
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owned their own houses in Selangor. Thus, more people depended on the rental 
market, provided by the state, private companies or by private owners. Nevertheless, 
public housing ownership by the State government shows a declining trend from 4.8 
percent in 1991 to 3.0 percent in 2000. Thus, this confirms the state had begun to 
retreat from overall housing provision. Furthermore, a study by Selangor Housing and 
Property Board (SHPB) in 2005 with regard to low cost housing revealed 50 percent of 
the occupants of low cost houses in the State of Selangor were tenants (Selangor, 
2005). The trend is worrying because low cost houses are targeted for owner 
occupation. It also meant that some buyers have more than one unit of housing in the 
state if they could rent out their low cost house.
The structure of low cost housing provision in Selangor from 1998 to 2005 was 
generally similar to other states in Malaysia. Both state and market were actively 
involved in low cost housing provision (see Figure 7.2) and the Federal and State 
governments focused on public low cost housing for rental under PHP and council 
homes. Although the Federal government was actively involved in low cost housing 
provision under PHP to eliminate the squatters, the number of houses built in Selangor 
was relatively low compared to other states in Malaysia. From 1998 to 2002, only 
4,884 units of low cost housing were built under PHP in Selangor or 9.3 percent of 
52,496 units planned nationwide. In addition to Federal government programmes, the 
State government of Selangor was also involved directly in the provision of low cost 
housing with the construction of 8,264 units of ‘Council Homes’ for rent in selected 
local authorities (Selangor 2006).
Housing matters in Selangor had been under the responsibility of SHPB since 2001. 
SHPB are responsible for the implementation of housing programmes and the 
allocation of low cost houses built by both public and private sectors, alongside the 
Federal government. The SHPB also managed all the rental low cost houses built by 
the Federal government under PHP and state owned Council Homes. Another 
important agency is the Selangor State Development Corporation (SSDC). From 1998, 
the corporation was transformed into a state owned company and run as a private 
company. The corporation no longer rely on the State government for funds and was 
allowed to sell houses at the market price, except for low cost houses. Despite 
corporatisation, the SSDC still focus on low cost housing provision, especially squatter 
relocation programmes with cooperation from the State government (Selangor 2005).
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Meanwhile, with regard to the market, low cost housing was largely provided by private 
housing developers. According to the Housing Development (Control and Licensing) 
Act 1966, a private housing developer “means any person, body of persons, company, 
firm or society (by whatever name described), who or which engages in or carries on or 
undertakes or causes to be undertaken a housing development.” Meanwhile, housing 
development “means to develop or construct or cause to be constructed in any manner 
whatsoever more than four units of housing accommodation and includes the collection 
of moneys or the carrying on of any building operations for the purpose of erecting 
housing accommodation in, on, over or under any land...”.
From 2001 to 2005, there were a total of 702 private housing developers registered in 
Selangor, of which 544 were small size developers, 87 medium size developers and 71 
large size developers (see Table 7.1). The size of housing developers in Malaysia were 
categorised based on the paid-up capital of the company as small (Less than RM3 
million), medium (RM3 million to RM10 million) and large (more than RM10 million) 
(REHDA 2007). However, 69 percent of the low cost house units in the state were built 
by large developers during the same period. This shows that the majority of low cost 
houses in Selangor were built by large companies. According to Yusof (2006, pp. 120), 
the large developers usually had the financial capability and owned large residential 
projects in highly strategic locations. This therefore allowed them to ‘cross-subsidise’ 
low cost housing developments with huge profits made from high cost developments 
within the project. Since 1998, the State of Selangor had adopted the ORS framework 
for the low cost house buyers’ registration and allocation process for both public and 
private sector low cost houses for sale.
Table 7.1: Total Private Housing Developers, No. of Developers and Total Low 
Cost Houses Approved According to Size in Selangor, 2001-2005
Total No. of 
Developers
No. of Developers 
Building Low Cost 
Houses
Total No. of Low Cost 
Houses Approved
Small Developers 544 83 9,803
Medium Developers 87 49 16,859
Large Developers 71 50 59,419
Total 702 182 86,081
Source: Ministry of Housing and Local Government (adopted from Yusof, 2006, p.120)
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7.3 LOW COST HOUSING ALLOCATION POLICY IN SELANGOR
There is no specific document which describes and explains the low cost housing 
allocation policy in the State of Selangor. Therefore, the information used for the 
analysis in this section derives from various sources including interview with a State 
government housing officer and publications by State government agencies, 
particularly the SHPB. The information was then used to identify the levels of the low 
cost housing allocation policy in Selangor (see Figure 7.3). The State government 
intervened and imposed an allocation policy on two levels, ethnic quota and squatter 
status. The policy applied to both public and private sector low cost housing 
development since 1998.
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Figure 7.3: Levels of the Low Cost Housing Allocation Policy in Selangor 
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At the first level, the State government imposed an ethnic quota for Bumiputera and 
non-Bumiputera. The practice was in line with the New Economy Policy (NEP) strategy 
implemented from 1971, regardless of the size or location of the project. Under state 
policy, 70 percent of the low cost houses were allocated to Bumiputera and the 
remaining 30 percent to non-Bumiputera (Selangor, 2005). The Selangor State Land 
and Mines Office (SLMO) were responsible for imposing and monitoring the 
implementation of the ethnic quota in the state. The State government of Selangor 
clearly used its power to impose a higher quota for Bumiputera rather than the 
minimum 30 percent quota recommended by the NEP. Although the imposition of the 
ethnic quota was important to achieve NEP objectives, the excessive number of units 
allocated to Bumiputera had several negative impacts on low cost housing 
development in the Selangor.
Firstly, the policy created an ethnic imbalance in some areas of the state, as reported 
in the Selangor Housing Blue-print Report (Selangor, 2005, p. 123). The blanket 70 
percent low cost housing units allocated to Bumiputera and not according to people’s 
housing needs did not contribute to ethnic integration. The report also highlights that 
the quota imposing a percentage according to race in housing developments in 
Selangor is no longer relevant and needs review. Even in the areas where the demand 
for low cost housing among the Bumiputera was very low, the State government still 
imposed the same low cost housing quota. However, information on the actual ethnic 
quota and homeownership for specific projects could not be obtained from the State 
government since the data is considered to be politically sensitive and highly 
confidential. Therefore, in reality, the figure could be higher than the minimum 70 
percent quota imposed by the State government.
Secondly, the quota reduced the chances of non-Bumiputera applicants who really 
needed low cost houses. The situation was largely caused by a limited number of units 
and greater competition among the non-Bumiputera, who comprised 46.5 percent of 
overall population (Department of Statistics Malaysia, 2001). Moreover, according to 
the Selangor Structure Plan Report (Selangor 2003), 65 percent of squatters were 
non-Bumiputera. In many countries with a multiethnic population, ethnic discrimination 
is unacceptable practice in housing allocation. In the United Kingdom, for example, the 
Race Relations Act 1976 places various duties on housing providers to eliminate 
ethnic discrimination and promote equality of opportunity (Blackaby and Chahal, 2000, 
p. 3). Therefore, local authorities have a legal obligation to ensure housing allocation is 
conducted in a way which eliminates discrimination and, at the same time, promotes
219
equality. Any ethnic or ethnic minority allocation policy is only decided upon 
consultation with the group involved. However, in Malaysia, the situation was rather 
different because the State government imposed the quota based on the national 
development agenda. Thus, the state played a crucial role in determining the ethnic 
distribution of the population in a particular area, rather than deciding according to the 
market or individual preferences. Even in countries with a multi-ethnic population like 
the United States and the United Kingdom, the state does not determine the minimum 
residential quota of low income housing for the majority white population instead of 
targeting the ethnic minority or black population (Boal, 2000).
Finally, private housing developers faced difficulties in selling low cost houses to 
Bumiputera buyers in selected areas. A study by Yunus (2005 p.70) revealed some 
private developers in Selangor faced these difficulties, particularly in urban fringes due 
to a lack of demand. The Bumiputera applicants were also spoiled for choice with 
regard to low cost houses available in the state. The imposition of the Bumiputera 
quota also meant direct state intervention in the low cost housing market and therefore 
went against neo-liberal practice.
Meanwhile, at the second level, the low cost housing allocation process was decided 
based on two different scenarios. In Scenario 1, when the low cost housing project 
was located in an area with squatters, 100 percent of the houses were allocated to 
squatters already identified by the local authority in the respective area. This is in line 
with State government policy to eliminate squatters. If there were any units leftover 
after allocation to squatters, the power to distribute the remaining units was given to 
the local State Assemblymen/women who are also politicians. Currently there is a total 
of 56 State Assemblymen/women in the State of Selangor. The SHPB, together with 
land offices across the state, were responsible for implementing and monitoring low 
cost housing allocation in the state. Surprisingly, there was no policy to indicate who 
would be offered the house by the State Assemblymen/women. Most likely the practice 
of ‘political houses’, described by Agus (1986) as when low cost units are offered to 
political party supporters as a reward, was still relevant. When responsibility was given 
to the politicians to offer the houses, this most likely exposed the allocation system to 
nepotism and corrupt practices. Some of the units could be offered to middle and high 
income people to buy. At the same time, it also denied the chances of people 
registered under ORS in the state who were really in need and who were eligible to 
buy a low cost house.
2 2 0
In Scenario 2, or a low cost housing project located in an area without squatters, fifty 
percent of the units were allocated for applicants registered under the state ORS. The 
buyers were identified from the applicants in the waiting list and offered the chance to 
purchase the house. Meanwhile, the remaining fifty percent of buyers were then 
identified by the Land Office, according to the State Assembly areas; the Land Office, 
through District Land Committee (DLC), was responsible for identifying the buyers. 
According to State Officer 1 interviewed, priority was given to people affected by 
natural disasters such as flooding, landslides and fire or who were affected by 
infrastructure development such as new highways and schools. The involvement of 
state Assemblymen/women in the committee shows the politicians were still very 
influential in the selection of low cost house buyers. The selection process also lacked 
transparency and was subject to manipulation by state officials and politicians.
The low cost house allocation policy in Selangor highlighted two main differences 
between State and Federal government intention. Firstly, the State government’s 
priority was to eliminate squatters. Therefore, regardless of squatters’ income or 
background, they were entitled to buy a low cost house. The main objective of the 
State government was to ensure that people in squatter moved into low cost houses. 
Squatters did not have to register with the State government to buy a low cost house; 
instead they were allocated a dwelling as part of squatter’s clearance programme and 
to improve the physical environment. In an area with squatters, people who registered 
with the ORS were totally denied the opportunity to buy a low cost house. In the 
meanwhile, when the Federal government introduced the ORS they wanted all low 
cost house buyers including squatters to register with the State government and 
undergo the selection process like other applicants. Furthermore, the squatters had 
been occupying state and private lands over the years without paying any taxes or 
rental. Thus, it was unfair to other people with a low income who lived in rented 
accommodation or an employer’s house.
Secondly, politicians continued to intervene in low cost housing allocation, particularly 
in areas without squatters. The politicians were still given the opportunity to allocate 
low cost houses without clear policy or guidelines from the State government. It was 
most likely that the house would end up being bought by middle and high income 
people with political connections. The practice therefore defeated the purpose of the 
ORS implementation by the Federal government to create a fairer and transparent 
allocation system. The discussion in the next section will focus on state intervention in 
the low cost housing allocation process under ORS in Selangor.
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7.4 THE LOW COST HOUSING REGISTRATION AND ALLOCATION PROCESS
UNDER ORS IN SELANGOR
The typical low cost housing registration and allocation process under the Sell and 
Build concept by the private sector involved ten key stages (see Figure 7.4). The 
process began with buyer registration and finished when the completed house was 
handed over to the buyers. It is important to identify the approximate duration of the 
process, since that determined the waiting time and difficulty faced by low cost house 
buyers registered with ORS. There were three key players in the low cost housing 
allocation process in Selangor: the State government, private housing developers and 
the house buyers. The diagram also shows various stages where the state intervened 
in the low cost housing allocation process.
The duration of each stage was identified based on information obtained from the 
SHPB, interviews with State government officers, housing developers and house 
buyers. The period for housing construction under the Sale and Build concept, 
however, was fixed by the government under the Housing Development (Control and 
Licensing) Act 1966 which stipulated 24 months for landed houses and 36 months for 
high rise houses. Although the process of housing allocation under ORS seemed 
straightforward, the length of time taken from the application stage to house 
completion was the main concern. Based on the approximate time taken at each 
stage, the total duration from application to moving into the house could have taken up 
to 77 months (six and a half years) not including delay during the construction stage. 
However, the duration could be shorter or longer subject to the house buyer’s period 
on the waiting list.
The low cost house buying process was generally similar to that of medium and high 
cost housing, except the buyers had to register with the State government of Selangor 
rather than go directly to private housing developer to buy the house. The people who 
intended to buy the low cost house had to submit their application form to the SHPB 
directly or land offices across the state for stage 1. In stage 2, the SHPB or District 
office received the application form from the applicant. They checked immediately to 
ensure the applicant fulfilled all the pre-conditions for the application i.e. citizenship, 
household income and age. If the applicant did not fulfil the requirements and failed to 
complete the necessary information for the form, the application was rejected. Upon 
acceptance of the submitted form, the applicant was given a registration reference 
number.
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In stage 3, the state computerised system began to process the application forms and 
award the points according to the criteria set by the State government. The results 
were issued immediately and the applicants were sorted according to the points 
awarded and area requested (in terms of district, sub-district and town). Meanwhile, in 
stage 4, after the sorting was completed, the applicant list was forwarded to the State 
Selection Committee for endorsement. Once endorsed by the State Selection 
Committee, the applicants’ names were kept on the ‘waiting list’ in stage 5. Since the 
low cost housing provision in the private sector was beyond the control of State 
government, nobody was certain of the duration of the waiting list. The State 
government was less concerned about the duration, since they were not obliged to 
provide accommodation or financial assistance for people on the waiting list. This is 
typical in a developmental state, where civil society is considered to be weak by 
bureaucrats. In general, the selection process under ORS was more transparent and 
suffered less interference from politicians and top State government officials compared 
to the list produced by the land office.
The involvement of private housing developers in low cost housing allocation was 
limited to requesting the list of eligible buyers from the State government (stage 6). 
Private housing developers requested a list of eligible buyers after obtaining building 
plan approval for low cost housing development. After receiving the list of eligible low 
cost house buyers from the State government, the developer contacted the applicants 
to finalise the purchase. In stage 7, the State government provided the list of eligible 
buyers to the private housing developer when they started low cost housing 
development. At the same time, the State government issued ‘offer letters’ to selected 
applicants from the waiting list.
Since the houses were built for home ownership, the State government and housing 
developers were not in a position to force applicants to buy low cost houses (stage 8). 
After visiting the project site and obtaining the additional information from the housing 
developer, the applicants then decided whether to continue with the house purchase or 
not. The applicant could decline the offer and their name would be placed back on the 
waiting list. The final decision to purchase was also subject to the ability of the 
applicant to pay the 10 percent deposit and obtain financing from a financial institution 
for the remaining 90 percent of the purchase price. Thus, the allocation of houses for 
sale was far more complicated than those for rent, since there were a lot of factors to 
be considered before buying a house. Even if the project was located within the
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preferred location, other factors such as the developer reputation, the type of house 
and the low cost location within the project would also determine buyer interest. When 
the construction was completed, the buyers would receive the house keys from the 
private housing developer. Once all the available low cost house units were sold, only 
at that point would the housing developer start the construction stage (stage 9). 
Although securing home finance was the responsibility of house buyers, in practice the 
developers would provide assistance to buyers to obtain a loan from financial 
institutions. Finally, in stage 10, upon completion of building construction, the house 
was handed over to the house buyers.
The lengthy low cost housing registration and allocation process clearly had direct 
consequences for the house buyers. In order to analyse the intended and unintended 
consequences of state intervention in low cost housing allocation, a low cost housing 
project in Selangor known as Sri Meranti Low Cost House Apartments in Bandar Sri 
Damansara Selangor was selected for the detailed study.
BACKGROUND TO SRI MERANTI LOW COST HOUSE APARTMENTS
Sri Meranti Low Cost Apartments are located in the north-west of Bandar Sri 
Damansara; the development of the Sri Meranti low cost house development began in 
June 1999 on 81.12 acres of land (see Table 7.2). A total of 1,964 units were approved 
by the Petaling Jaya City Council (PJCC) for five-storey walk up apartments (see 
Figures 7.5 and 7.6). According to data obtained from the PJCC, the low cost housing 
development in Sri Meranti was the largest in Petaling Jaya developed by the private 
sector. However, with a density of 24 units per acre, Sri Meranti Low Cost Apartments 
is still considered to be a medium density development, although it is located in a 
strategic area of Klang Valley. As part of the integrated township development, it also 
has excellent facilities, therefore justifying why Sri Meranti Low Cost Apartments 
become sought after property among people with a low income and property 
speculators.
Table 7.2: Background to Sri Meranti Low Cost Apartments
Development Commenced 1999
Completion 2004 (delay of 2 years and 1 month)
Total Units 1,964
Land Area / Density 81 acres / 24 units per acre
Population Approx. 9,034 people
Source: Sri Damansara Sdn Bhd, 2008
According to Schedule H of the Housing Developers (Control and Licensing) Act 1966, 
the maximum period for high rise housing construction should not take more than 36 
months. Therefore, the original completion date of the house should have been June 
2002. However, due to problems faced during the construction stage, the houses were 
only completed in July 2004 after a delay of 2 years and 1 month. Sri Meranti Low 
Cost Apartments were eventually completed and handed over to buyers after 5 years 
and 1 month. The delay, according to the developer, was due to technical problems 
faced during the construction using new technology. Delays or abandonment of 
housing construction are common problem in Malaysia under the ‘sell and build’ 
concept, particularly when private housing developers are involved (Dahlan, 2009). 
The impact is severe for people with a low income who are buying low cost houses 
since they still have to pay the monthly mortgage to the bank even if the house is 
incomplete or abandoned.
However, the floor area for the low cost house apartments in Sri Meranti was 60.4 m2, 
smaller than the size recommended by the Construction Industry Development Board 
of Malaysia at 63 m2 (CIDB, 1998). Other than that, the development of the low cost 
houses in Sri Meranti exceeded the building and planning standards set by the CIDB 
(see Figures 7.7 and 7.8). With quality housing provided both in terms of building and 
the facilities within the well-planned township, the price of RM 42,000 was clearly well 
below market price. Meanwhile, the medium and high cost housing was well above at 
RM 100,000 per unit within the township.
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Bandar Sri Damansara low cost housing development also shows the concept of 
‘cross-subsidy’ with medium/high cost housing worked well for big developments by an 
established developer. Thus, big private housing developers still continued to play an 
important role in low cost housing provision in Malaysia after the 1970s (see Johnston, 
1979; Sirat et al., 1998; Yusof, 2007). Although the developer faced several problems 
during the construction stage, they still managed to complete the house construction 
after two years delay. Without financial support from the parent company, it is difficult 
for the developer to complete a project in these circumstances due to huge cost 
increases.
No information on ethnic data or a detailed buyers list for the Sri Meranti development 
could be obtained from the housing developer or the State government. Both 
developer and State government consider the data to be highly confidential and 
believe it should be kept from public knowledge to avoid any controversy or prevent it 
from being used by political parties to attack government policy. However, the 
information obtained from the Sri Meranti Low Cost Apartments residents’ association, 
based on their survey, indicated that more than 90 percent of the residents are 
Bumiputera. Through observations during fieldwork, public facilities provided in the 
area particularly the size of mosque and large number of Bumiputera’s restaurants in 
the area suggested that the majority of the residents are Bumiputera. In terms of low 
cost housing allocation, according to the developer of Bandar Sri Damansara, the 
development was located in an area without squatters. Therefore, the allocation policy 
was based on Scenario 2 in which 50 percent of buyers were selected from a list 
provided by the state ORS and the remaining 50 percent came from the Petaling 
District Land Office.
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7.6 STATE GOVERNMENT INTERVENTION IN THE LOW COST HOUSING
ALLOCATION PROCESS AND ITS CONSEQUENCES
The main intention of the Federal government when it established ORS was to 
encourage people with a low income to register and eventually be offered the chance 
to buy a low cost house by the State government if eligible. However, the state’s 
intervention in the low cost house buying process, particularly in the market, 
produced several unintended consequences. The experiences of low cost house 
buyers who are registered and those who are not registered under the ORS provide a 
different perspective on the outcome of state intervention in housing allocation. The 
interview with low cost house buyers registered with the ORS brought the unintended 
consequences of state intervention to light.
Firstly, the ORS contributed to difficulties among people with a low income who 
wished to buy a low cost house. The fact that most people with a low income in 
Malaysia are not well educated and depend on government assistance to buy a low 
cost house is well documented in many previous studies (see Salleh, 1998; Sirat et 
al., 1999; MHLG, 1999). Therefore, excessive registration procedures and allocation 
control by the State government actually made it difficult for that group to buy low 
cost houses compared to people in a higher income bracket. All people with a low 
income who intended to buy a low cost house had to obtain a registration form at the 
price of RM2.00 per form from the SHPB Office in Shah Alam or from one of twelve 
District Offices across the state. The applicant then had to complete a complicated 
registration form and attach to it the additional documents required by the State 
government such as a national identity card, birth certificate, salary slip, marriage 
certificate and medical status report. The application form then had to be endorsed 
by the Commissioner for Oaths or Head of Department for Government Servants. 
Once completed, the form could only be submitted at the SHPB Office or District 
Offices.
Despite modernisation and computerisation, the applicants still had to submit the 
form in-person to these offices as required under ORS procedure. An interview with 
low cost house buyers reveals some of the difficulties faced when submitting the form 
or dealing with State government housing officers, as follows:
"... so many rules and regulations when I purchased the low cost house 
in 1999. They said you must arrive before 11.00 am (to the SUK’s office) 
so go out as early as 5.00 am. They are really double standard when
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dealing with us the low income people as if we really desperate to buy 
the house. So they can do whatever they like such as asking the 
employer confirmation letter and pay slip just to get the application form. 
The form also held by somebody and if want it you must see this officer. 
Then they asked for your identity card. They found out I come from state 
of Perak. I have to change the identity card since they not allowed 
people from outside Selangor (to buy the house)...” (Buyer 4, male, aged 
39 who works as a fish seller in Kuala Lumpur).
Buyer 4 also had to change the address in his national identity card in order to be 
able to purchase a low cost house in the State of Selangor. Since his previous 
address was in the neighbouring state of Perak, the officer in-charge did not even 
allow him to buy the application form. Although ORS policy clearly stated the State 
government must accept applications from people with a low income, in practice 
some State government officers could deny buyers from other states the chance to 
register in Selangor, thus denying people from other states in Malaysia the 
opportunity to buy a low cost house in Selangor. Meanwhile, for some people with a 
low income, access to the registration centre was a major concern, based on the 
experiences of Buyer 2:
“... as a low cost house buyer we have to face many problems when 
dealing with the state such as waiting time to see them, how to travel to 
the office and various state bureaucracy. The state should give low cost 
house buyers easier and less bureaucratic access when dealing with 
them. We don’t want bureaucracy and we have to refer here and there. 
That’s make our life difficult...” (Buyer 2, male, aged 41 who works as a 
general labour in Petaling Jaya).
The state’s intention to control the low cost house buying process through ORS was 
to ensure only eligible people could buy low cost houses. However, in reality most 
buyers interviewed found excessive state control discouraged people from registering 
with the state. It is common in many developing countries for the state to control low 
income housing allocation, but in Malaysia the state imposed strict procedures on the 
buyers in this group. They also had difficulty in dealing with private housing 
developers due to a lack of knowledge about the house buying process. Meanwhile, 
some of the salespeople in private housing development companies treated the low 
cost house buyers differently from medium and high cost house buyers.
Secondly, the State government failed to match demand for and supply of low cost 
housing according to buyers’ preference. The interview revealed that many buyers 
were offered a chance to purchase a house outside their preferred location. The
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problem emerged because the State government had no control over low cost 
housing development by the private sector in terms of quantity, location and timing. 
Thus, it was difficult for the State government to match demand for and supply of low 
cost housing. Furthermore, housing supply does not respond quickly to changes in 
demand and the stock is immobile to meet demand in other locations (Lund, 2006, 
p.7). Due to high land costs, most private housing developers in Selangor preferred 
to build low cost houses in urban fringes and new growth areas (Yusof, 2006, p. 122). 
Therefore, the houses were often located very far from the existing town and 
available jobs.
As explained by Payne (1977, p.78), land is always a main factor to determine the 
location of low income housing in developing countries and “speculation frequently 
gives it distorted and artificial value...” Furthermore for people with a low income, 
location is the most important factor to take into consideration before buying a low 
cost house. As explained by Payne (1977 p.54), people with a low income require a 
house near their workplace in order to maximise access to employment. Meanwhile, 
rich people usually have “more resources to apply either to transport cost or obtaining 
in whatever location it choose”. Thus, matching supply and demand for low cost 
houses is always a difficult task due to the nature of the low cost housing provision 
system in Malaysia under the ‘sell and build’ concept. In social rented housing in 
Western welfare state countries, the state only manages the allocation of existing 
housing stock, but in Malaysia the allocation is based on future stock. In addition to 
that, the houses allocated in Malaysia are for home ownership and not rental.
Some of the buyers interviewed revealed that they were initially offered a house 
which was not in the area requested on the application form. However, after 
submitting appeals to the State government, they were finally offered the opportunity 
to buy a house in Sri Meranti. Below are some of responses received from house 
buyers when asked about the offer they received from the State government to 
purchase a low cost house:
“...SUK (state) offered in other place at Bukit Raja, I work in Kuala
Lumpur, I don’t want to live in Bukit Raja..." (Buyer 9, aged 38 and
working as a production operator in Kuala Lumpur).
(Note: distance from Bukit Raja to Petaling Jaya = 30 km)
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“....communication with the buyers must be right, if we work in PJ 
(Petaling Jay a) and get the offer in Rawang, I don’t think it appropriate. 
Burden to the buyers...” (Buyer 12, aged 38 and working as a clerk in 
Petaling Jaya).
(Note: distance from Rawang to Petaling Jaya = 37 km)
Both buyers 9 and 12 were offered a house more than 30 km from their existing 
workplace in a new growth area located north of Klang Valley. The distance from their 
workplace could have increased their transportation costs and many of these areas 
often had poor public transportation services.
Meanwhile, due to the unavailability or insufficient number of low cost houses in 
certain districts in the state, the applicants were also being offered houses in 
neighbouring districts. The problem arises when some of the applicants are forced to 
purchase a house in the area offered by the State government. Despite the fact that 
there is no official policy on how many times applicants could decline offers to 
purchase low cost houses from the state, they were threatened by State government 
officers and told they should accept the offer or they might not have the chance again 
in the future to buy a low cost house, as described by Buyer 2:
"... I feel cheated (by State government) when they offered me (house) 
in Rawang. We never asked for that place. We work around this area in 
Selangor (Petaling Jaya). Travelling cost already half of our salary. 
When we protest they said, if you don’t want the house we are not going 
to offer again in the future. Reluctantly we just accept the offer...” (Buyer 
2, male, aged 41 and working as a general labour in Petaling Jaya).
However, no policy document or guidelines for the ORS mentioned any negative 
consequences for the buyers if they decided to decline the offer. Thus, the action 
taken by the state housing officer was more likely an attempt to quickly clear people 
from the state low cost housing waiting list. Furthermore, the increase in the price 
ceiling for low cost housing in 1998 also contributed to oversupply and most people 
with a low income became choosier in terms of location:
"... the situation is different before Sri Damansara. Sales of low cost 
house before that just like the ‘hot fried banana’. After Sri Damansara, 
price of low cost house already increase to RM42,000 and the house 
available everywhere. So we can choose where to buy unlike before that 
if the state send to Rawang people still want it because the price is 
RM25,000 people don’t mind as long they get the house...” (Buyer 4, 
male, aged 39 and working as a fish seller in Kuala Lumpur).
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Before the introduction of the new price structure in 1998, most buyers were less 
concerned about the location of the low cost house offered to them by the State 
government because the price was relatively low at RM25,000 per unit. The ceiling 
price increase in 1998 encouraged many private developers to begin low cost 
housing construction. Thus, buyers not only had to pay a higher price, but were also 
spoilt for choice since many houses were available on the market. Nevertheless, Sri 
Meranti low cost houses still enjoyed great demand due their location and medium 
density development. In contrast, many private housing developers struggled to sell 
low cost houses, especially in suburban, rural areas and new growth centres during 
the same period (Yunus, 2008, p. 134).
The low income housing market was clearly more complicated than the State 
government thought. The decision to purchase a low cost house involved many 
factors such as the reputation of the housing developer, the influence of friends and 
family and the community, in addition to usual factors such as location and financing. 
The State government’s assumption regarding the needs and preferences of house 
buyers most likely went wrong. Thus, this confirmed the neo-liberal belief that state 
intervention in the housing market not only generates problems, but is also inefficient 
in terms of the production and consumption process (Lund, 2006, p.5).
Finally, the ORS increased the buying period for low cost houses. The problem was 
mainly caused by the duration of the waiting list. In some cases, low cost housing 
applicants had to wait for up to three years before the State government could offer 
them a house. As described by Buyer 3, when asked about his experience buying a 
low cost house in Bandar Sri Damansara:
“...I have to wait for three years. After three year only I received the offer 
letter (from the State government)... construction 3 years, in 1999 signed 
the SPA, in 2004 only the house completed. Meaning 5 plus 3 years 
become 8 years...” (Buyer 3, Male, aged 43 and working as a salesman 
in Kuala Lumpur)
The practices in the low cost housing consumption process took a very long time, 
which was partly caused by low cost housing provision through the ‘sell and build’ 
concept. The house construction alone could take at least three years if there was no 
delay or abandonment along the way. In the case of the Sri Meranti low cost housing 
project, two years delay in housing construction increased the total period of house
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completion to five years. With such a long waiting period, clearly low cost housing 
was not targeted at people with an immediate need for a house, but rather people 
who were currently renting their house or living with their parents. Among the 
problems highlighted by the low cost house buyers (interview with Buyer 3) in the 
waiting list was the fact that they still had to rent a house while waiting for an offer 
from the State government. Similarly, during the period of housing construction, they 
had to pay for monthly rental and a mortgage for the low cost house, even though the 
project was affected by delays.
Meanwhile, the experiences of buyers who were not registered with the ORS shows 
they skipped most of the lengthy and strict selection process imposed by the State 
government. The question is: how they could buy a house directly from the 
developers without first registering with the state? The explanation given by Buyer 1 
and Buyer 10 partly answered the question:
“...actually I am not registered anywhere. I know this project (Sri 
Meranti) from the beginning. So I go directly to the developer office. I 
asked whether there’s any unit available. They said if I pay 10 percent 
(deposit) tomorrow I can buy the house. I just pay the 10 percent and 
get the house, that it...” (Buyer 1, Male, aged 38 and working as a 
technician in Kuala Lumpur).
“...I don’t register... I work with the Bank which give loan for this 
housing project. I got to know the project from that...” (Buyer 10,
Male, aged 30 and working as a bank clerk in Petaling Jaya).
Buyer 1 ’s experience shows that buyers could go directly to the housing developer’s 
office to buy a low cost house and register with the State government under ORS at a 
later stage. With regard to the private housing developer, as long the buyer was 
committed to buy the house and willing to pay the deposit, there was no reason for 
them not to sell the house. The developer could still arrange the registration of buyers 
with the state ORS once they had paid the 10 percent deposit before signing the 
sales and purchase agreement. This practice was sometimes used by private 
housing developers with the blessing of the State government for low cost housing 
projects located in undesirable areas or in areas with an insufficient number of people 
registered (Interview with a state government officer). However, it was unusual for a 
project located in a strategic area like Sri Meranti to use the this approach to sell low 
cost houses.
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Meanwhile since Buyer 10 worked with the bank which provided financing for the 
project, that means people who had a working relationship with the developers could 
also have bought the low cost houses. Interestingly, when he bought the house in 
1999, the buyer was only aged 21 and was still single. Since Buyer 1 and Buyer 10 
were unwilling to share their detailed experiences of how they bought their houses 
without registering with the state, the researcher began to look for other buyers who 
were willing to share his/her experience. After the interview with the former employee 
of Sri Damansara Sdn Bhd (Ex-Housing Developer 1), which was responsible for 
dealing with the land office and State government during the project implementation 
in 1999, he then introduced the researcher to a buyer who was willing to share his 
experience but not to reveal his identity.
According to the buyer, he managed to buy a low cost housing unit in Sri Meranti 
after paying RM500 to an agent linked to the housing developer. Since Sri 
Damansara Sdn Bhd is a subsidiary of a company listed on the Kuala Lumpur Stock 
Exchange, it is therefore unlikely the company would accept any form of payment 
from individuals for house purchase. However, the company employees could misuse 
their power to accept money or bribes from individuals and, in return, allow them to 
buy a low cost house or houses. Thus shows corruption in the low cost housing 
allocation practice still could happen in Malaysia, despite various improvements and 
modernisations implemented by the government under the ORS.
7.7 THE LOW COST HOUSE BUYERS’ VIEWS ON THE ROLE OF THE STATE AND 
MARKET IN LOW COST HOUSING ALLOCATION
Sri Meranti low cost house buyers hold conflicting views on who is supposed to 
handle low cost housing allocation. While some house buyers interviewed believed 
the state should be directly involved in low cost housing allocation, the other group of 
buyers rejected the idea. Despite the fact that more house buyers who were 
interviewed prefer the market to control low cost housing allocation, the issue is still 
subject to continuous debate. The proponents of the state’s role in low cost housing 
allocation gave three reasons why the state should continue to control low cost 
housing allocation.
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Firstly, private housing developers could not be trusted in low cost housing allocation. 
As described by Buyers 12 and 13 below, when asked who is supposed to handle 
low cost housing allocation:
"... if private (developers) handle, better if I give to my family member,
20 units each. Because I work with private housing developer the 
priority is to my family member. Nothing to do with the state, no 
monitoring from the government...” (Buyer 12, male, aged 38 and 
working as a clerk in Petaling Jaya).
“...under current practice, some of ineligible house buyers even 
managed to purchase the house through the developer’s
salesperson...” (Buyer 13, male, aged 38 and working as a computer 
salesman in Kuala Lumpur).
Clearly, some buyers doubted the private housing developers’ sincerity and
transparency when dealing with house buyers. Housing developers don’t really care 
who the buyers are as long as they can sell the houses and make a profit. The
problem, according to buyers, is also caused by the individuals working in housing
developers’ companies. They obviously will take the opportunity to sell the houses to 
their family members, friends and relatives if allowed to do so. Thus, cronyism and 
corruption eventually flourish in the system which clearly will not benefit the poor.
Secondly, the buyers argued the State government must take the responsibility to 
ensure only people with a low income own low cost houses. Since many people with 
a low income still do not own a house, the state should ensure this group is not 
forgotten in the creation of a home owning society. Through ORS, the State 
government can at least can control and monitor low cost housing allocation more 
effectively, as described by Buyer 3 and 4:
“...although difficult, at least we know who are the buyers and they are 
eligible or not...” (Buyer 3, a salesman working in Kuala Lumpur).
"... without the system (ORS) we don’t know (who are the buyers). 
Without SUK (state) monitoring, if  you got money you can buy. Those 
people who are really need a house don’t get it...” (Buyer 4, a fish seller 
working in Kuala Lumpur).
Competition between people with a low income and the higher income groups means 
state intervention is required in low cost housing allocation. Malaysia’s past
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experience shows that when people in the low income group fail to obtain a house in 
the formal sector they will end up living in the slums or squatter settlements. 
Therefore, registration under ORS will encourage people to buy a house in the formal 
housing sector.
Thirdly, the buyers claimed they needed government involvement due to difficulties 
dealing with private housing developers. Many people with a low income still face 
difficulty in dealing with private housing developers directly. Poor knowledge of the 
property buying process including legal and financial aspects require State 
government assistance. The need for State government involvement is important in 
the event that there are delays in the housing construction, as happened to the 
buyers in the Sri Damansara low cost housing project. They believe the state will 
provide assistance and resolve any issues with the housing developer.
Meanwhile, the proponents of market allocation highlighted five main reasons why 
the market should handle low cost housing allocation. Firstly, they questioned the 
need for them to register with the state under ORS if private housing developers still 
treated them just like any other home buyers. Under the Housing Development Act 
2001, low cost housing buyers need to pay a 10 percent deposit and to obtain 
financing from a private financial institution without any subsidy from the government. 
They don’t see any benefit in registering with the government if no special privileges 
are given to them. The responses received from the house buyers when asked about 
the issues include:
"... there is no different buying through ORS or not. If ORS establish by 
the government, the 10percent deposit should be abolish. With ORS the 
government should not ask people to pay the 10 percent. Low income 
people don’t have money but still have to pay 10 percent deposit. To find 
the 10 percent is our main problem...” (Buyer 1, a technician working in 
Kuala Lumpur).
"... If you pay 10 percent, better you directly to developer because you 
still have to pay...” (Buyer 9, Male, aged 38 and working as a production 
operator in Kuala Lumpur).
"... we should buy direct from the developer, no need for ORS. If 
government really wanted to establish ORS, then there is no need to pay 
the 10 percent (deposit)...” (Buyer 11, male, aged 34 and working as a 
production operator in Petaling Jaya).
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Clearly, most low cost buyers faced difficulty in finding the 10 percent deposit before 
signing the sales and purchase agreement. When they registered with the State 
government they expected some privileges would be given to them such as a lower 
(or no) deposit when making the house purchase. The situation is rather typical of 
many developing countries, as described by Purewal (2000) based on his study of 
housing access in India. In order to find decent accommodation, the buyers must 
have monetary savings, steady incomes and also ‘the privilege of contacts’ in order 
to afford or access adequate housing.
Secondly, some buyers felt they were treated poorly by the State government under 
the ORS. The low cost house applicants believed they would be offered a house 
immediately by the state, but that is not the case in Malaysia. Some buyers had to 
wait for up to four years on the waiting list, as described by Buyer 13:
"... from my opinion, ORS was established to register low cost house 
buyers, registered with SUK (state). When you registered, it takes 3 to 4 
years to get the house. Problem, that a long time. But if you buy direct 
from developer you don’t have to wait 3 to 4 years...”
The waiting time was 3-4 years before the construction began. Many of the low cost 
house buyers would have preferred to go directly to the housing developers when 
construction had already started. House buyers revealed their experience that the 
developer would do anything to sell low cost house units, as described by Buyer 13:
"... from my experience buying low cost house, I know from the 
newspaper. I go straight to developer’s office to pay the deposit, look at 
the pictures, and models. Then pay the 10 percent deposit. After that, 
they ask us to ballot to determine the house unit. That's all. After paying 
the 10percent deposit then only they ask whether you have registered 
with SUK (state). If yet to register with SUK they will ask us to register...”
Instead of asking for any proof of prospective buyer’s eligibility, the developers 
insisted the buyers had to pay the 10 percent deposit to confirm the purchase. The 
buyers were then asked to sign the declaration form by the developers to ensure they 
registered with the state. The declaration form included a clause that, in the event the 
buyer failed to get approval from the state to buy a low cost house, the developer 
would refund the deposit after deducting all the administration charges. Since they 
had already paid the 10 percent deposit before submitting the application to the state, 
this put the State government under pressure to approve the application. This so 
called ‘fast track’ application process could deny the opportunity of a house purchase
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to people on the waiting list. Furthermore, those buyers who had already committed 
to purchase a house would do anything to ensure the application was approved by 
the state, including submitting false information to the state. According to the housing 
developers who were interviewed, the State government thus far has taken no action 
to charge people who cheat in the low cost house buying process.
Thirdly, according to some buyers, the low cost housing allocation process is too 
political. Politicians still have control of the allocation process, despite the 
implementation of ORS. The buyers believed that the politicians could change the 
rules and abuse the system for their own benefit. Although the issue of politicians’ 
involvement in housing allocation is not new in Malaysia, as highlighted by Agus 
(1986, 1992), the practice still continues today, thus reducing the confidence of the 
public and market with regard to low cost allocation practice in the state.
The fourth reason is that the State government, also according to most buyers, is not 
sensitive to location preferences. Buyers clearly state their preference of two choices 
of location on the application form. Nevertheless, the interviews with house buyers 
revealed that many of them were still offered a low cost house in an undesirable 
location. The house was still located within the State of Selangor or the same district 
as requested, but for people with a low income house location is a highly sensitive 
issue. When making the application under the ORS, the buyers have no idea where 
they will be offered a low cost house by the State government.
Finally, the buyers also feel many of the State government officers who handle the 
ORS are not sincere and are corrupt. Some of the buyers interviewed still don’t 
understand why there are so many people who own more than one low cost house if 
the system works and the people who handle the system are sincere. The state 
officers also seem to give priority to people with political connections, regardless of 
whether they are eligible or not to buy a low cost house, as described by Buyer 10:
"... The system could be manipulated. Some people with higher income 
can purchase. ThaVs mean the government system is not transparent.
Low cost house are supposed for low income people but some people 
involved with politic also can get the house although their income is 
higher. There are people still live in squatter. Some of this people rent 
the house they bought, and they live in other place. So how we can 
ensure low income people will own the house?” (Buyer 10, bank clerk 
working in Petaling Jaya).
The same argument was also supported by the Federal Government Officer 1. 
Sometimes the problem with ORS implementation at the state level is caused by
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unethical State government officers. Therefore it is difficult to ensure only eligible 
buyers can buy a low cost house in the state, as described by Federal Government
Officer 1:
"... what really happen there are unethical people involved in the system 
operation. So they can delete or amend the applicant’s information and 
make the house buyers are so desperate now...”
7.8 PRIVATE HOUSING DEVELOPERS’ VIEWS ON LOW COST HOUSING 
ALLOCATION
The private housing developers have conflicting views over whether they should take 
over the responsibility to allocate low cost houses from the State government. 
Analysis of the interviews clearly indicates some housing developers are not 
: - epared to allocate low cost housing for the low income people due to several 
reasons. Firstly, there is an understanding among housing developers that the State 
government has to provide a list of low cost house buyers as part of the 20 percent 
low cost unit quota imposed by the state for private housing development. The policy 
aims to provide access for people with a low income to own a house as part of a 
poverty eradication strategy. Whilst the 20 percent quota for low cost houses is still in 
place, the State government will continue its role with the provision of an eligible 
buyers list to housing developers. Thus, it shows a willingness among housing 
developers to help the State government to achieve its social policy objectives.
Secondly, the private housing developers are also not in the position to check house 
buyer eligibility in terms of authority and capacity. As described by Developer 1:
"... maybe difficult because we sell house at the price of RM42,000, 
people sure will rush in. After that, without SUK interference we have to 
decide who will decide who is eligible or not, how are we going to do?
We need to set up a committee to liaise with these people to check their 
eligibility. We have to check their income, payslip and other to determine 
their eligibility. But now people can adjust their payslip. So it better for 
SUK to handle it. If SUK to handle, their purpose is to eliminate squatter 
and ensure everybody got access to housing although it small. Let SUK 
continue with the system and not hand over it to the developers.”
They believe that, without state intervention, it would be difficult for private housing 
developers to determine eligibility among house buyers. As described by Developer 
2, even with the government’s strict control, house buyers are still willing to take the 
risk of buying a low cost house with fake documents and false information, even
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though they know the consequences. The situation could be even worse if the 
developers themselves handle the selection of buyers and allocation. However the 
third orivate housing developer interviewed, Developer 3, believed the private sector 
is capable of handling housing allocation for people with a low income without state 
intervention if given more power and freedom. Private developers in Malaysia 
arguably look forward to a free market without state intervention in low cost housing 
provision and allocation.
Thirdly, the housing developers try to avoid the risk of finding sufficient low cost 
house buyers for their project. Unlike medium and high income earners, people with 
a low income are not interested in buying a house which is far from cities or job 
centres. With the state policy imposing a 20 percent low cost house quota regardless 
of the project location, some developers will face problems finding buyers. The ORS 
will provide them with a ‘ready buyer list’ and they can turn to the State government if 
there are still not enough house buyers. Besides, not all people with a low income are 
aware of the location of low cost housing projects in the state; therefore, the state 
becomes the middleman between the people and housing developers. Thus, in 
general, housing developers are still not ready to provide and allocate low cost 
housing themselves since it is a socially and politically sensitive issue. However, if 
more power is given to private housing developers in relation to low cost housing 
provision with less State government intervention, then the market might be willing to 
take over the role from the state.
7.9 THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN STATE AND MARKET IN LOW COST HOUSING 
ALLOCATION IN SELANGOR
The analysis in this section is based on the relationship between the state 
government and private housing developers with regard to low cost housing 
allocation in Sri Meranti Low Cost House Apartments. However, the discussion will 
also include views from other private housing developers involved in low cost housing 
provision in the State of Selangor in order to gain a wider picture of the state-market 
relationship in low cost housing allocation.
Despite strict government controls, most private housing developers interviewed 
enjoyed a very good relationship with the State government. For example, in terms of 
low cost housing allocation, the State government will ensure there are sufficient
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buyers for the houses. The assistance given by the state is not just limited to 
providing a list of buyers, but also encompasses other matters related to low cost 
housing provision, as explained by State government Officer 1:
"... Our (state) priority is to provide list of name. Meaning that all the 
developers planned to build and sell low cost house must obtain name 
list from us. We will provide the name. Secondly, we give assistance for 
the house sale. If developers faced problem to obtain house buyers, we 
will organise an open day for buyers registration together with 
developers. Meaning that, we will work together and promote the project 
with developers. On that day potential house buyers can register with us.
Then we will check their eligibility immediately and bring back to head 
office and double check, process and offer them the house. We have no 
problem doing the promotion together with housing developers. We will 
help in the promotion. If developers faced the technical problem during 
low cost house construction with any state departments, we also offer 
our help. They can tell us what is the problem? We will help on that. If 
developers still having problem to obtain the buyers, we can loosen 
some of the eligibility criteria and try our best to help them...”
This explains why housing developers are still keen to provide low cost housing, 
although the market is tightly controlled by the state. In the event that the buyers list 
is still not adequate, the State government will do all the necessary tasks to ensure 
there are enough buyers for the project. This includes conducting a registration drive 
with housing developers and, to an extent, modifying the eligibility criteria. Most 
housing developers interviewed were also satisfied with the process of obtaining the 
list of eligible buyers from the State government, as described by Developer 2:
“...we don’t have much problem...from my experience working here, we 
don’t have any problem to get the name from the State government 
because they can provide. So we don’t take long time to sell low cost 
house...”
However, several issues could undermine the relationship between the State 
government and private housing developers. The first is the delays in obtaining a list 
of buyers from the State government, which will definitely affect the sale and 
construction of low cost houses, which eventually makes the waiting time longer for 
the house buyers. Clearly the State government is having difficulty providing an 
adequate list of low cost house buyers, particularly for bigger projects, as described 
by Developer 1:
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“...let say we want to launch 400 units sometimes they cannot give 400 
at one time so they will give in batches. First batch maybe around 100 
names and few months later another batch with additional 100 names.
So in one parcel we need around 4-5 times soft launching...”
The State government is also not obligated to provide a list of eligible applicants 
within a certain time frame to housing developers. Since the State government does 
not suffer any penalty or cost, there is no need for them to provide the list 
immediately. Therefore, it is the private housing developers and house buyers who 
eventually suffer due to the delay. The second reason is a lack of adequate buyers in 
some low cost housing projects. Thus, the low cost houses built by private housing 
developers are not based on actual demand in a particular area. If the developers 
were informed of the total number of applicants for the area by the State government, 
the oversupply of low cost houses would not happen. As explained by State 
government Officer 1:
"... In some projects, particularly in very far location and low demand, we 
give them (developer) name list. At the same time, the person we 
offered might be not interested. When they visit the project they are not 
interested, not their choice of location, but we cannot force them to buy.
We tried to help developers, but not all the people in the list requested 
house in that particular area. When they visit the project and found the 
house located at further back they sometimes refuse to buy. Since they 
applied house for ownership, so we cannot force them to buy...”
At the same time, the State government also has difficulty in controlling low cost 
housing construction by the private sector. Although the state’s housing policy 
indicates that low cost house construction should take place in the early phase of 
development, it is still subject to decisions made by the developers in terms of the 
number of units to be built and when to build them.
The third is the ethnic quota imposed by the State government in low cost housing 
allocation for a housing development size of more than 10 acres. Private housing 
developers are required to allocate 70 percent of the houses built to Bumiputera and 
the remaining 30 percent to other races (SHPB, 2003 p. 122). The quota also applies 
throughout the state, regardless of the racial composition of the district, which thus 
could contribute to ethnic imbalance. Therefore, in some areas, housing developers 
face difficulty in attracting enough Bumiputera buyers (Yunos, 2006).
Finally, the housing developers also receive requests from various State government 
departments, particularly local authorities and the staff of technical departments, to
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buy a low cost house. An interview with Developer 2 revealed the dilemma and 
difficulty faced by the housing developer when dealing with requests from local 
authorities and technical departments:
"... We are subject to State government policy, and we have to offer to 
the people. Besides we have many State government agencies... There 
are also name list of poor people from land offices and MPPJ (Petaling 
Jaya Municipal Council). We just follow the instruction. So MPPJ gave 
us the list we have to consider, we assume everyone is eligible. We 
cannot question the list from land office. This is on top of list received 
from SUK (SHPB) thus already entitled. We have to allocate carefully...”
The housing developers clearly have difficulty rejecting the requests from these 
people, since they are directly involved in the housing development approval 
process. So, the developers have to handle the relationship with the State 
government staff carefully in order to avoid any problem with them. Therefore, in 
uiany cases, the developers just sell the house to these people and submit the name 
to the state for approval. However, as explained by Developer 2, buyers in this 
category are relatively small in number. Another issue highlighted by SHPB is the fact 
that most buyers for low cost houses usually register with the state when the 
construction of the houses has been started by the developer, especially in the 
strategic location. State government Officer 1 explained the situation:
"... If they find out the project near to their current resident, they come 
(to state) to register. At that time we receive a lot of application, although 
many still don’t know there is project in the area. Developer normally will 
test the market first with fewer house units available for sale, if there is 
demand then will construct all. But for the people, they will come if the 
construction already started on the ground... If the project located in the 
strategic location, many more people will come to register. If in less 
desirable location they wait until they feel confident enough the project 
will complete. Sometimes applicants look at who is the developer... They 
afraid the project abandon halfway...”
With many abandoned projects in the state including low cost housing projects, low 
cost house buyers do not want to take risk of buying a house. Under the ‘sell and 
build’ concept in Malaysia, the buyers still have to repay the total RM42,000 
mortgage to the financial institution even if the project is abandoned by the 
developer. So the financial consequences are greater for people with a low income 
who spend most of their life savings to buy a low cost house. Secondly, the buyers 
are offered a house in the wrong location. The housing developers interviewed also
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agreed there are some buyers being offered the chance to buy a low cost house 
outside the area chosen in their application form, as explained by Developer 1:
"... The state make an assumption based on the applicant current 
address. So if their address is at Meru for example, so they assume they 
want the house at Setia Alam or Bukit Raja low cost. Purchaser cannot 
decide which low cost house they want, as long there are low cost 
houses available the State government will allocate. The low cost house 
purchasers they want the house but don’t have enough money, to them 
no matter how small the house as long they have a house. After register 
with the state, they got offer for the house far from the workplace and 
family members... ”
The State government usually make the decision to offer the houses without 
consulting the applicants. Therefore, this limits the people’s freedom of choice to buy 
the house they prefer and is thus clearly against neo-liberal practice. The failure of 
the State government to match demand for and supply of low cost housing in a 
particular location further complicates the matter. This is thus consistent with the 
statement given by the Sri Meranti low cost house buyers on the issue earlier.
7.10 ACCESS TO LOW COST HOUSING IN SELANGOR
Based on the analysis conducted earlier in this chapter, people could access low cost 
house through four channels in the State of Selangor (see Figure 7.9); first, buyers 
from the squatters’ list. The squatters were identified by the State government 
through the local authority in the respective area. The low cost houses for sale were 
offered to the squatters who could afford to buy. Meanwhile, those who could not 
afford to buy would be offered a low cost house for rent. Once identified, the local 
authority informed SHPB of the list of people under this category. The second 
channel was people who were registered under the ORS in the state. According to 
the Ministry of Housing and Local Government Malaysia (MHLG), all low cost house 
buyers were supposed to register with the State government under ORS. Once 
registered and eligible, the applicants would then be kept on the waiting list (also 
known as buyers under ‘State ORS List’).
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Figure 7.9: Access to Low Cost Housing in the State of Selangor 
Source: Author
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The third channel was through the Land Office (there are 12 district land offices in 
Selangor). Under the State government policy, the Land Office provided a list of low 
rest house buyers for at least 50 percent of low cost housing units in a residential 
project located in an area with no squatters. The selection of buyers was carried out 
by the District Land Committee (DLC) headed by a District Officer (DO) and the 
members included state assemblymen (the politician) for the respective area. Once 
the DLC had identified the people, the land office forwarded the list to the SHPB for 
approval by the State Selection Committee.
Fourth channel, the people could also buy directly from the private housing 
developers under certain circumstances. This usually happened in low cost housing 
projects located in an undesirable area or which comprised a large number of units. If 
the State government faced difficulty in providing enough eligible buyers for a 
particular project, the private housing developers were allowed to sell the houses 
directly to people, as explained by State government Officer 1 when he was asked 
about the buyers from developer’s list:
“...if developers have difficulty to get the buyers or the project located 
very far, no demand. We allowed developers to offer the house who 
come to developer's office. Developers can buy the application from 
us in bulk and sell it to the people, they fill in the form and submit to 
developer or to the board. Then we know these people would like to 
buy the house in the project. We will process immediately and bring 
to Committee meeting and State Secretary for approval and we will 
offer the house...”
However, the buyers still had to register with the SHPB under the ORS. After paying 
the 10 percent deposit for the house, the buyers needed to sign a statutory 
declaration form provided by the housing developer which stated that if they failed to 
obtain approval from the State government to buy a low cost house, the developer 
had the right to cancel the purchase and refund the deposit. The application was 
made by the housing developer on behalf of the house buyers. Usually the 
applications were made in a bundle and were considered for ‘fast-track’ approval by 
the State government. In some cases, the low cost housing projects were located in 
rural or suburban areas which usually lacked demand from people with a low income; 
therefore this approach was used by the State government to deal with a mismatch 
between supply and demand. Thus, the practice did not affect the chances of people 
still on the waiting list.
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With the exception of buying directly from the developer, the SHPB would then issue 
the offer letter to the eligible buyers when there was an available low cost housing 
project in Selangor. Usually the location of the new low cost housing project was 
used to determine whether buyers were selected from the squatter list, the ORS list 
or the land office list. A squatter would be offered a house within the same area or 
district to ensure they did not face difficulty in finding a new job or school for their 
children. Similarly, buyers from the land office list were also offered a house within 
the same district. Meanwhile, buyers from the ORS list were determined based on 
their area of preference stated in the application form.
Once they received the offer letter from the SHPB, the applicant would then take the 
letter to the private housing developers to finalise the purchase. However, the 
applicant still had to decide whether or not to purchase the house after visiting the 
site and obtaining detailed information about the project from a housing developer. If 
the sale was agreed, the applicant would have to pay the 10 percent deposit and 
secure a bank loan for the balance. The allocation of housing units was based on a 
ballot process, since the house price was already fixed by the government. After 
signing the Sale and Purchase Agreement (SPA), the buyers had to wait for the 
housing construction to be completed before they could move into the house.
7.11 CONCLUSION
The trend of low cost housing provision in Selangor over the last 20 years shows 
increasing reliance on the market for provision and commodification. The state began 
to retreat from low cost housing provision and most low cost houses were provided 
by the private sector. However, the case study of housing allocation practice in the 
State of Selangor clearly shows the importance of the role played by the State 
government in low cost housing allocation. Despite the introduction of ORS by the 
Federal government since 1997, the State government of Selangor still allocates 
housing according to its own policy. Low cost house buyers’ experiences revealed 
that the current allocation practiced in the State of Selangor is still subject to 
manipulation by politicians and State government housing officers. State intervention 
has also had several unintended consequences towards people with a low income 
who buy a house through registration with the ORS. This includes a longer waiting 
period to occupy a house and the failure of the government to allocate houses in the 
buyers’ preferred location.
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Buyers who registered under the State government ORS system faced various 
difficulties during registration and have to wait longer on the waiting list compared to 
people buying through the land office. Generally, registration through ORS is clearly 
fairer and transparent. Meanwhile, for those buying through the land office’s list, the 
waiting time to be offered a house is shorter. However, the interview with the buyers 
revealed there is a lack of transparency and fairness in the housing allocation 
process through the land office list. The selection process is also subject to 
corruption and misuse of power by the people involved directly in low cost housing 
allocation, either private housing developers or State government officers. 
Meanwhile, politicians’ involvement in low cost housing allocation is still prominent in 
the State of Selangor through the land office list. Many difficulties and longer waiting 
times are faced by the buyers who register through ORS; this therefore explains why 
many people with a low income are reluctant to register.
Based on the interviews conducted, there are two conflicting views among the low 
cost house buyers on who is supposed to handle the low cost housing allocation in 
Malaysia. Some of the house buyers interviewed believed the state should be directly 
involved in housing allocation, but the other group of buyers rejected the idea. 
According to the proponents of the state, the reasons given for state control are 
mainly due to distrust and difficulty in dealing with housing developers. They believe 
the state has a responsibility to ensure people with a low income have access to low 
cost housing. Meanwhile, the market proponents opposed state intervention in low 
cost housing allocation due to the inefficiency of the ORS system and corrupt 
government officials. Interviews with housing developers also revealed they are not 
prepared to allocate low cost houses directly to house buyers due to many other 
restrictions and regulations imposed by the State government related to low cost 
housing provision. Without dismantling the regulatory framework related to low cost 
housing and giving more power to private housing developers, the practice of 
housing allocation is likely to remain the same in the future.
Finally, the implementation and operation of the ORS in Selangor reflects strong 
state control in low cost housing allocation. The State government goes even further 
in controlling the market than Federal government policy. This includes various 
quotas imposed by the State government for low cost housing built by the private 
sector such as the low cost unit quota and the Bumiputera quota. Meanwhile, the
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private sector played a subordinate role in low cost housing allocation, despite their 
contribution to overall housing provision in the state. The house buyers were also 
subject to strict control by the state and were not given opportunities in the low cost 
housing allocation process.
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CHAPTER 8:
CONCLUSION
CHAPTER 8:
CONCLUSION
8.1 INTRODUCTION
The objective of this chapter is to conclude the outcome of the research. It is divided 
into four sections and the first discusses the research findings. The second section 
focuses on the theoretical implications of the research and the third section explains 
the contribution of the research. The final section outlines suggestion for future 
research.
8.2 RESEARCH FINDINGS
This section will discuss the findings in relation to the research aim and objectives as 
outlined in Chapter 1 of this thesis. The aim of the research is to examine the role of 
the state and market in low cost housing allocation in Malaysia in the context of the 
global trend towards neo-liberalism. Meanwhile, the findings according to each 
research objective are also discussed in this section.
8.2.1 The Changing Role of the State in Housing Provision from Western and 
East Asian Perspectives
The literature review shows the current trend in housing provision in many European 
countries has followed the neo-liberal path (see Doling, 1999; Peck and Tickel, 1999; 
Whitehead, 2003; Forrest and Lee, 2003; Dogson, 2007; Forrest, 2008). Housing has 
been at the forefront of so called ‘modernisation’ projects including the sale of state 
housing, introducing market actors into the management of state housing, marketizing 
state rental systems and reducing the overall role of direct government provision in the 
housing market (Forrest, 2008, p. 179). Therefore, since the early 21st century, housing 
provision has been thoroughly embedded in market processes. The retreat from direct
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housing provision in the West is also associated with growth in individual home 
ownership and an increase in private renting. The state has also begun to withdraw 
from the role of public provision and has shifted emphasis towards the private sector 
and market. At the same time, the state has concentrated on improving the financial 
system and market framework, as well as developing guarantee and insurance 
systems to support the provision of funding (Whitehead, 2003, p.61).
However, housing provision in the context of East Asian countries still does not show 
sign of convergence with the Western neo-liberal model (Hirayama and Ronald, 2007; 
Cheung, 2009). As Hirayama and Ronald (2007) explain, despite some similarities in 
the commodification of private housing and the residual nature of public housing, there 
is a considerable variety of state-market mix and the stage of intervention in housing 
provision among East Asian countries. Singapore, for example, is still pursuing active 
and extensive state subsidised housing provision in line with its national development 
agenda. Meanwhile, has China undergone more radical changes, challenging the 
established housing systems and moving towards a more market-orientated approach 
since the early 1990s (see Wang, 1996 & 2001; Wu, 2001; Logan, 2002). Japan, 
South Korea and Taiwan have weaker controls and more selective state intervention. 
Subsidies are used to ensure that the housing needs of low income group are met 
within a market framework. East Asian countries not only shows divergence from the 
Western model in housing provision, but also in the set of social and political 
relationships which link state authority to housing policy (Hirayama and Ronald, 2007).
Similarly, in the context of Malaysia, despite economic liberalisation since the 1980s 
and growing reliance on the private sector, the state continued its role in the direct 
production and allocation of low cost housing. Even after the Asian financial crisis, the 
state continued to build heavily subsidised public low cost housing under PHP and 
controlled allocation through ORS. Thus, Malaysia, like many other East Asian 
countries, still does not show any signs of convergence with the Western neo-liberal 
model of housing provision.
8.2.2 The Changing Structure of Low Cost Housing Provision in Malaysia
The analysis of housing provision in Malaysia using the SHP approach shows the 
changing role of the state and market since the 1950s. In Chapter 4, the analysis was 
based on the overall model of housing provision in Malaysia in relation to the changing
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political economy. Analysis in Chapter 5, meanwhile, focussed on the structure of low 
cost housing provision in Malaysia. The research identified three distinct phases during 
which the role of the state and market in low cost housing production and allocation in 
Malaysia was ever changing (see Figure 8.1). The role of the state in low cost housing 
production in Malaysia began during the British colonial period through the 
establishment of the Housing Trust Federation of Malaya in 1951. The housing trust 
continued its role in low cost housing production after independence until 1976. In view 
of the continuous failure of the Housing Trust to provide adequate houses for people 
with a low income and the conflict with State governments, the Federal government 
decided to cease the trust’s operation in 1976. The responsibility to provide low cost 
housing was then transferred to respective State governments. The state governments 
received loans from the Federal government to implement PLCHP from 1976 until 
2002. The market’s involvement in low cost housing production accelerated further 
after economic liberalisation in 1986. From the early 1990s, the market began to take 
the iead in low cost housing production with state guidance and control. A planning 
system was successfully used by the state to ensure private developers provided a 
minimum of 30 percent low cost house units in every residential development.
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1 9 5 6 - 1 9 7 6
Key Player:
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(The Housing Trust 
Federation of Malaya)
1 9 7 6 - 1 9 9 0
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State Governments 
(Housing Section of State 
Governments and State 
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Corporations)
1991 - 2 0 0 5
Market (Guided)
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Private Housing 
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Housing Allocation 
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Federation of Malaya and 
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Key Player:
Housing Section of State 
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Figure 8.1: Changing Role of the State and Market in Low Cost Housing 
Production and Allocation in Malaysia 
Source: Author
256
Due to the need to address the problem of squatters, in 1994 the Federal government 
implemented PHP for rental. The programme aimed to relocate squatters into public 
rented housing. Later in 2002, the PHP New Policy for sale and rental was announced 
by the Federal government to replace the PLCHP implemented by the State 
government from 1976. Despite the implementation of PHP by Federal government, 
the market still played a significant role in low cost housing provision in Malaysia. From 
the 1990s, more than 70 percent of low cost houses were built by private developers. 
Thus, low cost housing production in Malaysia clearly moved towards commodification 
with a larger role played by the market.
Meanwhile, in terms of low cost housing allocation, the market has not held direct 
control or played a significant role since the 1950s. The state has continuously been 
responsible for low cost housing registration and allocation in Malaysia. Instead, the 
changes only involved the shifting of responsibility between Federal and State 
governments to manage the low cost housing registration and allocation process. 
From 1956 to 1976, the Housing Trust Federation of Malaya and the local council 
where the low cost housing project was located were responsible for identifying eligible 
buyers. The selection was mainly based on applicants’ income and number of 
dependents. However, following the implementation of PLCHP in 1976, the State 
governments began to take responsibility for allocating public low cost housing to 
eligible buyers from the Housing Trust. During the early 1980s, the State governments 
expanded their control of registration and allocation to include low cost houses built by 
private housing developers. Therefore, the market was not only required to build low 
cost houses without government financial subsidy, but also to surrender the 
responsibility of identifying house buyers to the State government.
In 1997, the Federal government established ORS with the intention to standardise 
procedures and criteria for the selection of eligible buyers nationwide. The reasons for 
the establishment of the ORS were mainly to solve the squatter problem, avoid 
corruption, reduce political intervention and balance the mismatch between supply of 
and demand for low cost housing. Under ORS, the Federal government and State 
governments are responsible for maintaining the nationwide low cost house buyer 
registration and allocation system. However, continuous state intervention and control 
in low cost housing allocation is not consistent with the commodification trend in low 
cost housing production. The current practice of low cost housing allocation in 
Malaysia clearly reflects the trend of decommodification. The state remains the key 
player and rejects the role of the market in low cost housing allocation. Therefore, low
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cost housing provision in Malaysia is not fully commodified and shows variation from 
the typical East Asian model of the market’s role in the allocation and consumption 
process (see Doling, 1999, p. 239).
8.2.3 The Role of the State and Market in Low Cost Housing Allocation in the 
Context of ORS Implementation
ORS was selected as the case study to analyse the role of the state and market in 
housing allocation in Malaysia. There are several reasons behind the establishment of 
the ORS including reduction of corruption and political intervention, elimination of 
fraud, provision of data for low cost housing planning, identification of migration 
patterns of people between states in Malaysia and modernisation of the low cost 
housing allocation system. The most important purpose behind the introduction of the 
ORS was to ensure only eligible buyers were entitled to buy and subsequently own low 
cost houses and that no buyers were allowed to purchase more than one unit of low 
cost housing and, finally, to ensure the selection process was more transparent.
The State of Selangor was selected as the case study to analyse the implementation 
of ORS at the state level and also to gather feedback from various players involved in 
low cost housing allocation. The case study in Selangor revealed three key issues 
related to the role of the state and market in low cost housing production and 
allocation. The first is the fact that the majority of low cost houses in Selangor from 
1998 to 2005 were built by private housing developers. Under the current planning 
system, the State government did not have direct control over the location of low cost 
housing projects by private housing developers. Therefore, some low cost housing 
projects were located in undesirable locations. The mismatch between supply and 
demand still happens in Selangor due to difficulties faced by the State government in 
controlling low cost housing supply. The problem was partially caused by a lack of 
people registered under ORS in the state. Thus, the data on low cost housing needs 
under ORS was not up-to-date and reliable for planning purposes.
Secondly, there are several ways to access the low cost housing market in Selangor 
other than registration through ORS. Furthermore, the priority for low cost housing 
allocation in Selangor was for squatter relocation from 1998. Therefore, not every low 
cost house buyers in Selangor were registered with the State government under ORS. 
The state’s low cost housing allocation priority was to relocate the squatter. However
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the interviews with low cost house buyers revealed the difficulties faced by people 
registered under ORS to purchase low cost houses due to competition with squatters 
and other non-registered buyers. Most low cost house buyers interviewed preferred 
the market to control allocation, especially for low cost houses built by private 
developers. They believed the current practice leads to corruption and lacks 
transparency, thus defeating the objectives of the establishment of ORS which were to 
create a transparent and fairer allocation system.
Finally, the implementation and operation of ORS in Selangor reflects strong state 
control in low cost housing allocation. In addition to policy introduced by the Federal 
government, the state government also imposed additional requirements such as an 
excessive number of units allocated for Bumiputera. Furthermore, the private sector 
played a subordinate role in low cost housing allocation, despite its huge contribution 
to overall low cost housing provision in the state. House buyers were also subject to 
strict controls by the state and were not given opportunity to get involved directly in the 
low cost housing allocation process. Thus, the practice of low cost housing allocation 
in Selangor reflects strong state control which fit well with the developmental state 
approach.
8.2.4 The Relationship Between the Key Players Involved in Low Cost 
Housing Allocation
The research also identified the relationships between the key players involved in low 
cost housing allocation under ORS, namely Federal-State governments, State 
governments-Private Housing Developers, State Governments-Low Cost House 
Buyers and Private Housing Developers-Low Cost House Buyers. It is important to 
understand the relationships between the key players in low cost housing allocation. 
The key findings are as follows:-
a) Federal-State governments
Three key issues undermined the relationship between the Federal and State 
governments in terms of low cost housing allocation. Firstly, from the State 
governments’ perspective, the purpose of the ORS is more than just coordination and 
monitoring of low cost housing allocation. State government felt the Federal 
government intended to impose control over state housing affairs. The second issue 
was poor coordination between Federal and State governments in terms of ORS policy
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formulation and implementation. There was growing rejection by the State 
governments of intervention by the Federal government in low cost housing allocation 
at the state level through ORS. However, the problems with the implementation of 
ORS and the misunderstanding between Federal and State governments are typical 
issues under the Federal government system in Malaysia (Jomo and Hui, 2002). 
Finally, there was a misunderstanding of the purpose of ORS implementation between 
Federal and State governments. Although the Federal government’s intention was to 
make it easier for people with a low income to register under ORS, the State 
governments believe the application process should be stricter to avoid undeserved 
buyers taking advantage.
b) State Governments-Private Housing Developers
Despite strict State government controls, most of the private housing developers who 
were interviewed enjoyed a very good relationship with the state government, since 
the state government make sure there are sufficient buyers for the low cost houses. 
The assistance given by the state is not just limited to providing a list of buyers, but is 
also helpful in other matters related to low cost housing provision. In the event that the 
buyers list is not adequate, the state government will do all the necessary tasks to 
ensure there are enough buyers for the project. However, three main issues could 
undermine the relationship between the state government and private housing 
developers. The first is the delay in obtaining a list of buyers from the state 
government, which affects the sale and construction of low cost houses, which 
eventually makes waiting times longer for the house buyers. The second issue is a 
lack of adequate buyers for some low cost housing projects. This reflects the fact that 
low cost houses built by private housing developers are not based on actual demand 
in a particular area. The third issue is the ethnic quota imposed by the state 
government for housing development sizes of more than 10 acres. According to state 
policy, private housing developers are required to allocate a minimum of 70 percent of 
the low cost houses built to Bumiputera (Selangor 2003, p. 122). The case study of 
ORS implementation in Selangor shows the state continues to dominate and heavily 
regulate the market. The market generally has no absolute control over low cost 
housing production and consumption in the state.
c) State Government-Low Cost House Buyers
The proponents of the state’s role in low cost housing allocation gave three reasons 
why the state should continue to control low cost housing allocation. Firstly, private 
housing developers could not be trusted in low cost housing allocation. Some buyers
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have doubts about private housing developers’ sincerity and transparency. Housing 
developers don’t really care who the buyers and whether the people registered with 
the State government under ORS or not to purchase low cost house. Secondly, the 
buyers argued the state government must take responsibility for ensuring only people 
with a low income to buy low cost houses. Since many people in this group still do not 
own a house, the state should make sure this group are not forgotten in the creation of 
a home owning society. Through ORS, the state government can at least control and 
monitor low cost house allocation more effectively. Competition between people with a 
low income and higher income groups requires state intervention in low cost housing 
allocation. Thirdly, some low cost house buyers still need government involvement due 
to difficulty in dealing with private housing developers. Poor knowledge of the property 
buying process including legal and financial aspects requires the state government’s 
assistance. They also believe that the state will provide assistance and resolve any 
ic?sues with the housing developer such as project abandonment and poor construction 
quality.
d) Private Housing Developers-Low Cost House Buyers
The proponents of market allocation highlighted five reasons why the market should 
handle low cost housing allocation. Firstly, the buyers preferred the market to handle 
the allocation of private low cost housing. They don’t see any benefit in registering with 
the government under ORS if they do not gain special privileges by doing so. 
Secondly, some buyers feel they are neglected by the State government under ORS. 
The common belief among low cost house applicants is that they will be offered a 
house immediately by the state, but that is not the case in Malaysia. Some buyers 
have to wait for up to four years on the waiting list. Thirdly, according to the buyers, 
there is too much politics in the low cost housing allocation process especially the 
allocation handle by the State government. They believed the politicians still have 
control over the allocation process, despite the implementation of ORS. The issue of 
politicians’ involvement in housing allocation is not new in Malaysia, as highlighted by 
Agus (1986, 1992 & 2002), but the practice still continues today. The fourth reason is 
that the state government is not sensitive to buyers’ preferences regarding their low 
cost house. The interviews with house buyers revealed some of them were offered a 
low cost house in an undesirable location. Finally, the buyers felt many of the State 
government officers who handle the ORS are not sincere and are subject to corruption. 
The state officers also seem to give priority to people with political connections, 
regardless of whether or not they are eligible to a buy low cost house
261
S.2.5 Current and Future Direction of the Low Cost Housing Provision Model
in Malaysia
The analysis revealed both external and internal factors are behind the current state 
intervention in low cost housing provision in Malaysia (see Figure 8.2). The external 
factors can be divided into three; the first is pressure from international agencies, 
particularly the United Nations, World Bank and IMF. Recommendations by the UN 
experts, charters and bodies such as UNCHS/UN-Habitat were key motivators for the 
Malaysian government to provide adequate and decent housing for the people with a 
low income since independence in 1957. The recommendations by the UN were then 
translated into policies and implementation strategies by the government in five year 
Malaysia Plans.
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Since the 1970s, the World Bank has played an important role in shaping low cost 
housing policy in Malaysia. However Malaysian government was not impressed by the 
recommendations by the World Bank on the site-and-services and self-help housing 
programmes during the 1970s. During the 1980s and 1990s state began to adopt the 
neo-liberal policies propagated by the World Bank and IMF following the 
implementation of Structural Adjustment Programmes. The market began to take a 
leading role in low cost housing production in Malaysia in the early 1990s. Most 
importantly, government intervention was crucial role to ensure the market’s 
involvement in low cost housing production.
The second factor was regional trends in low income housing provision. It was noted 
that most East Asian countries shared similar development trajectories after 
independence from colonial power after World War II. The housing issues and 
condition of the slums were generally similar in these countries. Therefore, state 
intervention in low cost housing provision was crucial to solving housing issues during 
the early stage of independence. Commonly, the government established special 
institutions to build public low cost housing such as the Hong Kong Housing Authority 
in Hong Kong (1954), Housing Trust Federation of Malaya in Malaysia (1951), Housing 
Development Board in Singapore (1960) and Korean National Housing Corporation in 
South Korea (1960). In general home ownership was promoted as the key low cost 
housing strategy in the region, with a small amount of public rented housing. Thus, 
state intervention in low cost housing provision in Malaysia was partly influenced by 
the trends and events in the East Asian region.
The third factor was globalization, especially in the financial sector. Although 
globalization of the financial sector made it easier for the market to become involved in 
low cost housing provision, at the same time it exposed the low income group to the 
effects of the global economy. State intervention was important to ensure private 
financial institutions provided financing for both private housing developers and low 
cost house buyers, particularly after the government no longer offered loans to buyers 
after 1998. The price of low cost housing was always controlled by the government in 
order to prevent fluctuation in house prices due to the effects of the global economic 
cycle.
Meanwhile, four internal factors were identified. The first addresses the political 
agenda of the ruling party. Since independence, the Barisan National coalition 
government has been in power. In order to ensure continuous support from people
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with a low income, state intervention in housing production and allocation are crucial. 
On many occasions, low cost housing programmes were seen as one of the ways to 
gain political support for the ruling party. However, in the 1980s and early 1990s, the 
state began to control private sector low cost housing allocation. Most politicians used 
the opportunity to allocate some of the low cost housing units to party members as a 
reward for their support (Agus, 1986).
The politicians, particularly at the state and local level, had a significant role in housing
w '
development by virtue of their position in the State government hierarchy and 
agencies. In the context of low cost housing, the politicians could even decide who 
gets a house, as demonstrated in the case study of the housing allocation process in 
Selangor. The politicians were also supported by strong bureaucrats who were 
involved in housing administration. These people formulated low cost housing policy 
and intervened in housing provision to ensure the state still had control over the 
market. State involvement in low cost housing provision also provided an opportunity 
among the contractors to win government tenders, particularly those linked with the 
ruling party. State intervention in low cost housing provision also reflects their 
dominance over the market, a typical feature in East Asian developmental states.
The second internal factor is to gain economic benefit. Housing development has 
significantly contributed to the country’s economic growth in terms of construction 
activities and the provision of job opportunities for the people. Meanwhile, during the 
economic crisis in Malaysia (1986-1989 and 1997-1998), special low cost housing 
programmes were launched to drive the economy out of recession. As part of a 
government strategy to eradicate poverty under the New Economic Policy (1971- 
1990), low cost housing provision was used to promote home ownership among the 
low income group. The most important government intervention in the market was the 
imposition of the 30 percent low cost housing quota by private housing developers. In 
return, the private sector was allowed to sell medium and high income housing without 
state control and received no monetary assistance from the government to build low 
cost houses.
The third factor is pressure for the government to improve the physical environment. In 
the mid 1990s, the state began to implement a large nationwide scale squatter 
clearance programme and invested a large amount of money in the public rented 
housing programme. The objectives were to improve the physical environment, to 
provide quality housing and better living conditions for people with a low income.
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Despite the large contribution of the private sector to building low cost houses, it still 
failed to solve the squatter problem. Thus, direct state intervention in low cost housing 
production under PHP and housing allocation through ORS was required.
The final internal factor is to overcome social challenges. Unlike other countries in the 
region, Malaysia is a multi-ethnic country with a varied economic, cultural and religious 
background. Therefore, distribution and allocation of low cost housing was identified as 
one of most important ways to build the nation and to maintain harmony among races 
in Malaysia. A minimum 30 percent ethnic quota for Bumiputera in every residential 
development was introduced from 1971 in order to achieve the NEP objective of 
restructuring society. Low cost home ownership was also an important form of welfare 
provision in East Asian countries, also known as “asset-based welfare”. The low cost 
selling price, set below the market price by the government, allowed house buyers to 
make a substantial profit if they decided to sell their house in the future. Another 
challenge was to address housing issues created by rural-urban migration in the 
search for better job opportunities. In the past, the failure of the government to provide 
adequate housing for low income migrants from rural areas created a squatter 
problem, especially in the 1970s and early 1990s. State involvement in squatter 
relocation to formal low cost housing units was important to reduce the social and 
criminal problems usually associated with squatter settlements.
In general, based on current trend the low cost housing provision in Malaysia shows 
no sign of convergence towards being fully commodified in terms of production and 
allocation in the near future. The state continues to control and regulate the market in 
order to achieve its national development agenda. Despite heavy reliance on the 
market for low cost housing provision, the state still controls other factors of the 
production and consumption process through ORS.
8.4 THEORETICAL IMPLICATIONS
In this section, the outcome of research on low cost housing provision in Malaysia will 
be located in the context of the literature. The first task is to identify low cost housing 
policy based on neo-liberal and developmental state debates. Subsequently, low cost 
housing production and allocation in Malaysia will be positioned in the context of 
housing commodification-decommodification debates.
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8.4.1 Malaysia Low Cost Housing Policy in the Context of Neo-liberal- 
Developmental State Debates
Despite economic liberalisation since 1986 and pressure from international agencies 
for neoliberal reform during the 1990s, the state in the context of Malaysia still played 
an important role in housing provision, particularly low cost housing. Thus state 
intervention in low cost housing provision shows that low cost housing provision in 
Malaysia is fit well with the developmental state approach. In terms of finance, the 
private sector and house buyers generally benefited from financial liberalisation and 
globalization during the early 1990s. Easy access to house finance contributed to a 
rise in homeownership in Malaysia and the country’s economy as a whole.
Similarly, in the context of business relations, the big private housing developers and 
government linked companies played an important role in housing provision. The big 
private housing developers provided more than 70 percent of low houses in Malaysia. 
Priority for government assistance and privatisation was also given to Bumiputera 
companies, particular those with strong political connections. This created a practice of 
cronyism in housing provision and formed a barrier against the involvement of new 
players in the industry. The practice clearly went against neo-liberal policy by 
dismantling national protectionist policies and allowing international private developers 
to get involved in housing developments in Malaysia.
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Table 8.1: Analysis of Malaysia’s Low Cost Housing Policy in the Context of Neo-liberal and Developmental State Models since 1980s
Characteristics Malaysia
Neo-liberal Model1 Developmental State Model* Federal Low Cost Housing Policy Selangor Low Cost Housing Policy
1. Finance
• Financial deregulation and globalization
• Deregulation of money market
•  Dismantling of regulatory constraints
• Separation of credit flow from productive 
sources of investment.
• Finance is the tie that binds the state 
to the industrialists.
• Raising and deploying financial 
resources to create or strengthen 
state organisation.
• The state can exert influence over 
the economy and investment pattern
Neo-liberal Policv
• Economic liberalisation and globalisation provide easy 
access for financing of low cost projects by public and 
private sector
DeveloDmental Policv
• Continuous increase in state investment in low cost housing 
since independence.
• Low cost housing projects to revive the economy during 
recession in 86-89 and 97-98
• Financial assistance for private developers amounting to 
RM 2 billion under SLCHP 87-89
• RM2.9 billion allocated during 94-02 for 67,247 units of low 
cost housing construction under PHP
• Central Bank directs private banks to provide loans to low 
cost house buyers
Result: Developmental
Neo-liberal Policv
• Economic liberalisation and globalisation provide 
easy access for financing of low cost projects by 
public and private sectors in the states
DeveloDmental Policv
• Limited funds, depend on Federal government 
support to implement low cost housing programme
Result: Developmental
2. Business Relation
•  Selective withdrawal of the state and 
support for leading national industries.
• Dismantling of national protectionist 
policies.
• Dismantling of national barriers to foreign 
direct investment.
• Strong relationship between the 
state and big business
• Creation of cronyism
• Intent to hone the competitiveness of 
national business in the international 
system.
• Ethnic division of labour in managing 
politics and the economy.
Neo-liberal Policv
• State began to reduce involvement in low cost housing 
provision in the early 1990s
DeveloDmental Policv
• Housing production in Malaysia mostly dominated by large 
companies which received assistance from the government 
through privatisation (i.e. cheap land)
• Government still protected local companies involved in low 
cost housing development and awarded tenders for 
government low cost housing projects only to locals
• Assistance and priority given to Bumiputera development 
companies in line with NEP since 1971
Result: Developmental
Neo-liberal Polipv
• Encourage private developers to build low cost 
housing through joint venture companies or 
privatisation of state lands.
DeveloDmental Policv
• Highly localised development companies with good 
relations with the state government involved in low 
cost housing provision (cronyism).
Result: Developmental
3. Governance/Bureaucracy
• Abandonment of demand-management
• Dismantling of traditional national relays 
of welfare service provision
• De-centring of traditional hierarchical 
bureaucratic and government control
• Imposition of fiscal austerity measures
• Shrinking of public sector employment 
through privatisation
• Public-private partnership
• Rescaling of state economic intervention
• “Political Capitalism”, where profits 
and investment depends on 
decisions made in the state.
• “Developmentism”, a dominant 
developmental discursive on the 
necessity of industrialisation and 
state intervention to promote it.
•  “Appointive Bureaucracy”, in which 
most government officers are 
affected by regime change
• The power of bureaucrats is highly 
unstable.
Neoliberal Policv
• Encourage market involvement in low cost housing provision
DeveloDmental Policv
• Low cost housing as a form of “political Capitalism” where 
selling price was determined by the government
• ORS as demand management tools and centring of 
hierarchical bureaucratic forms of government control
• Bureaucrats at the Federal and state governments make 
most decisions related to housing policy
• Established National Housing Companies to undertake low 
cost housing construction
Result: Developmental
Neo-liberal Policv
• Public -private partnership in low cost housing 
provision
DeveloDmental Policv
• State government controlled the market through 
planning system (i.e. racial quota and 30% low cost 
housing requirement)
• Establishment of Selangor Housing and Real 
Estate Board in 2001, indicates increasing role 
played by the state and an increase bureaucracy 
through ORS registration procedure for low income 
people including private sector housing
Result: Developmental
Sources: Brenner & Theodore1 (2002) and Woo-Cumings2 (1999)
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Finally, in the context of governance and bureaucracy, the bureaucrats and politicians 
continued to have a strong influence over housing matters through various committees 
md state government agencies. The introduction of ORS was part of a set of demand 
management tools and shows the centring of hierarchical bureaucratic forms of 
government control in housing provision. The case study in Selangor demonstrated 
that the State government bureaucrats and politicians have always had direct influence 
over housing matters from development to consumption. The private sector in general 
just adhered to directives or guidelines related to low cost housing imposed by the 
State government without question. Although the majority of the low cost houses in the 
state were built by the private sector, they only played a minor role in the registration 
and allocation process. This shows that the housing practice in Selangor is still very 
much in line with the developmental approach.
!r. conclusion, the current housing policy approach in Malaysia fits well within the 
developmental state model rather than that of the neo-liberal. Although the private 
housing developers became the main providers of low cost houses from the 1990s, 
this achievement was a result of state control and regulations. Even though the state 
continued to adjust its policy to incorporate neo-liberal ideas in low cost housing 
provision after the Asian financial crisis in 1997-1998, in general it has still retained 
much of its developmental state characteristics. Thus, low cost housing in Malaysia 
shows no sign of convergence with the neo-liberal model like most East Asian 
countries.
8.4.2 Malaysian Low Cost Housing Provision Model in the Context of Housing 
Commodification-Decommodification Debates
Most scholars suggest analysis of decommodification level based on housing tenure 
(see Barlow and Duncan, 1988; Harloe, 1995; Groves et al., 2007). But in the context 
of Malaysia, the lack of data on public and private rental made the analysis based on 
housing tenure alone difficult. The present statistical data on homeownership and 
rental housing does not differentiate according to price category (low, medium and 
high cost housing). Therefore, any analysis based on housing tenure alone can be 
misleading. The analysis of the decommodification level of low cost housing in 
Malaysia was conducted using measures employed by various scholars, as explained 
in Chapter 2 (see Table 8.3). The purpose is to position low cost housing production in 
Malaysia in the context of commodification-decommodification debates.
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Table 8.3: Decommodification Level of Low Cost Housing Production in Malaysia
Decommodification
Measures Low Cost Housing Production D C
Dickens et al. (1985)
1. Government subsidies
2. Rent control
3. Welfare benefits
4. Control over housing finance
5. Control over land prices
Government/private sector subsidised the cost 
Fixed price and rental by the government 
No demand-side subsidies or benefits 
No control over housing finance 
No control over land prices
✓y s
s
✓
Commodified
Barlow and Duncan (1988)
6. Low % of homeownership
7. Low social rented houses
High percentage of homeownership 
Low percentage of social rented houses
✓
Mix
Harloe (1995)
8. High level of state provision
9. Low level of homeownership
High level of state provision 
High level of homeownership
V
✓
Mix
Doling (1999)
10. Rules of Access
11. Rules of Exit
Based on ability to pay & non-financial criteria 
No intervention from government if 
repossessed
V
house ✓
Mix
La Grange et al. (2004, 2005)
12. Low % of homeownership
13. State control of land
14. State control of financing
High percentage of homeownership 
State controls land through planning system 
No control over housing finance
s
s
s
Commodified
Groves et al. (2007)
15. Large amount of non profit 
housing
Small amount of not for profit housing Y
Commodified
Note: D -  Highly Decommodified C -  Highly Commodified 
Source: Author
The analysis shows low cost housing production displays signs of a commodification 
trend over the last 20 years, with a more significant role played by the market. This 
includes low cost housing finance, land and construction, especially those built by 
private housing developers. However, the state shows no sign of retreating from low 
cost housing allocation in Malaysia over the same period. The implementation of ORS 
in 1997 further enhanced the state’s role in the low cost housing allocation process. 
Therefore, low cost housing allocation process is still not fully commodified, as the 
state continues to play a significant role. In conclusion, Malaysia’s low cost housing 
provision shows a combination of commodification and decommodification models or a 
‘hybrid’ model which is unique in the context of East Asia (see Figure 8.3).
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Housing Allocation
DecommodifiedCommodified
State
(30% )
Market
(70% )
Fully Controlled by the state 
through ORS
Housing Production
(construction, land & finance)
Low Cost Housing Provision in Malaysia 
(Hybrid)
Figure 8.3: A Model of Low Cost Housing Provision in Malaysia 
Source: Author
8.5 CONTRIBUTION OF THE RESEARCH
The first contribution of this research is a systematic analysis of the structure of 
housing provision (SHP) in Malaysia from the 1950s until 2005. The research 
highlights the impact of changes in the political economy with regard to the structure of 
housing provision in general and low cost housing provision specifically. For the first 
time, a systematic^and comprehensive analysis of SHP in Malaysia since the 1950s 
has been conducted by the housing researcher. The research also identifies different 
themes and periods which earmark the changes in housing policy and SHP. Thus, this 
study contributes to new knowledge of housing provision in Malaysia and low cost 
housing provision in particular.
The second contribution is the locating low cost housing provision in Malaysia in the 
context of neo-liberal and developmental state debates. An analysis of low cost 
housing policy and provision was used to establish whether the Malaysian housing 
model fit within the neo-liberal or typical East Asian developmental state models. The 
finding from the research shows low cost housing policy and provision in Malaysia 
clearly fit well into the East Asia developmental state model, despite global trend 
towards a neo-liberal policy approach over the last 20 years.
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Thirdly, this study has contributed in terms of housing commodification/ 
decommodification literature. Over the last 20 years, most studies on housing 
commodification/decommodification have focussed on selected East Asian countries 
particularly China, Taiwan, South Korea, Hong Kong and Singapore. This research 
provides important knowledge of the low cost housing commodification/ 
decommodification process in Malaysia. The finding of the research shows the 
significant role played by the market in low cost housing production, but the states 
strictly control and regulate low cost housing allocation in Malaysia. This makes 
Malaysia’s low cost housing provision unique compared to other East Asian countries 
with distinctive features.
The fourth contribution is an in-depth understanding of the low cost housing allocation 
model in Malaysia. The research on ORS clearly demonstrates the role of the state in 
solving the housing problem, particularly with regard to squatters and access to low 
cost housing. Most importantly, the research findings show how the state intervened 
and regulated private sector housing development in order to achieve its national 
agenda.
Finally, this study has provided important knowledge on public-private partnership in 
low cost housing provision. Malaysia was categorised as a typical East Asian 
developing country alongside Thailand and Indonesia (World Bank, 1993). Therefore, 
housing policy and practice in Malaysia could provide a good example for the other 
developing countries of how to deal with housing issues. In many developing 
countries, the private sector is generally unwilling to accept the high risks and low 
profits of building houses for the poor (Payne, 1984, p.3). The practice of the 
Malaysian low cost housing production and allocation system shows how the state and 
market can work together to solve housing problems for people with a low income.
8.6 SUGGESTIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH ON THE LOW COST HOUSING 
ALLOCATION SYSTEM IN MALAYSIA
Since there is a lack of research on the changing role of the state in low cost housing 
allocation over the last two decades, especially in East Asian developing countries, 
further studies are required to fill the gap in the housing literature. An understanding of 
housing issues and practice in East Asian developing countries like Malaysia is 
important to provide examples for other developing countries. With a growing tendency
271
for researchers to examine the impact of neo-liberalism and housing commodification 
in East Asia. The findings in this research also contribute to filling the gap of 
knowledge on how the state reacted to pressure from international agencies on neo­
liberal reform in housing provision.
However, this research could not cover in detail every aspect of low cost housing 
provision in Malaysia due to limited time and a vast knowledge gap in Malaysian 
housing literature. Attention is then focussed on the allocation stage of low cost 
housing, based on current practice under the ORS. Further studies are required in 
several areas of low cost housing provision in Malaysia; firstly regarding the 
perceptions of the various players involved in low cost housing allocation in Malaysia, 
particularly the private housing developers and the house buyers. The second area for 
investigation is the implication of government control over low cost housing allocation 
with regard to private sector provision. Finally, in-depth study on how the ORS has 
changed low cost housing tenure in Malaysia.
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APPENDICES
APPENDIX 1
In-depth Interview Questions
Federal Officer 1
Q1: What was your last position in Ministry of Housing and Local Government?
Q2: Can you explain how ORS was established and your role in its establishment?
Q3: What is your view on the current ORS implementation?
Q4: What are the common problems with ORS implementation?
Q5: Why the government still control low cost housing registration and allocation including those built by the 
private housing developers?
Q6: How the ministry used the data obtained from ORS?
Q7: Why mismatch between low cost housing supply and demand still happen although the State governments 
have adopted ORS since 1997?
Q8: Do you think the government should continue to control low cost housing allocation especially for houses built 
by the private sector or leave to the market?
Q9: How was the relationship between the Federal and State government in relation to ORS implementation? 
Federal Officer 2
Q1: Can you explain your involvement in ORS establishment?
Q2: How was the data from ORS used by the Ministry for low cost housing planning?
Q3: Why the government still control the registration and allocation of low cost housing especially those built by 
the private housing developers?
Q4: How the State government overcome the problem of low cost housing mismatch through ORS 
implementation?
Q5: Why the government still intervene in low cost housing production and allocation in Malaysia?
Federal Officer 3
Q1: What is your responsibility in the current ORS implementation?
Q2: Why the ministry still monitor low cost housing allocation?
Q3: Why after improvement done to ORS in 2006, there are still some State governments do not adopt the 
policy and criteria for low cost buyers selection proposed by the Federal government?
Q4: What are the common problems highlighted by the State governments in relation to ORS implementation?
Q5: How the coordination between the Federal and State government was done on ORS implementation?
Q6: How the data from ORS was used by the Federal government?
Q7: What are the common problems reported by private housing developers related to ORS?
Q8: Do you think the Federal government should involve in low cost housing allocation?
Q9: Do you think the government still need to control private sector low cost housing allocation?
Q10: Do you think ORS still relevant in low cost housing allocation in Malaysia?
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State Officer 1
Q1: W hat is your position and responsibility in Selangor Housing and Property Board?
Q2: What is the role play by your section in ORS implementation?
Q3: How is the ORS implementation status in the State of Selangor?
Q4: Any complaints from low cost house buyers on registration and housing allocation through ORS?
Q5: Any complaints from private housing developers on ORS implementation in the State of Selangor?
Q6: What kind of assistance given by SHPB to private housing developers related to ORS?
Q7: What is your view on the ORS established by the Federal government?
Q8: What is the priority group in low cost housing allocation in the State?
Q9: What kind of assistance given by Ministry (MHLG) to the State government?
Q10: How is the relationship between the State and Federal government in ORS implementation?
Q11: How the state government used the ORS database?
Q12: Why the State government still need to control low cost housing allocation including built by private housing 
developers?
Private Housing Developers (1.2 & 3)
Q1: What do you understand about the Open Registration System (ORS) for low cost house buyers?
Q2: How long it takes to obtain the list of eligible low cost house buyers from the state government?
Q3: Please describe your company experience dealing with the state government on the ORS?
Q4: Do you think ORS is useful in promoting home ownership among the low cost house buyers?
Q5: Do you think ORS is fair and transparent?
Q6: Please explain your company experience dealing with the low cost house buyers?
Q7: Any assistance from the state government in dealing with the low cost house buyers?
Q8: Do the eligible low cost house buyers from the ORS have any difficulty to purchase the house?
Q9: Do you think housing developers are ready to allocate low cost houses to purchasers directly?
Q10: What is your opinion about the future of ORS in Malaysia?
Ex-Housing Developer 1
Q1: How long you worked with the developer and your last position in the company?
Q2: How is your experience dealing with the State government to obtained list of eligible buyers under ORS?
Q3: Why there are many buyers list to purchase low cost house in this project?
Q4: Is there any other channels to purchase low cost house in the State other than register with ORS?
Q5: Do you think ORS is effective for housing allocation in Selangor?
Q6: Do you think housing developers are ready to allocate low cost houses to purchasers directly?
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Low Cost House Buyer 14
Q1: When do you bought low cost house in Sri Damansara?
Q2: How do you got the opportunity to buy low cost house without need to register with the State government 
under ORS?
Q3: Eventually after buying the house do you still need to register with the State government?
Q4: How many low cost house units the agent offered you to buy?
Q5: What is your opinion about the current low cost housing registration and allocation system in the State? 
Q6: Do you think housing developers are ready to allocate low cost houses to purchasers directly?
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APPENDIX 2
Focus Group Interview Questions
Low Cost House Buyer (Sri Meranti Low Cost House Apartment)
Q1: What do you understand about low cost housing registration and allocation system in the State? 
Q2: How is your experience buying low cost house from Bandar Sri Damansara developer?
Q3: What are the problems do you faced during the registration stage?
Q4: What are the problems do you faced in the waiting list period?
Q5: How is your experience dealing with State government to register buying low cost house under 
ORS?
Q6: What type of assistance given by the State government in the low cost house buying process?
Q7: What type of assistance given by the housing developers during the registration and house 
buying process?
Q8: What is your view on the current low cost housing registration and allocation system?
Q9: Do you think housing developers are ready to allocate low cost houses to purchasers directly?
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APPENDIX 3
Approval Letter from Ministry of Housing and Local Government Malaysia to 
Conduct Study on ORS
BAHAGIAN PEMBANGUNAN DAN PENYELARASAN 
JABATAN PERUMAHAN NEGARA
KEMENTERIAN PERUMAHAN DAN KERAJAAN TEMPATAN
ARAS 6, BLOK K
PUSAT BANDAR DAMANSARA
50782 KUALA LUMPUR
Telefon : 03 2094 7033 
Telefon : 03 2099 2313 
03 2099 3095 
03 2099 3029 
Fax : 03 2096 2491 
www.kpktgov.my
Ruj. Tuan: 
Ruj. Kami: 
Tarikh:
( 3 7  )KPKT(S)06/980/12 Kit. 9 
|°| Mac 2008
En. Syafiee bin Shuid 
No. 22, Jalan AU 3/14 
Medan Sri Keramat 
54200 KUALA LUMPUR
Tuan,
PERMOHONAN UNTUK MENDAPATKAN KEBENARAN MEN JALAN KAN 
KAJIAN BERHUBUNG SISTEM PENDAFTARAN TERBUKA (SPT) 
BERKOMPUTER BAGI RUMAH KOS RENDAH D I MALAYSIA
Dengan segaia hormatnya saya diarah merujuk kepada perkara di atas 
dan surat tuan, bil. phd/001/08 bertarikh 3 Mac 2008 adalah berkaitan.
2. Adalah dimaklumkan bahawa Jabatan ini bersetuju untuk memberikan 
kebenaran kepada tuan untuk menjalankan kajian berhubung Sistem 
Pendaftaran Terbuka (SPT) Berkomputer Bagi Rumah Kos Rendah Di 
Malaysia.
Sekian, terima kasih.
"BERKHIDMAT UNTUK NEGARA"
"KEMPEN KITAR SEMULA -  FI KIR DULU SEBELUM BUANG'
Saya yang menurut perintah,
( FARMUKHAYAtT B IN TI JAAFAR)
Jabatan Perumahan Negara 
b.p. Ketua Setiausaha
Kementerian Perumahan dan Kerajaan Tempatan 
s.k.:
KP/JPN
(Sila catatkan rujukan kami apabila berhubung)
APPENDIX 4
Low Cost Housing Achievement by Public and Private Sector, 1971-2010
Malaysia Plan Public Sector Private Sector Total
Planned Completed % Planned Completed % Planned Completed %
2nd MP 
(1971-1975)
44,000 13,244 30 - - - 44,000 13,244 30
3rd MP 
(1976-1980)
73,500 26,250 36 - - - 73,500 26,250 36
4th MP 
(1981-1985)
176,500 71,300 40 90,000 19,170 21 266,500 90,470 34
5th MP 
(1986-1990)
398,570 201,900 51 370,400 88,877 39 768,970 290,777 38
6th MP 
(1991-1995)
126,800 46,497 37 217,000 214,889 99 343,800 261,386 76
7th MP 
(1996-2000)
60,000 60,999 102 140,000 129,598 93 200,000 190,597 89
8th MP 
(2001-2005)
175,000 81,108 46 39,000 94,029 241 214,000 175,137 82
9th MP 
(2006-2010)
85,000 - - 80,400 - - 165,400 - -
Total 1,139,370 501,298 48 856,400 936,800 64 2,076,170 1,047,861 55
Source: Five Years Malaysia Plan (various years)
Note: The official statistic for low cost housing in Malaysia only available after 1971 and data for private sector 
achievement in low cost housing provision only available after 1980.
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APPEND IX 5
Low Cost House Design Specifications
Elements Terrace Houses Flats
Floor Space 4S-60m: 45-56 m2
Bedroom
-minimum number 3
-minimum area of habitatle room
(i) First room 11.7 m2 11.7 m2
(ii) Second room 9.9 m2 9.9 m2
(in) Third room 7.2 m2 7.2 m2
Kitchen-minimum area 4.5 m2 4.5 m2
Living and dining rooms Provided as one combined space or Provided as one combined space or
separately with adequate area separately with adequate area
according to internal layout. according to internal layout.
Bathroom and toilet Provided separately with minimum Provided separately with minimum
area of 1.8 m2 each. area of 1.8 m2 each.
Storage space and porch Adequate provision for resident's Adequate provision for resident’s
comfort. convenience and comfort.
Drone area - Adequate provision for each unit.
(*) Launderette facilities
Sources: Ministry of Housing and Local Governm ent 2002 & CIDB 1998
Typical Design for High Rise Low Cost House
MJKTKXJRI
HOSJrnpl
(2+tamp)
BILIK TIOUR 2
■v (8.87 mp)
BRJK TKXJR 3
(841 mp)
Source: National Housing Departm ent, 2002
Typical Design for 5-Storey Walk-up Low Cost Apartment
OAPUR
PELAN UNIT TIP IKAL
Source: National Housing Departm ent, 2002
Typical Design for Terrace Low Cost House
Source: National Housing Departm ent, 2002
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APPENDIX 6
Sales and Purchase Agreement (Land and Building) -  Schedule G 
Housing Developers Act, 1966
THIRD SCHEDULE
(Clause 4(1))
SCHEDULE OF PAYMENT OF PURCHASE PRICE
Instalments Payable % Amount
1. Im m ediately upon die signing o f das Agreement 10 RM
2. W ithin twenty-one (21) working days after receipt by 
the Purchaser o f the Vendor's written notice o f the 
completion o f-
(a) the foundation and footing works o f the said 10 RM
(b) the reinforced concrete framework o f the said 15 RM
(c) the walls o f the said Building w ith door and 10 RM
window frames placed in position
(d) the roofing, electrical w iring, plumbing (without
fittings), gas piping ( if  any) and internal 10 RM
telephone trunking and cabling to the said
Building
(e) the internal and external plastering o f the said 10 RM
Building
(j) the sewerage works serving die said Building 5 RM
(g) the drains serving the said Building 5 RM
(h) the roads serving the said Building 5 RM
3. On the date he Purchaser takes vacant possession o f 12.5 RM  
the said Building, w ith water and electricity supply 
ready for connection
4. W ithin twenty-one (21) working days after receipt by 23 RM  
the Purchaser or die Purchaser’s solicitors o f the 
separate document o f tide to die said Lot together w ith a 
valid  and registrable Memorandum o f Transfer to the 
Purchaser duly executed by the Vendor or on the date 
the Purchaser takes vacant possession o f the said 
Building, whichever is later.
5. On the date die Purchaser takes vacant possession o f the 5 RM
said Building as in  item  3 and to be held by die Vendor’s 
solicitor as stakeholder for payment to die Vendor as 
follows>
(a) two point five per centum (2.5% ) at the expiry 
o f six (6) months after the date the Purchaser 
takes vacant possession o f die said Building;
(b) two point five per centum (2.5% ) at the expiry 
o f righ***" (18) months after the date the 
Purchaser takes vacant possession o f die said
RiiMmg
TOTAL 100 RM
298
Sales and Purchase Agreement (High rise) -  Schedule H 
Housing Developers Act, 1966
Instalments Payable % Amount
1. Immcdiatdy upon the sigpmg of 10 KM
this Agreement
2. Within twenty one (21) 
vvtddng_days after receipt by the 
Purchaser of the Vendor's 'written notice 
of die completion o£>
(a) Ac work bdow ground levd
including piling «nd fcm Alw i
of Ac sdd Bidding comprising 
die said Pared
10 KM
(*) Ac reinforecd concrete 
fiamcwodc and floor slab of 
Ac said Pared
15 KM
(c) die walls of Ae said Pared 
wiA door and window frames 
placed in position
10 KM
(A the roofing/ceiling, electrical 
■wiring, plumbing (without 
fittings), gas piping (if any)
«nd telephone trunking 
and cabling to Ae said
Pared
10 KM
(e) dlC mtamal and aalwnal
plastering o f the said Pared
10 KM
0 die sewerage works serving Ac 
said Building
5 KM
<i > the drains serving the said 
Budding
5 KM
W die roads serving the said 
Building
5 KM
Ota Ae date the Purchaser takes 12.5 KM
takes possession of the said Pared with 
water and electricity supply ready for 
connection to Ac said Pared
4. Within twe&ty^nc (21) working 
days after receipt by Ac Purchaser 
o f Ac written confirmation o f Ac 
Vendor’s submission to and acceptance 
by the Appropriate Authority
of the application for subdivision
of Ac said Bidding
5. On Ac date Ac Purchaser takes vacant 
possession of Ac said Pared as in item 3 and to 
be hdd by Ac Vendor’s solicitor
as stakeholder for payment to the 
Vendor as foflows>
(a) two point five per centum (2.5%) at the
expiry of six (6) monAs after 
the date Ae Purchaser takes vacant 
possession of Ac said Pared
(b) two point five per centum (2.5%) at Ae KM
expiry of eighteen (18) monAs 
after Ac date Ae Purchaser takes vacant 
possession of Ae said Pared
TOTAL 100 KM
2.5 KM
5 KM
Housing Development Process in Malaysia under Build-then-Sell System
,;;Uvji3Governtna
Own Land
Purchase of Land
^  ^LandAcquisitiorT^
State
Government
Land Office
Joint Venture 3
Technical
Departments
National Land Code, 1965 Land Owner
Land Acquisition Act, 1960 Developer
Strata Titles Act, 1985
Respective State Land 
Enactments & Rules
Ownership Transfer
Land Conversion
^nd^^algam^onjj
State
Government
Land Office
Technical
Departments
Financier (if loan 
required)
Land / Buildings 
Subdivision
Note:
Approval process will 
take 6 months to 2 
years
Note:
According to Federal 
Constitution, land is under 
state responsibility
—>  ~Plann|ng|Pemi^ionJj
2 biSG.iy AND
Sell then Built 
Concept or 
partial Sell then 
built concept
El A (if more than 50 ac.; ]
State
Government
Local Authority
Building Plan 3 TechnicalDepartments
Engineering Plans
Town and Country 
Planning Act. 1976
Environmental Quality Act. 
1974
Consultants 3
Developer 3
Earthwork Plan ]
Traffic Impact 1
Note:
Planning approval will 
take 6 months to 2 
years. Others will 
take 3-6 months.
Street, Drainage and 
Building Act, 1974
Technical
Departments
Uniform Building By-Laws, 
1984 Community (if required)
Built then
Sell Concept
Dwelo^^UceTOeJj Ministry of Housing 
& Local Government
Advertising Permit
License and Permit 
Renewal
Note:
Approval will take 2-6 
months. Developer to 
submit progress report 
every 6 months.
Housing Developers Act. 
1966 (Amendment 2002) 
and Regulations
Developer
Note:
License & permit required for 
every development phases.
Ministry
Financier
Housing Development 
Account
Housing Developers Act, 
1966 (Amendment 2002) 
and Regulations
Standardized Sales & 
Purchase Agreement
Note:
Purchaser to sign Sales & 
Purchase Agreement and to 
obtain financing (if required)
Developer
House Buyers
Financier
Solicitor
^  Clea^ing&EarthworkJ
^BuHd^gWorks j^
Housing Developers Act, 
1966 (Amendment 2002) 
and Regulations
Contractors
Consultants
Note:
Under Built then 
Sell Concept, selling start 
after house obtained CF
Utilities & Facilities
Road and Drainage
Notes:
1. Construction for landed 
properties max. 24 months 
& 36 months for high rise.
2. Progress billing to house 
buyers according to 
construction stages.
3
^Developers^J
House Buyers 3
Financier
6 CERTIFICATE 
OF FITNESS
^  Site Inspections jj Local Authority
Clearance Letter 
from Technical Dept
Technical
Departments
Street, Drainage and 
Building Act, 1974
Uniform Building By-Laws, 
1984
Form E Submission
Issuance of CF
Note:
Issuance of CF by local 
authority minimum 4 
weeks after submission 
of Form E
Local Authority
Technical Dept.
Developers
Consultants
Contractors
OVER 
&T$I P$RCHASE$
^^^and^erKeyT^j
Defect Liability 
Period (18 months)
Housing Developers Act, 
1966 (Amendment 2002) 
and Regulations
Developer
Contractor
House Buyers
Source: Adopted from  REHDA, 2008
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APPENDIX 7
ORS Main Criteria and Point System according to September 1997 Guideline
Main Criteria Point Main Criteria Point
1. Current Rental Burden (RM) 3. Status of Existing House
Formula = Household Income -  Existina Rental a) Owned Squatter house 50
No. of Dependent b) Rent Squatter house 45
0 - 20 100 c) Garage, store, hall, stall, etc. 40
21 - 40 95 d) Rental House (flat, terrace, quarters) 20
41 - 60 90 e) Temporary stay (parents or friend) 5
61 - 80 85 4. Marital Status
81 - 100 80 a) Widow with children 25
101 - 120 75 b) Single mother 20
121 - 140 70 c) Single father. 10
141 - 160 65 5. Occupation
161 - 180 60 a) Government servant 25
181 - 200 55 b) Private sector employee 20
201 - 220 50 c) Business/own occupation 20
221 - 240 45 d) Others 15
241 - 260 40 6. Disability
261 - 280 35 a) Blindness, physical disability 25
281 - 300 30 b) Deafness, dumbness, dwarf 10
301 - 320 25 c) Others 5
321 - 340 20 7. Other Dependents
341 - 360 15 a) Parents 25
361 - 380 10 b) Siblings/grandparents/niece 20
381 - 400 5 8. Monthly Household Income
401 and above 0 a) Less than RM500 0
2. Current Rental Burden (RM) b) RM500 to RM600 25
Formula = Household Income -  Existina Rental c) RM601 to RM750 10
No. of Dependent d) RM751 and above 0
0 - 20 60 9. Loss of Home
21 - 30 65 a) Relocation Order (illegal squatters) 10
31 - 40 70 b) Disaster (i.e. flood) total house damage 10
41 - 50 75 c) Other than above 5
51 - 60 80 10. Dependents (Children)
61 - 70 85 a) 1 person 2
71 - 80 90 b) 2 persons 4
81 - 90 95 c) 3 persons 6
91 - 100 100 d) 4 persons 8
101 - 110 100 e) 5 persons or more 10
111 - 120 95 11. Applicant Age
121 - 130 90 a) Below 21 years 0
131 - 140 85 b) 21 to 29 years 2
141 - 150 80 c) 30 to 40 years 5
151 - 160 75 d) 41 years and above 10
161 - 170 70 12. Place of Work
171 - 180 65 a) Within 5 km from the project 10
181 - 190 60 b) Within 10 km from the project 6
191 - 200 55 c) Within 15 km from the project 2
201 - 210 50 d) More than 15 km from the project 0
211 - 220 45 13. . Length of Stay in Current Address
221 - 230 40 a) More than 10 years 10
231 - 240 35 b) 8 to 9 years 8
241 - 250 30 c) 6 to 7 years 6
251 - 260 25 d) 4 to 5 years 4
261 - 270 20 e) 2 to 3 years 2
271 - 280 15 f) Less than 2 years 0
281 - 290 10 14. Place of Birth
291 - 300 5 a) Within the state applied 10
301 and above 0 b) Outside the state applied 0
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APPENDIX 8
ORS Main Criteria and Point System according to April 1998 Guideline
Main Criteria Point Main Criteria Point
1. Loss of Home 8. Other Dependents
a) Relocation Order (illegal squatters) 100 a) Parents 10
b) Disaster (flood) total house damage 100 b) Siblings/grandparents/niece 5
c) Other than above 50
d) Not relevant 0 9. Applicant Age
a) Below 21 years 0
2. Monthly Household Income b) 21 to 29 years 2
a) Less than RM500 0 c) 30 to 40 years 5
b) RM500 to RM600 25 d) 41 years and above 10
C) RM601 to RM750 50
d) RM751 and above 0 10. Place of Work
a) Within 5 km from the project 10
3. Status of Existing House b) Within 10 km from the project 6
a) Rent 30 c) Within 15 km from the project 2
b) Illegal Squatter 50 d) More than 15 km from the project 0
c) Staff Quarters by Employer 20
e) Temporary stay (parents or friend house) 0 11. Length of Stay in Current Address
f) Owned house 0 a) More than 10 years 10
b) 8 to 9 years 8
4. Marital Status c) 6 to 7 years 6
a) Married 15 d) 4 to 5 years 4
b) Widow/Single mother/Single Father 25 e) 2 to 3 years 2
c) Single 5 f) Less than 2 years 0
5. Occupation 12. Place of Birth
a) Government servant 25 a) Within the state applied 10
b) Private sector employee 15 b) Outside the state applied 0
c) Business/own occupation 15
d) Others 10
6. Dependents (Children)
a) 1 person 5
b) 2 persons 10
c) 3 persons 15
d) 4 persons 20
e) 5 persons or more 25
7. Disability
a) Blindness, physical disability (unable to walk)
Deafness, dumbness, dwarf 10
b) None 0
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APPENDIX 9
ORS Main Criteria and Point System according to April 2006 Guideline
Criteria Point Criteria Point
1. Monthly Income 8. House Status
a) Less than RM1,500 26 a) Illegal Squatters/temporary stay 4
b) RM1.5001 to RM2.000 15 b) Rental 3
c) RM2001 to RM2.500 10 c) Quarters 2
d) More than RM2.500 5 d) Own house (other than squatters) 1
2. Existing Place of Living 9. Occupation
a) Metropolitan City 4 a) Government 2
b) City 3 b) Government Pensioner 2
c) Major Town 2 c) Own business (hawkers, etc.) 1
d) Small Town 1 d) Private companies 1
e) Rural Area 0 e) Jobless 0
f) Others 0
3. Dependants (No. o f Child/Adopted Child)
a) 1 5 10. Registration Duration
b) 2 10 a) 3 years and more 2
c) 3 15 b) Less than 3 years 1
d) 4 and above 20
e) Siblings/Parents/Grandparents/ 10 11. Ex-police or Army
Parents in-laws/ Nephews a) Yes 2
b) No 0
4. Applicant’s Age
a) 18 to 25 years 5 12. Disable Spouse
b) 26 to 45 years 10 a) Yes 2
c) 46 to 56 years 8 b) No 0
d) More than 56 years 5
13. Disable Child
5. Marital Status a) Yes 2
a) Single Mother/Father (with child) 6 b) No 0
b) Married 3
c) Single 2
6. Disability Status
a) High level (physical/blindness) 5
b) Medium level (deafness/dumb) 3
c) Low level 2
7. Health Status
a) High level 4
b) Medium level 3
c) Low level 2
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APPENDIX 10
Institutional Framework for ORS Implementation
Pulau Pinang
Kedah
Trengganu
Selangor
Perlis
Kuala Lumpur
Perak
Kelantan
Melaka
Pahang
Johor
Sabah
National Housing Department
Ministry of Housing and Local 
Government Malaysia
P. Pinang State Secretary Office, Housing Section
Kelantan State Secretary Office, Housing Section
Perlis State Secretary Office, Housing Section
Kedah State Secretary Office, Housing Section
Kuala Lumpur City Hall, Housing Section
Selangor Housing and Property Board
Perak State Secretary Office, Housing Section
P. Pinang State Secretary Office, Housing Section
Trengganu State Secretary Office, Housing Section
Pahang State Secretary Office, Housing Section
Melaka Housing Board
Ministry of Local Government & Housing Sabah
FEDERAL LEVEL
STATE LEVEL
